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HEREDITY AND OPPORTUNITY

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I. EUGENICS AND THE OBSCURE

A very spirited controversy over the relative influence of "nature and nurture" has raged through the writings of bio-sociologists and sociologists of the ordinary sort for so long a time that the prospect of contributing even an armful of brush to the illumination of this problem seems rather slight. There are, however, few matters of greater popular interest, and I think we may say of greater importance from the standpoint of the education of youth, than the attempt to trace the causes by which the notably successful, the notoriously unsuccessful, and the innumerable obscure come to their respective states.

The orthodox biological view regarding these matters has, it should be noted, undergone a remarkable change. The older environmentalism has declined and in its place has arisen the present cult of heredity with such pessimistic implications interwoven as the degree of eugenic fervor of a given writer may lead him to venture upon. A simple statement of how this change has come about may be in place.

The Lamarckian doctrine of use and disuse, promulgated some hundred years ago, served an earlier day as a theoretical

foundation for education. If use and habit could account for the evolution of organic differences in the animal world, how clear the inference that *human* progress likewise must flow from a training which, persisted in generation after generation, yields cumulative powers and aptitudes of the greatest advantage to posterity. There are still many individuals who receive the statement that no amount of musical, mathematical, legal, or other special training on the part of parents will improve the offspring one iota with a lingering incredulity. But the biologists gave and the biologists have taken away this illusory hope of a training which shall be cumulative. Weissmann and his school began their assaults upon this comfortable doctrine in the eighties of the last century, and today little or nothing of it remains.¹

It should be clear that this earlier, pre-Darwinian conception of the effects of use and disuse laid a much greater emphasis upon environment, including training or education, than it did upon heredity, and through all the long campaign by which the Darwinian doctrine of natural selection won its way in the world of science, this supremacy of the environment was not seriously threatened. It was in fact, variability and selection, not heredity, upon which the emphasis was laid; the latter was taken more or less for granted. The variable organism in the face of a portentous environment was turned now to death, now to life, with a constant survival of individuals fit to do business under existing conditions.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the general conception of organic evolution clarified by Darwin's great work, and including the idea of the struggle for existence, was eagerly appropriated by the sciences of human society. History, jurisprudence, political economy, and ethics all underwent considerable modifications

¹ "If we make a jack-o-lantern out of a pumpkin and afterwards plant the seeds, we do not expect a crop of jack-o-lanterns. Repeat the cutting and plant the seeds through fifty generations of pumpkins; not a jack-o-lantern will be grown. The inheritance is from the seed, not from the pumpkin.

"The human seed is equally unaffected by externals which do not damage the germ itself. Life's experiences must be impressed anew upon every generation as it comes along, and a thousand years of external impressions will not add or subtract or improve or corrupt one hereditary characteristic in the germ plasm."—Seth K. Humphrey, *Mankind*, p. 12.

in viewpoint and method. And of sociology it may be said that it has been extravagant in its professions of indebtedness to biology.

Many absurdities in social theory have masqueraded in the borrowed trappings of biological conceptions. The so-called biological analogy is a case in point. Much more pernicious was the attempt to base an ethics of rapacity and greed upon what was ignorantly called social Darwinism. It was apparently overlooked by some of those who glorified the struggle for existence that a genuine re-enactment of Nature's plan, far from confirming satisfied classes in their hereditary possessions and privileges, would cancel at a stroke all of the rules of civilized competition, overthrow private property and stable matrimony (for neither may be said to be precisely natural in a biological sense), and bring back Chaos and old Night. The world has seen much of such ruthlessness of late in the course of the world-war and its revolutionary sequels, but considering the world at large, there appears to be little disposition to identify the primitive with the admirable, or to regard the rule of brute force as adequate to the ethical requirements of civilization.

The work of Darwin will continue for many decades to mark epochs in the history of biology. Since the publication of his *Origin of Species* in 1859, the most important development has been the gradual emergence of a doctrine of inheritance, and during the past dozen years certainly no influence has swept over the field of social thinking comparable with the idea of heredity. As early as 1865, in advance of the recent researches in genetics, Francis Galton, the distinguished founder of eugenics, published two articles on "Hereditary Talent and Character." His *Hereditary Genius* appeared in 1869, to be followed by a long list of publications in support of the general thesis that man deserves more careful breeding.

The work of Weismann, whose *Germplasm* was published in 1885, has led at length to the almost complete overthrow of the doctrine of the inheritance of traits acquired by the individual through training or experience and has focused attention upon a new and fascinating problem—the mechanism of heredity. In

1900 the rediscovery of the lost investigations of the Austrian abbot, Gregor Mendel, now acclaimed founder of the modern science of heredity, once more drew attention to the fact that a very important body of biological knowledge was in process of formulation.

Much obscurity still envelopes the entire subject of the inheritance of mental traits which appear so complicated that only the long-continued efforts of psychologists, as well as geneticists, will avail to discover the unit characters which lie at the base of individual human nature. Without waiting for re-enforcements from that quarter, however, the eugenic army has already taken the field, planting its standards at every point of vantage, and issuing proclamations to the inhabitants of the land somewhat in this tenor:

WHEREAS, In the course of social evolution, defective and subnormal individuals, whom Nature never intended to spare, are being harbored in large numbers under the doubtful auspices of organized charity, city hospitals, almshouses, and orphanages, and

WHEREAS, The conspicuously able and successful classes of the population are conspicuous also for the fewness of their offspring while the obscure multiply exceedingly,

Therefore be it incorporated in the articles of religion, and in morals and law that the defective and inferior stocks shall by surgery, segregation, and sentiment be estopped from such excessive fertility, and the capable and successful shall be enjoined to marry prudently and to bring forth offspring with great fecundity.

So say the eugenists in chorus and a modern Cassandra arising among them represents even the remotest country districts as in process of being denuded of all exceptional ability by the inevitable lure of ambition.

City, college, factory, business, are within a day's journey of all but a few. No superior man, restless in his too meagre surroundings, is beyond hearing of the call to self-development; then why stick to the slow business of race development? The weak brother remains behind to multiply, while the strong rises to a position of greater usefulness and comparative infertility. No sooner does inborn capacity show itself in the remotest corner than it is whisked away to "make good."¹

¹ Seth K. Humphrey, *Mankind*, p. 91.

In general it may be said that there is little or no difference of opinion as to the desirability of restraining the multiplication of individuals with serious transmissible defects of mind and body. Here and there a voice has been raised in protest. One writer, Gertrude E. Hall, in *Survey*, October 6, 1917, has even represented the feeble-minded as turning upon the hurried, overworking, overworrying, "normal" individual with the assertion that the steady nerves and childlike mind of the moron may yet be needed to cool the fever in the blood of a race consuming itself in frenzied neurasthenic competition for place and power. This, of course, is far from orthodox and may even have been offered in the spirit of a remark which has been attributed, I think, to Cromwell when addressing a group of theologians, he said in effect: "I beseech you brethren in the bowels of the Lord that you consider the possibility that you may be mistaken." Science, we ought to remind ourselves, has its dogmatisms as well as theology, although, fortunately for the truth, they die much younger, for it is of the nature of science to foster a high infant mortality among ideas.

It is not defectives alone, however, who raise apprehension in the breasts of the bio-sociologists. The whole undistinguished mass of the lowly and obscure are also under suspicion. They also threaten racial values, for they are more fertile than the sophisticated and successful, and they will in time people the earth with a race of uniform mediocrity. Two contentions are here involved: one relates to the assumed racial inferiority of the obscure and the other to their disproportionate rate of increase. As to the latter point it should be noted that another generation or so will most probably see universal old-age pensions in some form, the effect of which will be to undermine the traditional idea that children must be numerous in order to provide parents with adequate insurance against old age. This will weaken one of the sentimental supports of large families among the lowly. Another change which is probably impending is the more and more general acceptance of some form of reasoned limitation of the size of families. If our racial integrity, therefore, can be maintained for a generation or two longer, some of the fears

obsessing the biological well-wishers of humanity at the opening of the twentieth century may prove groundless.

The previous question remains for discussion. It concerns the inferiority of the obscure as compared with the conspicuously successful. The matter might be stated thus: To what extent is the arrangement of society in stratified social classes—an arrangement once held to be as fundamental as the stratifications of the old red sandstone itself—to what extent are social stratifications based upon personal merit? The commonest assumption is that the official, professional, and successful mercantile elements in any population constitute a sort of *élite*, distinguished from the underlying layers of the population by superior capacity. It is a fair inference that when men run a race, those who arrive first at the goal are the best runners, and at first glance there may appear to be small question that a classification of the population according to eminence is roughly accurate as a classification of abilities.

Without prejudicing the inquiry which is to follow, this much may safely be asserted at once: If an entire population is educated to the limit of its varying abilities and all individuals are encouraged and enabled to aspire to any congenial task or position not denied by limitations of personal ability, then a near approximation to the conditions of the foot race would be realized. Such a society would be not unlike Plato's Republic, where the eminent are also the wisest and the best. On the other hand, in a population stratified into non-intermarrying castes, which coincide with privileged or handicapped political and economic classes, there is the minimum approach to the conditions of a foot race, and in such a society obscurity and eminence may have little relation to intrinsic personal abilities. The purpose of this paper is to examine the actual conditions of individual achievement in our own time and nation.

Two further truths, which need scarcely more than statement, should be set forth. First, men everywhere and always are found to differ greatly from individual to individual; it is not, however, merely that they are obviously unequal in respect to every human

quality, but each personality is *unique*, in literal fact the only one of the precise kind ever struck off in the fortuitous commingling of innumerable germinal cells of innumerable ancestors. "Every living being," says a leading biologist, "appears on careful examination to be the first and last of its identical kind."¹

The second truth is less generally recognized; it is that inferior groups, so called, usually turn out to have been disadvantaged groups, and conversely, superior groups, so called, usually turn out to have had superior advantages. One obvious exception to this rule consists of inferior groups whose character is the result of some selective factor, e.g., a class of repeaters in a graded school or possibly a group of paupers in an almshouse. When, however, selection of the membership of groups is largely accidental, it is rash to assume any intrinsic inferiority in one group as compared with another.

Before entering upon an analysis of the conditions determining personal achievement, some interest may be lent to the inquiry by adverting briefly to several groups once viewed as inferior, but latterly regarded more and more as differing in cross-section but slightly from the general population. These groups are women, non-European races, decadent communities and criminals. I shall discuss them briefly in inverse order.

It was not many years ago that criminologists were describing the multitudinous abnormalities of the *criminal type of man*, and even today the idea is still current that between the normal man and the criminal, Nature herself has interposed a great gulf. If we make exception of mental defectives, who naturally find it difficult if not impossible to conform to a society in which they ought never to be left at large, nothing could be farther from the truth. The painstaking statistical researches of Dr. Goring, the great-hearted intuitions of Osborne, the shrewd observations of Dr. Devon, and the testimony of a multitude of other competent students confirm the view that criminals, in so far as they are not mere imbeciles who never should have been born, much less left at large, are surprisingly like the rest of us. Dr. Devon, to

¹ Conklin, *Heredity and Environment*, p. 213.

call only one witness after long experience in His Majesty's prison at Glasgow, writes:¹

For sixteen years I have been looking for the offender of the books and I have not met him. The offender familiar to me is not a type, but a man or a woman and we shall never know nor deserve to know him till we are content to study him, not as a naturalist studies a beetle, but as a man studies his neighbor.

To say that as wolves breed wolves, criminals breed criminals is nonsense and mischievous nonsense. As canaries breed canaries, do poets breed poets?

Criminals are men and women who have gone wrong, not necessarily because of the possession of certain powers which they have inherited, but because these powers have been used in a wrong direction. They come from all classes and there is nothing to show that if their children were taken from them early in life and brought up in favorable surroundings they would take to crime, but there is an abundance of evidence on the other side.

A second social group frequently diagnosed as essentially inferior to other groups is the population of decadent rural communities such as may be found in abundance in northern New England. The writer has elsewhere pointed out:

In appraising communities, as in judging individuals, there is grave danger of imputing more to racial deterioration than the facts warrant. Not long since some of our social investigators were for pronouncing from a third to a half of our juvenile delinquents feeble-minded. But the influence of physical defect and of an untoward social environment is coming to be better understood and the emphasis is accordingly being corrected. Is it not probable that the trouble with backward communities is less germinal than psychic, and the remedies called for not merely eugenic, but the application in particular of an economic and psychic tonic?

A sort of moral and civic paralysis follows upon habituation to failure, and these communities, having seen themselves lose population and prestige for half a century or more, pass through the stage of self-pity to one of "reconciliation" and complete indifference. Proponents of new ways are met by a universal skepticism and are overborne by the recital of similar attempts which failed in the eighties or nineties. In short, such communities are obsessed by the fixed idea "It's no use." A farmer and his family living today on a New England farm may be racially as fit as the people who first put plow-share to sod in that region, and they may live 100 per cent more comfortably than the pioneers who preceded them, and yet be marked, and their whole community with them, with the mental stigmata of defeat. In

¹ See *The Criminal and the Community*, pp. 19, 48.

other words, a perfectly good region inhabited by perfectly good people may become discouraged, despondent, decadent, owing to nothing more serious than the inheritance of obsolete traditions of agriculture and of social relationships, and to discouragement due to a long continued shrinkage of population.

But just as a discouraged and morally decadent individual may come back to life and to achievement through a personal crisis of some sort—the kindling of a new friendship, religious conversion, or the breaking out of war—so a rural community which is given over to reminiscence and lethargy may, by a proper adjustment of its economic life and a proper stimulus to its civic imagination, begin once more to function with as much exhilaration as the very immigrants and pioneers themselves.¹

A third group or series of groups heretofore adjudged our inferiors consists of the primitive peoples and indeed of nearly all of the non-Aryan races. The naïve assumptions of ancient chosen peoples who represented themselves as fertile oases in a human desert of Gentiles, barbarians, and savages, find their counterpart in our time in the orthodox dogma regarding the negro, the views of but a few years ago regarding Mongolians, and the amusing assertions of racial superiority put forth by half the races of Europe, not only in behalf of their common Aryan stock, but of the particular blends of that stock which each associates with its own territory, flag, or mother-tongue.

A recent writer puts the matter thus:

Cultured man has always regarded primitive man as inferior. Europeans have always assumed that the white race was endowed by nature with a superior order of intelligence. This commonly accepted explanation, however, fails to explain. The assumption of superior mental capacity on the part of the white man rests upon the tacit assumption that those peoples are superior which are most advanced in civilization.

It is necessary to distinguish between the possibilities inherent in a people and their actual attainments.

. . . the consensus of scholarly opinion at the present time seems to be to regard the backward races, not only as not having been proven to be inferior in mental ability, but as being, in so far at least as their inherited mental capacity is concerned, substantially equal to the culture races. . . .

Boaz . . . holds that the differences in civilization are essentially a matter of time and are sufficiently explained by the laws of chance and the general course of historical events.

¹ *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, 1916, pp. 72-73.

Thomas would seem to find the fundamental explanation of the difference in the mental life of two groups is that the run of attention has been along different lines and in the emergence at fortunate intervals of great personalities. "The most significant fact for Aryan development is the emergence among the Greeks of a number of eminent men who developed logic, the experimental method, and philosophic interest, and fixed in their group the habit of looking behind the incident for the general law." . . . It would be a simple matter to multiply authorities who hold that in inherent capacity there is an essential mental equality among races and that whatever differences are manifested are explainable solely on the grounds of unequal opportunity.¹

This view is held not wholly without dissent, of course, but it is very significant that, whereas formerly it could hardly have received a hearing, it now commands the support of a preponderant weight of scholarly opinion.

A final analogy may be sought in the case of women. The dogma of female inferiority, venerable as history itself, is in process of dissipation before our eyes. Like the illusions of a striking and typical difference marking off lawbreakers from law keepers, decadent from vigorous communities, or white from darker-hued races, this illusion is also turning out to have arisen from fixing the attention exclusively on superficial differences which disguise the fundamental human identities lying much nearer to the core of reality.

These examples lead one to inquire whether the obscure, from whom the eugenists anticipate so numerous and dreadful a progeny, are in reality so inferior in endowment to the much lamented low-birth-rate classes, variously eulogized in the persons of officials, business men, teachers, professional men, and college graduates.

Donald Hankey writes in *A Student in Arms*,

One sees men as God sees them, apart from externals such as manner and intonation. A night in a bombing party shows you Jim Smith as a man of splendid courage. A shortage of rations reveals his wonderful unselfishness. One danger and discomfort after another you share in common till you love him as a brother. Out there, if anyone dared to remind you that Jim was only a fireman while you were a bank clerk, you would give him one in the eye to go on with. You have learned to know a man when you see one and to value him.

¹ E. B. Reuter, "The Superiority of the Mulatto," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1917, pp. 87-88, 92-93.

War and science are alike in this that each makes necessary a constant revision of values.

These preliminaries completed, we stand on the threshold of a great problem—that of the factors *which condition human achievement*. It is necessary first to separate so far as possible the hereditary elements from the environmental and then to disentangle a few of the strands which lose themselves in the confused factor of environment.

The following topics will accordingly be discussed in subsequent sections: II. Heredity and Achievement; III. The Family Environment; IV. The Social Level of Opportunity; V. Social Situations and Psychical Tone; VI. The Social Verdict.

II. HEREDITY AND ACHIEVEMENT

By the hereditary factor in achievement is meant the original capital with which the individual begins his trading with life some nine months before he is born. It consists as a matter of fact of a single cell.

Although relatively undifferentiated in structure, the germ cells are so marvelously organized that in the compass of less than one-hundredth of an inch, the human oöspERM contains the determining elements of all the physical and mental traits of the prospective individual. In so small a boat, or, as it has been well put, "across so narrow a bridge," is all the possible glory and beauty of life borne to us. Professor Walter, in his *Genetics*, well remarks, "the wonder grows that so small a bridge can stand such an enormous traffic."¹

Whatever is implicit in this single cell constitutes for the forthcoming individual, *heredity*; whatever befalls that cell or any of its daughter-cells in the next nine months and seventy years is environment.

It has already been remarked that individuals are not only unequal in their hereditary endowment but that each is also unique in regard to it. One interesting qualification ought to be made at this point. In the human species about one birth in a hundred consists of twins and about one pair of twins in six is produced from a single fertilized egg cell. Such twins are called uniovular, identical, or duplicate twins. As Professor Smith,

¹ Erville B. Woods, "The Subnormal Child," *Educational Review*, December, 1915, p. 481.

writing in *Science*, points out, "in duplicate twins Nature tries for us the important experiment of making two individuals out of the same germ plasm." Such twins are always of the same sex, and apparently of precisely the same germinal constitution. It is as if two vessels were built from a single set of blueprints, for in the germ plasm are written the specifications of every organ, tendency, and characteristic of the prospective individual. According to the writer just mentioned, a study of the palm and sole markings of such identical twins affords a clue to the extent to which Nature lays down in the germ plasm the specifications of future growth.

Since, by a comparison of the prints, it may be seen that the resemblance is confined to the general pattern while there is no especial resemblance in the individual ridges (Galton's "Minutiae"), we arrive at what may be called the limit of germinal control, i.e., the point where the directive force felt in the development ceases to act, leaving further details to other forces.¹

Heredity apparently draws the outline whether of a starfish or of a man, specifies in a general way the bodily pattern, the architecture of the various organs, the type of reactions with which they are to respond to the environment and the various phases of their neural and psychical dispositions. But beyond this point Nature leaves a bit of discretion, so to speak, to the exigencies of experience itself, to those byplays of competing stimulations eternally beating in upon us which we humor ourselves by calling the freedom of the will.

From quite another field confirmatory evidence is adduced in support of this view of the limits of hereditary determination. I quote from Robert H. Gault:²

. . . the disposition today among those who have given most attention to the experimental study of the question [i.e., of instinct] among lower animals is that there are but few instincts, properly speaking, and that these are less specific than generalized. They are natural dispositions that determine *within wide limits* what habits we shall develop, assuming that circumstances are favorable.

"Even the singing of birds is a highly modifiable instinct, or, as I prefer to believe, a complex habit built upon a generalized

¹ *Science*, XXVII, 451.

² "Psychology in Social Relations," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXII, 737 ff.

instinctive basis." A "crucial experiment" in this connection was that of Conradi, "who undertook to put a group of English sparrows to school. Canaries were elected to serve as school-masters. The sparrows were reared in the same room with the canaries severely isolated from others of their kind. The regular sparrow chirp developed at the proper time, but the birds soon lost that expression and assumed the peep that is characteristic of the young canary." Even a moderately successful imitation of the canary's song appeared in time. "Observations of this sort go far to justify the hypothesis that all our instincts are undefined motives and that what appears to be specializations are habits resting upon an instinctive basis—habits that are developed by repeated responses to environmental stimuli."

From such considerations one may appreciate that the marvelous predeterminations which constitute heredity are no more marvelous than the almost indefinite flexibility of life in the presence of its world. Whatever a man's heredity, *it always bears a contingent character*—life and conduct should be talked of in terms of tendency, *never in terms of rigid inevitability*.

Inasmuch as this is a study primarily of the social environment, it would lead too far afield to attempt any extended analysis of the part played in achievement by specific inherited qualities. It is probable that certain conspicuous traits serve among primitive as well as civilized peoples, to mark a man off for distinction and usually for leadership. Professor Hutton Webster in a paper read before the American Sociological Society in 1917, after sketching a number of biographies of men eminent in the annals of primitive peoples, concludes that "strength of body and strength of will, unusual intelligence, a persuasive tongue, great energy, ambition, and force of character are the personal traits which raise a man above his fellows and constitute the leader." It would not be difficult to prove that the leaders of civilized peoples, not only in political life, but the great executives of the business world are very often notable for their physical endurance and, as Gowin has shown statistically, are of greater physical bulk than men in subordinate positions. Strength of will, particularly in the form of pertinacity, unusual intelligence, including a highly

developed sense of economic values and an incisive freshness of view which approaches eccentricity, a persuasive tongue, great energy and initiative, ambition, highly developed public-mindedness, and force of character which sums up many virtues, are all of great importance in accounting for achievement on the hereditary side among civilized races.

The insoluble problem of how much influence shall be attributed to the hereditary elements in achievement as compared with the elements due to environment need not long detain us. It is as futile as the equally intelligent inquiry into the relative importance of having eggs laid and having them hatched. Both processes are quite indispensable to the continuation of the race of hens. Much has been said with reference to the claims on the part of mother and foster-mother respectively to the finally emergent chick, but science has not been enriched by either of these inquiries. Heredity signifies as a matter of fact a determinate mode of development and of behavior; development is possible for the organism only by the exchange of substance with a material environment and behavior is possible only in the presence of stimuli originating in an environment. Environment is equally without significance unless there be first the vital and sensitive organism with all its unfolding and reacting implicit within it.

There are, of course, considerable differences in individuals in regard to spontaneity or passivity in the presence of their environment. Some appear to meet life more than halfway; others, like General Grant, require a volcano or a military cataclysm to wake them up. I cannot refrain from quoting from two letters which Mark Twain wrote to his wife in 1879 from Chicago where he was attending a "reunion of the great commanders" of the Civil War.¹

What an iron man Grant is! He sat facing the house, with his right leg crossed over his left and his right boot-sole tilted up at an angle, and his left hand and arm reposing on the arm of his chair—you note that position? Well, when glowing references were made to other grandees on the stage, those grandees always showed a trifle of nervous consciousness, and as these

¹ Mark Twain's *Letters*, edited by Albert Bigelow Paine, I, 368-69 and 372.

references came frequently, the nervous change of position and attitude were also frequent. But Grant! he was under a tremendous and ceaseless bombardment of praise and gratulation, but as true as I'm sitting here he never moved a muscle of his body for a single instant during the thirty minutes! You could have played him on a stranger for an effigy. . . .

At two o'clock in the morning Mark Twain himself, having been placed last on the program to "hold the crowd" rose to deliver the fifteenth speech of the evening. I quote from the second letter:

And do you know, General Grant sat through fourteen speeches like a graven image, but I fetched him! I broke him up utterly! He told me he laughed till the tears came and every bone in his body ached. (And do you know the biggest part of the success of the speech lay in the fact that the audience *saw* that for once in his life he had been knocked out of his iron serenity.)

The author of these letters is not noted for the historicity of his episodes, but his comment upon Grant in these intimate letters to his wife appears consistent with what we know of a man who was sinking visibly into pitiful failure in the midst of a peaceful and civilized environment, but whom the thunders of war incited to a great and masterful leadership.

This difference between the spontaneous and the passive type is clearly stated by Galton in *Noteworthy Families*:¹

The force that impels toward noteworthy deeds is an innate disposition in some men, depending less on circumstances than in others. They are like ships which carry an auxiliary steam power, capable of moving in a dead calm and against adverse winds. Others are like the ordinary sailing ships of the present day—they are stationary in a calm, but can make some way towards their destination under almost any wind. Without a stimulus these men are idle, but almost any kind of stimulus suffices to set them in action. Others, again, are like Arab dhows, that do little more than drift before the monsoon or other wind; but then they can go fast.

Another characteristic of hereditary excellence which should be noted is the extreme delicacy of the accidental combinations of as yet largely unknown unit characters, which go to make up the individual endowment of geniuses and persons of great talent. Although they get nothing from Nature except by way of descent

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. xxi.

from their parents and their parents' parents, yet the virtues residing in them are in the nature after all of a throw of the dice or a momentary posture of the k  leidoscope, not likely to be ever repeated.

Galton himself ventures the opinion that "the highest order of mind results from a fortuitous mixture of incongruous constituents,"¹ and is therefore "unstable in heredity." He cites as illustration the artistic temperament with its commingling of Bohemianism, passion, and lack of "regularity, foresight and level common sense."

Havelock Ellis in his *Study of British Genius*² notes that fifty-seven of the eminent men in his list were the sons of more or less reprehensible fathers, who transmitted to their distinguished offspring nothing better perhaps than "an inaptness to follow the beaten tracks of life." He thinks also that "a certain degree of inoffensive eccentricity . . . seems to be not very uncommon among the fathers of men of eminent ability, and perhaps furnishes a transmissible temperament from which genius may develope." It would appear in short that while men of achievement nearly always have one or more parents or ancestors who were out of the ordinary, in many cases an exact knowledge of their peculiarities might not throw very much light upon the accomplishments of their offspring.

A final remark should be made upon the peculiar difficulties which surround the inheritance of mental traits. While physical characteristics are capable of direct observation, mental differences must be ascertained for the most part by means of *inference*. An individual either has or has not blue eyes, black hair, average stature, sound lungs, etc. The facts are easily ascertained. But when we come to the mental differences which are the most significant from the standpoint of future achievement, we find that few conclusions can be based upon direct observation, or exact measurements. To be sure with such simple things as memory type, and the various reaction times with which the practicing psychologist has familiarized us, a fair approximation to definitive results may be looked for, but in regard to the higher

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. xv.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 104.

complexes of motives which drive men far in the race of life or leave them early stranded by the way, or plodding at snail's pace where others fly, these are matters upon which neither the science of inheritance nor the psychological laboratory are likely to throw much prophetic light.

As Dr. Bronner points out in *Psychology of Special Abilities and Disabilities*:¹

It is quite doubtful if tests will ever offer an effective means of studying these complex aspects of mentality [the emotional side of life]. The situations which in real life call the emotions into play are not easily duplicated in the laboratory, and artificial stimuli for arousing them necessarily would result in totally different reactions. How can one study experimentally love and hate as they affect behavior? Or what can tests reveal concerning the formation and results of anti-social grudges?

A man's destination in life depends upon much else than his hereditary equipment; it depends upon an environment so complicated and so pregnant with potential stimulations that science has as yet hardly begun a survey of either its limits or its processes. All estimates of ability are inferences from performance or behavior of some sort and are liable to error from two principal sources; first, those stimuli which have acted to produce past achievement as, e.g., in the classroom or on the athletic field, may not be effectively reproduced in the counting-room, the clinic, or wherever the scene of the individual's life-work may be laid; second, the judgment passed upon many an individual may well be unfavorable because that individual has not been incited to his own characteristic type of performance by any appropriate stimulus in his narrow environment. Even college does not in the least arouse some natures of very unusual force and ability; ex-President Roosevelt is a case in point.

Before leaving the question of the significance of the hereditary factor, some notice should be taken of an extraordinary corollary which sometimes accompanies the extensive claims made on behalf of this factor. I refer to *natural selection* now thought to be so incapacitated by the assaults of modern humanitarianism as to be quite powerless to hold the race back in its headlong plunge

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

toward deterioration. Only a few years ago, Dr. Charles B. Davenport, director of the Station for Experimental Evolution of the Carnegie Institute, ventured to refer to the "beneficent agent of extensive infant mortality" and that in a paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Association for Study and Prevention of Infant Mortality!¹ Let us take time to look into the workings of this "beneficent agent." If an artisan has seven children and three of them die of enteritis, meningitis, pneumonia, or what-not, it is assumed that the four who remain will fare better than the three who were taken in regard to physical and mental traits. What appears difficult to understand is the precise connection which is assumed to exist between these traits and such selective agents as tubercle bacilli, pneumococci, and other organisms held in such warm esteem by some eugenists. However highly endowed by the Creator (or perhaps we had better say by some of his spokesmen) these wise little germs may be, can we after all feel certain that they are always able to tell a stupid baby from a gifted one, or even, granted that they can distinguish at a glance between the dull and the bright, can we be confident that they are so perfect in goodness as to invariably turn away from the little prospective success to bury their fangs in the little prospective failure? There are those who have even doubted the goodness and wisdom of God; why then should we be asked to venture upon the worship of bugs?

Perhaps the only thing which may really be asserted with any confidence is this: The individuals which are spared by a given type of infection are possibly by nature more resistant to that specific infection than are the individuals who succumb, but this difference is probably slight. Now in what other respects do these selected survivors differ from the rest of the population? Are they better, wiser, firmer, more resourceful, more appreciative, or more spiritual? So far as yet appears, they excel solely in their ability to meet one kind of contingency in life and one only, viz.: infection by a specific micro-organism. In thousands of other contingencies that sift and test human ability, contingencies of vastly greater significance for bringing out those differences in men which count for human achievement, they show no special

¹ *Transactions*, 1913, p. 135.

excellence. All we can say for a high resistance to smallpox, for example, is that it formerly made the individual a somewhat better life-risk in an actuarial sense in a community exposed to ravages of that disease; a group of negro women and girls were commended, in the advertisement of an old slave sale, as "especially likely" in that they had all had smallpox. But just as soon as infection of a given sort can be controlled by immunization or other prophylactic measures, the differences of resistance become negligible. Smallpox, typhoid, rabies, cholera, plague, tetanus, and diphtheria are all proving increasingly susceptible of control by means of a prophylactic inoculation, while yellow fever, malaria, hookworm disease, and other maladies yield readily to public and private hygiene. Nobody mourns because we are thus being deprived of the selective agency of these diseases, or because the average resistance of the population to these diseases will doubtless decline. It is often asserted that the sort of sifting that falls to the lot of the poor results in a much higher average of vitality, at least in those who survive. Abundant vigor—the capacity for hard work which approaches genius—is said to coincide with resistance to disease. "Weak" babies are said to be eliminated naturally by the hard conditions of the life of the poor. It may well be admitted that some puny infants are such because of a defective inheritance and these are less likely to survive in a bad environment. Let us be fair and credit that much to the barbarous social conditions which often prevail in industrial and sometimes in agricultural communities. They do weed out a certain number of hereditarily weak individuals. But the whole truth is that *untoward social conditions* are at work during the whole nine months of intra-uterine development and during all of infancy and childhood, and are making out of perfectly *good stock* as well, a multitude of twisted, warped, and undervitalized individuals who quite unnecessarily succumb to marasmus, or infantile infections, or the diseases of childhood, or, if they reach maturity, bear in their bodies and their minds the marks impressed by prenatal and infantile deprivations.

Dr. Hans Zinsser, professor of bacteriology at the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, in his recent work

on *Infection and Resistance*¹ inclines to the view that individuals of the same species

differ but slightly from each other in reaction to the same infectious agent. This would indicate that the individual differences in resistance displayed so plainly by human beings are due, not to any *fundamental* individual variations, but rather to such fortuitous factors as nutrition, metabolic fluctuations, temporary physical depression, fatigue, or chilling.

Thus it may turn out that of the artisan's seven children, the three who succumbed, were in general simply those who got a little more than their share of the malnutrition, chilling, fatigue or "temporary physical depression" of which life seems to hold so much in store for those in its lower ranks.

A few eugenists who still permit themselves vague commendations of "the beneficent agent of extensive infant mortality" fail to point out why they incline to think that a high infant-mortality rate is a blessing to the race while a high typhoid or small-pox rate is a disgrace to civilization. War, they have decided, has fallen from grace and is no longer a eugenic agent; its selections are no longer marked by nice discrimination as in a former day. Let them look to their germs as well—perhaps they too have lost their cunning and like war deserve to be relegated to the rear in the march of civilization. A vicious environment in short is open to the suspicion that it takes toll all along the line; that it weakens the strong, kills the weak, robs the individual, and robs the race. Some, whom it does to death, can well be spared; multitudes, whom it undermines and renders ineffective, deserved of life the opportunity for better things.

It must be admitted that those who lay major emphasis upon the influence of inheritance are quite right in maintaining that no end of good environment will not raise the average of racial quality one iota, but it must not be forgotten that no end of eugenics would not avail to solve some of the gravest of human problems. The gravity of two of these is beyond dispute: social injustice and war. Both are evils which will be cured by humanizing group sentiments, by generalizing those elemental impulses of good will which are sufficiently present in all tribes and peoples,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 59.

but which hoary exploitations and blind chauvinisms have well-nigh driven out of the human breast. It is not to eugenics that we shall look for peace on earth and good will to men. Indeed, one might go further and point out the fact that the entire Nietzschean conception of life and morals, with its black oppression of the weak by the strong—"its splendid blonde beasts lustfully roving in search of their prey" quite after the manner of Belgium in 1914—is entirely consistent with the eugenic program, which builds upon a single foundation stone, racial vigor. The most perfect beings whom the sun has ever shone upon would, if impelled by a vicious social philosophy, make a perfect hell on earth. And humanity's "best people" have often done so.

One writer, Frederick Adams Woods, of the biological school, who seeks to establish the high intellectual and moral average of the royal families of Europe, establishes also, although without intention, the thesis that breeding alone cannot hold back even the able from the most shocking of high crimes and misdemeanors, such as plunging the populations of Europe into war century after century, and in the intervals of peace grinding the face of the poor.

In conclusion, may we not compress our estimate of the hereditary factor into two pithy sentences borrowed from that shrewd observer of life—the Scotch physician, Dr. James Devon—"We inherit all the faculties and powers which we possess, but what they are only the event shows. Nothing can be taken out of a man but what is in him, but there may be a good deal in him which is never taken out."

A PROSPECTUS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

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NOTE.—In recent years the writer has introduced graduate students to general sociology by a course in the Autumn Quarter on the evolution of sociological method since 1800. This course has been followed in the Winter Quarter by an outline of general sociology. The present paper is made up of three introductions to this latter course. They were written in 1920, 1915, and 1916 respectively. Although in some respects they overlap and duplicate one another, they place the emphasis at slightly different points, and together they form a consistent exhibit. They are presented here in the order indicated.

Whether introductions ever really introduce; whether such general views as every synthetic thinker wants to present ever take shape in the minds of beginners, in advance of detailed instruction about rudiments, is a question which I find myself each year a little less inclined to answer with a confident affirmative. Nevertheless I cannot shake off the ingrained sense of duty to perform a ritual of introduction. I try to assure myself with the reflection that if it does not mean anything at the point where academic custom prescribes it, after it has itself been introduced by the course to which in form it was the preface, it may have acquired meaning. I therefore recommend that it be read in advance with zeal even if perforce without knowledge, and then that it be reread as a review at the end of the course, and with such piety as may be consistent with further acquaintance.

Teachers of general sociology will ask no apology from one of their number for printing such an extract from the notes which he has actually used in the classroom. Whether other teachers follow a method like or unlike his, they will have uses for this transcript from actual experience. For reasons which I have indicated in the "First Introduction," I hope that other readers of the *Journal* will find this informal pedagogical talk not wholly unprofitable.

I. INTRODUCTION OF 1920

There are two quite distinct points of view from which to pass judgment, first, upon what sociology actually is, and second, upon what it is worth. Those are the viewpoints, first, of those who intend to pursue sociology as a profession, second, of those who do not. In the world at large, and even in a graduate class in

sociology, those who look from the professional viewpoint are and should be the minority. Yet, for a number of reasons, every graduate course in sociology must be adapted primarily to the needs of this minority. The time is so short compared with the scope of the subject that it must be devoted chiefly to those aspects of the subject which are most fundamental, so that those who intend to make it the whole or a part of their profession may have the necessary basis on which their further specialization may have sufficient support. But those same aspects of human affairs are equally fundamental to intelligent life in any vocation. There is a practical use for systematic introduction to them, whatever be one's subsequent calling.

I have never been able to convince myself, therefore, that if I could offer a single major in sociology to graduate students who had made up their minds not to be professional sociologists, I could shape up a course that would be more valuable for them in the long run than this course which is the best I know how to offer to future professional sociologists.

In this course, and especially in the first half of it, I spend most of the time explaining a few of the most important general ideas which are the most ordinary tools of sociological thinking. These ideas are to further sociological thinking what such ideas as "point," "line," "straight line," "curved line," "angle," "right angle," "acute angle," "obtuse angle," "triangle," "quadrilateral," "polygon," "circle," "two dimensions," "three dimensions," etc., are to further thinking in geometry. Only a few of us ever in our lives teach a class in geometry. Still fewer of us ever in our lives conduct a piece of original geometrical research. On the other hand every one of us has to live his whole life in space. All our experience has to be within the setting of space relations. Even in the instinctive impulse to "cut across lots" on the way to school, and to avoid square pegs to plug round holes, we are unconsciously adapting ourselves to space relations for which geometry furnishes names and explanations and rules. To keep cobwebs out of our minds about these ordinary everyday space relations, or to remove cobwebs that are already in our minds, these elementary geometrical notions must be acquired somehow

or other. It would probably be a saving of time in the long run, it would probably make life more comfortable and happy for each man and woman in the world, if it were possible for all to go through the same elementary training in geometry which would be the wisest sort of training at the start for the few who are destined to spend their lives teaching geometry.

The analogy in this one respect between geometry and sociology is very close. It makes no difference whether we are professional social scientists of some sort, or whether we are butchers or bakers or candlestick-makers. We spend our lives in many kinds of contact and commerce with other human beings. Whether we will or no, give and take of influence with other human beings form the setting for the career of each of us. If we are to live in clear consciousness of what is happening to us, and of what we are doing to the world, instead of sleepwalking through life, we have to get wise somehow or other to those elementary types of human relationship for which sociology, to the extent of its means, supplies names and explanations and rules. Accordingly it is an asset to anybody who has to live in this world to acquire a working acquaintance with those generalizations of the recurrent types of human relationships which are carried in these sociological names and explanations and rules. If I knew, therefore, that each student had decided to be a professional chemist, or philologist, or astronomer, a surgeon, a newspaper editor, a banker, a farmer, a licensed accountant, or a civil engineer, I should vary this course only in the choice of the incidental illustrations I should use. I should say to myself, "These people have decided to give sociology a chance at them four hours a week for three months. It may be this is the only formal hearing they will ever give to sociology. The main work of their lives will be something quite different from sociology. In what way can sociology speak for itself in that brief time, so as to be as important a factor as possible in the future functioning of these people, who are not to be sociologists, nor even social scientists of any sort?"

As I said, my answer to that question would be this course, substantially as I have organized it as a first course for graduate students who propose to specialize in sociology. There cannot

be one geometry for ministers, another for lawyers, another for teachers, or one chemistry for Catholics, another for Baptists, another for Christian Scientists. The variations in geometry or chemistry to accommodate different vocations are simply in differences of time which may wisely be devoted to the subject, in proportion to the other desirable knowledge, and they are differences in subject-matter worth studying in detail after the elements are acquired. A minister might never have use for more geometry than he learned in high school. An architect, a land surveyor, a mechanical engineer, would deal with certain distinctive applications of geometry all his life.

In a similar way, there cannot be one sociology for settlement workers, another for salesmen, another for capitalists, another for college professors. There will be peculiarly appropriate elaborations and applications, but the underlying principles must be identical. Human relations are what they are, no matter who looks at them. Sociology is an attempt to set in order the most typical human relations in such a way that their bearings upon one another, in their ordinary forms, will be evident to anyone of sufficient mental grasp to understand them.

I am still speaking particularly to the state of mind of those who do not intend to specialize in sociology. Especially in the first part of the course, and perhaps in all of it, I shall seem to be dealing with ideas so abstract that they have no possible application to any interests not professionally sociological. The question would be natural whether I am so naïve as to suppose that anyone not solemnly dedicated to sociology will take these abstractions to heart as daily companions, and subjects of conversation; whether I suppose that before doing any sort of thinking, students who have taken this course will call up these sociological ideas, and ask them what they have to say about the subject.

My answer is that I no more expect this than I expect the average man to keep his mind constantly dwelling on the definitions and rules of arithmetic that he learned in the grades. For most of them he may never in his life have a conscious use. On the other hand, he may have frequent occasion to use some of them which in school seemed to him most meaningless. I cannot recall that

since I taught my last district school, while I was a college undergraduate, I have ever had occasion to find a least common multiple, or a greatest common divisor, or to extract a cube root. Yet I should hate to be ignorant of what either is, or to be unable to refresh my memory so as to compute either if occasion required. On the other hand, both for theoretical and practical purposes I have all my life had frequent occasion to reckon percentages, and the rules for handling decimals have been as real to me as they are to a teacher of arithmetic or to a book-keeper. Sociological technicalities have a precisely analogous part in the life of anyone who is not a professional sociologist. They have a certain desirability as a mental background, just as arithmetic has, as a stimulator of general consciousness of quantity values, whether one has occasion very often to calculate precise quantities or not. Then these sociological technicalities, like certain rules of arithmetic, have value as mental tools for dealing with specific social relations which actually arise in ordinary experience, just as the non-mathematician may have occasion to reckon interest on loans due from him or to him.

So much for the relation of non-professional people to sociology. I will say nothing now especially for those who do plan to specialize in sociology. That comes in other places.

There is something further, however, which very much needs to be said to specialists and non-specialists alike, and the need for saying it has grown in recent years.

Ten or fifteen years ago the superstition was at its height that psychology was a magic key to all the problems of education, and consequently to all the problems of society. Thousands of teachers flocked into psychological lecture-rooms in the expectation of getting tabloid psychological prescriptions that would make the practice of teaching as easy and precise as simple sums in arithmetic. Psychological quacks encouraged these expectations, and all the responsible psychologists were unable to undo their mischief.

If that delusion may not be said to have run its course, it has apparently spent a great deal of its force. It is not as much in evidence as it was a few years ago. The same kinds of people who followed the psychological delusion a little earlier seem now to be

turning with similar fatuity to sociology. The very marked increase of interest in sociology of late, especially in normal schools, is by no means altogether a healthy symptom. In many cases its impulse is quite as unintelligent, quite as certain to be disappointed as the earlier hopes that psychology would prove to be the revealer of an infallible pedagogy.

I have often confessed that American sociologists have not been without fault for the existence of this attitude. Twenty-five years ago they were themselves harboring over-sanguine ideas of what their specialty might accomplish. There are many reasons why we should now be very explicit and very emphatic in our disclaimers of any such exaggeration.

This is our present belief and our present claim. The most important study for man is mankind. All men are studying mankind in one way or another. Every man whose mind is normal uses the opportunities which his occupation affords for collecting observations about mankind in both collective and individual specimens. Some of us try to do this scientifically. That is, we do it not merely in the casual way which any vocation whatever permits, but we do it as a vocation in itself. We study from the standpoint of one of the social sciences. Whether our study of mankind is merely occasional and incidental to other employments, or a profession itself, we do not get as wise as it is possible to become about human nature from all the different angles in which it presents itself. In general we have to get acquainted with mankind *first* as a continual play of many motives, or psychologically; *second*, as the continuance of influences which had their beginnings long ago, or historically; *third*, as engaged in a constant wrestling with nature for the physical means of existence, or economically; *fourth*, as impelled by universal egotism into strife for precedence in controlling the opportunities of life, or politically; *fifth*, (and in a certain sense *including all the others*) as instinctively and later methodically acting in groups for promotion of each and all of the various human purposes, or sociologically.

Now the sociological claim is not that sociology is a magic which reaches superior wisdom about mankind by means of which it has a monopoly. The claim is that sociology has elaborated

certain processes of analysis by means of which each and all of the four other principal ways of approach to knowledge of mankind may become more instructive than either or all of them could be without this sociological co-operation. There is no mystery in the vulgar sense, no occultism in this claim. It means that sociology has found out how to pry into certain aspects of human experience which had not attracted much attention till less than a half-century ago, and that these neglected aspects of human experience are not only instructive in themselves but they throw much light upon those other aspects which had been longer observed.

This amounts to the statement that sociologists no longer claim, as they did a generation ago, that they are dealing with a detached sphere of knowledge—as indeed historians, and economists, and political scientists, and psychologists also claimed for their several specialties a generation ago. All thoroughly enlightened students of mankind today speak of their specialties each as one among many techniques for searching into the one comprehensive reality of human experience.

We instinctively ask innumerable questions about human experience. These questions range all the way from the queries of idle curiosity about our next-door neighbor's whims, and habits, and character, to the kinds of questions we ask when we are trying to compose a philosophy of history. What passes for social psychology, and history, and economics, and political science, and sociology is cluttered up with masses of more or less authentic fact, and more or less valid reasoning about aspects of human experience which are trivial in comparison with the sort of knowledge which we need in order to indicate the most dependable wisdom in planning our individual or social lives. Much that passes for history would be merely the negligible gossip of the local newspaper, if its date were yesterday instead of a century or two ago. Much that passes for political economy would be more precise and more valuable if it dropped its form of generality and added accuracy by getting itself transformed into the shop knowledge of any skilled laborer. Much that passes for sociology is merely rule-of-thumb conclusions about how to conduct friendly

visiting, or how to make out a questionnaire. Each of these things has its place, but human experience has its proportions and its perspectives and its gradations of importance. Because this is so, procedure which qualifies as scientific study of human experience must ultimately exhibit corresponding proportions, and perspectives and gradations of importance. Each of these divisions of social science is concerned in its way with finding out what aspects of human experience we need to understand first, in order that we may understand all the other aspects better. From the very beginning the sociologists have asserted that the older divisions of social science have allowed this interest in proportions and harmonies between real and possible subjects of knowledge to lag, and that they had allowed absorption in fragments to take its place. The sociologists became spokesmen for this necessary correlation of knowledge, not because it belonged to them more properly than to psychologists, historians, political scientists and economists, but because everybody else was ignoring it. From the sociological point of view it is necessary to get a clear vision, first of all, of the different ways in which human beings associate; of the underlying reasons why they associate; of the forms in which they associate; of the effects, for weal or for woe, of the different forms of human association upon the purposes which instinctively or methodically seek expression through association; of the devices by means of which human associations are controlled; of the aims which emerge in the course of association as the approved objects of human endeavor; of standards of measure for these conventional objects of endeavor; whether they justify themselves as permanent human desirabilities, or whether they have merely provisional and transitory value.

These, and such as these are the big questions which have stimulated the development of sociology as it is understood in the United States. As the sociologists see it, all social science has dignity in the degree of its devotion to the ultimate solution of these universal problems. The sociologists have ceased to imagine that sociology has the exclusive mandate to formulate and solve these problems. They are becoming aware, as they were not at first, that these are larger questions than any single type of men can

answer. They realize that the answers must come, in so far as they come at all, from co-operative co-ordination of all science and all life. The sociologists still feel that, until other scholars relieve them of the burden, they have a sense of relation which amounts to a mandate that they shall do their best to keep these big problems in sight, and to stimulate all other scholars to direct their studies toward contributions to the solutions.

In brief, one of the ideas that will be kept prominent throughout this course is that *there is no magic key to the secrets of society*. There is no key of any sort in the strict sense. There are various techniques by means of which different factors and aspects of the social reality may be partially understood by those who are able and willing to use these techniques for all they are worth. If we are able and willing to use each and all of these techniques as they supplement one another we may gain progressively sane and balanced and penetrating insight into social workings.¹

II. INTRODUCTION OF 1915

In recent years it has become increasingly clear to me that sociology is what it is, in the practice of the most reliable sociologists, much more than it is what is formulated as definitive or descriptive of it by the same, not to mention less significant sociologists.

Accordingly, the most timely report may be compressed into the formula: sociology is a technique in the making. This form of expression is deliberately preferred to the version "sociology is a *science* in the making." Throughout the course that follows, history, economics, sociology, etc. are treated as primarily *techniques*, rather than "sciences." Of course, every technique at once upon application begins to be also a tradition. A body of knowledge accumulates through use of the technique. This fact lends plausibility to the claim that the technique is a "science." In so far as the technique, and the lore which it accumulates, facilitate control of any body of experience, whether in the sense of understanding, or in the more complete sense of subjecting to the will of those who operate the technique, the attributes of "science" are given. Neither severally nor collectively do the disciplines to

¹ Vide Small, title "Sociology," in *Encyclopaedia Americana*.

which for convenience we assign the group title "social science" in a very high degree satisfy the requirements of "science." Hence the preference for the less pretentious term "technique."

Sociology is described in so many ways that few men outside the ranks of the sociologists themselves are convinced that it has a real vocation. The apparent contradictions in the accounts that various sociologists give of their technique are to be explained, however, less as real divergences of opinion about the scope and method of their department of knowledge, than as variations in perspective resulting from attempts to survey the whole sociological procedure from many points of view. Scarcely two sociologists subscribe without qualification to a single description of their specialty. At the same time, the disagreements are very largely matters of classification, or emphasis, or of mere terms, while careful inspection of the work carried on by a large number of men who call themselves sociologists discovers that there is underlying unity in their conceptions. To do justice to the subject, we must not only make its past interpret its present and predict its future, but we must hazard the very dangerous process of allowing its indicated future to interpret its past. That is, the scientific factors which have brought sociology to its present stage of development, a stage which is marked by many apparently incoherent types of sociological inquiry rather than by a homogeneous system of doctrine, cannot be understood unless we take account not only of their history on the one hand, but of their tendencies on the other. To say, then, what sociology is one must be able to see some distance beyond accomplished facts to what sociology must be when the forces which have thus far worked separately will have converged into conscious co-operation. The following account of the subject is accordingly not merely a description of the visible traits of sociology, but an interpretation of these external signs, and to a certain extent a prediction of the spirit in which the science is bound to develop.

The latest definition of sociology which I have made for my own use is this: *Sociology is study of human experience with attention primarily upon forms and processes of groups.* As I see it, this definition implies several things:

1. *Human experience*, in some or all of its aspects is implicitly the common subject-matter of all study which has human beings, in any phase of their reality, as its object. This is true because human beings in their particular phases are always, in a real and large measure, functions of human experience in general. In our ignorance, we propose to ourselves the pursuit of knowledge of human facts in numberless detachments and abstractions. If we pursue knowledge with an open mind and long enough, we discover that there is no possibility of exhausting the meaning of these facts, so long as they are held in detachment and abstraction. Sooner or later they must be represented within the whole system of relationships which is their medium of existence. This is the occasion for the proposition to be reiterated throughout this course, that "social science" is necessarily *one* science, i.e., the science of the experience of human beings, and that the so-called *social sciences*, whatever the claims of their promoters, are relatively sterile until they fit themselves into a system of knowledge which correlates all the phases of human experience.

2. Restating one, rather than adding to it, sociology then is only one of an undetermined number of valid ways of studying human experience, all of which ways must be correlated in order to make study of human experience yield the most objective results possible; that is, in order to make study of human experience in the highest degree instructive.

3. Conversely, all the other valid ways of studying human experience must adjust themselves to all that is objective in the methods and results of sociology, if the results which they reach are to be in the highest degree instructive.

4. Propositions 2 and 3 are not merely verbal variations of one and the same idea. On the contrary, each depends upon the other for reasons involved in the nature of human experience. That is, since the middle of the nineteenth century we have become aware that all human experience is primarily *group* experience. Approximate qualitative, or at least formal knowledge of all the kinds of groups and behaviors of groups within the range of human observation is accordingly a stage through which intelligence must pass in grasping with all the mind's might the details presented by all

the various sorts of activities falling under human observation. In other words, if we are to reach an understanding of human experience, whether as it is presented in records of past time, or in the events of our own day, that selected portion of experience must be represented in our minds in terms of the literal reactions between the persons concerned. Otherwise it is some sort of fictitious substitute for reality. This means that we must acquire acquaintance with the typical forms and processes into which human activities arrange themselves.

Pedagogically, then, the case with human experience is thus in some degree analogous to the case with reference to knowledge of *physics*.¹ A member of the physics staff in the University of Chicago was asked lately, "How much time do you give in your introductory physics course to the elementary physical concepts?" "Practically all of it," was the immediate answer. The questioner continued: "How much is 'all of it'?" "Five hours a week for the entire Freshman year." "Do you mean you give all that time to the general ideas of physics, beginning with such elementary notions as "matter," "properties of matter," "density," "adhesion," "cohesion," "inertia," "momentum," "specific gravity," etc.?" "Yes," he said, "not using quite your list, but we begin with substantially those concepts and give the students a year of introduction to progressively more difficult physical concepts, before they are started upon physical problems." A few days later this physicist reopened the subject by saying that he had talked it over with some of his colleagues and had found that 80 per cent was their average estimate of the proportion of the first year that might be accounted for in this way.

For the purpose of illustration neither the aggregate nor the proportion of time is important. It is true in "social science," as in physics, that progress toward control of the phenomena has to be made through a large amount of attention to a large number of typical types and behaviors of groups.²

¹ *Vide* note on the Hegelian categories, Small, *General Sociology*, p. 400.

² Accordingly, my *General Sociology*, the chief reference book for this course, is not a system of sociological theory. It is an exhibit of sociological *categories*, with indications of their relations to one another, and of their uses as tools of sociological research.

It is no less true that sociology would be impossible if other ways of studying human experience did not supply material for sociological generalization. All the historical and descriptive and analytical methods of inquiry into past or present human experience furnish necessary data which sociology generalizes, together with data of its own gathering, in terms of group-form and group-process. Thereupon these generalizations become tools both for testing the credibility and the sufficiency of previous accounts of human experience, and for evaluating proposed future activities.

For instance, how do we arrive at the generalization to which we shall return presently as the fundamental sociological idea, that all human experience is group experience, not merely a matter of individual fortune? In a word, from history on the one hand, and from psychology on the other.

This answer is more sweeping in form than the precise facts justify. When we say "history," we must mean by it all that inspection of past events which comes to be known as history when its method conforms to the strict technique which the professional historians have developed. When we say "psychology," we must mean by it all that observation of cause and effect in mental action which becomes psychology when it is made systematic and critical. This means too that we use the terms "history" and "psychology" to include between them all the subdivisions of science which, on the one hand, deal with past events as such, and, on the other hand, trace the mental reactions involved in events, whether past or present, i.e., surveys of the past, and inspection of the operations of motives whether past or present. If someone did not recount past events, and if someone else did not make out the psychic connections between events, past or present, sociology would be like judgment without the assistance of memory. Sociology would have no material to work on.

We repeat then, sociology is one of the ways in which we must deal with all available knowledge of human experience if the material of knowledge is to yield up its fullest meaning.

The comprehensive problem of sociology may be formulated in this way: What processes occur in the contacts and commerce

between person and person, from the most primitive and simple associations to the most advanced and complex; how do the contacts between person and person in different types of association react upon the personality of the individuals concerned, and, on the other hand, how do the individuals in contact affect the terms under which they associate? Thus sociology rests upon the conception that human experience is a function of three principal factors: first, the physical conditions of life; second, the personal equation of individuals; third, the types of association in which the individuals influence one another. Each of these factors is recognized as a variable. Investigation of the laws of variation of the first factor does not fall within the proper scope of sociology. Those laws must be borrowed from the physical sciences as data for sociology. Assuming those data as relatively fixed terms in the social equation, sociology proper discovers a necessary function in uttering its testimony among social scientists of all sorts that the older divisions of social science will soon find themselves futile, unless progress can be made in discovering some of the more constant laws of reaction between nature on the one hand, and individuals and groups on the other. Since these reactions are the principal incidents in the evolution of types of persons and types of association, it is a betrayal of puerile mental grasp that we have thus far felt so little need of understanding them. The sociologists have accordingly volunteered as pioneers to explore these neglected relations.

On one of its frontiers the problems of sociology merge into those of anthropology and zoölogy; that is, they are questions of the influence of physical environment upon the organic development of men. Rooted in the same problems, but ramifying in another direction, are questions of the relation of environment, particularly the conditions of the food supply, to types of wants, to habits, to vocations, to distribution of population, to customs, and to institutions, domestic and economic, political or religious. Before the latter order of problem is pursued very far it runs into questions which must be treated as primarily psychological; viz., to what extent and in what ways must the state of consciousness in the individuals concerned be regarded as (a) the *direct* effect,

(b) the *indirect* effect of the physical conditions; and to what extent and in what ways must the state of consciousness in the individuals be regarded as the cause of the actions observed, i.e., to what extent must the individuals be regarded as exerting a distinct psychical reaction upon the physical conditions?

A parallel division of problems occurs when we are dealing with phases of association in which we must eliminate the physical factor as a constant element, and deal with the individual and associational factors as the unknown quantities to be ascertained. The social reactions are then of two ground types: *first*, those in which the impulses of the individual modify the group; *second*, those in which the impulses of the group modify the individual. Of course this form of expression is merely an accommodation to first appearances. The fact is that both types of reaction occur in a given case. The one or the other is the chief object of attention in its turn. Investigation of these problems requires intimate co-operation between psychology and sociology. Indeed, it has been said that "the division of labor between the two sciences may be fairly represented by shifting the emphasis upon two terms in the same predicate: viz., psychology is the science of social *processes*; sociology is the science of *social* processes." In other words, the strictly social reactions are psychical reactions, but to an extent which was hardly recognized until very recent years psychical reactions are social reactions. We may accordingly approach the same ultimate facts from either of two directions. We may attempt to explain the phenomena of consciousness in the mind of an individual, but the attempt will lead at last into explanation of all the psychical phenomena in the range of association in which the individual lives and moves and has his being; or otherwise expressed, every psychological problem is at last a problem of sociology. On the other hand, we may try to explain the facts of a given association, its genesis, its structure, its aims. In this case we find that the association always resolves itself into mental states as its ultimate factors; so that every sociological problem is in the last analysis a problem of psychology. Whether psychology or sociology is the senior partner in a given investigation depends upon the phase of the phenomena to be regarded as

primary, whether mental processes are to be considered as conditioned by facts of association, or whether social situations are considered as conditioning or conditioned by mental processes.

The foregoing propositions prepare the way for further definition of the province of sociology, by distinguishing it from some of the older divisions of social science. Comparatively few persons are convinced that there is room for a science or a technique to be called sociology, unless it should succeed merely in occupying ground already covered by one or more of these "sciences," and in giving vogue to a new name. If we analyze and generalize the distinctive efforts of the sociologists, we find that, with all their seeming heterogeneity, they are directed toward a common center of attention. The sociologists in common with all other social scientists are implicitly concerned with the evolution of human personality. All the processes which result in types of individuals or of associations, as incidental to that evolution, all the processes in which the individual and the associational types form a perpetually reciprocating series, in alternating relations of cause and effect, have been selected by sociologists as their peculiar subject-matter. In other words, from the sociological point of view, everything in experience is regarded as incidental to the interpretation and evaluation of people, and to the determination of programs by means of which more ample human values may be realized.

The conventionalities of the social sciences are so confused that this formal statement is by no means clear without further explanation. The contrast between the center of attention in sociology and in the older social sciences is of two sorts. In the first place, we have types of ethnology and history, for example, in which there is no visible attempt either, on the one hand, to discover the relative values of physical conditions, of people, and of the machineries and products of people; or on the other hand, to place these three factors in an order of relationship that would show which of them is to be considered as ultimate and essential, and which as more tributary and incidental, in the final interpretation of life. These types of social science accordingly amount to mere description of more or less clearly assorted phenomena,

without advancing to the rank of very highly generalized science of the causal relations contained in the phenomena.

In the second place, we have types, notably of political and economic science, which expressly define their problems, not in terms of people at all, but in terms of a *technology* or a *product* of human activities. Thus we have variations of the formulas, "Civics is the science of government," and "Economics is the science of wealth." Now mere words must not be taken too seriously, but in these cases the uses of words correspond to very essential restrictions of purpose and method. From the viewpoint of sciences so defined persons are by definition relegated to secondary consideration, while the devices, or the products of persons are made paramount. The tendency to which we are now calling attention would be arrested if these techniques operated consistently in accordance with the alternative forms of expression: "Civics is the science of people in their processes of governing themselves," "Economics is the science of people in their behaviors toward wealth."

In contrast with all the varieties of social science which either fail to face the question whether, for their purposes, people, or the gear and chattels of people are most important; and in contrast with all the varieties of social science which deliberately choose not people but the machineries or the possessions of people as their subject-matter, sociology has instinctively chosen for itself the unclaimed problem of the objective aspects of people themselves. By this form of expression we mean to distinguish the sociological from the psychological division of labor. The latter we would speak of by comparison as pertaining primarily to the subjective aspects of people. How do human personalities develop out of gregarious animal associations into conventional psychic associations, and how do types of individuals and of their groupings, either by means of or in spite of their material and spiritual *impedimenta*, pass from stage to stage in the evolution of persons and of their social combinations? While the ethnologist describes human customs, occupations, technical equipments and modes of employing them, traditions, beliefs, ceremonies, rites, social organizations, etc.; while the historian devotes himself to occurrences

in which human beings have played a part, with the utmost license of selection of classes of occurrences, and with scientific criticism aimed, especially after "critical" methodology had been developed, less at the subject-matter than at the mere technique of discovery; while the political scientist devotes himself to men's systems of government, and while the peculiar interest of the economist centers upon the processes by which men produce wealth, the sociologist studies men themselves, as they manifest their character in all the variations of contact with one another, and as they realize or register themselves in the relations which occupy the previous sciences. To sociology, then, *the evolution of persons* is the central fact, while everything else is incidental. To the other social techniques, persons are virtually incidental, and their accidents are central.

This last proposition is true not necessarily of the persons who pursue the other divisions of social science, but of the processes which compose their technique. These processes necessarily divert the center of attention from people as such to those impersonal things, institutions. For social science as a whole, an adequate corrective of this tendency is necessary. I do not claim that sociology is that corrective. I do claim that the sociological center of attention tends to converge thought upon people, as differentiated from their gear, and *impedimenta*, and machinery—in short from their institutions; and sociology thus does something to arrest the devitalizing and desiccating tendencies in social science.

III. INTRODUCTION OF 1916

In one respect this course is like the old story of the boy's jackknife. It had two new handles and five new blades, but he always insisted that it was the same knife. Multiply the numbers in the story several times over and it represents the facts about this course. Each year since it was first announced it has received a new handle and a certain number of new blades. To speak literally, I have given each year what seemed to me at the time the best introduction to general sociology I could present. Each year I have learned more than I have taught about the relations

with which sociologists must deal, and each following year I have reshaped the course accordingly. I do not have to go back many years in my lecture notes to find myself in a kind of thinking which is as different from my present tone of thought as the German and American theories about war are from each other.

Each year I resolve to try to present the sociological case in a little simpler form than I have ever used before. Each year I hope to avoid details which confuse more than they clarify. I hope by so doing to put the class on the track of an improved method of construing human relations. I believe the sociologists have certain keys to human relations which make human experience mean more than could be found in it without the sociological kind of interpretation. I shall make another attempt this year to justify this belief. Of course I do not mean that I have wiped my slate clean of all the work I have done on it before, and that I am proposing an altogether new interpretation of human society. I mean that from year to year I have developed certain details in my ways of analyzing human relations. Each year a somewhat modified treatment is necessary in order to present these methods to the best advantage. In particular I want to emphasize what seems more important and to slur over what is less important for a brief survey.

I will begin with my latest answer to the question, *What is sociology?* viz., *Sociology is that variant among the different ways of studying the common subject-matter of the social sciences which centers its attention primarily upon the forms, processes, and values of human group activities, or upon human group phenomena as such.*

At once this description implies a sharp contrast with the descriptions of sociology in vogue twenty-five years ago. Then, and for many years afterward, the usual descriptions implied and even asserted a high degree of separateness among the social sciences. Today the tendency among social scientists in all departments is to recognize and even emphatically to assert the necessary oneness of social science, while the so-called "social sciences" are merely divisions of that one social science, if they are genuinely scientific at all.

This leads me to advertise at once that if one hopes to do anything serious in the study of sociology, one must be prepared to reckon with the scientific demands of the whole body of the social sciences. The one great comprehensive problem in the realm of the social sciences is the question, *What is the meaning of human experience?* So far as its value for strict science is concerned the whole technique of the social sciences, separately and collectively, is to be appraised at last simply and solely by the test of its efficiency in helping to answer this question. Whatever may be the special curiosity or convenience of scholars or teachers who have a chance to draw an income by discovering or distributing knowledge of traditional aspects of human relations, the insistent demand of human beings as such is for understanding of the principles of cause and effect which operate wherever there are human beings. This unconscious and implicit demand by human beings as such for knowledge of the essential meaning of the human lot is simply the untutored reaction of the human mind to the whole great objective mystery which conscious beings confront. This mass of relations in which human beings act, whether they will or no, presents the system of problems which it is the task of social science to solve in order to be science at all. That is, we have obviously two great divisions of knowledge problems. Even these two main divisions can be only temporarily kept apart. They soon run into each other. For convenience, however, we must discriminate between the relations in which physical cause and effect dominate, and the relations in which psychical cause and effect dominate. These latter are the challenge to social science. Social scientists are fulfilling their duty if they are doing their utmost to accept this challenge and to satisfy the human demand for knowledge of social relations. They are doing something less than their duty if they are doing something else than answering this demand.

It would not be worth while to discuss here how generally this idea of the business of social scientists has been in the minds of social scientists themselves. Whether they have thought of their work in this light or not, the fact is that different types of social scientists have developed with very different conceptions of the

sort of key that would open the most knowledge of the meaning of human experience. Oldest by many centuries have been the philosophers and the historians. In many periods of the growth of human thought it would be difficult to draw a sharp line between these two types of thinkers. The historians were philosophers and the philosophers were historians. In a certain sense this is likely, and it is desirable, to be the case forever, at least with certain types of philosophers and historians.

On the other hand, it is true that men have started with certain clues, or in pursuit of certain types of knowledge, and have presently fallen into the habit of thinking that their way of prying into the meaning of human experience is the only way that will amount to much, and the sufficient way to solve the big problem of social science, viz., *What is the meaning of human experience?* Accordingly men starting with slightly different interests have developed such specialties as philosophy, psychology, history, political economy, political science, statistics, sociology, social psychology, anthropology, ethnology, and a myriad of minor specializations. In course of time these divisions of labor have come to be regarded by their several devotees as existing for their own separate glorification, as having a reason for existence which is in no way dependent upon the existence of the other pursuits. Moreover, the devotees of each of these specialties have been under strong and often irresistible temptation to think each that his particular way of studying human facts is the only way necessary in order to get out of them all the knowledge which the facts contain about cause and effect in human life. This impression is possible only so long as the men who have the impression can avoid an accounting with the main demand of social science; viz., that all accredited scientific activities shall show results tending to answer the central question, *What is the meaning of human experience?* To make my point as clear as possible I will use an almost grotesque analogy. I hope its very extravagance will throw a search-light on the matter I want to emphasize. Suppose the woodcrafts divided themselves in imitation of the academic social sciences. Suppose they developed "axe science," "cross-cut saw science," "splitting saw science," "cant-dog science," "plane science,"

"chisel science," "auger science," etc. Converting grown trees into material consumable for human purposes, is the scope of wood-craft, and tools are merely instrumental at the points at which their particular specialty is in demand. A so-called "science" of one of these tools would be meaningless apart from the whole program of converting trees into consumable forms.

It is precisely so with the different techniques known as the social sciences. Probably neither the lumberman who fells a tree nor the builder of a limousine who puts a part of that tree into its final shape for consumption could exchange jobs with good results, but neither could function to the full without the other. So the historian and the social psychologist, for instance (or any other pair), might each be a bungler at the other's task, but neither task can be performed to the limit of its value unless it is correlated with the other.

I want to make the point as emphatic as possible, therefore, at the outset—and I shall keep referring to it—that in attending for a while to the technique called sociology one is not turning aside from the main business of social science to a curious pursuit outside the scope of history and political economy, and political science and psychology and the rest. On the contrary, the thing which I am doing in this course is actually the sharpening of mental tools which must be used in their proper time and place if the mental tools which are more peculiar to those other divisions of social science are to be used to the largest advantage. On the other hand the sociologists have no mental tools by means of which they can demonstrate the meaning of human experience in any large range unless the tools are used in co-operation with other tools in the hands of experts in these other divisions of social science.

This way of stating the case is in almost direct contradiction with the professions of sociologists twenty-five years ago. We then had more or less resolute convictions that we either had, or presently would have, means of explaining human experience which would leave the other divisions of social science either entirely without occupations or with very light occupations. That conceit must be set down to the discredit of a youthful zeal not yet chastened by much experience of its own. The substantial fact to the

credit of the earlier sociologists is that they were conscious of something lacking after the older divisions of social science had done their best, and they volunteered to supply the lack.¹ The sobered successors of those youthful enthusiasts now believe that they have already justified their earlier zeal not by establishing their premature claims in detail, but by having demonstrated that there are relationships running through human experience which the traditional divisions of social science had either ignored altogether, or had rated far below their proportional importance as factors in the human lot. The sociologists of today, therefore, tend far less than they did twenty-five years ago to follow the ideal of separateness from other kinds of social scientists. They tend far more to emphasize the fact that all social scientists have at bottom one problem, viz., *the meaning of human experience*. It follows that there are different angles from which light may be thrown on that problem. Furthermore, science of human experience, in the most responsible sense, will be developed not by keeping these different shafts of light separate, within academically divided departments, but by allowing them to merge into the pure white light of objective truth.

In a word, whatever else one may think about sociology, it is certain that one has failed to get the most authentic version of it unless it presents itself as one of the necessary operations within the whole complicated business of making human experience, in all times and places, throw all the light it can upon the problems of the living generation.

At the same time, for the benefit of those whose center of interest is in one of the other divisions of social science, I shall keep on reiterating this in every possible variation, viz.: It is equally true of each and every division of social science that it is an abortion if it fails to correlate its peculiar aspects of social relations with those aspects of social relations which are the centers of attention for each of the other divisions of social science.

One of the things on which the sociologists have put all the emphasis in their power for the last thirty years is this appeal to

¹ Vide Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1916.

their colleagues in the other divisions of social science: You are making the mistake of your lives in supposing you can ever build up a tenable "science" of psychology, or history, or politics, or economics, so long as you are trying to make either of these departments of knowledge sufficient unto itself, independent, a monument of splendid isolation. The phenomena in which the professors of these different departments of knowledge are specially interested are not sufficient unto themselves. They are not independent. They are not monuments of splendid isolation. Pretended sciences of them which in any degree represent them in these false characters are to that degree spurious sciences. Social scientists of all sorts must take this situation to heart, and they must find out how to get together.¹

With these generalities presupposed, I want to prepare for a certain bewilderment which the earlier part of this course, perhaps the whole of it, is bound to bring. The kind and degree of bewilderment will depend upon the extent of previous acquaintance or lack of acquaintance with general sociology. It often happens that for the first month or two, not the youngest, but some of the maturest people who take this course frankly do not know what I am talking about. If they do know what I am talking about, they are strongly of the impression that it is not worth talking about. So far as they can see, I am merely fussing about words, or about ideas that should be considered too trite for words. It seems to them a waste of time to putter with these words, when so much more important things need to be explained. On the contrary, I have the least possible interest in words for their own sake. The initial objective in general sociology is familiarity with certain cardinal relations which must be reckoned with whenever we try to explain what takes place wherever there are human beings. I am trying to show how we may approach closer to precision in understanding those relations. As the relations are not primarily mathematical, as they are not primarily chemical, we cannot represent them by mathematical nor by chemical notation. We have no other symbols for them but ordinary language. We are obliged to select out of ordinary language the best words available

¹ Vide Small, *Meaning of Social Science*.

for scientific purposes; we have to restrict those words to certain precisely defined meanings. In nearly every case other words might be agreed upon to do the same work. In nearly if not quite every case I should be ready without debate to join a majority of social scientists in adopting substitute terms. The mere verbal matter is utterly trivial, but it is not trivial to strive for consistency and accuracy in the content of our ideas. I am concerned about words then, in this course, merely as a traveler might be concerned about the checks for his luggage. It is a matter of supreme indifference to him what sort of checks the railroads use, provided his checks always produce his own luggage at the end of his trip. He certainly cannot afford to be careless about the checks—whatever their form—which identify his property.

I insist upon this matter because it is still a fixed idea in the minds of certain influential American scholars, even within the ranks of the social scientists, that the sociologists' entire stock in trade is merely a jumble of words. This is one of the curious surviving misunderstandings of the sociologists. It has had most unfortunate effects in retarding social science in general. I care for the particular words which I take so large a part of this course to explain, only as means of calling up in our minds the same ideas whenever the words are used.

In social science we have in fact a situation precisely parallel with certain aspects of physical science. There are certain recurrent, persistent characteristics of matter for which verbal symbols must be adopted. This use of accepted symbols for ascertained phenomena of matter is imperative both for accuracy in reporting facts already discovered, and for closeness of reasoning about interpretations of the facts. The verbal symbols themselves have no inherent sacredness. They have their authority not by inalienable right, but by agreement among scholars. If it turned out to be in the interest of exact knowledge, physicists might scrap the terms "inertia," "momentum," "specific gravity," etc., for such substitutes as "drag," "drive," "dead weight," etc. The words are merely the most convenient symbols for reality that can be selected. The like is true in every division of science. The selection of words to stand invariably for corresponding ideas

is not essentially a matter of verbal interest. It is a way of insuring the integrity of the ideas themselves. This elementary part of sociological procedure is simply one illustration which recurs in its way in every department of knowledge.

There is a certain approximate fitness to some words more than to others. This may be due to the fact that some words have long been more closely associated than others with approximately the ideas which analysis finds to be literal relationships in human affairs. In so far as this fitness is prearranged by general linguistic usage, it is economy of any science to adopt that usage into its technical idiom. In other cases, and this is true in all sciences in the degree in which they probe beyond ordinary commonplace observation, there are relationships for which everyday language has fashioned no familiar words. For instance, the words telephone, automobile, aeroplane, periscope, radiograph, etc., are illustrations from the sphere of invention parallel with words which have to be fabricated in the various fields of discovery. That which did not exist must have a name after it does exist, for the convenience of everyone who has to use it or to know about it. In the same way *relationships* which had not previously been observed, have to be named, so that everyone who has occasion to deal with them may have the means of indicating the relationships whenever record or exchange of ideas about them is in order. As in the case of the above-cited modern words for recent mechanical inventions, so in the case of scientific terms, they may be awkward and hideous. No scientist is likely to waste much effort refuting such charges. Let anyone who can suggest better words at any time. The main thing with the scientist is that the words selected to denote the relations with which he is professionally concerned shall be unequivocal, precise, constant, and that their meaning shall correspond with an actually observed aspect of the material which his science is attempting to comprehend.

In the case of sociology the most frequent vagueness arises not from use of novel terms but from our appropriation of extremely commonplace terms, which we try to restrict to very closely defined meanings. Perhaps we might get ahead faster, in the long run, by coining utterly unfamiliar terms for the relationships which

we want to throw into the spot-light. Either horn of the dilemma has its difficulties, but all these difficulties are trifling in the minds of people who assume once for all that terminology is strictly subsidiary to the real social relationships for which the words are merely the most convenient signs.

Now I hope I have prepared the way for a proposition which may have a more dubious sound than anything else that I have said, viz.: *This course attempts to explain certain categories under which all social phenomena must be thought if they are thought objectively.*

I suspect that one of the results of supposed modern improvements in education is that such an elementary proposition as the foregoing carries no meaning to the minds of any but the exceptional students who have had special training in logic. I must stop long enough, therefore, on this proposition to make sure that I have made my best effort to make it commonplace.

To express the case in the most homely form, we may say that *categories* are the pigeonholes which the mind uses in assorting its knowledge. They are the receptacles for objects of thought in which the mind finds identical distinguishing marks. Each of these receptacles holds its contents separate from those of other receptacles whose contents have other distinguishing marks.

We begin to use *categories* such as they are as soon as we begin to name objects. When the child says "man," "tree," "cow," he is using categories of an extremely elementary type. The child is beginning to construct rudimentary science when he employs these categories so accurately that he does not use the category "man," for instance, when the object to which he applies the term belongs in the category "tree" or "cow." Science at its utmost reach is in one aspect nothing more than duplication of this rudimentary mental performance, with more elusive objects of knowledge as the material assorted. Science in its most precise and comprehensive form may be characterized as the assorting of knowledge with such precision that no "tree" is called "man" and no "cow" is called "tree."

A part of the *Century Dictionary* definition of the term "category" is as follows:

(1) In *logic*, a highest notion, especially one derived from the logical analysis of the forms of proposition. The word was introduced by Aristotle, who applies it to his ten predicaments, things said, or *summa genera*, viz.: (1) substance, (2) quantity, (3) quality, (4) relation, (5) action, (6) passion, (7) where, (8) when, (9) posture or relative position of parts, (10) habit or state. These are derived from such an analysis of the proposition as could be made before the developed study of grammar. The categories or highest intellectual concepts of Kant are: (1) *categories of quantity*, (2) *categories of quality*, i.e., (a) reality, (b) negation, (c) limit between these; (3) *categories of relation*, i.e., (a) substance and accident, (b) cause and effect, (c) action and reaction; (4) *categories of modality*, i.e., (a) possibility, (b) impossibility, (c) actuality, (d) non-actuality, (e) necessity, (f) non-necessity. Modern formal logic furnishes this list: (1) qualities, or singular characters; (2) simple relations or dual characters; (3) complex relations, or plural characters. Many lists of categories have been given not founded on formal logic.

But the categories which the foregoing quotation describes are not the best illustrations of the categories of positive science. It is hard to make the difference plain, and perhaps it is impossible in a few words. The key to the matter is in the statement that the above are "logical" categories, i.e., they are forms of the mind's action in the course of its reasoning or reflection. The kinds of categories with which all sorts of positive science are primarily concerned are forms revealed to the mind in the course of its observation or perception.

I am fully aware that this distinction plunges us into deep psychological water. If any reader is a specialist in psychology, to him the qualification is due that I do not imagine reasoning or reflection, on the one hand, and observation or perception on the other, as activities which are completely separate. In what I am now saying, I mean to draw the distinction between activities on the one hand in which reasoning predominates over observation, and on the other hand activities in which observation predominates over reasoning. In the former case the mind tends to impose itself on everything external to itself. In the latter case everything external to the mind tends to impose itself upon the mind. As we shall see in a moment, it becomes a vital matter in all sorts of science to make out whether would-be scientists are actually carrying on more of the one kind of activity or of the other in building up their alleged science.

We may illustrate in this way: Suppose we are infants just beginning to get acquainted with the outward world. Suppose we have stubbed our toes and bumped our heads till we have learned to say "hard." We have unconsciously employed what philosophers call a "category." The generalization summed up in that category "hard" is simply a résumé of our experience with hard objects. We have actually come in contact with things that resist our pressure in the fashion which we refer to when we use this word "hard." Perhaps a dash of every more advanced mental activity is already involved in the activity which we perform in using the category "hard." Be that as it may, our category "hard" is essentially a summary of experiences which we have had in contact with things outside of ourselves. We have done a minimum of reasoning about those things or those contacts. We have principally given a name to the way in which they affect us when we meet them.

But suppose we have grown old enough to reflect about this experience of hard objects. Suppose we have begun to philosophize. Suppose we have asked the question: "Is this 'hard' a *thing* outside of me, or is it a *feeling* inside of me, and if so what does it have to do with the tree or the stone or the club that gives me the feeling?" As a matter of fact, most of us got the earliest answers to questions of this sort from other people, and they very likely got them in turn from a line of people who passed the answers along from the earliest persons who ventured answers. Suppose however that we worked out answers for ourselves. It is possible that after puzzling our brains a long time over these questions we might have hit upon the conceptions "thing" and "qualities of the thing," or "substance" and "attribute," or "entity" and "quality," or "noumenon" and "phenomenon." These are what I mean by categories of reasoning or reflection. They are the mind's inferences from its experience, while the categories of observation are the direct reflection of external things upon the mind.

Doubtless a logician or a psychologist would laugh at this rough and ready way of explaining those necessary tools of all responsible thinking, *categories*. Perhaps the essential matter may be put in

evidence more effectively for our purposes, however, in this amateurish way, than by more technical explanations. The mind actually makes categories as its tools. The mind thus creates for itself the problem of finding out whether the categories which it makes for itself are fits or misfits when it becomes necessary to check up the elements of experience, as the mind reconstructs them, by the elements of experience as they exist outside of the mind.

In his book on the British Constitution published more than a generation ago, Mr. Walter Bagehot remarked that the English farmer classifies the animal kingdom as "game, vermin, and stock." These, such as they are, belong in the generic group "category." They probably satisfy the demands of the English farmer. They would hardly serve the purposes of the zoölogist. The difference between the English farmer and the zoölogist in this connection is not that the one uses categories, while the other does not. The difference is that the one uses categories which correspond roughly with the facts, while the other uses categories which defer to more precise analysis of the facts.

But in order to make the proposition completely lucid, we must furnish an equally elementary explanation of two other words, viz., *subject* and *object*, with their variations.

It is literally true that neither practical nor theoretical thinking breaks down oftener nor more disastrously anywhere else than at the points where it is necessary to distinguish between the subjective and the objective. As the alphabet is to reading, and as the multiplication table to mathematics, so must variations of these terms "subjective" and "objective" and of the ideas which they symbolize be to him who would do scientific work of any sort.

Again I am deliberately avoiding technical explanations. I want to get the gist of the distinction expressed in the least technical way. As to the word *subject* and its derivatives, it is only fair to say that the meaning which has been attached to it in modern scientific idiom seems more arbitrary and forced than is the case with most scientific terms. Probably the philosophy of Kant was the strongest factor in requisitioning the word for its present scientific use. Whether we can see any natural affinity or not between this conventional use of the word and its less sophisticated

meanings, the situation is just this: *subject* means the *self*, especially the self engaged in thinking; or at least the self in the state of consciousness; the self considered as a unit of mental action standing in contemplation of anything or everything else.

All the variations of the term *subject* in their scientific use have this meaning as their pivot. "Subjective" means that which pertains to the self, that which gets its character from the self, that which is a phenomenon of the self, whether or not it has a counterpart in the world over against the self. It comes about very naturally that people interested in positive science turn the word *subjective* into a term of reproach, an epithet. They apply it to any assertion or doctrine or preconception which seems to them to have its source in the person who does the thinking more than in the reality about which he is thinking. For instance, there are some people still who do not believe the earth is round. They picture it in some other way. Responsible physical scientists condemn such pictures in short order with the verdict *subjective*, meaning made to suit the thinker himself rather than adopted by the thinker from the external facts (mystical). So of England's present interpretation of Germany, and Germany's present interpretation of England. The cool-headed philosopher at this distance refuses to accept either version without modification. He says that each version is in a high degree viciously *subjective*. It is made up too much out of the prejudices and snap-judgments of the national self in each case, and too little out of cold, literal acquaintance with the facts.

The term *subjectivity* corresponds in general with the meaning of the term "subjective" as just explained. In the idiom of different writers, however, it does not always carry the same content, as may be seen in a paper by Professor C. A. Ellwood in the November, 1916, number of the *American Journal of Sociology*.

I would not be understood as teaching that the subjective aspects of thinking are necessarily abnormal and vicious. There could be no thinking without thinkers. All human thinking is necessarily an activity of human selves. The primary concern of psychology is with this aspect of the situation. Social scientists are more immediately concerned with the tendency of human

thinking to remain too exclusively of, for, and by the peculiar selves. To use a homely analogy, critics of the methods actually employed by would-be scientists, whether physical or social, have to repeat over and over again in substance the charge that such and such pretended scientific theories are like wine put into casks saturated with something that has a strong odor or a pungent taste. When the wine is drawn it is no longer itself. It is vitiated by the smell or the taste of the cask. Our minds are apt to be to knowledge what the saturated cask is to the wine. What comes out of the mind carries modifications imparted to it by the mind which more or less falsify these mental deliverances when tested as unadulterated representations of reality. We are "subjective" in this sense whenever, for any reason, we hold to conceptions of any part of the real world which are more largely the presumption of our own minds, or of other minds from which we have borrowed them, than they are authentic copies of the reality in question.

The case with the term "object" and its derivatives is precisely the reverse of the case of the term "subject" and its variations.

The "object" is anything and everything which is not the thinking self. The "object" is all the rest of reality that presents itself to the self as something to be thought. Whether the self ever becomes conscious of this challenge in any considerable degree, there is always this real contrast between the different human "selves" or "subjects" and the total reality in which they are submerged or carried in suspension. Now if the "selves" or "subjects" or any larger or smaller number of them, are roused to inquire about what is external to themselves, veracity consists in allowing or compelling this outside reality to reveal itself not so as to confirm the prejudice of the thinkers, but just as it is, whether the thinkers like it or not. "Objectivity" accordingly means veracious representation of the object, so far as the representation goes. We are having every day in the newspapers vivid illustrations of the subjective in contrast with the desirable objective, in the different official reports of action on the different European fighting fronts.¹ With rare exceptions neither side reports the

¹ October, 1916.

occurrences of the previous day as they will be recorded after the war is over. Each side puts into its report more or less of what it wishes the facts were, or what it wants the rest of the world to believe the facts are. Objectivity would consist in a literal report of the physical facts in their precise relation to the military situation which the facts affect. This latter detail may be a more important item in objectivity than the concrete facts themselves. In other words, "truth" or "science" does not consist merely in statements of facts. It consists of facts formulated in their actual functioning relations.

We might illustrate the technical terms "subjectivity" and "objectivity," by use of two identical Associated Press "stories," on the same day in two Chicago papers. The head-line writer of the one paper gave the paragraph the caption: *Russians Again in Kaiser's Net!* In the other paper the heading was: *Russians Defy Kaiser!*

I now return to my main proposition, viz.: *This course attempts to explain certain categories under which all social phenomena must be thought if they are thought objectively.* Instead of enlarging further on that particular proposition, we may perhaps locate ourselves with reference to the precise aim of this course by adding a brief historical statement.

For a number of years I have followed the clue that the whole evolution of the social sciences since 1800 has been a drive in the direction of *objectivity*. This movement has been partly conscious, but still more unconscious. All along the line, from men who started from the ancient disputes about the "philosophy of law," and others who developed the more modern "philosophy of history," men of aggressive temper, men of critical spirit, began to be impatient with some parts of the tradition of their own academic division of labor. That is, men in each of the divisions of labor began to suspect that the methods in vogue in their respective divisions of labor did not enable the laborers to do their best conceivable work. I am unable to say how early scholars began to express this in variants of the proposition, "We are not sufficiently *objective* in our science." It makes little difference whether those words were used early or not. The same idea was

conveyed in many other phrases; e.g.: we are not accurate enough; we do not get at all the facts; we do not find out all the connections of the facts; we treat the evidence as advocates, not as judges, etc. The cumulative effect of these dissatisfactions with habits of thinking in the social sciences was a mighty stimulus to more searching methods all along the line of social science. This stimulus not merely reanimated the older social sciences, but as I keep repeating, it created new ones. To speak in more modern idiom, this stimulus to closer objectivity brought investigators of human experience face to face with new problems, and some of the most crucial of these problems appealed to types of minds that could not work at their best upon the same types of problems that occupied the older types of scholars. Hence presently the modern divisions of labor.

Repeating what I have just said: this impatience expressed itself most energetically in modifications of the methods of historians, economists, and political scientists. After 1850 similar movements resulted in the divisions of labor since known as anthropology, ethnology, psychology (as distinguished from the earlier "mental philosophy"), sociology, etc. My belief is that the most intelligent history of these developments that will ever be written will treat them as primarily parts of one and the same movement, viz., as I have expressed it, *the nineteenth century drive toward objectivity in social science*.¹

To be sure this correlating fact does not appear on the surface. After 1800, as before, scholars were starting with dogmatic definitions of their procedure which committed them from the outset to a high degree of subjectivity in the pursuit of their so-called "sciences," whether philosophy, history, political economy, political science, or whatever. But there was another side to the case. Men in each of these divisions of social science were striving to reduce the ratio of partial interpretation or erroneous interpretation of reality which was carried along in the traditions of their specialty. While they did not propose as completely intelligent methods of interpreting human experience as the combined scholarship of the present day ought to be able to outline, they did

¹ I have elaborated this proposition in *Encyclopaedia Americana*, title "Sociology."

propose improvements in methods of research which were directly or indirectly tributary to objectivity. These men were bursting the shell of encrusted academic methods, and they were opening paths toward free knowledge. In spirit, if not in literal fact, they were proclaiming, "We have found the line of least resistance in the path toward completer knowledge." Their biggest mistake was not in supposing that they had discovered a better way to get knowledge, but in supposing that their way was the only way and the sufficient way. Men in each division of the social sciences fell under this temptation. Thus their very improvements after a while became obstinate provincialisms which obstructed further improvement. Sociology, or as I prefer to speak of it, *the sociological movement*, has been a perfectly normal development of this nineteenth century reaching out after completer objectivity. While the historians reached chiefly in one direction, and the economists in another, and the political scientists in another, and the psychologists in another, there were men who started in one or another of these divisions of labor, but who became impressed first and foremost by the belief that the great guiding question of social science must be, in substance, if not in these precise words, *What is the meaning of human experience?* Then these men, after brooding long over human futilities in trying to answer this question, were further impressed to the effect that the line of least resistance in blazing out a more direct way toward objectivity in answer to the question did not lie within the range marked out for themselves by the older social scientists. These innovators felt that the line of least resistance must be in a new track of their own. In this respect the sociologists were like Columbus. That is, he made no headway in convincing the learned men of Europe that their idea of the physical world was imperfect, so long as he stayed in their world. He actually had to find some additions by which to enlarge their world, before they would consent to overhaul their theories of the world.

For more than a generation the sociologists have been diligently reporting aspects of human experience which had either wholly or in part escaped the ken of the older social scientists. Whether these older social scientists are aware of it or not, these reaches

of human experience which the sociologists and the psychologists have brought to light within recent years, have changed the perspective of all social science as decisively as the discovery of the New World changed the outlook of physical science after 1492.

It may be helpful to express this in terms of *categories*. One of the great turning-points in the history of physical science was the substitution of the category "globe" for the category "disk," in ways of thinking about our physical world. Another turning-point in the history of science is marked by the substitution of the category "satellite" for the category "center," to express the relation of our world to what we now refer to as our solar system. Another turning-point in the history of physical science is marked by the substitution of the category "gravitation" for all the mythological categories which had previously been resorted to for explanation of the visible universe. In each case science was promoted in two ways: first, by the stimulus to inquiry which resulted in additions to knowledge of concrete facts; second, by stimulus to reasoning which resulted in reconstructions of known facts, so that relations between them were more veraciously represented, (that is, to use our technical word, so that reality was more "objectively" represented).

Of course, the substitution of a more accurate for a less accurate category did not have the effect of an Aladdin's lamp, to perform miracles in the search for knowledge. Neither one nor all of these new categories gave us forthwith a finished science of astronomy or geology or physics or chemistry or biology. Each of these categories simply did something to reduce the amount of blur in men's eyes when they were prying into the facts which have meanwhile been organized into modern physical science. This is precisely what more accurate categories substituted for less accurate categories are doing in social science. They are clearing dust out of eyes focused on social phenomena, and enabling those eyes to make out more accurately what the phenomena mean.

Perhaps the most useful illustrations may be drawn not from technical science, but from analogies in popular thinking. The categories "liberty," "equality," "fraternity," were substituted for the categories "slavery," "inequality," "tyranny" in the

minds of millions of people toward the close of the eighteenth century. These categories were not merely political slogans. They were not merely revolutionary weapons. They were also theses in social interpretation. They were assertions not only of things that the people wanted to gain. They were translations of the human lot in new terms, i.e., the human lot not as it had already developed, but as those people believed it was capable of developing and intended to develop. They were translations of the human lot as it was into marching orders to conquer a better, more rational, more consistent human lot supposed to be latent in existing conditions. As such, these new categories transformed men's attitudes toward the real world. They made men act less like helpless victims and more like capable captains of their own souls and architects of their own fortunes. These new categories were assertions that the human lot is a foreordained régime of "liberty," "equality," "fraternity." They were assertions that human wickedness had thwarted the plan of nature to realize "liberty," "equality," "fraternity." They were proclamations that, if the arbitrary contrivances erected by selfish interests were once torn down, natural forces would presently realize a condition of "liberty," "equality," "fraternity" among men throughout the world.

To what extent these people were right, and to what extent they were wrong, makes no difference for the particular point here illustrated. It is the universal truth of psychology, "as a man thinketh, so is he." Adopting categories which put a new interpretation on the world started both the people who accepted the categories and those who scorned them into greatly altered activities. These changed states of mind have been factors both in the world of research and in the world of practice ever since. The same thing is true in its measure of every alteration of the categories which men use as the terms of their thinking. This is my reason for believing that there can be no more radical preparation for objective dealing with the meaning of human experience than sufficient preliminary attention to the leading categories in use by the sociologists. This is fundamental "preparedness" in social science, and it is fundamental preparedness in general sophistication about the ways in which human affairs proceed.

One more formal expression of what is involved in sociology may be added, viz.:

a) The problem of all social science is discovery of the meaning of human experience.

b) The sociologists attempt to do their part toward this discovery by contemplating human experience as a totality of *group situations*.

c) Sociological technique has developed as analysis of group situations considered, *first*, under the aspect of *status*, i.e., the group relationships viewed as relatively permanent; *second*, under the aspect of *movement*, or the group relationships viewed as processes; *third*, under the aspect of *value*, or group processes viewed with reference to the types of persons and types of interpersonal relationships which they tend to produce; *fourth*, under the aspect of *control*, or group process—situations presenting alternatives for constructive effort.

Any adequate introduction to the study of sociology will, among other things, furnish a content for such generalizations as the foregoing.

WHAT SHALL WE DO WITH THE STATE? II

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So far the discussion has dealt with certain recent indictments by humanitarians and philosophers of so-called state nature—indictments based on the foreign policies of the great nations—and the criminal, aggressive wars directly or indirectly attributable to those policies. The attempt has been to point out the superficiality of those indictments and the necessity of a very different analysis of the international situation than that which underlies the notion that the state as such, or state nature, is somehow responsible for the diplomacy of intrigue, conquest, aggression, and greed.

In the following pages the alleged responsibility of "the state" for political, social, and economic evils "at home" will be discussed. Shall we abolish the state? *Can* we abolish it? Should we get rid of the evils and maladjustments complained of by liberals and radicals if we could, and did, abolish the state?

First of all, what is the state? A correct answer is clearly essential, yet is hardly ever given. The proper answer is, The state is another name for compulsory co-operation. A certain community, or state, or nation, organizes itself, a government is created, legislation adopted, and the individual, or the minority, has no choice, no alternative, but to obey the law of the state. In the freest and most democratic modern state, despite such devices as the initiative, the referendum, the recall, local home rule, the element of compulsion is necessarily always present. If all co-operation were voluntary; if the majority had no right to coerce the minority; if government actually, and in the literal sense, rested on the "consent of all the governed," there would be no state. There would be spontaneous collective action along many lines, no doubt, just as today there is

co-operation for religious, social, ethical, political, and aesthetic purposes *sans* the slightest suggestion of physical force or compulsion. But the state, as we know it, would have disappeared.

Now, this is exactly what the pacific and philosophical anarchists mean by "abolition of the state." They would gradually restrict the authority of the state, increasingly free the individual and the minority, and at last make even taxation and military service entirely voluntary under all conditions. They accordingly insist on the right of the individual to secede from, or ignore, the state. They would, of course, use force to prevent aggression or invasion by any individual; they would punish "crime"—that is, violations of the principle of equal freedom and equal opportunity—but with the inoffensive, peaceable individual, no matter how selfish, unsocial, unyielding he might be, they would not interfere—except, possibly, to the extent of boycotting him and impressing upon him the fact that he is deemed an unpleasant and undesirable neighbor.

This is the general idea Thoreau, the New England recluse and intense individualist, vaguely entertained when, for example, he wrote the following lines:

I heartily accept the motto (of Thomas Jefferson): "That government is best which governs least"; and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which also I believe: "That government is best which governs not at all"; and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have.

The progress from an absolute to a limited monarchy, from a limited monarchy to a democracy, is a progress toward a true respect for the individual. But is a democracy, such as we know it, the last improvement possible in government? Is it not possible to take a step further toward recognizing and organizing the rights of man?

There never will be a free and enlightened state until the state comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly. I please myself with imagining a state at least which can afford to be just to all men, and to treat the individual with respect as a neighbor; which even would not think it inconsistent with its own repose if a few were to live aloof from it, not meddling with it, nor embraced by it, who fulfilled all the duties of neighbors and fellowmen. A state which bore this kind of fruit, and suffered it to drop off as fast as it ripened, would prepare the way for a still more perfect and glorious state which also I have imagined, but not yet anywhere seen.

Who will object to these ideals and conceptions? But the difficulty with them as expressed is their strange, complete irrelevance to any actual problem of which we are conscious and which presses for a solution. Suppose we accept the view that the society of the future will be held together in the way outlined by the logical and uncompromising individualists. What follows? What is the bearing of that admission on our own situation? What practical program is suggested by the ideal of a free, state-less society? What are the steps to be taken today—this year, next year, the year after, ten years hence, and so on—with a view to reaching, at some distant day, the remote goal?

We know what the answer is: "Repeal, repeal, and again repeal." Society can become free only by removing one restriction after another, destroying one barrier after another, to the freest human intercourse. Free trade, free access to land, free banking, free issue of notes to circulate as currency, free association for any and all purposes not inherently immoral or criminal—this is the individualist platform.

Sound or unsound, this platform is certainly definite. But how many of the men and women who are discontented and rebellious, and who talk about radical changes in the organization of "the capitalistic state," accept the individualist views concerning protection, monopoly, banking, currency, and land tenure? Metaphysical discussion of the nature of sovereignty, limitations upon the power of the state, or the natural rights of the individual throws no light whatever on questions of economics. So great is the confusion of thought that a man may in the same breath urge the abolition of the state and propose high protective duties, or a government monopoly of coinage and currency! It is futile to paint alluring pictures of a free, state-less society when, as a matter of fact, only a most insignificant minority is prepared anywhere to take the first steps toward the alleged goal—namely, to repeal tariff laws, banking laws, currency laws, patent and copyright laws, and a hundred other regulative and restrictive laws supposed to be necessary for the protection of the poor, the uneducated, the credulous, the weak!

The problems of our period are primarily economic. The revolt being witnessed is a revolt against poverty, gross inequality in the

distribution of wealth, chronic unemployment, and the like. How many of the radicals believe that "the abolition of the state" in the anarchistic sense would do away with these evils? To be sure, socialists of the Marx school, too, have attacked "the state" and professed a desire to kill it. Under socialism properly understood, we have been assured in books and periodicals, the state dies, or dissolves into something totally different. When we analyze these affirmations, what do we find? A totally arbitrary assumption that the state is a capitalistic device, an instrument of oppression and enslavement, and that to abolish capitalism, nationalize industry, make everyone an employee of the community, is to kill the state.

Nothing can be more absurd and empty than this. The implied definition of the state in the socialist declamations against it is erroneous. Granted that there is such a thing as a capitalistic state, as there was such a thing as a military and aristocratic state, it clearly does not follow that to destroy any particular type of state is to destroy the state. There is also a democratic state, and a socialistic state. The Russian Bolshevik leaders are Marxian socialists, but *they have certainly not destroyed the state*. They lost no time in setting up a proletarian state, as they called their non-proletarian tyranny. They dispossessed and disfranchised the *bourgeois* elements, but they had the decency to refrain from pretending that they were abolishing the state. They admitted that they were setting up a dictatorship, a despotism, a state after their own heart. They had all manner of excuses, of course; the dictatorship was to be temporary; the revolution had to be saved at any cost, and the enemies of socialism were wicked counter-revolutionists, who deserved condign punishment and effective restraint. The intention was to usher in a reign of brotherhood and equality, to replace capitalism by harmonious co-operation. Meantime Lenin and his fanatical followers were to be "the state"—and a ruthless state in truth it has been.

Let us, however, recognize the distinction between emergency, or war, policies on the part of socialist or communist reformers, and permanent policies that are to obtain under normal conditions. Would socialism under normal conditions dispense with the state—kill the state? "No," is the answer, if, as has been shown, the

essence of the state is compulsion. Would a socialist state permit the individual to secede from it, to ignore it, to cultivate his little patch, and exchange his products with his neighbors without paying the state any kind of tax or tribute? Would the socialist state renounce the right to conscript men into military service, or the right to impose taxes on dissenting minorities? Where and when has any socialist author or leader proposed to kill the state *in this sense*—to depend entirely and unreservedly on voluntary co-operation, and to base government on the actual consent of all of the governed? There are individualist writers who assert that the socialist state would revert to involuntary servitude and would coerce the workman to a far greater degree than the capitalistic state has done. Let us not hastily subscribe to such charges as these. Certain it is, however, that the socialist state would not even attempt to dispense with compulsion and coercion of non-invasive individuals. The majority would rule—at least, in respect of essentials. How, then, can it be maintained that socialism would destroy statism?

At this point the guild socialist may be imagined as appearing on the stage and making his plea. No, indeed; orthodox socialism is incurably statist and tyrannical, and this very fact explains the advent of the guild socialists. *They* are not juggling with words; *they* are not guilty of inconsistency. They distrust the state and would reduce it to a minimum. For this reason they would give industrial guilds the maximum of autonomy; they would encourage the formation of other associations for various purposes; they would stimulate voluntary co-operation in a hundred directions. The jurisdiction of the state would be so limited that its present claim to a mysterious sanctity, to metaphysical authority, would appear ridiculous, and utility would become the sole title of the state to respect. Within its sphere, however, the state would use compulsion and possess sufficient authority to prevent usurpation or abuse of power by the autonomous guilds, or other local and functional organizations.

Manifestly, the guild socialists, though sincere in their libertarian professions, beg the real issue, or at least ignore it. They do not propose to kill the state, but merely to limit its jurisdiction

and force it, as one writer has said, to come down from its present "sovereign" pedestal and surrender some of its powers and functions to guild organizations. Their plan may indeed promise greater efficiency than any reasonable person can expect from a bureaucratic and despotic state; it may, too, prove more alluring to lovers of freedom and appreciative students of human personality. Still, the state would be perpetuated by guild socialists, and on supreme questions its fiat would be law.

The syndicalists assert that they would abolish the capitalistic state and prevent the establishment of a democratic or socialist state, but what would be their syndicate if not a small state, and what their federation of syndicates but a confederation of small states? As a matter of fact, syndicalism is a paper scheme that would break down at the first touch of reality—that would spell confusion worse confounded, and sooner or later lead to the restoration of a despotic state. As Mr. Bertrand Russell argues, the syndicalists have outlined no *modus operandi* to settle controversies among the autonomous industrial organizations, or between any of them and the consuming public. To affirm that the syndicalist directorates would be at all times amenable to reason and properly regardful of interests other than those of their particular industrial group—the miners, say, or the railroad workmen, or the able seamen—and that justice would be done in every case without prejudice or passion, is to revert to utopian socialism with a vengeance! But even if we should admit for the sake of the argument that syndicalism is practical, all that would be implied by the admission is that the modern or the traditional state is too powerful and therefore too dangerous, and that the time has come to replace it by a congeries of small, weak states. For, manifestly, the syndicate would be neither more nor less than a small state. The syndicate would have its directorate, its officers, its representative assembly, its referendum system, its rules and regulations. The majority would govern the syndicate within certain constitutionally prescribed limits, and the minority would have no choice but to obey. The majority might allow individuals to withdraw from the syndicate, but this right would have to be qualified and reconciled with the requirements of efficiency and stability. The advantages

of such withdrawal would be problematical, moreover, since the seceding individual or group would, in order to live and earn wages, be forced to join some other syndicate.

Syndicalism would abolish, to be sure, the "political" state, but it would substitute for it the "administrative" state. There are writers and thinkers who derive great comfort from this anticipated change, but it is to be feared that they are the victims of illusions and verbal juggles. Cannot an administrative state be even more tyrannical and arbitrary than our political state? Cannot a trade union be oppressive and despotic? Is "administration" protected by some magic, invisible shield from the vices and evils of political and bureaucratic government?

We must conclude, then, first, that none of the modern schools of thought really proposes to abolish the state, and, second, that the individualistic and philosophical anarchists, who would like to abolish it, and know exactly what is meant by the phrase "abolishing the state" admit that their goal is very distant and from any practical viewpoint utopian, since more than sufficient unto the day are the very first steps suggested toward that goal.

Is there, then, no problem before us that concerns the state, its structure and form, its basis and pillars? Are those who are asserting that the state is undergoing profound modifications imagining vain things? Does the state require no substantial changes? Has it adapted itself to the needs and conditions of our age and is it now functioning as it should? By no means. It is true that the state is "in transition," and that vital and important changes are clearly ahead of it. The nature of the changes is doubtless indicated by recent developments. They are, however, often magnified and even misapprehended.

In the first place, there is much confusion in radical minds with regard to the further democratization of the state. That the state has been, is being, and will continue to be "democratized," is a truism nowadays, but in what sense is the term democracy as applied to the state to be used? With a curious inconsistency many radical writers advocate at the same time the emancipation of the individual and the complete democratization of the state! Democracy is, however, very far from being synonymous with

individual liberty. If a completely democratized state means a state in which the majority rules absolutely, and in all departments of activity, and in which individuals and minorities enjoy none of the guaranties which, for example, they are accorded by the Constitution of the United States, then the democratization of the state will mean the enslavement of the individual. Minority government, oligarchical government, plutocratic government, are severally intolerable, and embattled majorities are now rightly seeking to destroy such forms of government. But majority government is not necessarily just or free government, and within certain limits the individual and the minority must always be protected from majority aggression. On this point the alleged *undemocratic* features of the American system are sound in principle, though no doubt far from perfect and open to much improvement. We cannot, in the name of democracy, suppress freedom of speech or of the press, or religious freedom, or artistic freedom, or freedom in personal and domestic conduct up to a certain point. To exalt and free the nonconforming individual is to restrain and curb the majority or the democratic state.

Again, the very people who are condemning the present state because of its arrogant assumption of sovereignty, its disregard of individual rights, the individual conscience, and the like, are clamorously demanding additional protective, regulative, restrictive legislation in the interest of the greater or greatest number, of the majority. Send profiteers to prison! is the cry. License all big corporations! Regulate prices and profits! Stop hoarding and speculation! These policies may be democratic, they may be necessary evils, but they are not consonant with individual and minority freedom, with the professed intention of starving and eventually killing the state. The consistent anti-statist may not admire profiteers and hoarders and food gamblers, but he would not regulate them by statutory law. He would trust the law of supply and demand in a free market. He would suffer temporary hardship and loss, but he would not sacrifice personal and economic liberty. To favor increased regulation of industry and commerce is not to kill the state but rather to strengthen it and give it a new lease of life.

Assuming, however, that there are democrats who are also good libertarians, and rational libertarians who are also good practical democrats, the question recurs, What would *these* do with the state? How would *they* improve it? First of all, they would deprive it of much of its occupation by re-establishing genuine equality of opportunity and industrial democracy. When crime and criminal vice abound, the state has much to do, and there can be no talk of killing it. When artificial monopoly and iniquitous privilege militate against the equitable and wholesome distribution of wealth and enable the few to exploit the many, appeals go up from a thousand directions to the supposedly mighty state, and legislation is sought in behalf of the poor, the weak, the disinherited. When commercial warfare and tariff or other discriminations threaten war or bring it about, the state metaphorically rubs its hands in glee and knows that its power and prestige are about to receive coveted immunity from criticism. War and preparedness for war always revivify the state and silence its theoretical enemies. War tends to tyranny. War is intolerant. War makes the state sovereign.

Peace, plenty, opportunity, economic justice, on the other hand, tend to weaken the state. Free and prosperous men do not need much government. To fight poverty, involuntary idleness, and unmerited misery is, therefore, to fight the present state. Industrial freedom will pave the way for greater political freedom. This is why the enlightened libertarian is not today greatly interested in academic attacks on the metaphysical state or the political state. He is interested in well-directed attacks on special privilege and shielded, protected monopolies, knowing that to get rid of these is to eradicate much poverty and much of the crime, vice, and brutality that poverty breeds. He who fights for economic and social reform fights for the emancipation of the soul of the individual as well, or for the curtailment of the authority of the state. Flank attacks on the state are far more effective at this stage of evolution than frontal attacks.

Yet there is no reason why in some sectors of the battle line a direct attack on the present "political" state should not be attempted. The governmental machine is breaking down, and the causes of this breakdown are not exclusively, though chiefly, eco-

nomic. Representative government very often seems to represent only the tricky and seamy side of human nature. Men elected to represent mixed constituencies often lack the courage to take definite positions on important questions and "play safe" by trimming, drifting, and pretending to be all things to all men. There are too many demagogues, time-servers, shifty politicians (called "practical"), in the public life of every democracy. Such men have no intellectual or moral fitness for the functions they are supposed to discharge. The result is futile, insincere, and ineffective legislation, evasion and paltering and endless delays in attending to ripe problems that demand earnest discussion and statesman-like action.

Even the average man, who is no philosopher, is disappointed in the conditions or prospects of modern democracy. He rails at politicians and politics. He does not expect efficiency or integrity of democratic government. He refuses to take seriously campaigns against waste, extravagance, or "graft." He sneers at party platforms, made, as he says, "to get in on but not to stand on." He is skeptical regarding the success of proposed reforms of the familiar type—for so many of them have been tried and found empty and fruitless.

This aspect of the democratic situation cannot and need not be ignored. It is responsible for much of the sympathy, interest, and enthusiasm which the Russian soviet system has aroused in liberal and progressive circles. The Russian Bolshevik idealists, we are assured by many, have shown us the way out—have evolved what Lenine calls "a higher form of democracy" than that of England, France, or America. Let us abolish our legislatures and executives, and "sovietize" our state and national governments, cry some superficial radicals.

The soviet system has nothing to do with bolshevism, terrorism, Leninism, or the dictatorship of a class. It does offer hints to advanced democracies, and its failure in Russia, which is certain, will not prove its total want of merit.

We must make our legislatures more representative and more efficient. This can be done, undoubtedly, by substituting, at least to some extent, representation of industries, social groups, schools

of opinions, vocations, and functions for the representation of geographical areas, heterogenous populations, and nebulous partisan policies. *This substitution is the essence of the soviet system*, and it is worth studying and experimenting with under favorable circumstances.

There is no reason why these American states that have been discussing the possibility of applying the commission plan of government to states, or of abolishing the upper chamber of the state legislature and experimenting with a unicameral general assembly, should not seriously consider an experiment along the Russian soviet lines. They might retain the state senate, but provide for the election of its members not, as now, by the body of voters, but by electoral colleges representing industrial guilds, commercial associations, bankers and brokers, merchants, trade unions, professional and scientific bodies, etc. Years ago Herbert Spencer, if memory serves, suggested the reformation of the British House of Lords after the manner just indicated. He would not have favored the soviet plan in its entirety, but he recognized the defects of Parliament—Carlyle's "Talking Machine"—and the necessity of such changes in the electoral system as might insure the adequate representation of the ability, the enterprise, the intelligence, the character, and the industry of the nation in the parliament. A revising chamber of experts, of men who "do things," who have had special training for constructive and positive work, would undoubtedly give a much better account of itself than a chamber of lawyers and politicians—especially of lawyers and politicians nominated and elected by partisan machines and local bosses.

In addition to a revising chamber of the type suggested, or pending the adoption of constitutional amendments permitting the creation and election of such a senate, national, state, and local councils might be organized for the purpose of deliberating on industrial, social, and mixed problems, carrying on investigations and tendering formal advice to the legislature. Such industrial councils are being organized, or at least proposed, in Great Britain. As some enlightened newspapers have pointed out, British progressives, with characteristic sense and sobriety have modified the Russian soviet plan and adapted it to the institutions and traditions

of their own country, whose genius for timely compromise and accommodation is universally admired. It is no humiliation to the sovereign Parliament of Britain to admit that it often fumbles and muddles because it lacks scientific and practical knowledge, and because it is hampered by partisan politics and supposed partisan strategy. But, humiliating or not, the admission that parliaments and congresses and legislatures of the conventional type have developed weakness and faults and require extensive "mending" will have to be made. And it is fortunate that sober-minded students of the problem are beginning to develop a sort of consensus of opinion respecting the sort of mending that needs to be done. Extreme, superficial notions are being discarded. The silly demand for the sudden, immediate "sovietizing" of our so-called *bourgeois* governments on the Moscow, Petrograd, and Budapest models was confined to ignorant and shallow editors of the yellow radical press. We shall hear little of that nonsense after a while, but we shall and ought to hear much about genuinely representative legislative assemblies, as well as about electoral machinery and electoral laws that are intentionally designed to produce such assemblies.

It is certain that even plain business men who would warmly repudiate any charge of sympathy with radicalism will increasingly insist on changes in the composition, personnel, and atmosphere of our legislative bodies. The complaint that "there are too many lawyers" in Congress is familiar and symptomatic. There are too many lawyers in every legislative body in the United States. Lawyers have a strong bias toward legalism. They are more adept at raising objections, drawing fine distinctions, splitting hairs, finding reasons against proposed courses of action, than at removing difficulties and making constructive suggestions. The business man is right when he asserts that we need, in public life, more men who know how to get results. We need farmers, merchants, manufacturers, engineers, physicians, educators, practical sociologists, mechanics, labor leaders, in our legislative bodies. This is in strict accord with the true democratic principle; there is nothing wild or extreme about the idea. We shall have a better state, a more efficient and democratic state, when the men and women who speak and act in its name represent industry, commerce, science,

the liberal professions, the arts, practical benevolence, and the like. That state will be as good as the average character, intelligence, and culture of the people can make it. More is impossible.

Finally, within the limits of the state's proper activities—and, to repeat with emphasis, to demand more democracy is *not* to demand the enthronement of the majority and the abolition of individual and minority rights—the voters must be armed with effective weapons of control and defense, with the referendum, the initiative, the recall, proportional representation, as against their elected representatives. A golden means must be found between the chaos and emotionalism of so-called “pure democracy,” which, in truth, has become impossible in large and heterogeneous societies, and a too rigid system of representative government, which has so often resulted in anti-democratic, anti-popular, misrepresentative government.

Changes still more fundamental than those sketched may and must be left to the future. It is unprofitable to speculate upon their nature, for the data available are wholly insufficient. Mere technical and mechanical progress may react powerfully on the modern state. The further development of a sane and sound internationalism, which is inevitable, cannot fail to affect the nationalist state. But such changes cannot be foreseen in the concrete; to predict them in vague generalities is not to facilitate them. The course of wisdom and sane, philosophical radicalism is to interpret and facilitate such changes as are surely coming, as are actually casting shadows before them, and as we can afford to encourage and welcome.

EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP IN A DEMOCRACY¹

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The Great War was supposedly fought to "make the world safe for democracy"; while some of us hoped that, purified by the trials of that mighty struggle and ennobled by its heroism, democracy might become "safe for the world." Neither result, however, is yet in evidence; and those of us who were optimistic as to the beneficent results of a victorious war upon our democracy and our civilization must sorrowfully admit the old, well-known truth that war in its effects is destructive, not constructive, and that constructive work for democracy must come through education. The only way we can "make the world safe for democracy" or democracy "safe for the world," it should now be evident, is through educating the world for democracy.

The sober fact is that democracy is now confronting the greatest crisis of its existence, and unless education can do something to foster it and render it successful it must go under. So far from increasing enthusiasm for democracy, the war seems to have had exactly the opposite effect in some quarters. Only recently university presidents, corporation managers, and even politicians have expressed doubts about the ability of the people to govern themselves. Such doubts may seem not unjustified in view of the present disturbed condition of even the most democratic countries. Democracy as a political and social system has, of course, been successful in the past, but under much simpler conditions of life. We must recognize that the relative success of democracy under the simple, rural conditions of life in which our fathers lived is but little argument for the success of democracy in the complex, urban civilization in which we live. The individualistic laissez faire democracy of our fathers will not work today. Their simple, rural life demanded only a minimum of

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social control, while our complex urban world demands a maximum of control, because social interdependence has been so vastly increased by the use of many things in common. The twenty million people massed in the great cities of our eastern seaboard would soon perish miserably if they were cut off for even a short time from the rest of the country by civil disturbances. Even the scattered striking of a few thousand switchmen throws their food supply into confusion. We have built a gigantic material civilization that resembles nothing so much as a mighty machine which requires almost infinite intelligence and good will to run it in such a way that it will not bring disaster upon us. Yet the intelligence and good will necessary to run this social machine must in a democracy reside in the people themselves. Here, then, is our problem, How are we to secure the intelligence and good will needed in the mass of our citizens to meet the increasingly complex problems of an ever-increasingly complex civilization?

Quite evidently both the advocates of democracy and the leaders of education have been guilty of serious overlookings as to the exact relations which must obtain between education and democracy in complex societies, if democracy is to be successful. Let us face facts as they are. In a democracy the people are the masters. This means that they must solve their own problems. The real sovereign in a democracy is public opinion; but public opinion is only the co-ordination of the individual judgments of the mass of individual citizens. If public opinion is to solve the staggering social and political problems which now confront our nation, it can only be on the condition that a good degree of social and political intelligence has been developed in the mass of citizens. To be sure, social and political leaders may play a dominant part in the formation and guidance of public opinion; but it should never be forgotten that in a democracy the people must provide and select their own leaders. They must provide for the training of wise leaders in their system of public education; then they must have enough social intelligence to distinguish the wise leader from the demagogue. This, again, makes the solution of social and political problems through public opinion a matter of education and of the general diffusion of social intelligence.

To put the matter concretely: the solution of such social and political problems as the harmonization of the relations of capital and labor, the juster distribution of wealth, a just system of taxation, the deflation of our currency, the reduction of the cost of living, the settlement of our international relations, the harmonious adjustment of the negro and the white, the control of immigration, the promotion of agriculture, the sanitation and government of our cities, the repression of vice and crime, all depend upon the development of intelligent public opinion. But this public opinion will depend for its intelligence, in the last analysis, upon the general diffusion of social and political intelligence among the mass of the people. Plainly the success or failure of democracy resolves itself into a matter of the social and political education of the citizen. Not until the nation sees this is there any hope of escape from the ills which now beset us. To think that citizens in a complex democracy like our own can become efficient through common sense and common experience is more foolish and more dangerous than to think that efficient farmers or engineers can be so produced. The problems which even the average citizen in our communities is now called upon to help solve are too complex to be solved intelligently through common sense and experience, but on the contrary require specific social and political education. Such social and political education, rightly conceived and carried out, is the real and the only remedy for the unrest and the disorders of our time.

But before we can discuss wherein such social and political education for citizenship in a democracy should consist, we must note the impediments which still stand in the way of all education in the United States, and how little as yet the public mind has linked the fate of our democracy with education. We are often told that the American people are "crazy over education" and we boast of our schools. How little warrant there is for such exaggeration or boasting, however, the facts disclose. A nation that pays its common-school teachers less than it pays its ditch-diggers and hodcarriers, its highest rank of university professors less than its locomotive engineers, can scarcely be said to be "crazy over education." We have left our schools to be dominated by petty and

local interests, often even without intelligent central supervision. How idle it is to boast of our schools we realize when we are told that nearly 25 per cent of the young men gathered into the training camps to form our national army during the Great War were found to be practically illiterate. Yet these illiterates help to make public opinion and decide public policies on the complex issues before our democracy. We expect them to share in the ideals which make our nation great as well as to fight its battles. Is it any wonder that our democracy often fails when it confronts some of the great crises of human history? Until our schools are at least efficient enough to free us from the curse of illiteracy and until they can free themselves from the blight of petty localism on the one hand and from the blight of inadequate support on the other; until they can become, in a word, agencies of national efficiency and of national service, it seems idle to discuss education for citizenship through them. Adequate social and political education for democracy, of course, cannot be realized until these preliminary difficulties are met.

Assuming, however, that these and similar difficulties have been met, what sort of education for democracy shall we plan? What is an adequate education for citizenship in a democracy? Obviously such an education must aim at creating social intelligence in citizens, on the one hand, and at maximizing co-operation among citizens on the other hand. The creation of social intelligence is the foundation. If democracy means that the people must solve their own problems, then ignorance is the deadliest foe of democracy. Ignorance makes democracy impossible, and of all the forms of ignorance the most deadly in a democracy is sociological ignorance; that is, ignorance of the laws and conditions of human living together. It is this sort of ignorance which breeds crimes, revolutions, bolshevism, anarchy, distrust and antagonism of classes, and even lack of faith in democracy itself. Not that ample knowledge of social laws and conditions would at once and in all cases lead to civic virtue and social harmony, but that it is the necessary foundation on which a harmonious and well-ordered social life can be built up. The more one studies present social life, the more one becomes convinced that the evils

from which we suffer are more due to ignorance than to malevolence. Even in the economic sphere the profiteering of business men and laboring men alike has in it a large element of ignorance. If, for example, everyone understood that our main economic problem is still that of increasing production rather than that of securing a juster distribution of wealth, that if all incomes were equalized even in this the richest nation in the world, they would still be inadequate for a comfortable standard of living, such knowledge alone would help to harmonize the relations between classes. Sheer ignorance, in other words, has led to an unfortunate overemphasis of the importance of the problem of the distribution of wealth, while the problem of the adequate production of wealth still remains unsolved. Similarly, lack of knowledge or imperfect knowledge is at the bottom of most social maladjustments, while misunderstandings and ignorance are the real causes of most of the conflicts of individuals, classes, nations, and races in our human world.

Said a prominent member of the British Parliament recently: "A quarter of a century in politics has converted me to one creed, to which I hold steadfastly in a world of changing political panaceas—the belief that education and knowledge, and the mutual forbearance and understanding sympathy which only knowledge can give, are the only cure for the social and political ills to which mankind is heir. We want information—a ceaseless propaganda of honest information, so that we may understand the complex and difficult problems of the period of transition through which we are now passing."

If these words are true, then the only way out in our civilization is through the developing of more social and political intelligence in the masses; and the easiest way to develop such intelligence is through more social and political education in our schools. Social studies should be fundamental in the curricula of our schools from kindergarten to college and should occupy not less than one-third of the student's time. By "social studies" I mean those that are concerned with human relationships and conditions, such as the study of history, of government, of industry, of family and community life, of public health, of social organization and

progress, and of social standards. Only through such social studies becoming central in our whole scheme of education can the present amazing ignorance of rich and poor alike regarding social conditions and laws be overcome and adequate education for citizenship in a democracy be secured. This is the revolution which is needed to solve our political and social problems and to lead us securely in the path of progress. The trouble is that our schools, held fast in the bonds of a traditional curriculum, and our educators, bound by the narrow educational theories of the past, only touch the fringe of genuine social education. So far as I know, no school or college has as yet definitely accepted the educational revolution of making social studies *central* in the curriculum. Yet how we can have an efficient, intelligent democracy, capable of solving its own problems, on any other condition than that social studies be made central in the curricula of all of our schools I fail to see.

Many profess to fear that such definite social and political education in our schools will work to maintain an established social order and even to sanction abuses of power. The reply is that if social studies are introduced into our schools upon a scientific basis no such effect need be feared. The social sciences necessarily involve searching but impersonal criticism of existing institutions and policies. They of all studies are best fitted to emancipate the mind and to free it from thralldom to mere social tradition. Other studies may be liberating and liberalizing for the mind, but none so profoundly as the social sciences, since they develop an impersonal or scientific attitude toward human affairs. If democracy means free society, then they best prepare for democracy, because they free the mind and thus prepare the way for rational social progress. The truth is that those who oppose social studies in our schools are usually those, whether they are revolutionists or conservatives, who believe that society must rest upon force rather than upon reason. They, in other words, are persons who distrust democracy. Democracy, on the other hand, has everything to gain and nothing to lose, from growing social intelligence and education.

We should not forget that alongside of the formal education of the schools is the informal education of the public press and

public oral discussion, which for the adult population is even more important than the schools in the diffusion of social information and in the formation of public opinion. It is through these agencies that the adult citizens of a democracy must educate one another regarding public questions; hence the importance of keeping them free and untrammelled by selfish interests. If they are kept free, the schools will also maintain their freedom, and we should not need to fear that social education would become an instrument of political conservatism. Educators have every interest, therefore, in maintaining freedom of public discussion and a free press—within the limits, of course, of courtesy, decency, and truth; for they are a part of the necessary machinery for the education of a democracy.

But social education means much more than instruction in social studies, important as that is. The imparting of social knowledge and the development of social intelligence is its foundation, but the socialization of the will, the maximization of the attitude of service, is its crown. Just now the world seems more sadly in need of good will and of unselfish service than of knowledge. Any social education which does not eventuate in the inculcation of social values, standards, and ideals is abortive. But as we have already pointed out the best way to inculcate social standards and ideals is through the scientific study of social facts and conditions. Thus as soon as we have ascertained the conditions and effects of child labor we have the knowledge on which to base a scientific standard regarding it which will compel the assent of all reasonable minds. We have made the mistake in the past of thinking that moral values, social standards, and even patriotism can be taught effectively as abstractions or dogmas. The right way to teach these highest things in social education, however, is undoubtedly through the study of concrete situations and problems, in which these values naturally emerge. If so taught, there will be no danger that the student in later life will regard these things as "mere dogmas."

The school should maintain and teach the attitude of service at all times. This it should do not dogmatically, so as to stifle individual conscience and judgment, but as an elastic, dynamic ideal which will give a definite social direction to the student's mental

and moral life. Self-interest as a basis for social living has been shown to be inadequate both through the experience of the past and through the study of the laws of human living together. The service ideal of life accordingly will naturally emerge from the study of social conditions and laws, and the school by its discipline and spirit should reinforce this ideal. The inculcation of the service ideal of life—of service beginning in the smaller, primary groups, such as the family and the local community, but extending to the nation and finally to humanity—is, then, the end to be sought in all education for citizenship in a democracy. Thus may we maximize co-operation and minimize conflict in the nation and in the whole world. Thus may we also, through the unexplored possibilities of co-operation or "team work," make our democracy some day so startlingly efficient that the boasted efficiency of autocracy will look small in comparison.

It should not be overlooked that such a thorough, socialized education for citizenship in a democracy would be essentially a religious education, in that it would aim to secure that consecration of life to the service of the community which ethical religion also aims at. It would be essentially a Christian education, not in a theological sense, but in the sense that it would inculcate the service of humanity as the highest end and aim of life. Thus social education would find that science, religion, and patriotism, now so often foolishly put in opposition to one another, are essentially harmonious and are all essential in education for ideal citizenship.

It should be unnecessary to point out that such a social education, which would throw the emphasis in education upon social intelligence and social service, would leave ample place for literary, physical, vocational, and every other sort of education needed for complete human living. Thus an education which did not include preparation for the serious work of life in a vocational sense would scarcely be worthy to be called social. Only social education would subordinate vocationalization to socialization. It would exalt the social man, the citizen, above his vocation, his physique, or his culture in the narrow sense of that word.

Two final matters of the utmost importance can only be touched upon in concluding our discussion of education for citizenship in a

democracy. The first is the necessity of educating leaders in a democracy. Democracies are like all other human societies—they can achieve great things only through capable leadership. But in a democracy the people themselves must provide and select their own leaders. This means that the whole educational system should be devised to select and train the most capable for social leadership. This places the main responsibility for the success of democracy upon those higher educational institutions which are supposed to be equipped for the training of social and political leaders, namely, the colleges and the universities. Are American colleges and universities awake to their full responsibility in this regard?

The second matter is the need of a national system of education in a democratic nation. Training for intelligent citizenship must be the first concern of the nation, if the nation is to live and to realize its destiny. Such education is a national concern and cannot be left with safety wholly to local interests. It is to our credit that we have devised a system of government which reconciles local and national interests. It should not be difficult to devise a system of education also which will reconcile local and national interests. We need a national minimum in education, and Congress should pass without delay the Smith-Towner bill, or some better bill, to provide at once a national system of education as the one indispensable measure for national reconstruction.

In conclusion, may I say that we need a deeper faith in education as a savior and regenerator of democracy? We need to realize that education is the conscious method of social evolution and so, in the last analysis, the only rational means of social progress. We need to see the vital relation between democracy and education, that both must rise or sink together. But we need especially a practical faith in education, such as will lead us to match every dollar spent for army or navy or military training by at least another dollar spent for our schools. Then, perhaps, we shall be able to safeguard our own democracy, and thus do our bit in making a world safe for democracy.

THE WAR AND THE COMMUNITY MOVEMENT

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I

While the war-born hope of international understanding and co-operation seems doomed to disappointment, the patriotic forces for unity set up within nations still give promise of bearing permanent fruit. The United States made a relatively small sacrifice in the struggle but shares equally with other nations the benefits of victory. The war shook America out of its provincialism and, like some powerful chemical, cast into more complete solution the various elements of its population. That old southern mountaineer spoke with significance who declared that the Hickory Division and the Twenty-seventh New York "done bust the Mason and Dixon Line" when they together broke the Hindenburg line. What years of patient education and exhortation in peace time failed to bring about the war swiftly advanced—an enlarged capacity for co-operative effort in good causes. The impetus to the community movement is the most conspicuous illustration of this hopeful phenomenon.

The armistice signed, public attention shifted from the arena of the war to the arena of community life. The nation functioned through the community in fighting to win the war; now it looks to the community to conserve the fruits of victory. The patriotic motive has been translated into a civic sense transcending that of pre-war days. The great religious and social organizations created or enlarged by the war, now that the soldier has returned, aim to build up in his home town a community life that will reflect the democratic ideal for which he fought. Concentrating on the instruction of women in rural and isolated communities, urging the war nurses to enter public health service rather than private, and enlarging and intensifying activities of local chapters, the Red Cross is endeavoring to build up higher standards of community health. The Y.M.C.A. has appealed to the returning soldier and

sailor to carry into his home community the lessons of the service and has striven to find for the soldier and sailor in every community friendship, the church of his choice, and some unselfish service. The National Catholic War Council found easy the transition from the activities of the Knights of Columbus in the training camps and in France to a full-fledged social program in the community. The activities of the War Camp Community Service in organizing and stimulating the resources of cities for the recreation of the men in uniform, instead of diminishing, have been intensified and are emerging into a broad peace-time movement for the general enrichment of the lives of all citizens. The welfare organizations are continuing in peace time and infusing their enthusiasm into the normal economic and social activities of the community.

While on the one hand the spirit of industrial conflict seems to be increasing, yet on the other the more far-sighted leaders of both labor and capital are interpreting the business of production in terms of association and partnership between employer and employee. Social well-being as well as material gain is declared to be the object of industry. Understanding the other fellow's problems and viewpoint, it is asserted, is the *sine qua non* of contentment and progress in industry.

The war itself and the social by-products of the war constitute no mean challenge to the church. The simple Christianity of the trenches is in order at home. Rabbi, priest, and minister are agreed that theories, beliefs, and doctrines must make concession to practical service. Ecclesiastical propaganda must yield to an emphasis on life, works, and social justice. An enlarged sense of community obligation has infected all creeds. Points of agreement and unity between sects, rather than points of divergence, are emphasized. The community church appears less impractical than formerly. Personal salvation, the importance of the hereafter, the emphasis on negations, many declare are secondary to social service, the urgency of the present, and a positive gospel. Fraternity, churchmen say, must be practiced as well as preached. The democratic tendency to give laymen a large place in the affairs of the church which was in evidence before the war has been greatly

stimulated. It is insisted that fellowship should be the democratic ideal of the church just as comradeship was the glory of the army.

The appeal for more humanity in education, the installation for the first time of courses in community organization by many colleges and universities, the re-emphasis on community centers by governmental and private organizations, all point to the desire to have the schools catch up and carry on into the future the democratic lessons of the war. A great educator has declared that the schools were created for the present hour. Secretary Lane proposed soon after the armistice that in the village communities where he would place the returned soldiers there should be community centers where the people might gather, have their own life, express themselves as they desire, and engage in co-operative buying and selling.

The stern business of war strangely enough brought out in the American community unexpected resources in the spirit of play. The spread of the play institute and the revival of amateur sport are evidences of the new attitude. Community singing has swept the country from the Atlantic to the Pacific. No public gathering, from a political convention to a church supper, is complete without mass singing. The play and pageant, like singing, are being applied to more democratic uses. General O'Ryan has proposed a municipal playhouse as a fitting memorial of the Great War. Percy MacKaye's ideal of community drama—"Splendidly and efficiently to be neighbors"—has an ever-widening appeal. Educators are now interpreting recreation as re-creation.

The community ideal of neighborliness and democracy has striking illustration in the direction that the war memorial idea has taken. The kinds of memorials that have appealed most to the fancy of the people, as well as of the artist, are such living memorials as the community house, auditorium, bridge, park, library, playhouse. The community house reflects the democratic lesson of the war and carries into the future the spirit of public service which has been so greatly stimulated. An expression of the community itself and designed to serve local needs, the community house is to become at once a new home and school of democracy.

The most unmistakable and trustworthy evidence of the community movement, however, is observable in the spontaneous spirit and enterprise of the communities themselves. The general impulse for community development is characterized by an emphasis on crying social needs, capitalization of the leisure time of the people for constructive recreation, democratic organization of the neighborhood life, and liberality in the expenditure of public funds. There is a surprising willingness to make financial investment in that intangible thing called community spirit. Co-ordination, harmony, the elimination of duplication and overlapping among organizations are the common slogans. Small cities and towns give the greater evidence of this civic awakening, although many large cities have plans for great improvements. Birmingham, Alabama, has voted a bond issue of four and one-half millions for the erection of schools, a city hall and library, and a community auditorium to cost five hundred thousand dollars. Fayetteville, North Carolina, having a population of but seven thousand, has bonded itself to the amount of \$115,000 in order to erect a community center as a war memorial and in addition has raised fifteen thousand dollars by public subscription to support a community service program that will insure ample and wide use of the community center. The St. Louis plan involves an expenditure of ninety-three million dollars and includes the construction of water works, parks, bridges, a great auditorium, water-front development, and the establishment of community centers. Indianapolis has decided to erect ten community houses to cost not less than seventy-five thousand dollars each. Within a short time after the armistice a council for "after-war service" was formed in Grand Rapids, the purpose of which was to "(1) co-ordinate and harmonize all organized efforts directed toward the solution of local after-war problems, (2) work through all private and public agencies which are doing or are preparing to do specialized work in any part of the whole field, and (3) stimulate organized effort in any particular field not already filled." The example of Reading, Massachusetts, where one thousand citizens as volunteers themselves performed the manual labor of laying out a tract of land as a memorial park, shows how a war-created

interest may fuse a whole community. Upward of one hundred cities where War Camp Community Service was in operation have taken up the work this organization laid down and will aim to provide organized recreation for the general population as well as for men in permanent naval and military posts.

The extensive programs of national and international organizations, the spontaneous impulse for civic development among the cities and towns themselves, and the concentration of fostering care upon the more isolated and economically poor communities by the federal government point to a better day in the civic life of the nation. The permanency of this fine enthusiasm and the success of plans projected will depend on whether communities have actually incorporated in themselves the lessons of the war. In fighting for a democratic cause, have we learned community democracy? Winston Churchill says that democracy has become a scientific experiment. In helping to win the war have we discovered the basic principles of successful community life? There is some evidence that the outlook for the future does not depend solely on the patriotic enthusiasm engendered by a righteous cause nor upon the natural wave of humanity and idealism that spread over a country which fought not for material gain but for the freedom of the world.

II

The community is not so conspicuous solely because Americans witnessed and shared in a war of democracy against autocracy. Nor do we look hopefully to the community inspired simply by a vague, indefinite sense of brotherhood and good will. Immortality is not gained by an immobile worship of deity. Democracy is not achieved by a patriotic subscription of loyalty to the cause of freedom. The prime importance of the community interest bears in on a citizen's consciousness when he has experienced a share in unselfish and co-operative service in its behalf. We are democratized by participation. A muscle develops through use.

The men who actually fought in the trenches are not the sole spiritual beneficiaries of the war. While it is true that in the midst of heroic sacrifice they were washed clean of sordid and

mean impulses, and a unique solidarity and comradeship were erected, at the same time the people back home were learning their own lessons in unselfish service and co-operation. When our men began to return from France, some writers with no little emotional vehemence undertook to paint a gulf yawning between the soldier heroes and ordinary people. A gulf there may have been, but it closed without any discernible social earthquake, as the history of the American Legion demonstrates. The differences between the returning soldiers and those who made them possible were after all not immeasurable. It was found that what Columbia produced she could take back to her bosom. The heroic and democratic stuff of our soldiers and sailors is also in the citizenry at large.

An immediate consequence of American participation in the war was to make civic spirit function more completely. The government fostered thrift, greater production of necessary commodities, the raising of funds for war purposes, the entertainment and welfare of the fighters. While every community looked to Washington for leadership, inspiration, and hope, Washington in turn looked to each community for fighters, goods, and morale. The great loans and other funds were raised by the skilful utilization of all the community forces in united drives. Liberty-loan parades, which brought into a single festive column representatives of all the social and racial groups of the population, reduced prejudices and increased mutual respect. What patriot could look upon the enthusiastic faces of the foreign-born or view a foreign flag carried side by side with the Stars and Stripes without feeling a thrill of sympathy and good will. However temporary, the money-raising campaigns drew the community together because of the common enthusiasm and voluntary co-operation they involved.

However, in the vast amount of so-called volunteer work during the war, more than in anything else, is found the key to the increased capacity of the American public for community effort. The war work of the countless volunteers in every community is as significant as that of the dollar-a-year patriots at Washington. In the outlook for the future, what is most important

is not what they did but how they did it. The self-appointed war tasks of many communities demanded the development of no little democratic technique.

The reaction of communities to the nearby concentration of large numbers of student soldiers was a wholesome civic improvement. Selfish interests at first sought to reap usurious profit from the soldiers' and sailors' necessity. But gradually cities and towns cleaned house and assumed for themselves the rôle of hospitality. The eager throngs of soldiers and sailors who poured cityward were a challenge to the heart and conscience of the community. The city became immediately a party to the training of the army and navy. In grappling with the leisure-time problem of the men in the military and naval service, communities learned lessons in co-operation, brotherhood, and democracy more potent and permanent than the temporary enthusiasm of a war-loan drive, the sympathetic appeal of Belgian suffering, or the loud acclaim of the glory of the embattled rights of man.

In the presence of the young men in khaki and blue, important psychological changes occurred in individuals which in the combined citizenry took form in significant social change. The visits of the soldier and sailor brought a personal as well as a social problem. In the face of such a challenge, a sense of personal responsibility for the welfare and entertainment of the men in uniform developed which expanded into an enlarged conception of the obligation of one's church, of one's club, and of the community. Business man, clergyman, clubwoman, artist, Boy Scout, musician, workingman, Rotarian, social worker, pooled their capacities to promote constructive recreation. Mr. Business Man not only served on a committee and voted an army and navy clubhouse but he personally dropped around to the club, chatted with the men, served coffee, or sold stamps. Mr. Workingman gave unpaid service in helping erect or decorate the club. The same spirit of service inspired the saloon-keeper in an industrial town to organize community singing as that which impelled a conscientious minister to permit movies and dancing in the church parlors. The ladies added to their Red Cross duties organized entertainment at the clubs, in the church, and in the home. The tirelessness, spontaneity, and

cheer of the American women in their war activities is no less remarkable than their capacity for organization and co-operation. Cutting across and uniting all groups, the community war work taught many valuable lessons of co-operation in social effort.

The varied and educative war activities of the community did more than give an outlet to the pent-up patriotic impulses of all sorts of people. The work of volunteers has given to tens of thousands a new spirit of service and has enriched the country with a veritable army of persons of some degree of training and experience in civic enterprises. The spoken conviction of American business that association and partnership are the necessary relation in industry has its basis in the personal activity of the business man in war work as well as in the fear of impending industrial revolt. The Baltimore business man with a three-hundred-a-day income who served sandwiches in a soldiers' club was being trained for the personal relation in industry. In the temporary alliances of war work an understanding developed that may yet become the basis for permanent harmonious relationships. A widespread though not always articulate spirit of social service exists. Sharp lines of social, religious, and racial cleavage have to a degree faded.

The development and outlook of the returned soldier and sailor have also had a wholesome influence on the community mind. The folks at home understand that the soldier and sailor have had a unique and broadening experience. The draft brought into the military organization a remarkable cosmopolitanism. Many an outfit learned its Americanism in the trenches. Army life was a liberal education because it provided each man with the technical training of warfare and the cultural influences of music, drama, reading, religion, and social intercourse in camp and city. However, the chief lesson that the soldier and sailor themselves say they have learned alike from the monotonous grind of the training camp and the acutely poignant trial of battle is that of comradeship. Returned to civil life, they mean to have a part in building a new humanity on the basis of the fine fraternity of the military and naval life. This point of view is having no uncertain influence on the community in this period of reconstruction.

The imaginative recreation so generously utilized everywhere has had a great influence in the community. Mass singing has served to melt the ice of civic indifference and has become the forerunner of co-operative activities of more substantial character. "People act less on reasoned conviction than on the spur of emotional or instinctive attitudes." The harmony of large diverse groups singing with one purpose results in united civic activities. Community drama, pageantry, and amateur theatricals have also had their socializing influence.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the spirit of play was abroad in the land far more during the war than before. This was the result of the camp athletic games and the attempt of the community to provide recreation for the soldier and the sailor. The community not only provided athletic contests, games, parties, and dances, but participated in these activities with their soldier and sailor guests. Joining in the game had the same fine socializing effect as community singing. Team play, harmony, brotherliness, and co-operation were the visible effects. Understanding, sympathy, postponement of individual to collective ends are the social by-products of collective play.

The popularity of the community house as a memorial is partly accounted for by the popularity of the soldiers' club the country over. The club in town and the hut at camp came to represent warmth, good cheer, camaraderie, and the spirit of brotherhood. They had something of the home touch. Returned from the service the soldier and sailor naturally favor a permanent institution of a similar character. The community, too, became accustomed to the club as a common gathering place, since it was there they assembled to entertain the men in the service. Moreover, the club represented the labor and the love of the many different groups who had a part in making it possible. An investment in a common house for the whole citizenship is a logical consequence of an investment in a club for a part of the citizenship that had donned the uniform. An additional cause of popularity of the community house is the powerful conviction that such a building is most symbolic of a living democracy and of the American spirit in the war.

The patriotic spirit in the country was not always articulate, not always well directed. Hospitable impulses and efforts were often wasted in overlapping. However, the government set in motion in the community civilian agencies which helped to make practical and productive the spontaneous spirit of service without superimposing authority or crushing initiative. The War Camp Community Service, in particular, functioned as a co-ordinating and stimulating agency, a clearing house for recreational activities provided for the soldier and sailor. A non-sectarian, non-partisan agency, it was able to teach many communities the art of doing things together with dispatch and effectiveness. It could not create community spirit, but it helped the community to apply it.

No institution worth the name in the community but has felt the impress of an enlarged community sense. The church could not but be stirred to self-examination as it was drawn more and more into the community activities of war work. The direct contacts of the Y.M.C.A., Knights of Columbus, and the Jewish Welfare Board—the agencies of the church—with the men in the service contributed immensely to the lesson. No chamber of commerce could meet the innumerable calls of the community without enlarging its social ideals. No club could open its doors to the soldier and sailor or promote a liberty loan without imbibing some of the spirit of a larger brotherhood. No refined home could receive an awkward, rough-shod farmer lad without being drawn closer to him and his kind. War activities made for practical neighborliness.

The country has begun reconstruction with a generous force of community spirit which will make for sanity, safety, and enhanced national efficiency if utilized. Shall the rich resources of trained personality in every community be demobilized and dismissed? Shall the spirit of unity and brotherhood go to waste? Will the warm impulses for service, which the war stirred in so many people, be permitted to dry up?

III

The intelligent application of the war-inspired enthusiasm and fervor for the community good to a sane program is the urgent task of the present. Far too many citizens, failing the glamor

and romance of the war motive, have already relapsed into pre-war indifference. Wisely guided, the spirit of neighborliness will not vanish into thin air but will crystallize in substantial opportunities for a larger life for the average citizen.

A practical plan of community service must have its chief inspiration and support not in a superimposed program but in local initiative. While many isolated and socially and economically poor communities will welcome a community service institute sent out by the state government, yet the towns and cities and even some rural districts will be averse to outside interference. In the main, each community must work out its own salvation. Local pride has been accentuated by the self-revelation brought about by war activities. A central and stimulating agency there may be, which will circulate successful ideas and methods or even furnish skilled community workers on request. But the service of the clearing-house cannot be thrust upon the community.

Community action must be as practical as it is spontaneous. The basis of community service must be organized friendship. Many cities that have a wealth of institutions, agencies, and societies that represent the finest motives of Christian spirit and friendship seldom have effected co-ordination and co-operation. They work at cross-purposes, overlap, waste effort. The basis of team success is the absolute performance by each member of the duty assigned him. The secret of a real neighborhood life is the acceptance of the personal responsibilities for which each individual is peculiarly qualified.

The objective of the community movement is, briefly put, a larger life for everybody. It means better moral, industrial, and social conditions, more production and productivity, more play and recreation, better health and better education, more adequate neighborhood expression. It means Americanization that will teach American ideas, customs, standards of living, democratic traditions, and social life as well as the English language. Community service may not fuse ecclesiastical organizations but it can unite churches in a wide range of community projects that imperil no special religious doctrine. The community will work for a healthful and profitable use of leisure time, by the provision

of parks, playgrounds, baths, municipal playhouses, community houses, museums, art galleries, libraries, band concerts, community singing, and pageants. The joint consideration of housing conditions, health, and employment may lead quickly to the orderly and friendly consideration and settlement of problems of wages, hours, profit-sharing, industrial management, and partnership.

The attainment of such an objective calls for a facile and adaptable organization of community resources. No organization of an institutional character can organize community spirit and make it function in practical ways. The first instinct of an institution is self-perpetuation. It demands a loyalty to itself that ultimately narrows its possibilities. It is essentially conservative and static. Only a community agency can successfully co-ordinate and stimulate community activity. It must aim at service, results; be content to accomplish in the name of other organizations; be dynamic, progressive, objective. It must guide, rather than dominate; point the way, suggest; act as a clearing-house for practical ideas from without; dispense methods, not means. It cannot create community spirit, but can harness that spirit to practical programs. The community agency is the transformer into which is poured the combined genius and social force of the community and from which issues forth forms of practical service that warm and brighten the life of every citizen.

Whatever the name or character of the agency, it must be representative. In cosmopolitan and heterogeneous neighborhoods, an organization of sectarian, political, or social bias is obviously impractical. A truly representative body is practical in any community; that the war demonstrated. The community committee, commission, or council, representing the humblest as well as the proudest, may approach any problem fearlessly and openly. It seeks through the community to do the practical things that make for human happiness. Municipal legislation as well as private initiative are its tools. It utilizes existing social machinery and creates new machinery only when necessary. The school, the community center, the church, the association, the club, the home, the individual are the working members of the great community team.

Unless the schools, in their teaching, catch up the new ideals of association and neighborliness, community spirit will eventually die. The old individualistic ideals must not be instilled into the minds of the pupils to the exclusion of the new conception of the necessity and glory of co-operative action. Each child must grow up realizing that he is a responsible member of a neighborhood and must be taught the how as well as the why of community service. The community center should inculcate citizenship in terms of civic activity, an American attitude of mind, and a well-rounded life as well as in terms of the three R's.

A well-rounded life has its play time. Recreation as an end in itself and as an approach to more vital social developments has come to stay. Community singing, plays, pageantry, and physical recreation must be stimulated among adults as well as among the youth. The outlet to physical and moral energy that the play of the camp and the game of warfare furnished the soldier and sailor must hereafter be provided the average citizen through constructive relaxation. Physical sport and imaginative recreation helped to produce good soldiers. They will help to make good citizens.

The church, the club, and the association as well as the school must prepare to play a larger part in the community life than they have heretofore. They must participate directly in many of the everyday problems of the everyday man and inspire their individual constituents to activity in others. While the church cannot transform itself into a settlement or nursery and continue to fulfill its own distinctive mission, yet it can have a large part in making the community function through its influence and teaching. The business men's association, the social club, the Grange, must broaden their activities to include adherent as well as inherent community interests. In community service, every participating organization will find a larger life; they will not be cramped or restricted. Neighborliness pays.

Says Mazzini: "We must make ourselves strong and great again by association." The war has created the sentiment for unity and fraternity and has revealed the method. Its termination has released rich resources in dedicated personality which have

the power to make civic achievement possible. The time is ripe for community service. All political creeds, social groups, religious sects agree to it in principle. The approval of both labor and capital is a safe guaranty of its success, if wisely handled. If an autonomous expression of the community conscience, functioning through a representative agency and projecting a practical program, it will operate successfully. It should tend to make more articulate the desires and aspirations of the common people and help them to realization. It should teach the lesson of mutual responsibility and brotherhood. It should interpret each group of the community to every other group. It should utilize to the full the newly discovered capacities of that great body of citizens who labored in war work at home and also of the men who defended the nation's honor on land and sea. It should make for stability, justice, neighborliness. It should do its work so well that ultimately it will cease to have need for existence because it will have taught the government how to function fully in every phase of community life.

STUDENTS' DISSERTATIONS IN SOCIOLOGY

The following list of doctoral dissertations and Masters' theses in preparation in American universities and colleges is the compilation of the returns from letters sent by the editors of the *Journal* to departments of sociology. The dates given indicate the probable year in which the degree will be conferred. The name of the college or university in italics refers to the institution where the theses or dissertations are in progress.

LIST OF DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN PROGRESS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES

- Gertrude B. Austin, B.S. Grinnell. "Leadership in the Woman Suffrage Movement in New York City." 1920. *Columbia*.
- I. W. Ayusawa, A.B. Haverford; A.M. *Columbia*. "International Labor Legislation." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Frank Clyde Baker, A.B. Oberlin; B.D. Yale; LL.B. New York Law School; LL.M. New York University Law School. "A Statistical Study of the Local Distribution of Voting on Constitutional Amendments by the Population of New York City." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Georgia Baxter, A.B. Denver; A.M. California. "A Statistical Study of Non-Support and Desertion." 1921. *Bryn Mawr*.
- Herman H. Beneke, A.B. Miami; A.M. Chicago. "The Concept of Graft." 1920. *Chicago*.
- William Arthur Berridge, A.B. Harvard; A.M. Harvard. "The Risk of Unemployment." 1921. *Harvard*.
- Martin Hayes Bickham, A.B. Pennsylvania; A.M. Chicago. "The Social Evolution of Democracy." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Walter Blaine Bodenhafer, A.B. Indiana; LL.B. Indiana; A.M. Kansas. "Rôle of Group Concept in Ward and Modern Sociology." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Emerson O. Bradshaw, Ph.B. Chicago; M.A. Chicago. "Social Forces Affecting the Life of the Industrial Community." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Barnett Robert Brickner, B.S. *Columbia*; A.M. *Columbia*. "Community Organization of the Jews in Cincinnati." 1921. *Cincinnati*.
- Thomas I. Brown, A.B. Clark College; M.A. Clark University. "American Business Mores during the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century." 1921. *Clark*.

- Agnes Mary Hadden Brynes, A.B. Northwestern; A.M. Columbia. "Industrial Home Work in Pennsylvania." 1920. *Bryn Mawr*.
- Ginevra Capocelli, A.B. Naples; A.M. Columbia. "The Influence of the War on Italy." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Niles Carpenter, A.B. Northwestern; M.A. Northwestern. "Guild Socialism." 1920. *Harvard*.
- Archibald B. Clark, A.B. Reed. "The Popular Vote as an Index of Solidarity." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Bertha W. Clark, A.B. George Washington; A.M. Columbia. "Attitude of Foreigners in America toward Our Educational System." 1922. *Minnesola*.
- Mary O. Cowper, A.B. Drury; A.M. Kansas. "The History of Woman Suffrage in Kansas." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Frieda Opal Daniel, A.B. Drake. "A Social Survey of an Industrial Area, Chicago." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Stanley P. Davies, A.B. Bucknell. "Racial Assimilation in a Community in the Anthracite Coal Region." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Jerome Davis, A.M. Columbia. "Russians in the United States." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Jerome B. Davis, A.B. Oberlin. "The Russian Slav in America." 1921. *Wisconsin*.
- C. A. Dawson, A.B. Aciadia. "The Social Nature of Thinking." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Frederick G. Detwiler, B.D. Rochester Theological Seminary; A.B., A.M. Denison. "A Study of the Negro Press in the United States." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Julius Drachsler, B.S. City College of New York; A.M. Columbia. "Ethnology in New York City: A Study of Amalgamation of Foreign Nationalities." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Z. T. Egardner, A.B. Basel; A.M. Cincinnati. "Problems of Socialization, Democratization, and Americanization in an Urban Community." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Frieda Fligelman, A.B. Wisconsin. "The Principle of Participation—A Critique of 'Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés Inferieures.'" 1921. *Columbia*.
- W. E. Garnett, A.B. Cornell; A.M. Peabody. "Social Survey of Albermarle County, Virginia." 1920. *Wisconsin*.
- Jacob A. Goldberg, A.B. City College of New York. "Social Treatment of the Insane." 1920. *Columbia*.
- George E. Hartmann, A.B. Cincinnati. "Race Consciousness: A Function of Race Prejudice, with Particular Reference to the American Negro." 1920. *Chicago*.
- H. B. Hawthorne, A.B. Iowa Agricultural College. "The Comparative Efficiency of Rural Communities." 1921. *Wisconsin*.

- Joyce O. Hertzler, A.B. Baldwin-Wallace; A.M. Wisconsin. "Social Utopias and Utopianism." 1920. *Wisconsin*.
- Roy Hinman Holmes, A.B. Hillsdale; A.M. Michigan. "The Farm in Democracy." 1920. *Michigan*.
- Jakub Hořák, Ph.B. Chicago. "A Study of Czecho-Slovak Community Organization in Chicago." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Gwendolyn Hughes, A.B. Nebraska; A.M. Nebraska. "Mothers in Industry; a Study in Causation." 1920. *Bryn Mawr*.
- Uichi Iwasaki, LL.B. Kansas; A.M. Columbia. "Phases of Social Organization in Japan, 1911-1919." 1920. *Columbia*.
- C. C. Jansen, A.B. Taylor; A.M. Kansas. "The Americanization of German-Russian Mennonites in Central Kansas." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Glenn R. Johnson, A.B. Reed. "The American Newspaper as an Indicator of Social Forces." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Frederick Jones, B.S. Virginia Polytechnic Institute; A.B. Richmond; A.M. Columbia. "Measure of Forms of Political Progress." 1921. *Columbia*.
- S. C. Kincheloe, A.B. Drake; A.M. Chicago. "The Psychology of Leadership." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Ada Ruth Kuhn, A.B. Nebraska; A.M. Nebraska. "Mothers in Industry; a Study in Effect." 1921. *Bryn Mawr*.
- Dan H. Kulp, A.B., A.M. Brown. "The Chinese Family." 1921. *Chicago*.
- C. S. Laidman, A.B. Manitoba. "A Study of the Institutional Church in Chicago." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Charles E. Lively, A.B. Nebraska; A.M. Nebraska. "The Social Life of the Rural Community in Its Relation to Types of Agriculture." 1922. *Minnesota*.
- Roderick D. McKenzie, A.B. Manitoba; A.M. Chicago. "The Social Study of the Neighborhood." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Benjamin Malzberg, B.S. City College of New York. "Causes of Crime." 1921. *Columbia*.
- May Baker Marsh, A.B., A.M. Michigan. "Folkways in Art." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Anne Harold Martin, Ph.B. Chicago. "The Conflict Myth." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Bruce Lee Melvin, A.B. Missouri; A.M. Missouri. "The Social Structure and Function of the American Village." 1920. *Missouri*.
- Richard Stockton Meriam, A.B. Harvard. "Development of Trade Unionism in Imperial Germany." 1921. *Harvard*.
- Else Milner Michod, A.B. Chicago; M.A. Chicago. "The Woman Offender." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Ralph W. Nelson, A.B. Phillips; A.M. Kansas; B.D. Yale. "Elements of the Social Theory of Jesus." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Clemens Niemi, A.B. Minnesota; A.M. Chicago. "The Finnish Element in the American Population." 1921. *Chicago*.

- Hazel Grant Ormsbee, A.B. Cornell. "The Juvenile Labor Exchange in the United States and England, with a Statistical Analysis of Records in the Philadelphia Bureau of Compulsory Education." 1921. *Bryn Mawr*.
- Maurice Thomas Price, A.B. Chicago. "The Technique of Religious Propaganda." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Samuel Henry Prince, A.B., A.M. Toronto. "Catastrophe and Social Organization." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Clarence E. Rainwater, A.B., A.M. Drake. "The Neighborhood Center." 1921. *Chicago*.
- S. C. Ratcliffe, A.B. Mount Allison; A.M. Alberta. "The Historical Development of Poor Relief Legislation in Illinois." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Ellery F. Reed, A.B. Lenox; A.M. Clark. "Causes and Control of Radicalism." 1921. *Illinois*.
- Frank Alexander Ross, Ph.B. Yale; A.M. Columbia. "A Study of the Application of Statistical Methods to Sociological Problems." 1920. *Columbia*.
- G. S. H. Rossouw, A.B. Cape of Good Hope; A.M. Chicago. "Nationalism and Folk Language." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Herbert Newhard Shenton, A.B. Dickinson; A.M. Columbia; B.D. Drew. "Collective Decision." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Ernest Hugh Shideler, A.B. Ottawa; M.A. Chicago. "Social Heredity." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Russell Gordon Smith, A.B. Richmond; A.M. Columbia. "A Sociological Study of Opinion in the United States." 1921. *Columbia*.
- William C. Smith, A.B. Grand Island; A.M. Chicago. "Conflict and Fusion of Cultures as Typified by the Ao Nagas of Northeast India." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Donald R. Taft, A.B. Clark. "The Rôle of Sympathy in Labor Organizations." 1921. *Columbia*.
- J. Franklin Thomas, A.B. Beloit. "Theories concerning the Influence of Physical Environment upon Society." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Donna Fay Thompson, A.B., A.M. Indiana. "The Birth-Rate in College Graduates' Families." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Frederic M. Thrasher, A.B. De Pauw; A.M. Chicago. "The Boy Scout Movement as a Socializing Agency." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Sumis Uesugi, A.M. Chicago. "The Family in Japan." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Amey Eaton Watson (Mrs. Frank D.), A.B. Women's College, Brown; A.M. Pennsylvania. "Social Treatment of Illegitimate Mothers." 1921. *Bryn Mawr*.
- Comer M. Woodward, A.B. Emory; A.M., D.B. Chicago. "A Case Study of Successful Rural Churches." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Thomas Jackson Woofter, A.B. Georgia. "Rural Organization and Negro Migration." 1920. *Columbia*.

- Fred Roy Yoder, A.B. Lenoir; A.M. North Carolina. "The Social Aspects of Farm Tenancy." 1920. *Missouri*.
- Oscar B. Ytrehus, A.B. North Dakota. "A Study of the Scandinavian American Press." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Tinn Hugh Yu, A.B. Maine; M.A. Clark. "Social Evolution and Social Control in China." 1920. *Clark*.
- A. C. Zumbunnen, A.B. Central; A.M. Missouri. "The Community Church: A New Expression of the Movement for Denominational Unity." 1920. *Chicago*.

LIST OF MASTERS' DISSERTATIONS IN PROGRESS IN AMERICAN
UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES

- Ruth Babcock, B.S. New York Teachers College. "A Study of a Public School as a Social Force in an Italian Neighborhood." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Gladys Norton Beaumont, A.B. Nebraska. "Administration of Juvenile Court Law in Nebraska." 1920. *Nebraska*.
- Myrtle Disie Berry, A.B. Nebraska. "Effect of War on Legislation Relating to Foreigners." 1921. *Nebraska*.
- David A. Bridge, A.B. Southern California. "Recreation Center District of Los Angeles." 1920. *Southern California*.
- Ralph F. Burnight, A.B. Southern California. "The Japanese Problem in Rural Los Angeles County." 1920. *Southern California*.
- Anna Marghuerite Cameron, A.B. Nebraska. "Borderlinity: A Study of 200 Cases of Retardation in Lincoln Public Schools." 1920. *Nebraska*.
- Spenser W. Castle, A.B. Beloit. "A Newspaper Phase of Sociology." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Grace Challman, A.B. Minnesota. "The Use of Leisure Time by the Italians of New York City." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Seward Cheung Chan, Ph.B. Chicago. "Religious Education in the Home." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Winifred Chappell, Ph.B. Northwestern. "Industrial Missions." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Ernest John Chave, A.B., Th.B. McMaster. "Religious Education and the Development of Social Attitudes." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Ta Chen, A.B. Reed. "Practical Eugenics in the United States: Birth Control." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Albert B. Clarfield, B.S. Kiev; LL.B. New York University. "The Americanization of the Foreign Born in a Typical American Community." 1920. *Minnesota*.
- Eleanor Coit, A.B. Smith. "Some Primary Social Effects of the Organization of Women in Industry." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Marjorie H. Coonley, Ph.B. Chicago. "The History of the United Charities of Chicago." 1920. *Chicago*.

- Herbert Cumming Cornuelle, A.B. Cincinnati. "A Critical Examination of the Social Teachings of Jesus." 1920. *Cincinnati*.
- Mearl P. Culver, A.B. Albion. "A Sociological Survey of a Long Island Town." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Peter Marshall Curry, A.B. Baylor. "Woman As Fundamentally Related to Social Progress." 1920. *Brown*.
- Hazel Jane Darby, A.B. Ohio State. "Labor Turnover in Department Stores in Columbus." 1921. *Ohio State*.
- Henderson Hamilton Donald, A.B. Howard. "An Interpretation of Negro Migration in 1916-18." 1920. *Yale*.
- Elizabeth Downing, A.B. Trinity. "After-Care Methods in Dealing with Children in Catholic Institutions." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Edwin F. Dummeier, A.B. Louisiana State University. "Financing Public Education in Colorado." 1921. *Colorado*.
- M. Eutropia Flannery, A.B. Marquette. "Biblical Influence on Modern Novels." 1920. *Loyola*.
- Arabel F. Forbes, B.S. New York Teachers College. "The Labor Problem of Ulster County of New York State." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Katherine A. Fox, B.E. Wisconsin. "Democracy in Merchant Gilds of Middle Ages." 1921. *Loyola*.
- Edward Frazier, A.B. Clark. "New Currents of Thought among Our Negro Population." 1920. *Clark*.
- A. A. Frederick, A.B. Beloit. "A Study of the Personality of the Workman in Machine Industry." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Daniel C. Fu, A.B. William Jewell. "The Chinese Family." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Mary B. Garvin, A.B. Illinois. "Fifty Years of Progress toward Church Unity in the United States." 1920. *Illinois*.
- Dorothy Gary, A.B. Westhampton. "Headlines of Some New York Papers as Social Stimuli." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Julia Gethman, A.B. Northwestern. "The Settlement—A Factor in Americanization." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Columb Gilfillan, A.B. Pennsylvania. "Successful Social Prophecy in the Past." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Sophia Gleim, A.B. Ohio Northern. "The Visiting Teacher." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Charles Guy Gomon, A.B. Nebraska Wesleyan. "The Saloon: A Study in Social Causation." 1920. *Nebraska*.
- Alonzo G. Grace, A.B. Minnesota. "Problems in Amalgamation and Assimilation." 1920. *Minnesota*.
- Clementina Griffin, A.B. Vassar. "Poverty among the Mexicans in Los Angeles." 1920. *Southern California*.
- Royal G. Hall, A.B. Park; B.D. Auburn Theological Seminary. "The Religious Implications of Democracy." 1920. *Kansas*.

- Olive Hardwick, A.B. Agnes Scott. "The American Newspaper as a Social Force." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Ralph Harshman, A.B. Ohio Northern. "Racial Contacts in Columbus." 1920. *Ohio State*.
- James Noble Holsen, A.B. Butler. "The Public Lands, 1860-1900." 1920. *Indiana*.
- Frank C. Irwin, A.B. Saskatchewan. "Canadian Industrial Disputes Act." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Helen Rankin Jeter, A.B. California. "A Summary of Juvenile Court Legislation in the United States." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Ernest Jones, A.B. Missouri. "Survey of the Rural Churches of Randolph County, Missouri." 1920. *Missouri*.
- Fay B. Karpf, B.S. Northwestern. "History and Development of Jewish Philanthropy in Chicago." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Frances M. Kilpatrick, A.B. Northwestern. "A Sociological Study of Feminism." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Ellis L. Kirkpatrick. B.S. Iowa State Agricultural. "Social Life of the 'Brethern': A Study of the English River Community, Iowa." 1920. *Kansas*.
- Olive P. Kirschner, A.B. Boston. "The Italians in Los Angeles." 1920. *Southern California*.
- E. T. Krueger, A.B. Illinois; B.D. Chicago Theological Seminary. "The Problem of the Function of the College." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Shiko Kusama, Ph.B. Chicago. "Public Opinion and the Japanese Press in the United States." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Charles M. Larcomb, A.B. Ohio Wesleyan. "Survey of Free Placement in Chicago." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Henrietta Larson, A.B. St. Olaf. "The Social Significance of the Non-Partisan League." 1920. *Columbia*.
- O. R. Lavers, A.B. Queens. "The Social Significance of Housing." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Amy Jane Leazenby, B.S. Missouri. "Day Nurseries as an Agency in Child Care." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Celeste Legér, A.B. Chicago. "Bibliography of Catholic Periodicals." 1920. *Loyola*.
- Cynthia B. Lewis, B.S. New York Teachers College. "The Society of Friends in the War. A Sociological Study." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Chi Li, A.B. Clark College. "The Problem of Individual Differences." 1920. *Clark*.
- Elsie McCartney, A.B. Trinity. "The Development of the Juvenile Court Movement." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Emma C. Martin, A.B. Butler. "A Study of Leadership. Woman in the Professions." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Harold Shepard Matthews, A.B. Grinnell. "The Influence of the Missionary on the Social Conditions of China." 1920. *Chicago*.

- Ernest Meili, A.B. Central Wesleyan. "The Standard of Living of the Coal Miners of Columbia, Missouri." 1920. *Missouri*.
- Olga M. Meloy, A.B. Dickinson. "A Recreation Survey of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Frankie Merson, A.B. Bates. "Recent Tendencies in the Labor Movement in England and America." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Montagu F. Modder, A.B. Royal; B.H. Springfield. "Caste System in India." 1920. *Clark*.
- John Alexander Morrison, B.S. Lewis Institute. "A History of the Salvation Army from 1880 to the Present." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Marguerite Munroe, A.B. Southern California. "Caring for Orphans in Los Angeles County." 1920. *Southern California*.
- Elizabeth Carle Nelson, A.B. Texas. "Economic Organization of the Eskimo and Chukchee." 1920. *Texas*.
- Marian Neuls, A.B. Southern California. "Home Service in Los Angeles." 1920. *Southern California*.
- Grace Pabst, A.B. Hunter. "The History and Present Status of the Eugenics Movement." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Warren Pearson, A.B. Kansas. "The Problem of Leisure Time." 1920. *Kansas*.
- Lillian Pierce, A.B. Southern California. "The Negro in Watts, California." 1920. *Southern California*.
- Carl Terence Pihlblad, A.B. Bethany. "The Language Assimilation of a Swedish Community in the Middle West." 1920. *Missouri*.
- Lorine L. Pruette, B.S. Chattanooga. "Sumner and Durkheim; a Comparative Study." 1920. *Clark*.
- Edward G. Punké, B.S. Hastings. "The Guild Socialist Movement." 1920. *Missouri*.
- Norman J. Radder, A.B. Wisconsin. "A Study of the News Value of Feature Articles in Newspapers." 1921. *Minnesota*.
- Harry Henry Reimund, A.B. Nebraska. "Enforcement of School Attendance Law in Nebraska." 1921. *Nebraska*.
- Lendell C. Ridley, A.B., B.D. Wilberforce. "Housing Conditions among Colored People in Columbus." 1920. *Ohio State*.
- Myra Rieve, B.S. Loyola. "Preventive Work in Religious Orders of Women." 1921. *Loyola*.
- Kenoske Sato, A.B. Illinois. "A Study in Social Valuation Process." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Helen I. Schermerhorn, A.B. Vassar. "Some Observations of Social Behavior in Children of the Intermediate Grades." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Wilford Hall Scott, A.B. Culver-Stockton; D.B. Bible College of Missouri. "The Significance for Missions of Hindu Social Attitudes." 1920. *Chicago*.

- Earl Truman Sechler, A.B. Drury College; S.B. Springfield Normal. "The Attitude of the Prophets toward Wealth." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Clifford R. Shaw, A.B. Adrian. "Family Disintegration as a Contributing Factor in Juvenile Delinquency." 1920. *Chicago*.
- John Herman Shields, A.B. Texas. "Corporation Taxes in Texas." 1920. *Texas*.
- Aileen Smith, A.B. Southern Methodist. "Social Organization in a Club of Young Working Girls." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Francis M. Smith, A.B. Southern California. "Social Conditions in Tropic, California." 1920. *Southern California*.
- Gilbert H. Smith, A.B. Trinity. "Denominational Activities at the State Universities." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Louise M. Spaeth, A.B. Texas. "An Analysis of Trade Unionism from the Standpoint of Social Control." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Earl Sylvester Sparks, A.B. Texas. "A Survey of Organized Labor in Austin, Texas." 1920. *Texas*.
- Gladys F. Speaker, A.B. Minnesota. "An Americanization Teaching Program." 1920. *Minnesota*.
- Virginia Wendell Spence, A.B. Texas. "The Awards of the National War Labor Board." 1920. *Texas*.
- Ellis L. Starrett, A.B. Kansas. "A Survey of National Voluntary Social Welfare Organizations in the United States." 1920. *Kansas*.
- Katherine Tighe, A.B. Vassar. "The Unplaceable Child." 1920. *Minnesota*.
- Arthur Van Dervort, A.B. Hiram. "Was Sumner Fatalistic?" 1920. *Columbia*.
- Thomas F. Walsh, A.B. St. Joseph's. "A Study of the Increased Wages and of the Increased Leisure of the Working Class in a Catholic Parish in Upper Manhattan." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Frank Bird Ward, Ph.B. Denison. "An Interpretation of the Chartist Movement." 1920. *Cincinnati*.
- Frank Dale Warren, A.B. Princeton. "Causes of Migration." 1920. *Columbia*.
- Mabel Ranney Wheeler, A.B. Kansas. "The Germanic Element in Kansas: Its Significance to the State." 1920. *Kansas*.
- Elizabeth K. Wilson, A.B. Kansas. "The Development and Value of the Psychopathic Laboratory in the Courts of the United States." 1920. *Kansas*.
- Cass Ward Whitney, B.S. Cornell. "Rural Recreation." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Forest Emerson Witcraft, A.B. Chicago. "The Elements of the Mana Concept." 1920. *Chicago*.
- Wilbert L. Witte, A.B. Northwestern College. "The County Y.M.C.A.: Its Development, Organization, and Program." 1920. *Minnesota*.
- Erle Fiske Young, Ph.B. Chicago. "The Use of Case Method in Training Social Workers." 1920. *Chicago*.

NEWS AND NOTES

Notes of interest to the readers of the *Journal* should be in the hands of the editor of "News and Notes" not later than the tenth of the month preceding publication.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK

The National Conference of Social Work held April 14-21 in New Orleans was both a revelation of the progress of social work in the South and an impetus to its growth in the future. A further indication of the fundamental nature of this social interest is the opening and expansion of departments of sociology in several universities and colleges in southern states. A feature of the conference was the increased interest in training for social work. One session of the Division on Organizing of Social Forces was devoted to this subject. Professor R. J. Colbert, at present educational director of the Gulf Division, American Red Cross, spoke on "Training and Action in Social Work," and Porter R. Lee, director of the New York School of Social Work, gave a paper on "Providing Teaching Material." The Association of Training Schools of Social Work also held an open session on the relation of field work to the training of social workers.

Among the sociologists present at the conference, the following read papers: Professor Lee Bidgood, University of Alabama, "The Place of the Juvenile Court in the Care of Dependent Children"; Professor A. J. Todd, University of Minnesota, "The Responsibility of Social Workers as the Interpreters of Industrial Problems" and "Desired Minimum of Sociological Insight for Workers with Delinquents"; Professor Alfred Arvold, University of North Dakota, "Citizenship through Dramatic and Art Interests"; Professor E. C. Lindeman, North Carolina College for Women, "The Organization and Maintenance of Recreation in Rural Communities"; Professor Frederick Seidenburg, Loyola University, "Federations of Catholic Charities"; Professor Robert E. Park, University of Chicago, "The Foreign Language Press and Social Progress."

THE SOUTHERN SOCIOLOGICAL CONGRESS

The Southern Sociological Congress held its ninth annual convention in Washington, D.C., May 9-13. The president, Bishop

Theodore Bratton of Mississippi, presided. Among those who made addresses were: Dr. Shailer Mathews, of the University of Chicago; Professor Charles A. Ellwood, of the University of Missouri; Dr. Edward T. Devine, of New York City; Professor Irving Fisher, of Yale University; Dr. Samuel Zane Batten, of Philadelphia; Dr. R. R. Moton, president of Tuskegee Institute; Mr. George W. Coleman, of Boston; Dr. Livingston Farrand, of the American Red Cross; Dr. H. W. Wiley, Washington, D.C.; Dr. William L. Poteat, North Carolina; Surgeon-General Hugh S. Cumming, of the Federal Public Health Service; Dr. Worth M. Tippy, of the Federal Council of Churches; and Rev. J. Fort Newton, recently of City Temple of London.

Professor Ellwood was chairman of the Committee on Resolutions, and among the important resolutions adopted was one asking Congress to establish a federal Department of Education and Health, with a cabinet officer at its head.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Dr. L. H. Haney, formerly with the Federal Trade Commission, has been appointed specialist in economic research in the Bureau of Markets of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. He will conduct costs-of-marketing studies relating to certain representative agricultural products. The necessity for these studies is daily more apparent, and Dr. Haney's economic investigations of prices and price control during the period of the war, as well as his earlier studies, fit him peculiarly for this work. Dr. Haney's publications include *History of Economic Thought*, 1911; *Business Organization and Combination*, 1913; *Report on the Price of Gasoline in 1915, 1917*; and *Price Fixing in the United States during the War*, 1919.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

The Southern Branch of the University of California will be held at Los Angeles from June 21 to July 31. Dr. A. B. Wolfe, professor of economics and sociology in the University of Texas, gives courses in general sociology and industrial reconstruction. John Collier, formerly director of the New York Training School for Community Work, in connection with Mr. R. Justin Miller, assistant executive officer of the state Commission of Immigration and Housing, offers courses in immigration and community organization. Professor Ira B. Cross gives a course in contemporary social problems.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Under the leadership of Professor Robert E. Park, the Society for Social Research of the University of Chicago was organized during the Winter Quarter. According to the constitution adopted, "The purpose of the society is to bring about the co-operation of persons engaged in social research and social investigation." The main purpose of the society, at present, is to co-operate with and assist graduate students in research problems undertaken after they have left the University. In order to stimulate interest and promote efficiency in research and investigation the society will act as a clearing-house of investigation and research, will collect bibliographies and pamphlet literature, and formulate methods. There will be an advisory committee to assist members in research problems. This committee will promote the publication of standard works in research and investigation.

At the last meeting of the school year of the Sociology Club Professor Arthur J. Todd of the University of Minnesota, at present director of Industrial Relations, B. Kuppenheimer and Company, gave an address on the subject "The World-War and Social Progress."

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

Professor John M. Mecklin, of the University of Pittsburgh, has accepted a chair in sociology in this institution. He will be associated with Professor E. B. Woods, the head of the department, in expanding the work in sociology. Harcourt Brace and Howe announce among their new books *An Introduction to Social Ethics; A Study of the Social Conscience in a Democracy*, by Professor Mecklin.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

Professor Newell L. Sims has recently published *The Rural Community*, a compilation of materials upon the various aspects of rural life.

FRANKLIN COLLEGE

Mr. Ernest H. Shideler, of the University of Chicago, has accepted the position of associate professor and acting head of the newly established department of economics and sociology. During the past year Professor Shideler has been engaged in working out and teaching high-school courses in social science in the University High School of the School of Education, University of Chicago.

LAWRENCE COLLEGE

Mr. Fred A. Conrad, of the University of Chicago, who has had charge of the work in sociology at the University of Cincinnati during the spring quarter, has been appointed to the headship of the department of sociology.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

In the June issue of *The Historical Outlook*, a journal for readers, students, and teachers of history, Professor Ross L. Finney has an article on the subject "Course in General History from the Sociologists' Standpoint." This paper will be of interest to sociologists because it is an elaboration of the point of view presented to the American Sociological Society at its last meeting by the Committee on Teaching of Sociology in the Grade and High Schools of America, of which Professor Finney was chairman.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Mr. A. F. Kuhlman, A.B., University of Chicago, 1916, now director of surveys of the Southern Division of the American Red Cross, Atlanta, Georgia, has been elected to an assistant professorship in sociology at the University of Missouri. Mr. Kuhlman will begin his work at the University of Missouri in September and will have charge of the practical social service courses.

SIMMONS COLLEGE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK

Announcement is made of the retirement of Dr. Jeffrey R. Brackett after sixteen years of service as director of the School of Social Work and professor of social economy in Simmons College. Dr. Brackett has been made professor emeritus. His place will be taken by Dr. Stuart A. Queen, now associate professor of social technology in Goucher College and director of educational service of the Potomac Division of the American Red Cross.

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

During the summer quarter Professor H. E. Woolston will give courses in the principles of sociology and also conduct a senior seminar. Professor R. D. McKenzie, of the University of West Virginia, offers courses in community organization and in poverty and relief.

UNIVERSITY OF WEST VIRGINIA

Dr. Henry D. Hall, of Wesleyan College, Connecticut, has been appointed to give courses in labor problems and rural sociology during the summer term. Dr. E. B. Reuter, Goucher College, and Miss Julia Worthington, of Cincinnati, have been chosen by the Educational Service Department, Potomac Division, American Red Cross, to give courses in race problems and applied sociology for the summer quarter.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Announcement has been made by the Century Company of a new book by Professor Edward A. Ross, entitled *Principles of Sociology*. The interest of students of sociology in this work has been stimulated by several chapters from it which have appeared in recent issues of the *American Journal of Sociology*.

REVIEWS

The Principles of Sociology. By EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS. The Century Co., 1920. Pp. xviii+708.

Without slightest abatement of respect for the preparatory work that in the generation now passing has built up a meritorious sociological literature, I must confess the reaction that in this book sociology, as an exhibit of results in contrast with a discussion of methods, has at last arrived. Many men, widely scattered in time and space, have given more or less heed to the premonition that there is a point of view, if it could only be determined, from which instruction might be derived about essentials of human experience that the traditional sciences of society have overlooked. Since 1880 the number of men who have devoted themselves to search for this point of view, and to the development of a procedure appropriate to it as a point of departure, has increased at a rate approaching arithmetical proportion. Among these believers that the older social sciences had not fully exploited the evidence, profitable though thankless work was added to work year after year in locating a more promising base of operations and in elaborating a technique suited to the enterprise which the clearing outlook demanded. Incidental to this mostly methodological dead-work, many scholars who called themselves sociologists succeeded in bringing to light important facts and significant relationships of more or less permanent and general significance. These partial or tentative results, however, whether in one of the fields of concrete survey or in fundamentals, have accumulated at such widely separated spots that only a few specialists in social science have been able to grasp them in the aggregate, still less in correlation, or even to become distinctly aware of their existence.

Now comes a book, not of methods, but of findings. It does not attempt to sum up all the results of sociological analysis. It sets in systematic order a large body of perceptions which appeal to the author as of prime importance. He does not claim that he has finished the task of interpreting human experience. He does claim that his system of analysis is a valid interpretation in itself, however much more interpretation the facts may turn out to bear.

The book appeals to me as sufficient to convince all competent-minded persons not previously convinced that there are ranges of vital

human relationships which had almost wholly escaped the notice of the older types of social science. The life of men turns out to move in the course of incessant construction and destruction, arrangement and derangement of group situations. Sophistication about life consequently begins with ability to detect the phases of this process which are involved in the particular situations with which one is concerned.

Accordingly Professor Ross begins his eye-opening program by introducing the actors in the human drama as "The Social Population," to be made intelligible by certain traits in their conditions and composition. In Part II, under the title "The Social Forces," the author rapidly sketches the least exceptional influences that play within the orbits of human relationships. Then follows the bulk of the book—nearly five hundred pages—on "Social Processes." Part IV, on "Social Products" traverses more familiar ground, and Part V, "Sociological Principles," is the small fraction of the book which may interest the professional social scientist more than the layman.

In Part III, "Social Processes," Professor Ross introduces the reader to some forty types of reaction between people, any one of which may occur, after its kind, in the course of the most humdrum daily occupations no less than in exceptional and dramatic episodes. Essentially the same reaction, with differing proportions and modes of manifestation, may be present in a session of the Grand General Staff and in a Friends' Yearly Meeting; in the Council of Nicea and in the San Francisco Convention; in Buckingham Palace and in an east-side tenement. These are the things of which history is composed, but which the historians as a rule have notoriously neglected to notice. Professor Ross has not exhausted the catalogue of these typical reactions. On the contrary it seems to me that sociological analysis is likely to duplicate in its way the experience of astronomical technique in enlarging our conception of space. With each improvement of our technique, new vistas of human relationships uncatalogued and unexplored are appearing upon our field of vision.

The book serves two chief purposes, and they are as different as science and popularization. In the first place, no one preparing to be a professional social scientist, whatever his particular division of labor, can afford to be ignorant of it, or even only superficially acquainted with it. Henceforth the student of social science who has not assimilated it is undertrained. But a danger signal is necessary. For anyone with rudimentarily developed social intelligence the book is such luring reading that it might easily seduce into the illusion that by reading it

one makes one's self a sociologist. Eating a good dinner would be a co-ordinate claim to competence as a cook. Let no one flatter himself that one can do equally original and demonstrative sociological thinking of one's own without the tedious discipline which supplies the technique and forms the judgment.

On the other hand the book should be a great popular educator. Any high-school graduate with a mind for social relations, or anyone qualified to take a respectable part in trade-union discussions should find it gripping. It is essentially not a book for specialists but for everyone who is trying intelligently to find himself in the adventure of the common lot.

If the number of the *Journal* for which this notice is scheduled were not already overdue, I should probably yield to the temptation to accept some of the implicit challenges in the book to methodological discussion. While, as already implied, Professor Ross has kept technique well out of sight of the layman, the technologist will discover it, and the book is hardly likely to have a higher ratio of value for the non-professional public than it will have in provoking debate about method.

At present a single instance must suffice. The first sentence of the book speaks truth, viz., "The traits and tendencies of society are in no small degree determined by its human composition." It is equally true, however, that *the traits and tendencies of human composition are in no small degree determined by society*. To the layman in general and to most sociologists there is little or no choice between taking one's departure from the one of these propositions or from the other. To the suspicious critic of method the preference which Professor Ross shows indicates that, while he has been doing more than one man's share toward making the new procedure which we call by some variant of the name *group psychology*, that new procedure has not shifted his viewpoint as far as might be expected from the more conventional individualistic outlook. From beginning to end of the book Professor Ross is talking about things that are of, for, and by groups, but I realized with something like a shock that he does not begin to take groups as the direct subject of discourse until the forty-eighth chapter (p. 575).

In the present volume then Professor Ross is consistent with the judgment which he published fifteen years ago, that the *group* is not the true unit of investigation in sociology, but that the primordial fact is the *social process* (*Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 87-91). There is no doubt in my mind that social science as a whole would be abortive if

it were not served by techniques which begin their operations with phases of reality either genetically or logically antecedent to the human group. To my mind, however, the category "social process" is meaningless except as *the group in motion*. I cannot think of the group in motion without presupposing the group which is the subject of the motion. Accordingly, if I were composing a treatise on sociology today, my first sentence would be, *In the beginning is the group*. By "beginning" I should mean not the beginning of things, but the beginning of the strictly sociological aspect of things.

Such considerations as these, however, are specialists' stuff, and Professor Ross's book is something bigger than specialists' grist. It is a luminous revelation of realities of the common life. Sociologists may well be peculiarly proud of it, but it belongs in the larger literature which enlists all life and all the sciences of life to interpret life.

ALBION W. SMALL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Bolshevik Russia. By ÉTIENNE ANTONELLI. Translated from The French by CHARLES A. CARROLL. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1920. Pp. xi+307. \$2.00.

This is an attempt at a fair account of the rise of bolshevism and an appraisal of what it did in Russia up to May, 1918.

The detailed recital of events in chronological order is straightforward and clear but for the confusion of names of individuals and of parties and factions which are almost meaningless to an ordinary reader in this country. The psychological analysis of the Russian is interesting, but its over-simplification makes one feel that it is inadequate. After describing the great destruction and the steady disintegration of nearly all traces of Western civilization the final prophecy is of "a democracy which will not be made up of gradual conquests, plucked by shreds from a plutocratic bourgeoisie, but which will build itself up out of the very stuff of the people, a democracy which will not descend from the powerful ones to the people, as in all present forms of society, but which will rise voluntarily and surely from the unorganized and uncultivated folk to an organizing intelligence.

VICTOR E. HELLEBERG

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Social Science in the Colleges.—The rise of social science is one of the most interesting features of modern intellectual development. A hundred years ago a few "intellectuals" interested themselves in the philosophy of history and in certain abstract theories of the state. Today the study of concrete social problems has acquired such a vogue as to be in serious danger of developing into a popular fad. During the past century the problems of government, of industry, of education, and of every phase of common life have been greatly complicated. Social workers have come more and more to use the scientific method of getting at the fundamental causes of the evils in society. The scientific method as developed in the nineteenth century is something very different from the deductions and classifications of the old school men. It may be briefly summarized as (1) a statement of the problem, (2) seeking for a hypothesis, (3) collecting relevant data by observation and experiment for the purpose of testing the hypothesis, (4) revising the statements of problem and hypothesis in the light of new data, (5) the assembling of other data bearing on the revised hypothesis, and so on until (6) a working solution has been found. In a university, research work and the training of specialists frequently bulk large, but in a college these have very little place. Chief among the functions of the social science department in a college are these: to develop a healthy interest in social problems; to give information about social problems; to train habits of scientific study of social problems; to offer vocational guidance, with special reference to social work, teaching, commerce and administration; to give preliminary or prevocational training for social work, teaching, commerce and administration; to furnish advice to public officials, social agencies, and the community at large.—Stuart A. Queen, *Bulletin of Goucher College*, June, 1920. O. B. Y.

Physiological Aspect of the Present Unrest.—In this article the present unrest will be looked upon as a social disease and the material factors connected with it are uncontrollable because of diseased morale. There are three stages in the analysis of the symptoms of the social disease. (1) Through the immediate influence of the war many of our traditional interests, attitudes, and habits were abandoned for the sake of loyalty. The laborers also found in the reduction of wages their status disturbed. The various organizations, such as the Socialist party, the Socialist Labor party, etc., whose program is one of antagonism to existent forms of government, took advantage of the war situation. Instead of using peaceful and legitimate means in seeking our ends we have accustomed ourselves in this great struggle to the argument of force. The war also stimulated our interest in the fundamental philosophy of life. (2) To what extent the present difficulties are legitimate results of pre-war tendencies. The industrial revolution and the change from individual to collective production resulted in mental changes, such as the loss of the feeling of individual responsibility on the part of the workman. The second phenomenon is the conflict between labor and capital produced by co-operative work based on self-interests of each group concerned and not on feeling of common interest. The weakening of governmental and religious authority has had somewhat unstabilizing influence on the people. (3) In the analysis of these phenomena the underlying psychological forces at work are the instincts of self-preservation and of preservation of species as expressed in the processes of adaptation of the civilian to military life and of the soldier to civil life.—John T. MacCurdy, *The Survey*, March, 1920. C. N.

The Logical Implicates of the Community.—If the ideal human society is an all-inclusive community of individuals engaged in mutual co-operation, it must first of all rest upon a common understanding. For co-operation without understanding is not

the voluntary co-operation of free and rational beings. There are many kinds and degrees of understanding. If we call the more abstract understanding logical, we may speak of the more concrete as ethical and aesthetic. In comparison with fulness and richness of moral and aesthetic conditions, the merely logical implicates of the community must seem thin and abstract. Unless men are capable, in principle, of a logical understanding of one another, they cannot understand one another either ethically or aesthetically, since moral and aesthetic judgments also incorporate within them the forms of logical judgment. The foremost logical principle is that of identity. It is a principle which at one and the same time defines the individual mind's continuity of thinking and the social consciousness of a common thought and a common world. It asserts that meanings of all kinds, and hence also the corresponding objects, may be apprehended as identically the same, whether by the same mind at different times or by different minds at the same or different times. It asserts further that the universe of discourse is the same for all minds that understand each other. The conduct of all meaningful thought, therefore, whether individual or social, requires the validity of this law as its first condition. The next principle is that of inference: that judgments may be concatenated into systems of logical interdependence, so that one or several judgments may serve as the reason for a conclusion. The third is the principle of causation, which asserts that things behave in the same uniform manner. The fourth is the principle of teleology, which explains that there is a reason for all existing things, so that the universe has a rational meaning. All these principles underlie various aspects of the community life. In itself the logical order is something pre-existing; in its use and application for knowledge and life, it is human achievement. The pre-existence of a valid logical order is the first necessary condition for the realization of the true community. But it is not the sole or sufficient condition. There is a host of real and ideal conditions, physical, economic, political, aesthetic, and moral in which human effort can be a directing and creative force. The logical order is valid and necessary; the actual order, for which the logical order furnishes in part the framework, is at one and the same time a beneficent gift and moral task for the highest energies of free man.—David F. Swenson, *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, Scientific Methods*, May, 1920. K. S.

Mekanisme og Vitalisme.—All who are engaged in the study of life and its various functionings are aware that the meaning and value of their studies are dependent upon the same premises as that of every other scientific study. The conflict which has divided biologists into two camps is not on the question whether or no life is determined by causal relations. The disagreement is on the subject of deciding which set of conditions should be reckoned with in every explanation of life and its phenomena. On one side are the biologists who see in life-phenomena a special order of mechanical and chemical processes. On the other side we find the biologists who think there is something in the living organism which cannot be explained as a mere complication of mechanical and chemical processes. J. S. Haldane, in his essays entitled *The New Physiology*, calls the attempt to explain life as a chemical-mechanical process "the most colossal failure in the whole history of modern science." If the organic and inorganic processes are to be comprehended in the same categories, he says, our whole conception of dead nature must be radically modified and must be drawn in under the biological point of view. The attempt to regard the world-process as a harmonious whole is a biological rather than a mechanistic conception. In the field of psychology it is impossible to understand the relation of mind and body if each is substantialized. A material atom cannot be put into motion by an idea or emotion. To accept the mechanistic viewpoint will merely serve to make life and consciousness seem increasingly mystical, the more mechanical science advances.—C. N. Starcke, *Tilskueren*, April, 1920. O. B. Y.

International Education of World Statesmen, the Key to Permanent Peace.—Full realization of Cecil Rhodes's conception would be a preventive of war eminently more reliable than expensive armaments. Reinforced by an international court and police force, cosmopolitan education of world-leaders would probably prove the precursor of permanent peace. The plan rests on the sound principle that friendship, which may induce individual self-sacrifice to the extent of life itself, is the surest

guaranty of generous compromise between peoples. In practical operation the Rhodes scholarships, because their opportunities and international significance have not been appreciated, have not attracted those ablest young men in the United States through whom alone the American and English branches of the Anglo-Saxon race could form strong friendship. The Rhodes scheme, too, embraces only two of the great powers within its scope. Perfected and actualized, then, Rhodes's plan would appear as an institution whereby *prospective leaders of all the great nations*, through sojourns in cosmopolitan centers of culture such as Oxford University, would become democratic world-citizens in sympathy with all peoples and classes. Reciprocity in education among the nations is an application to the sphere of international relationships of those institutions which human experience has proved to be the unrivaled developers of enlightened self-interest and altruism in individuals. National selfishness is as many times more vicious than individual selfishness as falsely patriotic millions are more able to do harm than short-sighted individuals. The gratifying effects on average welfare of national loyalty to world-welfare, are as many times those of individual loyalty to national welfare as the world is bigger than the nation and as truly patriotic millions are more capable of accomplishing good than far-sighted individuals.—Ralph H. Bevan, *Education*, April, 1920. V. M. A.

Social Tyranny.—Not only in the realm of social institutions, but sciences, art, and religion are all held under the popular slogan of socialization. We are daily reminded by federal legislation, by the Protestant clergy, by our moralists and penologists, and by the most potent of modern forces, science, business, and industry, that the individual person is a social function. This is partly admirable and partly vicious. A man should cultivate his talents and his solitary pleasures, not only because they will make him more useful to his fellows but also because they are in themselves admirable. Artistic creation, scientific discovery, spiritual insight are indeed valuable because they raise the level of society; they are also valuable wholly by themselves. These two sorts of value are not inherently contradictory. But man is inherently inclined to treat them as if they were. The evil effects of the excessive deference we pay to the social milieu are best seen in the higher disciplines. If American philosophy has been on the whole unproductive, that is because it has not respected its own instinct for metaphysics. Our schools of new realism and pragmatism have but followed the standards of science: the former on the whole of physics and mathematics, the latter of biology. The deeper need of our time, of all times in fact, is that principle of duality which corrects exclusive individualism and exclusive sociality alike; which supplements the ideal of organic unity by the ideal of independent individuality; and which, when the two ideals cannot be harmoniously joined, points the way to compromise. When the state exercises its sovereignty in every way as it does now, it kills all individuality and eventually itself. It must, therefore, voluntarily abdicate its sovereignty in those matters wherein the individuals show their initiative and gain personal satisfactions. The state must ultimately limit its function to that of arbitration between disputing parties.—W. H. Sheldon, *Philosophical Review*, March, 1920. K. S.

Community Americanization: A Handbook for Workers.—Technically the word "Americanization" means "the process of making Americans." To accomplish this we must first possess the American spirit ourselves. We must have, besides, some knowledge of those we seek to bring into the brotherhood; a knowledge of their difficulties; a knowledge and appreciation of their cultures. A community survey should be made in order to understand the situation, and the pamphlet devotes ten pages to a suggested plan. A knowledge of the English language is indispensable to all who are to be truly Americans. To attempt to use a compulsory system upon the adults, however, would be fatal to the cause. They must be skillfully led to see the advantages accruing to them from a knowledge of English and then the community should see to it that every possible opportunity is offered to them to learn. Teachers who understand teaching English to foreign adults should be supplied by the school boards. But the language is only a beginning. Hitherto we have resented foreigners invading the native-born sections of our cities and thereby we have kept them in colonies which have not received the attention bestowed upon other sections of the

cities. Hence come housing evils, overcrowding, and filth, so that many immigrants are thrust into conditions of life far below the standards of health and decency to which they were accustomed in their own lands. This must be changed and all the deceitful schemes for swindling immigrants must be abolished before we can expect the foreigners among us to be true Americans. Thus, great is the task before us. Fortunately, however, there is a great deal of machinery with which to do the work already at hand in every community. The crying need is for co-ordination of this machinery. A central committee engaged by the national government is suggested, then state and finally community committees should be established for this purpose.

U.S. Bureau of Education Bulletin, No. 76, 1919.

S. C. R.

Rural Socialization.—Socialization is the integration of group consciousness and conduct. The process of socializing the rural neighborhood is fraught with difficulties. The social instinct of the American rural people has become partially dormant during the period of lonely pioneer life. There are, however, four stages of co-operation for socialization: (1) Associational level, one of instinctive pleasure and also of least possible cost. Neighborhood meetings of almost any kind conduce to the growth of the social disposition in those associating. Assemblages should appeal to the play instinct, which is strongly reinforced by the social instinct. (2) The work stage, the range of which is limited and tends to become more so under modern conditions. (3) The economic level, where the business end of agriculture is involved. Community selling and buying, ownership of tools, grain elevators, storage warehouses are good examples of economic co-operation yielding immediate pleasure to utilitarian incentives and satisfactions; (4) the cultural or welfare level of socialization, where far more remote utilitarian interests furnish the motives and the cost to the group has become the greatest yet demanded. The dynamic forces behind co-operation are manifold. Instincts, desires, ideas, as well as environmental, social, and economical pressures have acted as controlling agencies. But the real and only dependable agency is personal leadership. Rural teachers, pastors, county agents, and perhaps others are those upon whom must fall the task of socializing the country neighborhoods of America.—Newell L. Sims, *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1920.

C. N.

Revolution und Gewaltlosigkeit. Zum Jahrestag des Neunten November.—It was pleasurable for the German people to recall, on the anniversary of the German Revolution, that it took place almost without loss of life. The years of war seemed to the co-workers toward cultural progress the greatest crime against humanity. Both within Germany and abroad a small group of men and women could be found who saw that the foundations and development of a new sex morality, conditions conducive to the welfare of yet unborn generations, are capable of realization only in a world that has forever broken with bloody force. It is painful to contemplate how limited is the understanding of the fact that only in a world without force can civilization be built up. Those who disapproved of the use of force between nations, now approve of its application to the internal dissensions. Only a small minority favor disarmament in civil strife, and they are viewed as inimical to the majority. A strong protest should be made against the continuation of the dangerous principle that "might makes right." The simple fact that a class has had a hard struggle does not enable it to bring welfare to humanity. As long as this class is just as much determined to secure its own advantages as the class previously in power, a mere change as regards the powers in its possession could achieve no beneficial results for humanity. The attitudes of men must change and human life must be considered sacred. But a change of attitude cannot come until we do away with this *Blut-moral* war. Before the war we struggled for a refinement of culture by striving for the protection of future generations, the yet unborn child, motherhood in despair, and we struggled against the effects of force in the relations between the sexes. Our progress in the field of the morality of the sexes will depend on the realization of higher standards in the world at large. Dr. Helene Stöcker, *Die Neue Generation*, September, 1919.

L. M. S.

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REFLECTIONS UPON THE SOCIOLOGY OF HERBERT SPENCER¹

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I imagine that nearly all of us who took up sociology between 1870, say, and 1890 did so at the instigation of Spencer. While he did not invent the word (though most of us had never heard it before), much less the idea, he gave new life to both, and seemed to show us an open road into those countries which as yet we had only vaguely yearned to explore. His book, *The Study of Sociology*, perhaps the most readable of all his works, had a large sale and probably did more to arouse interest in the subject than any other publication before or since. Whatever we may have occasion to charge against him, let us set down at once a large credit for effective propagation.

It is certain that nearly all of us fell away from him sooner or later and more or less completely. My own defection, I believe, was one of the earliest and most complete; and since the recoil has gone farther with me than with most others, it is not unlikely that I now fail to do him justice. However, my views, such as

¹ A paper read before the Research Club of the University of Michigan at a meeting held to commemorate the centenary of Spencer's birth. On the same occasion Alfred H. Lloyd read a paper on Spencer's philosophy, which appears in the *Scientific Monthly* for June, 1920.

they are, have at least had ample time to mature, and I offer them for what they may be worth.

The ancestors of Herbert Spencer were plain people of the English middle class, most of them dissenters from the Established Church and somewhat radical in politics. His father, however, was a man of marked ability, a teacher noted for ingenious ways of evoking interest, and the author of a work on *Inventional Geometry*, in which this subject was taught by a method of experiment and discovery. An uncle, Thomas Spencer, took a degree at Cambridge and became somewhat distinguished in the church, rather as an agitator of reforms, however, than in orthodox activities. He was frequently at odds with his colleagues and finally went so far as to advocate the separation of church and state. The innovating spirit observed in his father and uncle was justly regarded by Spencer as a precious part of his own heredity. His mother was amiable and devoted but apparently of no marked individuality, rather harshly treated by her husband, and sometimes referred to by her son as an example of the ill effects of too much self-abnegation.

Herbert received very little systematic instruction. This seems to have been due partly to his father's views, exalting self-activity and disinclined to force natural inclinations, and partly to the boy's delicate health. His mind was active, but chiefly upon inquiries of his own—into mechanics, natural history, or ethics—and even then he showed signs of that incapacity for sustained reading which was pathological in his mature years. He began Latin and Greek, but apparently did not get enough to be of any use, and never studied English grammar at all. Indeed, apart from a limited ability to read French, acquired later, Spencer seems never to have had the use of any foreign or ancient language. Nor does it appear that he ever studied history, literature, or philosophy, except as he was incited to occasional reading in these subjects by the requirements of his own work.

At the age of fourteen his uncle, with whom he was then living, describes him as having superior talents but lacking diligence and modesty,¹ this last judgment referring to the irrepressible con-

¹ *Autobiography*, I, 119.

tentiousness for which he was at all ages remarkable. We may think of him, then, as a bright, argumentative boy, rather disagreeably self-confident, well supplied with ideas, many of them original, regarding mathematics, natural science, and the conduct of life, but notably deficient in the foundations of traditional culture.

At seventeen Spencer got a job as a civil engineer and was engaged in this work four years, showing an aptitude for it which might apparently have led to distinguished success, had he not preferred to give it up and try for something more befitting the large faculties of which he was conscious.

The period from twenty-one to twenty-eight was spent in desultory study and brief experiments at making a living. He tried writing, editing, and inventing, with indifferent pecuniary success, and was employed more profitably upon a parliamentary investigation of certain railways. At one time he took an active part, on the radical side, in a political campaign. At twenty-eight he got work as sub-editor of the *London Economist*. The duties were light, leaving him ample time for other pursuits, and he was thus enabled to develop his ideas, increase his acquaintance, practice writing, and pass gradually into that career of philosophic thought and publication which occupied the remainder of his life.

The character of Spencer's sociology is so interwoven with his personal traits that I find that my best approach to it will be through an inquiry as to how far his nature and training fitted him to deal with this subject. That he possessed very great powers is too obvious to dwell upon; I shall therefore occupy myself chiefly with indicating certain limitations.

I think, then, that Spencer was not by nature especially suited to be an observer of mankind and of society. It seems clear, from his own account of himself in his *Autobiography* as well as from other witnesses, that he was rather deficient in those sympathetic qualities which are, after all, the only direct source of our knowledge of other people. A lack of tact, which he deplored but did not overcome, was accentuated by a somewhat censorious and unconciliatory way of expressing himself, both of which traits

he ascribes to heredity. "The Spencers of the preceding generation," he says, "were all characterized by lack of reticence."¹ On the other side, "my mother was distinguished by extreme simple-mindedness; so much so that, unlike women in general, she was without the thought of policy in her dealings with other persons. In me these traits were united."¹ "The tendency to fault-finding," he adds, "is dominant—disagreeably dominant."² He thought this was probably "a chief factor in the continuance of my celibate life. Readiness to see inferiorities rather than superiorities must have impeded the finding of one who attracted me in adequate degree."³ It would be ungenerous and indeed injudicial to convict one of a defect of this delicate nature solely from his own confession; the confession is ingratiating and in some measure contradicts itself. It accords, however, with the impression one gets not only from the *Autobiography* but from the authorized life by Duncan and from contemporary anecdotes, which is that of a nature high-minded indeed and in its way fine-minded, but unsympathetic and of a schoolmasterish sort of egotism, prone to read other people lectures rather than to hear what they have to say. This native lack of touch was increased by his preoccupation with speculative ideas. "I am a bad observer of humanity in the concrete," he says, "being too much given to wandering off into the abstract."⁴ He was, in short, quite the opposite in these regards of his compatriot Lord Roberts, of whom it is said:

He had . . . an immense power of sympathetic absorption in the affairs of others. He spoke to you not only with his whole attention for the time being, he went further than that: he gave you the impression that this was the supreme moment of the day for which he had been waiting. He entered so fully, so sympathetically, into my interests, that I was tempted to expand and to confide in him even private affairs, in no way connected with the matter . . . that I had come about.⁵

Spencer's disregard of personality is curiously illustrated by his essay on "The Philosophy of Style." In this he does not appear to be interested in the fact—if indeed he perceives it at all—that

¹ *Autobiography*, II, 329.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 520.

² *Ibid.*, p. 512.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 461.

⁵ Mortimer Menpes, *Lord Roberts*, p. 7.

at least half of style is the communication of personal attitudes, and this by means so subtle as to defy the rather mechanical analysis which he employs. The whole study, therefore, lacks penetration and, I should suppose, would be a most unsafe guide to practice.

This lack of insight into other minds, whether in face-to-face intercourse or through works of literature and art, was nothing less than a lack of the perceptions indispensable to any direct study of social phenomena. It was a fatal handicap.

Of the same piece with his defect of sympathy is Spencer's lack of literary and historical culture, which, for an intellectual man and a writer, was remarkable. Not only did he have no discipline of this sort, to speak of, in his youth, but in his later years his nervous trouble appears to have prohibited any sustained reading not indispensable to his work. His power of attention, limited to some two hours a day, was infringed not only by serious application but by a novel or a newspaper or even by hearing others read. For these reasons, quite sufficient and by no means discreditable to him, he had, apparently, only a perfunctory knowledge of English literature and practically none of any other. In middle life he organized for his works on sociology much historical material compiled by assistants, but by that time the bent of his mind was fixed; and, moreover, he approached this material with a set purpose and not in the disinterested attitude propitious to culture. Canon Barnett, with whom he made the Nile trip in 1879, wrote in a letter, "He is strangely ignorant of history and literature; so I should be shy of taking any of his facts," adding, "He is not interesting. There are few matters which he knows enough of, or is interested enough in, to discuss."¹ Whatever his knowledge, Spencer certainly had little or nothing of the historical sentiment, no brooding sympathy with the movements of the human spirit in the past. Anything of this sort was quite alien to his formal and positive mode of thought.

He not only lacked culture, in the usual meaning, but he set a low value on it, he almost scorned it. "Had Greece and Rome never existed," he remarks, "human life and the right conduct of

¹ *Canon Barnett*, by his wife, I, 230-31.

it would have been in their essentials exactly what they now are: survival or death, health or disease, prosperity or adversity, happiness or misery, would have been just in the same ways determined by the adjustment or non-adjustment of actions to requirements."¹

Is this true? I think not; Greece and Rome are of our life-blood. It seems to me, indeed, that such expressions reveal a defect which is more detrimental to truth than ignorance, namely, contempt for essential knowledge. A man may lack a certain kind of culture, as Keats lacked Greek, and yet have a sympathy and reverence which brings him close to it; but Spencer was not a man of this sort. His was not that lowly mind which enters easily all the doors of knowledge. Humility is hardly to be found in him, and his attitude toward such matters as history, literature, philosophy, and the fine arts is that of one who does not need to pore over the records of the past, but is already competent, by virtue of natural gifts and a philosophy of his own device, to instruct the world on these questions. He displays, in short, a cocksureness that does nothing to reconcile us to his insufficiency.

It is no crime in a man not to care for the loveliness of St. Mark's church at Venice—we all have our blind spots. But what shall we say of one who, with no title to competence, assumes to set aside the judgment of time and to pronounce, after a page of rather fatuous comment, that it is "not precious aesthetically considered"?² Are not such judgments bold with the boldness of the man who declares that the earth is flat, because it looks so to him? And this is typical of Spencer's attitude not only toward art but toward many other things of which he knew equally little. It argues, I think, a certain incomprehension of the nature of phenomena of this sort, and of the conditions necessary to their appreciation. Works of literature and the various arts have their being in a traditional organism of thought and expression, and there is no hope of participating fully in their spirit except as one earns a membership in that organism. This is done by sympathy, by open-mindedness, and by reverent study of works which promise to repay such study.

¹ *Autobiography*, II, 43.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 407-8.

I do not mean that Spencer had a mind wholly insensible to the fine arts. He enjoyed and even practiced music, for example, had considerable skill in drawing, and liked to read aloud the poetry of Shelley. I mean that he seems to have no feeling for the traditional, social, and personal elements that enter so largely into art and literature and therefore no sense of the need of culture and sympathy in passing judgment upon them.

If our philosopher's defects of nature and education were such as I have indicated, it will not be surprising if we find that he lacked direct and authentic perception of the structure and movement of human life, and that he conceived these phenomena almost wholly by analogy. The organic wholes of the social order are mental facts of much the same nature as personality, and much the same kind of sympathetic imagination is needed to grasp them. This Spencer did not have, and accordingly his conceptions, however bold and ingenious, are, in my opinion, not properly sociological at all.

If there is in Spencer one dominant trait, engendering both his qualities and his defects, it is without doubt the energy of his speculative impulse. This was not only immensely strong and bold but was combined in a signal degree with the need to think exhaustively and in concrete terms. It thus impelled him not only to conceive a vast scheme of cosmic principles but to develop these with apparent consistency in every department of nature, fortifying each detail by clear statement and a convincing array of facts. This chiefly gave him his great vogue with inquiring young men; he gratified two needs of every sound mind: to think largely and to think in definitely conceivable forms. Never vague or merely abstract, he saw in detail what he saw at all. No doubt, also, his great pretensions and his rejection of traditional knowledge contributed to his acceptance by confirming the inquiring young man in his own self-conceit.

So far as I am able to judge, Spencer had great gifts as an observer of inanimate nature, and only his exorbitant speculative trend prevented his achieving more important results than he did. His questioning of accepted ideas, his persistency, his ingenuity and manual skill (much greater than that of Darwin) were all

valuable traits. What he mainly lacked as a natural scientist, I imagine, was again humility. He was inclined to domineer over his facts, instead of listening with open mind to what they had to say.

Spencer claimed that he had "equal proclivities towards analysis and synthesis." This is true, in the sense that he had an equal need to see his conceptions in large and in detail, but I think that both his analysis and his synthesis were *a priori*, that in both the disposition to work out preconceived ideas is far more active than disinterested curiosity. Indeed, when he once gets to work, especially upon social material, the latter is hardly discernible. He himself regrets that he was apt "to be enslaved by a plan once formed"¹ and to slur over difficulties.²

Here, of course, is his most obvious inferiority to Darwin. While he may have surveyed almost as many facts, he did so in a wholly different spirit. Darwin's great gift, I suppose, was the combination of a humble and tireless curiosity with a generalizing power vast, indeed, but by no means domineering. He collected facts and drew a theory from them, while Spencer spun a theory from any material he happened to have and collected facts to illustrate it. Hence, in spite of his ingenuity, he was far less original, less solid, less truly the man of science than his contemporary. The inquiring young man will not long remain content with Spencer if he has any gift for direct observation. He will presently discover that the light which seems so clear is not daylight but the artificial illumination of a theory; that the array of facts are but illustrations of the theory; and that the assertions do not stand the test of real life.

The conception of organic process which Spencer gave most of his life to elaborating remains meager. It grows longer and longer but never fills out with real flesh and blood. Where will you find in him any of those illuminating flashes that show a conception vividly and as a whole? It is all detail and formula, never a revelation.

Nothing could have been more odious to him than the suggestion that his work belonged, psychologically, in a class with that

¹ *Autobiography*, II, 215.

² *Ibid.*, I, 452.

of the systematizers of theology—Thomas Aquinas, perhaps, or John Calvin—rather than with the true men of science. But would there not be some truth in such a suggestion?

Turning now from Spencer's talent to his works, there is perhaps nothing more fundamental for our purpose than his social psychology. This is found in those four chapters of his *Principles of Psychology* which treat of "Sociality and Sympathy," "Egoistic Sentiments," "Ego-altruistic Sentiments," and "Altruistic Sentiments." The *Principles of Psychology* was first published when Spencer was thirty-five, costing him such labor that he ascribes to it in great part the impaired health from which he suffered thereafter. It did not at that time, however, include any social psychology, but was concerned wholly with the development of the individual mind. Apparently he did not perceive the need of a social psychology at all until he began some years later to work out his sociology. Then, having, as he says, "to follow out Evolution under those higher forms which societies present," he was led to discuss "the special psychology of Man considered as the unit of which societies are composed."¹ The idea of treating the subject was, then, an afterthought conceived rather late in life and carried out in a supplementary part of his *Psychology* called "Corollaries," published in the second edition of that work, which appeared when the author was fifty-two years old. It is not strange that his discussion is somewhat perfunctory and involves no change from his previous modes of thought.

Speaking summarily, I may say that he explains the social sentiments by their utility, by conscious and unconscious adaptation to the conditions of life, and by the cumulative inheritance of acquired mental traits. Natural selection is included but not much emphasized; it is hardly essential to the argument. We are shown that the individual is sympathetic because sympathy has been useful and habitual to the race in the past. Transmitted by heredity and increased by use it is enabled, with the aid of the representative powers of the mind, to unite with instinct in forming social sentiments. These may be ego-altruistic (so called because

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, II, 508.

they involve both a sense of one's self and a reference to the state of mind of others, like the love of approbation); or they may be wholly altruistic, like a generosity which seeks no recognition, or like a disinterested sense of justice. All sentiments, however, are primarily egoistic, according to Spencer, and become altruistic when referred to others. "The altruistic feelings," he says, "are all sympathetic excitements of egoistic feelings."

Let me first point out that this phraseology of egoism and altruism marks an individualistic conception; that is, it makes the whole matter one of the interplay of separate units rather than of collective growth. A sentiment grows up in one person and may be referred to another by sympathy: there is no idea of *a continuing social life, having an organization and history of its own, in which sentiments are gradually developed, and from which they are derived by the individual*. It cannot be said that Spencer's treatment excludes such an idea, but his failure to develop it, here or elsewhere, shows that it had no considerable part in his thought. And yet it is the central conception of any real sociology, since any science of life must have a distinct life-process with which it is concerned.

A sociological view, I think, would be that the higher sentiments are in general neither egoistic nor altruistic as regards their source, but just social, derived, that is, from the stream of an organic common life. It is, for example, an incorrect view of the sense of justice to say that we first develop it regarding ourselves and then transfer it by sympathy to others. Our sentiments of justice have been worked out by society in the past and come to us primarily from the social environment and tradition, their reference to myself or to you being secondary. We acquire them just as we do the meaning of the word "justice," that is, we find the idea or sentiment already organized for us in the current of history, and assimilate it by the aid of conversation and literature, although it must get flesh and blood, as it were, from our own experience. The social tradition supplies the pattern which the individual fills out and colors in a more or less original manner. The proof is the established fact that the customs or mores of the group can make almost anything appear to the individual as just or unjust.

Spencer's view is scarcely different from that of one who should maintain that the idea of justice is created anew in each generation by heredity and sympathy, failing to see that it also represents the accumulated wisdom of the past transmitted through language. His process is not social but biological and individual.

The essential differences between present social psychology, as I understand it, and the conception of Spencer may be otherwise stated as follows: We now believe that the individual is born with decisive but quite rudimentary capacities and tendencies, owing little or nothing to direct inheritance of the effects of use. For the development of these into a human personality he is wholly dependent upon a social environment which comes down from the past through an organic social process. This social process cannot be inferred from individual psychology, much less from heredity; it must be studied directly and is the principal subject of sociology.¹ It absorbs individuals into its life, conforming them to its requirements and at the same time developing their individuality. There is no general opposition between the individual and the social whole; they are complementary and work together to carry on the historical organism. Neither is there any general opposition between social environment and heredity; they also are complementary, working together to carry on a human whole which is social in one aspect and biological in another. Spencer, on the other hand, has little perception of a *social* organism continuous with the past. His organism, so far as he has one, is biological in its process, transmitted to the individual by the direct inheritance of mental states created by use. No doubt, as he sees the matter, the individuals thus generated unite into a differentiated and co-ordinated society, but this is conceived almost as if it were continually reproduced from biological roots, like the annual foliage of a perennial herb. Its historical continuity, momentum, and abundance of content, its power to mold individuals as well as to be molded by them, is not clearly seen. And this is true of all Spencer's sociology. It is

¹ Much that has recently been published regarding the social working of instinct shows little improvement upon Spencer in this regard. I mean that it proceeds from an analysis of instinct directly to social conclusions (sometimes of the most sweeping character), without the least direct study of the social process. Even the instinct studied is usually subhuman, that of man being inferred from analogy.

biological-individualistic, the biology being of a type involving use-inheritance, and the individualism of a mechanical sort quite inadequate to embrace human personality.

It is a common impression that Spencer emphasized the social order at the expense of the individual person. I would rather say that he had little conception either of a social order, properly speaking, or of persons as members of that order, and consequently never seriously confronted the problem of their relation. Such questions, for example, as that of the precise nature and value of leadership are not worked out by him, because they belong in that region of true, as distinguished from analogical, sociology which he scarcely entered.¹

At least one critic, Mr. J. M. Robertson, in his *Modern Humanists*, has pointed out that Spencer's thought about society shows two distinct currents, separate in their origin and appearing to other minds irreconcilable. One apparently came from the intellectual atmosphere surrounding his youth and early manhood, before he became in any sense an evolutionist. It is essentially static, individualistic, hedonistic; and is otherwise remarkable for the doctrinaire thoroughness with which he worked it out and applied it to questions of the day, often, it would seem, in defiance of sound practical judgment. The other current is evolutionary, beginning apparently when he was about twenty in the reading of Lyell's *Geology* (where he found an account of the views of Lamarck), gradually gaining upon him as he grew older, greatly increased and modified by the publication of the *Origin of Species*, when he was about forty, but never so possessing his mind as to solve his thought into one consistent whole. He remained to the end partly of the old time and partly of the new, asserting both tendencies with equal conviction, unaware of any incompatibility, and never becoming an evolutionist in the sense that most men are who have grown up in Darwinism.

Among the works in which the first influence is ascendent are *Social Statics*—his first book, published when he was thirty—the *Principles of Ethics* and *Man versus the State*, the two latter

¹ Compare the remarks on the relation of the individual to society in the *Autobiography*, II, 543.

appearing late in his life. In these his leading conceptions are pre-Darwinian, in the sense that they have proved incapable of survival after Darwinism has had time to develop its social implications. The point of view is individualistic and the practical policy one of extreme laissez faire, as opposed to social control. The process is conceived not as continuously evolutionary but as tending toward an ideal condition of moving equilibrium, in which the relations of men to one another will be morally adjusted and we shall all be as happy as we can reasonably desire. To this conception he adhered at all times when he was dealing with questions of personal conduct or social policy.

I do not know that it would be worth while to argue at length that these ideas are unevolutionary. The most convincing argument is that they have not in fact been able to endure as a part of evolutionary thought. It is more and more recognized, I think, that while the organic view of life implied in Darwinism is consistent with very great emphasis upon individuality, it also involves an increasing consciousness and self-direction in the process as a whole, irreconcilable with the drastic reduction of state functions advocated by Spencer. And I am not aware that the idea of a coming equilibrium of human relations, in the anticipation of which we can find a code of conduct, has any important following at the present time. It is felt to be untenable.

His ideas on general evolution find their first expression in an essay called *Progress: Its Law and Cause*, published in 1857, and are finally elaborated in *First Principles*, which appeared in 1862, when he was forty-two years old. The second part of *First Principles*, on the Knowable, contains matter which philosophic students of sociology may still find worth while, and it is perhaps the only part of Spencer which I can recommend to such with any confidence. His method is to take elementary processes, such as differentiation and co-ordination of parts and functions, and set them forth with a great array of facts from the inorganic, the vegetable, and the animal worlds, and finally from the social. This had a great effect upon me in the eighteen-eighties by showing the life of man upon earth as one of progressive organization and so giving me an animating and assuring perspective. Although

I now think that the view thus revealed is superficial, nevertheless it was worth seeing then and I see no reason why it should not be so now.

Regarded more closely, *First Principles* shows those defects of which I have spoken. Human life is perceived not directly but through mechanical analogies. The higher and more distinctively human part of it is hardly perceived at all; there is, for example, no discussion of the growth of rational social guidance as a part of progress. The thought is mechanized to a degree almost incredible to one who enters its stifling atmosphere from the world out of doors.

I almost hesitate to quote Spencer's famous formula of evolution lest I may appear to be ridiculing him. It has a quaint sound now, but as he himself regarded it as quintessential we are hardly at liberty to pass it by. It runs, then, as follows:

Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the contained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.¹

Now the problem of evolution is the problem of life; and it is safe to say that if in the future it is found possible to sum up the process of life in a formula it will not be a formula of this kind. Life must be summed up in terms of life, not translated into another language. Least of all is such a formula adequate to human life. You can never compress reason and beauty and hope and fellowship and the organic being of communities and nations into differentiations, coherences, and heterogeneities. These terms may be applicable to human life, just as you can measure a man in inches and pounds, but they can never be the essential and characteristic truth about it. There is more light and more good sense in the simple statement of Comte that progress "consists in educating, more and more, the characteristic faculties of humanity, in comparison with those of animality."

Of Spencer's volumes on the *Principles of Sociology* I need say little, not that they are unimportant but because, being a logical development of his *First Principles*, they do not offer anything

¹ *First Principles*, chap. xvii.

fundamentally different. They are, in general, what one might expect; and the value one sets upon them will vary with one's estimate of the point of view and method. The material was collected under Spencer's direction by assistants, usually, I think, with a definite plan as to what he meant to get out of it. It was rather an amassing of illustrations than research, though fresh ideas often occurred to him in the process. If we are content with a vast array of facts, sequently arranged and clearly interpreted in accordance with large but somewhat mechanical conceptions, we shall regard these as important works; if we think that human insight is a *sine qua non* they will seem little more than a desert, the more forbidding the more there is of it.

Parts I and II are of a general character, called respectively "Data" and "Inductions" of sociology. The remaining parts deal with special institutions—domestic, ceremonial, political, ecclesiastical, professional, and industrial. After three brief introductory chapters discussing the nature of social or super-organic evolution, the classification of the factors, and the influence of climate, geographical features, flora, and fauna, Spencer devotes the bulk of Part I to the nature of primitive man, and chiefly to the genesis of his religious ideas. Although his knowledge of this field was necessarily secondhand, the vigor and ingenuity of his mind enabled him here as elsewhere to advance views which specialists regard with respect.

Part II is a discussion of the organic character of society, and therefore epitomizes the nature and limitations of his sociological thought. Instead of being a direct and searching analysis of the process of human life, it is wholly analogical and hence wholly superficial. Not only is the proposition "Society is an organism" sustained by biological comparisons, but the whole part, of some one hundred and fifty pages, is given to such comparisons. Whatever is said about society is said under the evident domination of conceptions derived from another order of phenomena; and that order is rather the mechanical than the biological, since his biology is itself rather mechanical than vital. The terms of his summing up are similar to those of his general formula of evolution, and the whole part adds nothing of much importance to what we get

from his *First Principles*. I would not object to the use of biological analogy as a source of nomenclature and framework; every new growth of knowledge, I suppose, has to use the language of the old. But surely the material itself, the observation and conception, should be essentially direct and fresh, and with Spencer it is not so.

The elaborate discussion of particular institutions that follows is always clear, always vigorous, always ingenious, and always subject to the limitations I have pointed out. In some cases, as in his treatment of the opposition between militarism and industrialism, he sets forth practical truth of great moment, but never, I think, without a certain superficiality inseparable from his method.

Descriptive Sociology is a publication, in eight atlas-like volumes, of material compiled by his assistants, primarily for other works, and giving historical and descriptive data regarding the principal savage and barbarous peoples—African, Asiatic, and American—and also regarding the Hebrews and Phoenicians, the French, and the English. The facts and references are arranged in parallel columns under appropriate captions, so that it is easy to find what one seeks. I have made some use of these works, and it is my impression that they are much less known than they deserve to be. For students making comparative studies covering a wide range of societies they should be of much service. They were published by subscription and represent on Spencer's part a large pecuniary sacrifice to scientific ideals. When their publication ceased, he estimated his net loss at about £4,000.

The two strongest impressions I receive on re-reading parts of Spencer are that of the fixity of his limitations and that of the abundance of his mind within those limitations. Although, if I am right, his way of seeing and thinking was not sociological, it was large, keen-edged, and propelled by an intellectual passion almost sublime. Though commonly described as an infidel, his work was a signal act of faith. Never timid or half-hearted, he stained with his life-blood every detail of his vast scheme and defended it as a mother defends her child. He spent his whole life in the elucidation and propagation of truth as he saw it, devoting without question

his spirit and all its instruments to this supreme object. Some of his chief defects were virtues in excess; as he might have been more of a man of science had he been less ardent as a philosopher and moralist. That he was a moralist, somewhat dogmatic, but sincere and ready to make sacrifices, there can be no doubt. He shone also as a critic of easy-going conventions. Bold, ingenious, iconoclastic, pungent in illustration, he loved to demolish shams and did it extremely well. He raked up and burned much theological and other rubbish, earning the gratitude of all the liberal world.

If I have seemed to depreciate him it is perhaps because Spencer set his claims so high that any attempt to estimate them almost inevitably takes the form of lowering his own mark. But, when all is said, he remains a man of extraordinary powers and vast influence upon the thought of his day, if not altogether the equal mate of Darwin that we once supposed him to be.

HEREDITY AND OPPORTUNITY—*Concluded*

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III. THE FAMILY ENVIRONMENT

If, as has been pointed out above, there is still very much to learn with reference to the inheritance of mental traits, it is even more true that an almost unknown territory awaits exploration by those who have the hardihood to attempt the measurement of environmental forces.

The earliest phase of the social environment to act upon the individual is that of the family. There is a legacy, not of blood, which every child receives from the home influences which surround him. It is this fact which makes the pedigrees of notorious pauper and criminal families somewhat less convincing than they appear at first sight. It is conceivable that a durable tradition of lawlessness or of thriftlessness may establish itself in stock of quite ordinary quality—no worse in fact than the average of the population. The most intimate studies of our criminal population reveal a large number of individuals whose difficulties appear to be grounded in just this situation, viz.: a lawless or immoral tradition which the submerged individual assimilates as inevitably as persons born in a higher social class appropriate law-abiding and property-respecting traditions.

To the thoroughgoing eugenist the family environment appears to be nothing but the projection of the family germplasm. Bad family environment, ergo, bad heredity. Nothing is simpler than the unctuous fatalism with which the Whethams, for example, dispose of the whole question:

There is, to put it mildly, a strong probability that the environment normally provided by the parents and the immediate family will be fairly well suited to children who inherit the same inborn qualities, that the same occupations will attract their capacity, the same interests absorb their leisure hours.¹

¹ *Heredity and Society*, p. 121.

The commingling of nature and nurture in the family circle is charmingly revealed in the early experiences of Maxim Gorky as reported in *In the World*. The figure of the staunch, lovable grandmother—philosopher and gatherer of herbs—appears and reappears in his pages. Sometimes she taught him lessons of courage and patience, often she remarked a propos of the sordid brutal life about them, "When one thinks of people, one cannot help being sorry for them," and of one of those mysterious and wonderful days afield he writes: "I followed her silently and cautiously, not to attract her attention. I did not wish to interrupt her conversation with God, the herbs and the frogs. But she saw me." Here was a nature which had bequeathed to him, no doubt, much of his rich poetic imagination, but here also was a companionship as fructifying for inner development as spring sunlight upon young plants.

Sir Francis Galton has given us some well-known passages dealing with the judges of England under the impression that he was analyzing the forces of heredity only. It would appear that much else was involved, especially the factor now in question—family tradition and family position. As Dr. Devon points out, it is conveniently assumed that position is of no importance. Everybody knows that in the professions chosen to illustrate the theory [i.e., of transmitted ability] promotion is not wholly dependent on ability. That a father and son have both been judges offers no presumption of special fitness on the part of the son. That high military rank has been held by several members of the same family need not prove any of them to be great soldiers.¹

Van Denburg in his study of the *Causes of the Elimination of Students in Public Secondary Schools of New York City*² gives us an example of a quite different sort where a family environment, instead of affording a point of vantage from which to survey and appropriate life's opportunities, acts rather as a handicap which can be overcome only with the greatest difficulty. After pointing out that seven-eighths of the pupils entering high school fail to graduate, he says:

At least seventy-five per cent of the pupils who enter have brains, the native ability to graduate if they chose to apply themselves. They come from

¹ *The Criminal and the Community*, p. 20.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 183-84.

homes where there is no intellectual tradition of study for study's sake. They feel the pressure of limited means, parental sacrifice, narrow living, if not the pinch of poverty. They desire to be independent financially of the home, to help with the rent, to buy their own clothes. They see no use in the high school as a means to a better livelihood. They want a little pleasure in living, some time to play, to visit with their friends, to enjoy themselves in their own amusements. Study to them is not a pleasure, it is the hardest and most disagreeable kind of work. They lack the faith to see in it a road to better things. They do not know personally men and women who are high-school graduates save only their teachers. The lives of the men teachers seem exacting and profitless to the boys. Few, indeed, desire to emulate them.

It is a commonplace to point out that certain types of homes foster industry, ambition, or conscientious regard for duty. It is interesting, however, to note that in college careers large classes of men are influenced apparently by something in the home environment impelling them to quite different degrees of energy in their scholastic achievements. Of about 2,500 recent graduates of Dartmouth College it appears that sons of clergymen averaged 77 per cent for their entire college course, whereas sons of business men averaged only 71 per cent and sons of farmers 74 per cent. Of 416 sons of bankers and manufacturers, 16 per cent took high rank (a grade of over 80), and 45 per cent, low rank (a grade of less than 70), while of 505 sons of artisans and farmers, 23 per cent took high rank, or about one and one-half as many proportionately, and 33 per cent took low rank, or only three-fourths as many proportionately.

Stated in slightly different form, these figures mean that whereas the sons of bankers and manufacturers contributed approximately one high-rank man to every three low-rank men, the sons of artisans and farmers contributed two high-rank men to every three low-rank men. Selection, no doubt, plays a certain part in the explanation of these differences, but beyond variations in the make-up of the groups, there are evidently subtle differences in outlook upon college and attitude toward the intellectual life which characterize these various occupational groups. Of the clergyman, for example, we may say that his work necessitates a close companionship with books, that these books and the literary activities which accompany their use, have their place within the home and

are not without their effect upon the sons. The son of the farmer has learned the lesson of hard work and knows that nature yields her increase only under compulsion. The artisan's son is pre-disposed to value highly opportunities which appear so far beyond the reach of most boys in his economic class. Sons of business men, on the other hand, may not have had either familiarity with the intellectual life at home nor with the discipline of hard work under adverse economic conditions. A college education may be only the closing episode in a long series of conventional experiences which have befallen them without much volition or responsibility on their part.

If, however, the differences between boys from various occupational groups seem slight and difficult to interpret in the case of college students, they are far from uncertain when ascertained for pupils in the common schools.

In 1910 a statistical study was undertaken by the writer of the ambitions and plans of boys in the seventh and eighth grades of the public schools of the city of St. Paul.¹ Altogether 1,076 boys wrote answers to the following questions: "Do you expect to go to high school?" "What is your father's exact occupation?" "What occupation or work do you think you would like best to work at all your life?" "Why do you think you would like that occupation?" Material was thus provided for a rough sort of reconstruction in statistical terms of a part of the family environment of these one thousand boys. Their replies reflected interesting differences in family outlooks upon the possibilities of life. In answer to the question: "Do you expect to go to high school?" 94 per cent of the boys from the professional class replied in the affirmative, 86 per cent of the mercantile class, 74 per cent of the clerical, 61 per cent of the artisan class, and 54 per cent of the sons of laborers. A total of 990 boys expressed a preference for some sort of work. Of these, 111 chose each his father's identical occupation, or about 11 per cent. There was evident in the figures a considerable tendency to choose occupations in the same general order of vocation as that in which the father was employed; thus three-fifths

¹See "The Social Waste of Unguided Personal Ability," *Americal Journal of Sociology*, XIX, (November, 1913), 358.

of the sons of professional men wished to be professional men and two-fifths of the sons of artisans wished to be artisans and one-fourth of the sons of merchants wished to be merchants. Another tendency was also well marked and disclosed a sharp line of cleavage between the manual and non-manual occupations. The sons of fathers engaged in the four groups of non-manual occupations were alike in recording the largest number of choices in favor of the professions. Such work appeared to be the ideal of clerks', merchants', and professional men's sons alike. But the most frequent choice of the manual workers' sons was uniformly some skilled trade with agriculture tying for the first place in the case of the small group of farmers' sons. These figures illustrate very clearly that vocational ambitions in the absence of skilful vocational guidance are relative to family outlook and sophistication. Preferences appear to be conditioned by the vocational viewpoint established by the occupation of the father.

IV. THE SOCIAL LEVEL OF OPPORTUNITY

Opportunity implies the absence of barriers between individuals and the high places of life except, of course, the barriers interposed by inherited personal inferiority. Complete equality of opportunity has probably never existed anywhere in the world, for the distribution of knowledge and the distribution of wealth have everywhere been of such a sort as to establish an initial inequality at the very beginning of the race. These initial differences can, of course, be reduced by improvements in the practice of public education and by the gradual emergence of a social democracy correlative with political democracy. In Chile, Professor Ross tells us,¹ it is impossible for the bright boys born in the mud huts of the common people to advance into the government service or the liberal professions because preparation for the free high school and university is provided only by private fitting schools. The classes, therefore, who are too poor to pay the tuition are effectively prevented from making any exit from their own level. Little of such conscious artificial limitation is imposed upon the poor of our own land, yet the results, due to the economic and cultural poverty

¹ See "Class and Caste," *American Journal of Sociology*, XVIII (May, 1917), 757.

into which millions of our population are born, are of the same sort though in lesser degree. I should like to emphasize the term just used—cultural poverty—and to point out that the son of a Croatian miner in a soft-coal town of southwestern Pennsylvania or northern Illinois may be almost as handicapped at fourteen years of age, after stumbling through five grades of a parochial school taught by poorly educated sisters, themselves born in Austria-Hungary, as though he were living in a mud hut in Chile. To say that his poverty is only a stimulus to ambitious effort and that if he is a lad o'parts he will pull up out of his environment is pure nonsense to anyone who has lived in such a community. A soft-coal town in northern Illinois did give the country a John Mitchell, but he may well be the exception which proves the rule, and he escaped, moreover, the handicap of a foreign-speaking home and the cultural destitution of the Croatian peasant. Not less than two-thirds of the workers in the great basic industries of America, such as coal-mining, copper- and iron-mining, blast furnaces, rolling mills, and iron foundries are either foreign-born or of foreign or mixed parentage. This is liable to prove a handicap in proportion as the race to which they belong has come recently to this country and is separated from American culture by a considerable interval. Here, then, are social levels of opportunity upon which our industrial population is arranged not unlike the successive levels of a Roman amphitheater.

A similar and striking difference exists between different geographical localities. George R. Davies, following the lead of Odin, Lester F. Ward, and others, has demonstrated in statistical terms the marked superiority of a densely populated over a sparsely populated region in the production of men of note.¹ Contrary to a popular impression it is the cities with the regions immediately surrounding them which have produced eminent men out of all proportion to their population. This is apparently equally true on both sides of the Atlantic and is undoubtedly due to the fact that in cities are found libraries, museums, galleries, universities, courts, bureaus, and other cultural and commercial paraphernalia by the use of which men raise themselves in the scale of productivity.

¹See his *Social Environment*.

Another circumstance appears to make a marked difference between sections; I refer to the effectiveness of elementary education as measured by the literacy of the population and by the school attendance. The six New England states, for example, in a comparison embracing twenty-nine states in all, ranked in regard to elementary education in 1860, first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and eighth, and in regard to output of noted men, as indicated by entries in *Who's Who* for 1912, they ranked first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh. Arkansas and Florida, on the other hand, ranked twenty-seventh and twenty-ninth in regard to elementary education, and twenty-ninth and twenty-seventh respectively in regard to production of noted men in 1912.

One may say, therefore, that mere presence in an urban region as compared with a remote rural section, or in Massachusetts as compared with Arkansas, constitutes a distinct opportunity for personal advancement which has even been made the subject of statistical calculation. Here are the beginnings perhaps of the measurement of the influence of social environment.

A recent writer has said: "Good books, like well built houses, must have tradition behind them. The Homers and Shakespeares and Goethes spring from rich soil left by dead centuries; they are like native trees that grow so well nowhere else." It is not by accident that our men of mark come from the ancient haunts of culture and learning and from the great marts of trade. It is here that time has left its richest deposits, here that the social environment resembles in some measure the soil of the forest enriched by the mold of the leaves of unnumbered autumns; for it is the peculiarity of a city that, though young in years, it soon sets up institutions which embody the age-long traditions of the race.

There remains one highly dynamic factor in the production of opportunity, which has been defined, in what precedes, as the *absence of barriers*. This is a merely negative view, however, which needs to be supplemented by the positive conception of opportunity as *effective stimulation*. It is not mere comfort, nor freedom from discrimination, nor even leisure, but rather positive stimuli to definite lines of action, which are of greater importance in the

lives of those who are most auspiciously situated. At certain times conjunctures of events result in a great increase and intensification of these urgent appeals to action. Such a time was that immediately after the period of discoveries when the self-complacent conservatism of the Middle Ages was giving way to a new and restless spirit of progress. Columbus and the Portuguese had added new worlds to the old; Copernicus had bidden men look beyond terrestrial limits into the field of the universe. The printing-press was rendering possible the rapid dissemination of thought and a "strange curiosity" and thirst for learning had taken possession of men's minds. Books of travel in distant lands were seized upon and read with the greatest eagerness. Grecian scholars had spread throughout Western Europe, and the study of the Greek classics had made its way into the universities. Everywhere the old forms of faith and learning were being shaken to their foundations. It was an era of revision and of revolutionary change, not wholly unlike the present. The spirit of a new time was calling upon the old to give account of itself or yield ground. Such was the spiritual environment out of which there issued a period of the greatest literary and intellectual achievement.

In the field of scientific discoveries a single new conception or a single great invention may stimulate achievement in almost geometrical progression. Inventions notably wait upon one another and, once a stubborn obstacle has been overcome, application follows application as logs go out when once the jam is broken.

In industrial development conjunctures in the exploitation of new resources, such as steam applied to locomotion, or water power to the production of electricity, or the discovery of the commercial possibilities of petroleum in the fifties of the last century, create situations where achievement is inevitable. Out of the crude-oil situation in western Pennsylvania in the sixties almost anything might have come, assuming flexibility of conditions, but assuming railroad and commercial ethics as they actually were, assuming the *laissez faire* political philosophy then rampant in this country, assuming the young commission man in Cleveland, who had learned from a shrewd close-figuring father how to buy and how to sell, who had learned also that "I could get as much interest

for fifty dollars loaned at seven per cent . . . as I could earn by digging potatoes for one hundred days," assuming all this, then the creation of the greatest fortune of history appears to be a highly natural phenomenon. Here was the opportunity for a tremendous stroke, a master-exploitation, which only awaited a man with imagination big enough, a trader's technique shrewd enough, and a stomach stout enough to withstand the necessary desolation that commercial buccaneering and submarining always entail. Mr. Rockefeller does not profess to any of the virtues of the ordinary producer, such as industry, technical proficiency, and the like, but, quite on the contrary, confides in a magazine interview:

People persist in thinking that I was a tremendous worker, always at it early and late, summer and winter. The real truth is that I was what would now be called a "slacker" after I reached my middle thirties. I used to take long vacations at my Cleveland home every summer and spent my time planting and transplanting trees, building roads, doing landscape gardening, driving horses and enjoying myself with my family, keeping in touch with business by private telegraph wire. I never, from the time I first entered an office, let business engross all my time and attention; I always took an active interest in Sunday school and church work, in children and, if I might say so, in doing little things for friendless and lonely and poor people.¹

I once held an interesting conversation with an aged French-Canadian, who had been the employer of James J. Hill when the latter worked for wages as one of a flat-boat crew who with long poles propelled cargoes of freight up the Minnesota River from Fort Snelling. Here again is the case of a remarkable man who fell into a remarkable situation. Mr. Hill had the discernment to perceive that the Northwest was pregnant with economic opportunity where others could see only sterile wilderness. He had other qualities by which in the end he profited enormously from a conjuncture which will not occur again in American railroad history.

It is absurd to attempt to account for such conspicuous economic success solely in terms of individual traits. The rôle of great "once-for-all" opportunities must be recognized.

Professor William James has made some interesting comments upon opportunity in his essay "Great Men and Their Environment":

¹ B. C. Forbes in *Leslie's*, quoted in *Current Opinion*, LXIII, 308-9.

It is true that certain types are irrepressible. Voltaire, Shelley, Carlyle, can hardly be conceived leading a dumb and vegetable life in any epoch. But take Mr. Galton himself, take his cousin, Mr. Darwin and take Mr. Spencer; nothing is to me more conceivable than that at another epoch all three of these men might have died "with all their music in them," known only to their friends as persons of strong and original character and judgment. What has started them on their career of effective greatness is simply the accident of each stumbling upon a task vast, brilliant and congenial enough to call out the convergence of all his passions and powers. I see no more reason why, in case they had not fallen in with their several hobbies at propitious periods in their life, they need necessarily have hit upon other hobbies and made themselves equally great. Their case seems similar to that of the Washingtons, Cromwells, and Grants, who simply rose to their occasions.¹

There is no reason to believe that the "accident of stumbling upon tasks vast, brilliant and congenial" happens to every able character, nor that occasions are always presented to which they may rise. Indeed, Professor Jastrow, another psychologist who has pondered this problem, writes: ". . . for every case of marked success, there must be many more competitors of quite equal capacity whom the discouragements of circumstance, or the distraction of interests, or the ill-adjustment of appraisal, has deprived of a like measure of reward."² When we consider the professional men of our acquaintance who are alert, suave, industrious, adaptable, conscientious, plausible, rather than possessed of any exceptional intellectual gifts, I venture to think that among cobblers or carpenters, farmers or sailors, there may be as many, also alert, suave, industrious, adaptable, conscientious, or plausible, who, if they had had the appropriate stimulus and the requisite advantages, would be teaching pharmacy or philology, or sitting in a swivel chair under beetling rows of professional treatises of some sort as acceptably on the whole as those who are actually doing these things today.

We have considered opportunity in its negative aspect as the absence of barriers to personal achievement, and in its positive aspect as appropriate stimulation to achievement; in conclusion it is probably safe to say that great as are the differences between

¹ *The Will to Believe and Other Essays*, pp. 242-43.

² *The Qualities of Men*, pp. 128-89.

men, the differences between the situations in which men find themselves are of even greater and more bewildering variety.

V. SOCIAL SITUATIONS AND PSYCHICAL TONE

Reference has already been made to the great difference in men in regard to spontaneity and passivity in the presence of the social environment. Some go self-propelled through life seeming almost to create the scenes and settings needed for their own heroic rôles. Others are borne aloft only upon the crest of some wave of social revolution or intellectual upheaval. We have now to examine some of the circumstances which wake men up, which create in them that high potential of energy which in most men would suffice for great achievement if once they could throw it into gear. The most natural point of departure for a study of these factors is probably that remarkable little essay of William James, entitled "The Energies of Men," and most of the factors enumerated here are discussed in his brilliant pages.

It has often been noticed that commonplace men once elevated to conspicuous and responsible positions in the government, with the eyes of the whole people fastened upon them, sometimes achieve a level of performance which could never have been predicted from anything in their previous records. Desperate situations of all kinds, including war with its wild alarms, likewise never fail to reveal heroic and masterful natures which had not before been put to the proof. As James puts it "Every siege or shipwreck or polar expedition brings out some hero who keeps the whole company in heart." The unexpected heroism shown in the face of death by some of the dissolute ne'er-do-wells in Kitchener's army moved Donald Hankey to words which will not soon be forgotten:

Portentous solemn death, you looked a fool when you tackled one of them! Life? They did not value life! They had never been able to make much of a fist of it. But if they lived amiss they died gloriously, with a smile for the pain and the dread of it. What else had they been born for? It was their chance.

Not only in the fury of battle, but in the lives of all those who have made their last reckoning with selfish ends and henceforth look out serene and detached upon a world of purely objective

causes, we catch a glimpse of a new and higher order of achievement. Sandeman in his *Uncle Gregory* refers to

that quite unmistakable note that you get in a very few people, who, in one way or another, have actually accepted death, and are only, so to speak, alive in the meantime. It belongs to the flawless perfection of the military spirit with its entire detachment from life itself, from self-will, from fear, and from ease, and from all pretenses.¹

An essential part of this heightened and intensified energizing is the heightened emotion which accompanies it. Some of the men thrown up out of the depths by the convulsion of the world-war have been almost incandescent in their emotional intensity. Such was Kerensky. From a physical weakness so great that "before the revolution a single speech seemed to leave him on the verge of collapse," he went on from strength to strength "for weeks on end, delivering a dozen or a score of such speeches in a single day, and finding time in the intervals between them to pour out proclamations, appeals, and decisions on the most critical matters of the most vital of all the departments of state."²

Louis Raemakers, the influence of whose cartoons was estimated by the Germans in terms of army corps,

was unheard of previous to the opening of the great war. On the first of August, 1914, he was living quietly with his family, contentedly painting the tulip fields, waterways, cattle and windmills of his native Holland. Four days later he drew the first cartoon, "Christendom after Twenty Centuries," of a series that was to reveal him as a champion of civilization and make his name a household word in every country.³

In the early days of the war he went to Belgium and, as he put it, "explored hell."

Another psychic factor of much importance in accounting for achievement is the spiritual uplift of a moral victory; still another, the impact of great and heavily laden ideas such as Fatherland, "God wills it," Democracy, Truth, Holy Church, etc.

Conversion in the religious sense often emancipates locked-up energies as does also "methodical ascetic discipline" which keeps "the deeper levels constantly in reach."

¹ Quoted by Thomson in *Darwinism and Human Life*, p. 226.

² E. H. Wilcox, "Kerensky and the Revolution," *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1917.

³ See "Book Notes" in *Century Magazine* (January, 1918).

A complete theory of genius has been erected upon the semi-religious conception of detachment from self and objectivity in one's attitude toward life, which, as we have seen, characterizes those utterly devoted to great and perilous causes. Tuerck says:

The man of genius develops an activity apparently similar to that of other men, but in which his inspired nature inwardly assumes a totally different attitude toward what he does or leaves undone, his actions being in truth only play, having no reference to his own individual self, whereas other people are clumsily and ridiculously in earnest about their own petty existence, an existence at the mercy of any and every accident. Hence the calm and great courage of the man of genius, his clear and unprejudiced outlook, his extraordinary boldness combined with the greatest coolness, his irresistible advance along the path he has once traced out for himself.¹

According to James, *heightened emotional excitement* or "*some unusual idea of necessity*" are the stimuli which induce these extraordinary manifestations of energy and of will, and he believes "that men the world over possess amounts of resource which only exceptional individuals push to their extremes of use."

This faith in the energies of men, properly stimulated, contains no disparagement of the legitimate claims put forth in behalf of inheritance; he who is by nature a potential dynamo of power may well surpass in achievement the man who has but feeble resources, granted both are performing under a maximum load, but who takes on the burdens of the world's thinking and loving and inventing and directing is another question, and we shall have to admit that the stimuli coming from the social environment are very potent in determining who actually carry their maximum loads. It still holds that "we inherit all the faculties and powers which we possess, but what they are *only the event shows*. Nothing can be taken out of a man but what is in him, but there may be a good deal in him which is never taken out."

VI. THE SOCIAL VERDICT

In connection with the preceding topics an attempt has been made to distinguish the things of Nature from the things of Nurture. No two men it appears are alike, but on the contrary they vary enormously in natural capacity. The social environment in which

¹ *The Man of Genius*, p. 60.

they are immersed is also as variegated as one can conceive, and when the innumerable permutations of circumstance which play upon the individual are considered, it is entirely safe to say that no two men ever find life the same. A man's environment, therefore, is no less unique than his heredity. The frequent practice of writers upon this subject, who assume out of hand that brothers, or classmates, or members of a given social class are subjected to the same social environment, is the occasion of much fallacious reasoning. Identical twins even, bred alike, dressed and educated alike, indistinguishable possibly to their own parents, may be as far apart as the poles when it comes to that intimate isolation of the spirit which we call individuality. Alike in the superficial experiences of life, surrounded by the same walls and the same people, they may nevertheless differ unspeakably in all that really matters in the things of the spirit.

We come at length to a final question—that of the social appraisal of personal quality. The outstanding fact appears to be that both the various hereditary values, and the many sorts of achievement values are alike rated high or low, according to somewhat capricious social standards.

Bagehot has offered a clear formulation of this principle in the following passage:

If any particular power is much prized in an age, those possessed of that power will be imitated; those deficient in that power will be despised. In consequence an unusual quantity of that power will be developed and be conspicuous. Within certain limits vigorous and elevated thought was respected in Elizabeth's time and, therefore, vigorous and elevated thinkers were many.¹

Says Jastrow:

It is only in Utopia that condition is so nicely fitted to merit that success becomes of itself significant. A mundane people must first itself be judged before approving the type of men to whom it awards success.²

In proportion as a nation is all for one type of activity, a larger and larger proportion of successes will appear in that speciality. There will be many prizes in that quarter and some mere personages will sit in the seats labeled "for the great." That is to say, the social demand will much outrun the supply of natural variants of

¹Quoted in Carver, *Sociology and Social Progress*, p. 724. ² *Op. cit.*, p. 131.

the sort suited to excel in that type of activity. Persons of great but unspecialized powers will also be swept along in the same current, setting to the common goal, and, being strong swimmers, will outdistance rivals marked by respectable but not pre-eminent powers. In short, when a nation is all for war, or all for poetry, or all for commerce, the very general competition ensuing in those lines will draft into service all the pre-eminent special geniuses of those bents, many great all-around men, and even many men lacking exceptional talents of any sort, who, nevertheless, get captaincies and lieutenantcies, so to speak, because of a dearth of officers. When, on the other hand, a type of activity is despised or ignored, there will resort thither only such persons of specialized genius as combine with it great self-reliance and independence of mind, and they will no doubt be awarded but a partial recognition by their distracted contemporaries; they will be sadly under-rated just as many who achieve a moderate success in the prevailing activity will be much over-rated. Many a sensitive soul will have his powers chilled by the prevailing indifference and many a mediocre personality will bask in the warmth of a popular esteem, which, in a long view of the matter, is, in one century or another, indulgent equally of parasites and poets, athletes and authors, saints and soldiers, creators of art and captains of industry. But these types cannot all flourish, each in its peculiar perfection, at one and the same time.

In order to get a cross-section of contemporary opinion as to what types of individuals are most worthy of being signalized, I took the trouble to go over the names of all residents of the state of New York which were contained in the edition of *Who's Who in America* for 1910-11 and to compare them in point of numbers with the total membership of their respective crafts enumerated in New York in the census taken the same year (1910). I selected the following occupations as representative of useful effort along a variety of worthy lines: sea captains, members of fire companies, locomotive engineers, life savers, carpenters, cooks, persons employed in agriculture, builders and building contractors, musicians and music teachers, actors, bankers and brokers, architects, physicians, clergymen, lawyers and judges, chemists, artists, journalists

of all sorts, and authors of all sorts. The sophisticated may smile at this list, for quite according to their expectation the 150,000 good people engaged in the first six of these occupations, from sea captains to carpenters and cooks, did not secure a single entry in the list of the "conspicuously successful people" of the state. Of the 378,000 persons engaged in agriculture, one in every 75,000 was notably successful, netting us five or six biographies. Builders and contractors were admitted at the rate of 1 to 2,000 so engaged; musicians and music teachers at the rate of 5 per thousand; actors, together with bankers and brokers (for both professions hold out equal prospects of biographical mention), 11 per thousand; physicians, 16 per thousand; architects, 17 per thousand; chemists, 26 per thousand; clergymen, 28 per thousand; lawyers and judges, 32 per thousand; artists, 52 per thousand; journalists, editors, reporters, etc., 71 per thousand; while, wonderful to relate, of 1,442 males and females constituting the tribe of writers, no less than 426 per thousand, or nearly 43 per cent, were admitted to this shrine of publicity.

If one were disposed to make comparisons it would appear, for example, that if one of two brothers should engage in farming or dairying, while the other became a newspaper man, the chances of the former's appearing in *Who's Who* in comparison with those of the latter would be as 1 to 5,380. A banker has one chance to thirty-nine enjoyed by a writer. A physician is from a fourth to a fifth as likely to be "conspicuously successful" as a newspaper man. Even the lawyers and judges have but one chance in thirteen of getting into the Hall of Fame when pitted against the authors.

Such then is Fame! Those who interest us, whose work arrests our eye, whose names become household words, whose signed contributions lie about our living-room and library tables, these are in a fair way of getting a modest immortality which, after all, bears small relation perhaps to their place in the social economy. Is there not the possibility that even the inspired muse of history may now and again have slipped into the simple and natural expedients of the profane editors of *Who's Who* and collated the conspicuously successful under the impression that she was informing us with reference to the makers of history?

THE PRICE SYSTEM AND SOCIAL MANAGEMENT

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The problems of reconstruction are commonly thought of as a matter of deep concern to applied economics, and so they are; but more recently there is coming to exist in the minds of those who have taken the matter of reconstruction to heart a feeling that reconstruction must mean more than a mere application of the present economic theory—that it is going to call into question nearly the whole of that theory; that the first step in reconstruction will be not to apply the existing theory, but to develop a theory that will be able to cope with the problems before the world.

There is nothing very surprising in this view of the case. It has been apparent for an appreciable term of years that there was something wrong or at least incomplete in economic science as it stands. With adolescence of the machine régime the old political economy became inadequate. It was both too wide and too narrow. On the one hand, it failed to put sufficient emphasis on the business phenomena, so that practical men of affairs would have none of it; on the other hand, it failed to go deep enough into the social structure to be in any sense an explanation of the economic life of the group, or to allow opportunity for the development of any theory of group welfare. The Marginal Utility School cut economics to fit the business facts, and so made of it a glorified system of accountancy, in which the market was the beginning and the end. The business men are now satisfied or should be. Where there are conflicts between the economic point of view and the business point of view, most of these conflicts are mere disputes over terminology. Thus the economist is likely to insist on the separation of the factors of production according to the traditional method, while the business man knows (and he is entirely right) that for his purposes the factors of production can

be lumped as capital. In any particular contact that the economist makes with business it is difficult to see that he is governed by anything differing from the business man's theory. But economics is a social science; and the market is only one among scores of social institutions both antecedent and consequent to it. Slowly the light has been dawning that if economics is not to be hopelessly discredited as a social science it must adjust itself to social facts. To go back to political economy is impossible; to remain a mechanistic exposition of large scale cost accounting (that is, to be simply "economics") is not sufficient; it must become in some real sense, a science of social economy.

Among those who speak for changes of a drastic sort in economic thinking the emphasis varies; sometimes it is a demand for a new theory of value;¹ more often, recently, it is a demand for changes in the price system. The two sorts of demands mean much the same thing. The present theory of value is entirely competent to deal with such elements of value as profess to interpret demand and supply as market facts. If value theory is enlarged to take on something of the element of "social value" or if the price system is modified in some way so as to give force to value elements coming from outside the market, the results to be expected will be substantially the same. Normally no changes are made in theory until the felt needs become powerful enough to change the institutions that are explained by the theory. Accordingly the more interesting phase of the attack on economics as it stands is the demand for the abolition, abrogation, or drastic modification of the price system. An additional interest attaches to the price system on account of the connection with the problem of war and peace, and the manner in which by that fact it becomes bound up with the entire problem of reconstruction. Thus Veblen:²

So if the projectors of this peace at large are in any degree inclined to seek concessive terms on which the peace might hopefully be made enduring,

¹ B. M. Anderson, *Social Value*; J. H. Hobson, *Work and Welfare*.

² Veblen, *The Nature of Peace*, p. 367. The quotation of a single sentence cannot of course hope to be convincing. Nothing less than the whole of the nature of peace can bring out the necessary relation between economic arrangements and the

it should evidently be part of their endeavors from the outset to put events in train for the present abatement and eventual abrogation of the rights of ownership and of the price system in which those rights take effect.

There are others of the current economic writers who either imply or express much the same, or at least part of the same, idea. Without exception, however, the manner in which the price system is to take its departure is left to the imagination; the way in which "events are to be put in train," etc., is not mentioned. Probably it is a case of the better part of valor; yet the question remains—a typically Veblenian question, embarrassing in the extreme, shouting its demand for solution seemingly insoluble.

It is not by any chance the purpose of this paper to attempt an answer to the question; but rather to speculate on the nature and possible development of the price system during the time that remains to it. That the price system will be eliminated in anything like the immediate future, seems very doubtful. Professor Cooley points out that the price system is an institution. "We have to do with a value institution or process far transcending in reach any special sort of value and participating in the most diverse phases of our life."¹ It has taken unto itself the function of dominating and relating all values, whether those values be of the economic, the aesthetic, or the moral type. So widespread, so deeply rooted an institution will not soon die. Reconstruction may, it is true, entail so great a stress as to achieve that which looks impossible. Barring that contingency, the price system will continue, strengthening its hold, cumulatively, on social life. Allowing for the most optimistic hopes for the abolition of the price system, it must have a place in our reckoning for yet an appreciable time and during that time the changes that the price system is making within itself seem of considerable import to the social sciences, particularly with reference to the engrossing problem of post-war reconstruction.

possibility of a lasting peace. The arrangement of the price system may seem to be merely an uncalled-for impertinence unless preceded by the thorough analysis which no one probably is so well qualified to give as is Mr. Veblen. The reader is therefore referred to the complete work, and is asked temporarily to accept the assertion that it is the conclusion just quoted toward which the whole argument is pointed.

¹ C. H. Cooley, *Social Process*, p. 309.

The price system is not to be considered solely as an institution that is to be described and analyzed in terms of dollars and cents. The price system must be taken to mean the market plus the allied institutions which are the necessary results of the price system as well as the *sine qua non* of the development of the price system to its present vigorous state, namely, those institutions which for lack of more comprehensive terms may be called capitalism and modern technology. Capitalism being used to describe the price system on its organization side; modern technology describing it on its production side. It should be quite apparent that the organization as well as the production of industry is on a basis of price, and that any other basis is difficult if not impossible to imagine. The truth of the matter is that the price system in all of its ramifications—the price system so universal in its dominance, so much a part of every phase of social and individual life—is too big a concept to be put readily under a single caption. Perhaps the only term that comes close to the expression of the whole idea is modern industrialism. By the term industrialism is meant all of the industry, not the type of organization alone, nor the technique alone (nor what might be implied by the somewhat wider term “the state of the industrial arts”) nor the price basis alone; but all of these elements combining and reinforcing each other—that is industrialism as used here.

Industrialism like any other institution serves itself. But institutions may not serve themselves alone; they must also be serviceable to the larger institution, society, in which the particular institution has its being. The matter might be put more convincingly in the negative. Institutions that are disserviceable to the social whole become unfit to survive and tend to become eliminated. Disserviceability is an extreme term, just as absolute serviceability is an Utopian dream. Institutions, as a matter of fact, fall somewhere between the two limits; that is, they represent in greater or less degree the universal phenomenon of maladjustment.

The maladjustment entailed by modern industrialism is scarcely open to argument. The mobilization of industry for war was a particular instance in which the necessity of adjustment to the social responsibility required of it became apparent.

The vast changes that the war made necessary in industrialism indicate in some slight degree the extent by which that institution falls short of adjustment to the society that it is to serve. Most of the adjustments of industrialism to war needs were imposed from without, by the collective social will, through its formal political institutions. Some of the advantages will be retained—not so much because of the governmental command but because for the most part the advantages to society have been advantages to industrialism also. Even the most optimistic, however, does not dare to believe that the force of government can perpetuate in peace times the control that was designed and accepted in the “win the war” spirit. Much of the adjustment of industrialism to social needs must depend on industry itself.

It will be desirable, therefore, to take a somewhat more detailed view of modern industrialism to the end that the possibilities in store for social welfare may be made apparent. Modern industrialism presents four prominent characteristics or phases: (1) Modern industrialism on its technical side is becoming almost purely a machine process. (2) It is tending to operate on a basis of large units of plants which are becoming progressively larger. (3) Industrialism is becoming capitalistic, not only in the equipment sense that is implied by the foregoing, but also in the investment sense; that is to say, industrialism represents large blocks of impersonal wealth gathered from scattered sources and focused at particular points through the mechanism of incorporation. (4) Finally, all of industrialism is measured and controlled at every step by the pecuniary calculus—every action, every policy, every development conditioned by the answer to the question, “What will be the effect on the balance sheet?”

The result of the growth of the machine process has been to call attention to the problem of management as affecting labor. The business man has been quick to see that the machine process involves the spending of vast sums for fixed charges, that is, expenses that go on quite regardless of the amount of product, hence ultimately regardless of the income that the business receives. The first result of the increasing fixed charges is a demand for the highest possible mechanical efficiency. But effi-

ciency of the machine is all but useless without efficiency of the men who work the machine. Sooner or later a situation typically as follows finds its way into the calculations of the cost accountant.

COST OF 1,000 UNITS OF PRODUCT

Interest charge on \$20,000 machine . . .	\$ 4.00
Depreciation charge on \$20,000 machine . .	3.50
Rent charge for floor space occupied . . .	2.00
Other overhead charges, light, heat, management	6.00
Material, 1,000 units	10.00
Labor	2.00
	<hr/>
Total	\$27.50

The cost accountant or the efficiency expert finds that the labor used in the above process is only 30, or 40, or 50 per cent efficient. The conclusion must occur to him: "If I can increase the efficiency of the workingman to something approaching 100 per cent, I can get 1,500 units surely, and possibly 2,000 or 2,500 units with the same equipment I have and with proportionate increases in only the item of material, and a small increase in the labor item (the latter being the first prerequisite of higher efficiency that comes to be thought of). Probably the accountant would go into the matter in somewhat greater detail, and with a finer discrimination in terminology. That is, however, beside the point; the situation substantially as outlined is not only of frequent occurrence, but it is becoming an inevitable consequence of the machine process wherever the machine process has reached a certain fullness of development. Likewise the conclusion that the management draws from the situation is inevitable; so much so that the conclusions are frequently expressed as slogans: "Cheap labor is too expensive to use." "Efficiency is the watchword," etc. The attention of the management becomes riveted on the human equipment of the plant, precisely that phase of the industrial policy that is fraught with tremendous possibilities for good or ill to the working man, and, overflowing the immediate workingman, to the whole social group.

It must not be assumed that the relation of large fixed plants and the demand for efficiency is an isolated and simple causal

sequence. At any time the business end of the plant, that is, the sales organization, may step in and nullify the proceedings. There is a limitation on efficiency always in the background; not how much can be produced, but how much can be sold at a profit is the final arbiter of what will be produced. There can be no reasonable doubt that the price system sets in train a retardation of the production of commodities of greater or less seriousness, and, moreover, that this retardation although acting through the management of owners is entirely beyond their control. To apply these considerations to the individual plant, the manager may fear to produce the two thousand units of product lest that may mean the selling of the product for a price so low as to eliminate profits. Offsetting this fear is the hope that he, and not his competitor, may be able to dispose of all of his own product at the present price, that is, that by increased efficiency he may be able to get something of a differential profit or monopoly advantage. All in all, there is a certain undeniable force in the machine process which demands efficiency. No better evidence of this tendency should be desired than the writings and arguments of the scientific managers. Any of their current works will be seen to be made up, not only so far as indicated by mere bulk, but, more in point, by the importance attached to the various phases of management, largely of discussions of the efficiency of labor and the methods by which it may be increased.

Now the development of human efficiency in industry has possibilities that are of tremendous social consequence. In a word, efficiency in industry first and last hits every point in a tangled bundle of relations characterized by the term, "the labor problem." This is quite evident in the large view of things. The labor problem while meaning something more or less different to each of the three interested classes, employer, laborer, and society, means at least one thing to all, namely, that so long as any portion of the labor problem remains in the minds of any of the three classes, in so far is the existence of a source of inefficiency proved. Do the employers believe that labor presents a problem to them? Are there strikes, is the labor turnover large, is there soldiering or sabotage? These are but particular

ways of expressing the belief in the existence of inefficiency. Are there unfulfilled demands of the workers? Are the hours too long, the pay too short, the factories not sanitary or safe? If any of these are felt by the laborers as matters to be remedied, then the contingencies regarded by the management as symptoms of inefficiency and feared for their effect on the balance sheet will inevitably be present. The labor problem is synonymous with inefficiency. The manager caught in the toils of the price calculus, more firmly perhaps than any other participant in industry, must remove inefficiency because inefficiency is unprofitable. The manager turns his thoughts resolutely toward a solution of the labor problem.

Needless to say, there are solutions and solutions of the labor problem. What might be an acceptable solution to the management may not appeal to the worker; and even if a solution is acceptable to both management and workers, society has certain ideals, more or less inarticulate at present, but which will sometime reach definiteness and which will demand a hearing. It is of course the social demands that are eventually to be reckoned with most seriously, containing as they will all the elements of any class demands. It is essentially the thesis of the present paper to set forth the mutuality of the social and the industrial ideals. To that end it is necessary to bring out for examination in greater detail the other characteristics of industrialism mentioned previously as part and parcel of the price system, namely, the size of the industrial unit and the corporate, investment nature of their organization. No particular effort will be made to develop the niceties of causal sequence. Industrial units could not have become large without the machine process; the machine process could not have developed without large units coming into the case sooner or later. Corporations can be the normal type of organization only in an industry made up of large units, and large units demand corporations as their logical method of administration. It is the large, impersonal, corporate business, making extensive use of the machine process, that comes most fully under the direction of the price system. It is the same sort of industrial unit that has exerted upon it pressure for a solution of the labor

problem. Is this a coincidence? Or is there a causal relation between the price system and the solution of labor problems? If it can be shown that the price system demands the right kind of efficiency, it may do much toward a solution of labor problems. To complete the argument it remains necessary to show that the modern industrial unit under the lash of the price calculus does make for efficiency of the right sort—that is, efficiency based upon the long-time, rather than the short-time, view.

An individual business cannot look farther than the individual who owns it. Personal idiosyncrasies, bias, likes and dislikes will determine the policies of this owner in his social capacity. Allowing for these things the pecuniary interest will prevail but invariably it will be the immediate pecuniary interest. Consider a concrete instance of the individual owner in his social capacity. What is his interest in the conservation of labor? Comparing his labor needs with the total supply of labor, he is struck most of all with the tremendous amount of labor available. The belief that he has but to use the labor he wants is very natural. The result is exploitation, abated only by the humanitarian considerations or social mandates that come wholly from without his business life.

The corporate form of ownership makes short shrift of the personal element in management. This is particularly evident where the business is large and the stockholders numerous. No one stockholder can step in and make demands as to the policy of the management nor has he the knowledge or the desire to do so. One point of contact and one only remains to him and to his associates—the pecuniary. The management must produce returns; this is the extent of the demands that the stockholders may make. Thus is the management given the first great aid of scientific procedure, incentive, open-mindedness, a curiosity to test proposed policies for their effect on the balance sheet, a necessity for looking far afield, perhaps, for the ideas of management in similar organizations. Moreover, the modern corporation is beginning to take on the qualities of an institution. Stockholders may die or sell out; the corporation continues. Employees may come and go; the

business persists. Patrons may change; the institution lives on. No one group nor all of the groups of human beings most intimately connected with the corporation can be said to be the equivalent of that corporation. The corporation is not on the other hand identical with the material equipment, either in a value sense or in a social sense. The one single fact that comes nearest to an explanation of a corporation is the investment of a certain value in pecuniary terms—a pecuniary force set loose in the world subject to the few limitations put upon it by the institutions among which it operates and the primary limitations invoked by those who gathered the investments together. It is evident that a picture of a corporation gained merely from a reading of its balance sheet must be very incomplete. The investment fact, the material equipment, the personnel of the management, employees, officers, and patrons must all be considered and then there is left that something, beyond, which is characteristic of institutions.

It cannot be denied that corporation stockholders will demand immediate returns and that the delicate mechanism of the stock exchange will enable them to enforce their demand, but if the corporation is an institution having a life and entity of its own and, what is more important, an eternal lifetime to look forward to, these demands must always be tempered by the long-time view. Consider for illustration the purely physical fact of maintenance of the material equipment. If we take the evidence of the accountants and business executives, much of the depreciation of a plant is entirely invisible. Barring the matter of obsolescence, the plant might continue without replacement for five, ten, or twenty years, without affecting its mechanical fitness. Nevertheless, the accountant insists with evident propriety that a portion of the ostensible income must be held against the demands of the stockholders to meet the deferred day of reckoning. It is evident that this sort of reasoning perpetuates itself, for when the twenty-year period is ended, the thought of the corporation has gone forward to another distant point. Always the plant, physical or intangible, the plant as a going institution or as a fixed investment must be kept intact. Thus the corporation

gets into the habit of taking the long-time view.¹ Now the efficiency engineers, reasoning from the analogy of the machine technique, have come to regard the human equipment of the plant as vastly important. What more logical than that the human equipment should be kept intact, should be conserved for the benefit of the corporation? The machine process calls attention to the necessity for making the employees efficient. The corporate, investment, large scale characteristic of business units determines the period during which this efficiency is to operate. It becomes efficiency for the indefinite future, not for the immediate day.

Now the difference between social needs and individual needs lies largely in the insistence of the former on a long-time view. There is a constantly growing body of evidence that points to a tendency of industrial plants to measure their needs with reference to a long-time standard. The industrial units are becoming large enough and impersonal enough to make the long-time view profitable. Consider, for example, the simple matter of the tenure of employment of skilled or semi-skilled laborers. There is no longer any reasonable doubt in the minds of employers that it is a wild extravagance to be continually hiring and training new workers. The conclusion of these employers is very evident—"Get your employees young, train them well, keep them through the whole of their working lives, and make adequate provision for them when old age makes retirement necessary"—rather a large step toward the recognition of social ideals. A part of what commonly goes under the name of "welfare work" is a further step in the same direction. Some welfare work is merely a substi-

¹Almost any one of the transcontinental railroads presents a striking case in point. Evidence seems to show without much doubt that the reason why railroad investments as compared with other business do not pay sufficiently large dividends in spite of the clamor of stockholders is due, frequently, to the inordinately large amounts spent for improvements of plants. This may amount to nothing more or less than an evaporation of water from the stock; nevertheless the conflict between the immediate demands of the stockholders and the vital needs of the corporation is a real conflict in which the stockholders seem to be losing out. A more obvious instance of the long-time view as shown by railroad corporations is the large amount of money spent for developing and colonizing new territory or the policy of forest protection and planting on the railroad, looking to the benefit of the road fifty or seventy-five years in the future.

tute for wages or other claims wrongfully withheld from employees, or so regarded by them. The justice of the charge is immaterial; the result in any case is failure; and if welfare work is a failure, it is thereby unprofitable. Real welfare work is profitable; among the hundreds of industrial plants that have earnestly tried it, there is not a dissenting voice. Real welfare work means the doing of something for the employees or employees' families that the employees would find it difficult or impossible to do for themselves, even if given more wages. Welfare work is successful (therefore profitable) in the degree in which it is social.

Unfortunately there comes a time in the life of most industrial plants when the desire to engage in socially useful welfare work has to be suppressed. It may be that the plant is too small to permit of extensive long-time investments, or that the investment might result in a gratuitous benefit to competing plants. Thus an industrial corporation might see the profitableness (eventually) of a recreation park for the use of the entire community; yet if the corporation's employees do not make up a substantial portion of such community, the park will not be established, or if established, will not be thrown open to the entire community. The existence today of hundreds of industrial plants that are complete communities, and the probability of the increase of such situations, removes the last barrier to the entrance of ideals into industry.

It will be objected, no doubt, that a certain corporation, "The United States Steel Company," not only has plants that constitute entire communities, but that some of these communities were deliberately planned by the corporation, that in this planning the corporation had unlimited opportunities to promote the social well-being of the future communities, and, in the main, passed them by. Such is indeed the superficial interpretation of the "steel cities"—superficial only because the "steel cities" show a decided and steady tendency of their maker to put more emphasis on the larger social needs.¹ It is quite within the range of probabilities that future steel cities will leave nothing to be desired in the way of scientific planning for the convenience, comfort,

¹ See Graham Taylor's *Satellite Cities* for an illuminating description of these and other industrial cities.

and health of their inhabitants, for such foresighted investment will pay large dividends.

The logical outcome of an insistence on efficiency of labor is a demand on the part of industrial managers for social efficiency. That the managers, even those calling themselves scientific, have not realized the size of the job they have contracted for, needs no documentation here. The present failure of scientific management is evident on the face of things, from the fact that labor troubles are painfully frequent and extensive, that scientific management has met with a lukewarm reception generally and hostility frequently, that scientific management has not yet discovered the need for retention of labor unionism and the possibilities for its utilization. Scientific management is in its infancy. If it develops its potentiality, its program must be in its general outlines somewhat as follows:

1. Sanitary conditions in working places must be determined not by eliminating features that are unsanitary but by constructive and scientific calculation of what is positively good. Industrial policy on this phase of the problem is relatively far advanced, that is to say, in the progressive units; the actual achievement is ahead of the formal or legal demands of society.

2. There must be scientific determination of the hours of employment and the rate of pay, including a workable scheme whereby these and similar matters may be considered by both the employer and the employee.

3. There must be scientific determination of the physical, mental, and psychic fitness of the workers for their position.

4. An educational plant must be put in operation within the industrial plant, and this educational plant must be designed as much for the rounding out of the individual lives of the employees as for the immediate needs of the plant.

5. There must be maintenance of beneficial living conditions for the working force. Initially this will concern itself with housing conditions, but sooner or later it must overflow from that beginning to such large items of social welfare as city planning, a beautification of surroundings, and the like, with the constant care that these social matters are not worked out by anything

savoring of paternalism—difficult, to be sure, but part of the problem nevertheless.

6. There must be special protection to motherhood and infancy, for the industry must look ahead to the next generation of workers.

7. There must be conservation and development of the morale of the community of workers, including provision for recreation and the like, welfare work of a real sort; and more than any one thing, the maintenance of the right attitude between employer and employee.

Morale is psychic, not physical. The problem of morale is not to be solved by science alone, but only by science coupled with imagination. This is the really big problem of management. Most of the other essentials can be standardized, not this. It may be that industry will have to develop a new type of manager, a man in whom the social needs of his community will find as quick response as the fluctuation of the balance sheet.¹

It must be remembered that a program such as that sketched above will be one that industrial enterprises will be loath to embrace in its entirety. Even the enterprises that are purest in their pecuniary control will retain some vestige of the traditional ideas of management and will moreover be influenced in the same direction by policy of business units not completely dominated by the price system. On the other hand, it must be remembered that all the other institutions of social life will continue to develop along with the development of the price system and will come to have more force than they have at present. Accordingly government, art, social will in the large sense, will tend to reinforce the development of industry in a direction of social utility.

¹ The public utterances of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., are perhaps to be taken with a grain of salt; nevertheless they show, if nothing more, the sensitivity to public demand. At the recent business conference at Atlantic City Mr. Rockefeller said *inter alia*: "I believe that the purpose of industry is quite as much to advance social well-being as material prosperity. . . . I believe that every man is entitled to an opportunity to earn a living, to fair wages, to reasonable hours of work, and proper working conditions, to a decent home, to the opportunity to play, to learn, to worship and to love, as well as to toil, and the responsibility rests as heavily upon industry as upon government or society, to see that these conditions and opportunities prevail."

THE COURT AND THE DELINQUENT CHILD

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The increasing complexities of modern life have placed upon the shoulders of all, adult and child alike, similarly increasing responsibilities. Acts that were indifferent in years gone by are now harmful. The bare competition to live demands a higher culture and more specialized knowledge. The opportunities to derive a livelihood directly from natural resources are rapidly diminishing, and the children of today, the voters of tomorrow, will be forced to a struggle for existence in a more artificial atmosphere created by the intricate civilization of science and city life. Even the rural communities are impressed by new standards of living. The isolation and primitiveness of the farm of a generation ago have passed into the limbo of forgotten things.

New and ever-changing duties and responsibilities have compelled mankind so far as possible to adjust itself thereto. Many have been lost by the wayside, and they present the human elements of our constantly shifting social problems which require continual variations of methods to meet them.

Among the imperfections which during the last twenty years have most insistently thrust themselves upon the attention of social workers is the failure to conserve sufficiently the well-being of children. Particularly, old ideas have proved to be inadequate in the correction of delinquents. Out of the obvious necessity of fitting our social, and more particularly our legal, institutions to their requirements has developed what we know as the "Juvenile Court."

The need was seen long before the cure was discovered, and those more fully aware of the evil attempted its eradication without any clear conception of its true character. Rules of legal procedure and practice, particularly in matters of a criminal nature, were designed for adults and not for children. Jurists having juris-

diction of the causes of children were among the first to discern and deplore the impotency of the courts to deal with them. Men and women, more earnest than competent, sought to produce order out of chaos by establishing children's courts and evolving a system of jurisprudence applicable to juveniles. Their efforts have resulted in making confusion worse confounded. Laws have been enacted more through sentiment than reason, the courts have been poorly organized, and the judges usually have not been qualified. But some good, not to be underestimated, has resulted in that it has brought to the consciousness of people generally the necessity of the enlightened treatment of children guilty of anti-social conduct. The way has also been opened for a closer investigation of childhood's needs, and by reason of the very fact that the courts have proved unequal to their tasks, it may now be seen with comparative clarity what the prerequisites to the successful control of recalcitrant children are.

We know that each case is an individual study and that general laws applicable to all are few indeed. We know that before any rational method for the correction of a child may be found, thorough and scientific investigation of his environment, his physical and mental condition must be made, and all facts of heredity and birth must be in the possession of someone capable of analyzing and interpreting them. Juvenile courts, in order to meet these requirements, have surrounded themselves with corps of psychologists, alienists, physicians, probation officers, and what not, for the purpose of acquainting themselves with all of the ascertainable facts that might be construed to be causative factors of delinquency. They have attempted to establish human laboratories where each child is placed under the microscope of science, to discover even the most minute variation from the normal. But even with all of this paraphernalia, they have found themselves unable to dispose of any single case to the certain satisfaction of those most interested in it. Consequently, juvenile courts are held in suspicion by the layman, in contempt by the lawyer, and regarded with a sense of weakness by the judge. The only conclusion anyone familiar with even the best of them can reach is that in providing machinery for the reformation of incorrigible children, they have failed.

The reasons for this failure are many. Among them are the poorly conceived laws, inadequate equipment both personal and material, and incompetent judges; but by far the most salient reason is that courts are not fundamentally adapted to this work. It is not the legitimate province of a court to investigate the habits of an alleged delinquent to determine whether or not he should be prosecuted, thus pre-judging before trial his guilt or innocence; and much less should it be its duty, after conviction and suspension of sentence, to supervise his conduct, or to determine whether or not he should be brought again into court, thus making the judge the complaining witness, the prosecutor, the jury, and the executioner. Yet, such are the duties imposed upon the juvenile courts by all the "children's codes" in the United States, so far as I know. Under the old belief that a convicted defendant should be punished because he had broken the law, the rendition of judgment in a criminal case, specifying the kind and degree of punishment, was just as truly a function of the court as entering a money judgment in a civil action; because under this theory the sentence was merely retribution to the state against the criminal who had injured it, in the same way that a money judgment was retribution by a defendant to the plaintiff whom he had damaged. But as soon as we vary from this principle and consider the treatment of delinquents from the standpoint of their social rehabilitation, we are departing from the realms of legal procedure to those of governmental policy. Lawyers and judges rightfully resent this institutionalization of courts. The true function of a court is to determine judicially the facts at issue before it; or, in criminal matters, the guilt or innocence of persons charged with crime. Investigations of the lives, environments, or heredity of delinquents, the infliction of punishment, and the supervision of probation institutionalize the courts and are repugnant to every tenet of the science of law.

In the report of the proceedings of a conference on child welfare standards recently held under the auspices of the Federal Children's Bureau, is found the following:

Every locality should have available a court organization providing for separate hearings of children's cases, a special method of detention for children, adequate investigation for every case, provision for supervision or probation

by trained officers, and a system for recording and filing social as well as legal information. In dealing with children the procedure should be under chancery jurisdiction, and juvenile records should not stand as criminal records against the children. Whenever possible such administrative duties as child-placing and relief should not be required of the juvenile court, but should be administered by existing agencies provided for that purpose, or in the absence of such agencies, special provision should be made therefor; nor should cases of dependency or destitution in which no questions of improper guardianship or final and conclusive surrender of guardianship are involved, be instituted in juvenile courts.

The juvenile victims of sex offenses are without adequate protection against unnecessary publicity and further corruption in our courts. To safeguard them, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court should be extended to deal with adult sex offenders against children, and all safeguards of that court be accorded to their victims.

In all cases of adoption of children, the court should make a full inquiry into all the facts through its own visitor or through some other unbiased agency, before awarding the child's custody.¹

While this report does recommend that "whenever possible" administrative duties concerning the placing of dependent or neglected children should not be placed upon the court, it emphasizes the duty of the court to make "adequate investigation for every case, provision for supervision or probation by trained officers, and a system for recording and filing social as well as legal information," for delinquents. In order to justify this recommendation it specifies that in "dealing with children the proceedings should be under the chancery jurisdiction, and juvenile records should not stand as criminal records against the children."

All of this means that a child who breaks a law is not a law-breaker, that a crime is not a crime when committed by a juvenile, and that so far as children are concerned things are not at all what they seem. It is merely an attempt to make a rose smell sweeter by some other name. This fiction that has been exalted to an axiom by juvenile workers illustrates the paradoxical situation in which an attempt to supervise delinquents places the court. Not even under their "chancery powers" have courts heretofore been endowed with administrative authority of this kind. In all the history of legal procedure there cannot be found another instance

¹ *Standards of Child Welfare*, Report from Conference Series No. 1, Bureau Publication No. 60, Department of Labor, Washington, 1919, p. 442.

where such conflicting powers and duties have been placed in one tribunal.

This does not mean that the juvenile offender should be treated in the same way that the adult offender is treated, or that there should not be special statutes concerning the punishment and correction of children, or that the laws heretofore in force have been fitting or adequate in their application to childish misconduct. It merely means that the court is not the instrumentality by which these things should be undertaken.

If a better adaptation of our social activities, particularly our legal methods, to the needs of children is imperative, and if the court is not the proper forum to accomplish it, it is fair to ask what agency should be used. Before answering that question, it is well to consider briefly just what the reformation and correction of delinquent children contemplate. It is evident that delinquents may be divided broadly into two classes: first, those who are delinquent on account of unpropitious environments; and, secondly, those who on account of feebleness of mind or body have become misfits in the social order. The second class is not subject to improvement by moral suasion. Incurability resulting from low mentality is not curable by probation. Delinquency resulting from ill health is the concern of the physician, not the probation officer. The mentally and physically unfit, therefore, as soon as their conditions are detected, automatically eliminate themselves from the consideration of the social worker immediately they are placed in proper custody. His supervisory work is limited to the normal child who on account of adventitious circumstances finds himself at cross purposes with the conventions of life. Only the uninformed ascribe anti-social habits to "pure devilment" or "original sin." Incurability is an effect which necessarily presupposes some cause. In the normal child it is an absence of appreciation of his obligations to others. It is induced by some extraneous element which must be found in the home, the school, or the community. This idea was neatly expressed by Professor Randolph as follows:

Every Juvenile Court case represents, first, the failure of a family to adjust a child to the existing conditions of life; second, the failure of a public school

to offset a family's inadequacy; and, third, the failure of a community to provide an adequate organization of protective agencies to guard its children from growing into anti-social and ruinous habits.¹

"Anti-social and ruinous habits" in the normal child are the result of failure to train him to observe the conventions of his environment; in other words, a lack of education.

There are as many definitions of education as there are persons who use the word. Vorhees defines it as follows:

Education is a broad and comprehensive term. It has been defined as the process of developing and training the powers and capabilities of human beings. It is the bringing up, physically or mentally, of a child, or the preparation of a person, by some due course of training, for a professional or business life, or other calling. It may be directed particularly to either the mental, moral, or physical powers and faculties, but in its broadest and best sense it refers to them all.²

This is probably as good a definition as any other, for it implies what all suggest: the process of making good citizens, of fitting the young for the responsibilities of life. One who capably and creditably discharges life's duties is a good citizen and an educated person. He cannot be incorrigible. The reformation and correction of delinquent children are, therefore, processes of education. When they cease to be delinquent, they are, to that extent, educated.

Education is specifically the province of the home and school, and by no stretch of imagination that of the court. It is the duty of the community to provide the opportunity for good homes and to establish sufficient schools. If the community has not done so, and neither the home nor the school has taught the child to discharge his obligations to society, then can it be expected that the court, the purposes of which are altogether different, will succeed where they have failed?

Much less can it be expected that the court will be able to accomplish the most essential task of *preventing* youthful wrongdoings. It is elementary that prevention through the wise direction of children before criminal habits have had time to be formed,

¹ "The Farm and the School," *Colorado State Teachers' College Bulletin*, September, 1918, Greeley, Colorado, p. 46.

² *Law of the Public Schools*, 1917, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, p. 9, sec. 6.

is the most certain means of eliminating puerile misconduct. It is seldom that the courts are called upon until definite wayward predilections have become fixed. It is then too late to provide the ounce of prevention or avert the need of the pound of cure. The aid of the courts is invariably invoked when the possibilities of success are remote. The juvenile court has discharged its debt when it has destroyed all necessity for its existence. Merely because the natural agencies have often failed is no reason why the courts should be warped to supply a want totally foreign to their genuine objects.

"But what shall we do," someone may ask, "if the home and the school both fail, shall we then abandon all hope for ultimate redemption?"

Certainly not. But if it is expected that the judge of a court, by making him super-child-spanker to the community, will be able to succeed in the face of previous failure, that expectation is doomed to disappointment.

Remodeling inefficient homes into cultured and effective ones is a long course and a discouraging one. Increase in income, provision for wholesome amusement, the teaching of parental obligations, the raising of the standards of living, and a thousand and one other factors may contribute to the betterment of family conditions. The best immediate remedy is to make the school succeed where the home has failed. *The suitable institution to undertake the reformation and correction of incorrigible children is the school.*

Educators may argue that the religious and moral training of children is no part of school work; that the school is essentially interested only in the intellectual development. Whether or not this is theoretically a correct division of responsibilities, it cannot be denied that ethical training is as much a part of education as the teaching of the three R's. If the schools are established to educate the child, then no part of his education can honestly be ignored by them. But even if this arbitrary segregation be tenable, the fact remains that the schools continually, willy-nilly, assume supervision of moral instruction. In a large measure they have been forced to procure treatment for physical ailments and to curb

vicious tendencies, though "weak eyes and bad manners should be taken care of in the home." If they are not taken care of, the school is unable to give the child the full benefit of its instruction. It is necessary to cure weak eyes and to correct bad manners in order to teach geography and grammar effectively. The school has already encroached upon these prerogatives of the home; or, it would perhaps be more precise to say that the home has abandoned them to the school. School physicians and nurses, dental clinics, noon-day luncheons, classes for exceptional children, and many other innovations of recent years emphasize this fact.

If the school is constrained in a measure to extend its activities beyond strictly intellectual teaching, it should be thorough in its expanded office and not haphazard and inconclusive. Concentration in one institution will certainly be more forceful than distribution among several institutions whose duties are sure to overlap and leave fatal gaps, and no one of which covers the whole field.

There is much argument, from the standpoint of the schools, why they should cover this wider field. Many educators and most laymen feel that the schools are not fulfilling their object of "fitting the young to discharge the responsibilities of life." Pupils are constantly falling out of school, because, as they say, they are "getting nothing out of it." Too much attention has been paid to "higher education," and not enough to "common schools." The elementary education of all children is much more important than the "higher education" of a few. Yet in every rural school we find two or three lower grades under one teacher, while there is only one of the upper grades under a teacher. If a new building is projected, it is usually a high school building, not a primary building. These conditions should be reversed. Parent and child should believe that the "grammar grades" are actually teaching things that will be of practical assistance in the everyday routine of life. This cannot be done so long as the common schools are designed merely to prepare students for college. "The sooner schools organize to meet their full responsibilities, the sooner teachers are likely to acquire the measure of public estimation which will justify paying them the wages they want."

In Colorado, the child unruly in school is a juvenile delinquent. The remedial work attempted by the court (necessarily educational) is designed, among other things, to make the child more subservient to school rules. The truant is a juvenile delinquent, and the court is called upon to compel his attendance in school. Practically every case of delinquency involves school children, their conduct in school, and their formal education. The judge, to make his orders at all coercive, must have the close co-operation of the schools, and practically the only fruitful results he accomplishes are through that co-operation. If the schools have, as I believe they have, potentially all the attributes necessary to carry on the juvenile work, then by all means let it be confined to them. It is wasteful to pile institution upon institution.

True, the schools are not at the present equipped to carry on this task. Neither, for that matter, is the court. The schools may be so equipped; the court never can be, if it retains its true form. In order to supply the deficiencies, many changes will have to be made in the pedagogical system. Without any attempt to discuss them exhaustively, it may be well to mention a few. There should be a county-wide centralization of school control in one body with power, among other things, to direct the duration and seasons of sessions, the curriculum, the placing of teachers, the enforcement of the compulsory education law, the designation of textbooks, and the discipline of pupils. There should be connected with this unified body, a complete organization of scientists and trained workers. The age of delinquency and the school age should be identical. Then, assuming a strict enforcement of the compulsory attendance laws, all normal delinquent children would be in the schools. All state institutions such as reform schools, industrial schools, and training schools for the feeble-minded, should be under the supervision of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, or the state officer having similar powers, as an integral part of the school system. They should not be under the management of state boards of charities and corrections or penal bureaus. In short, all agencies for the instruction, reformation, correction, and training of children of school age should be subject to school authority.

In the event any child should prove so incorrigible that it should become necessary to commit him to an institution, such commitment should be made by due process of law. No child should be taken from his parents before he has had an opportunity to state his case before an unprejudiced tribunal. It is indispensable, also, that for extreme cases of insubordination, there should be some officer connected with the schools with authority to enter lawful judgments of punishment and commitment, and with power to enforce them when they are made. Here and only here has a court any consistent place in this work. Its jurisdiction then would extend only to the judicial ascertainment of whether or not the child before it is in law a delinquent. If he should be so found, he would be formally remanded to the custody of school officials. If they should believe that he could be helped best by probation, then he would be referred to the school's probation officers. If it were deemed wiser to confine him in an institution, they should have full power to do so. Thus, the court would discharge its lawful office of judicially determining the guilt or innocence of the child, and having so determined, would have performed its every legitimate function.

The jurisdiction to determine these issues could be placed in established courts or in a special court connected with the central school body. It should be presided over by a lawyer, because even a child has a right to an orderly trial and to the protection that the law throws around all persons who are accused of breaking it. Under the present system this is not true. The judge, through the investigations of his officers, has usually decided the case before the wrongdoer has been brought formally into court. Indeed, there is seldom any hearing until it has been determined that it is necessary to sentence. Probably there have been but few instances of injustice, but the possibility always remains, where large property rights or personal interests are involved, that a venal judge might "railroad" an innocent child. Certainly, the means of doing so are present. Possibly the court, on account of its personal acquaintance with children who have been informally before it, is too prejudiced to judge them fairly. The power to take a child bodily from his parents and place him in the custody of strangers

is formidable. The very fact that our institutions are becoming more and more efficient is sometimes a temptation to commit children whose surroundings are not all that they should be. It is unwise to intrust investigation, decision, commitment, and supervision to any one person. There should be the wholesome check that an independent court, presided over by a judge trained in the law and respecting its principles, would have over the too enthusiastic and often wholly biased investigator.

By placing the responsibility of the correction and reformation of incorrigible children in the educational institutions, and limiting the powers of the court to the mere determination of the facts of delinquency, we may anticipate great improvement in the methods of treating incorrigible children. Until this is done, we must "muddle on" as best we can, hoping against hope and courageously striving to overcome insurmountable obstacles.

A COLLEGE PROGRAM FOR RURAL SOCIOLOGY

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The departments of sociology in the American colleges can no longer be charged with the neglect of the rural community. No division of the science of sociology has made more rapid progress during the last ten years than has rural sociology. This progress has been mostly due to the emphasis that rural sociology has received in the program of the sociological departments of the colleges. Courses have been established in the majority of the colleges where sociology is taught, research has been undertaken, especially in the form of survey studies, and recognition for the rural social interests has been obtained at national conferences. The pioneer days of rural sociology are coming to an end, and from now on the importance of this division of social science will be taken for granted. The need of pleading the importance of rural social interests has passed. The teacher of rural sociology must now increasingly busy himself with the routine of teaching and with the problem of increasing the scientific value of his subject-matter.

Teachers of rural sociology frankly confess their present difficulties in teaching their subject. There can be no reasonable question in regard to the importance of the social life of the rural community, but it is open to discussion whether we have as yet enough substantial knowledge regarding this social life to afford a comfortable teaching equipment for the instructor. To state this does not mean to discount in any degree the value of texts recently published. The task of the teacher of rural sociology has been lightened by these texts, but the books themselves bear the marks of the pioneering days of the study of rural social life. The instructor in the field of rural sociology finds his work less difficult than it has been but he still carries the handicap of teaching a body of knowledge for the most part still in the process of being

made. The contrast between the teaching problem in the rural field and the urban is vividly felt by every instructor who has classes in both subjects.

It would be too much to claim a distinct teaching technique for the rural sociologist. It is, however, safe to maintain that rural sociology has its own program and that, as a part of the college curriculum, there is need of formulating this program in a catholic manner that each element may receive reasonable emphasis.

At the present time there is one difficulty that every teacher of rural sociology experiences. Cities the nation over are essentially alike. The differences between urban conditions are not such as to create a difficulty in the teaching of urban sociology. In rural sociology, however, the situation is such that geographical and local variations must ever be kept in mind. If the student is to feel personal contact with the subject, due regard must be paid to the conditions as he knows them in his own community. Opportunity has to be provided for him to grasp the significance of such facts as he has or can discover in the life of a rural people that he personally knows. At the same time he must be kept from seeing all rural life through his own contacts. And because of the variations in rural life conditions, considered nation-wide, this is in its teaching aspects a more difficult problem than any that arises in the teaching of urban sociology.

The teacher of rural sociology also wrestles with another difficulty that he escapes in the urban science. That is the task of isolating country from village society. The latter has not yet a sociology of its own, and yet in teaching rural sociology it is constantly necessary to contrast village life and that of the open and remote country. Of course, the two societies are bound together by intimate and common interests. This statement of intimacy and mutual relationship is true also of rural and urban societies. The latter groups, however, can be separated for the purposes of teaching without difficulty; at present the former must be treated together since the village is so largely the natural center for the group interests of the rural people. The teacher cannot do justly by the student unless he leaves him realizing both the natural variations in rural life conditions and the necessary

distinction in science between country and village social life. If the material the teacher uses, texts and articles, more carefully observed these distinctions his task would not be nearly so difficult. One of the interesting outcomes of this situation that promises relief to the teacher of rural sociology is the increasing attention that village social life is receiving. Alongside rural sociology there is rapidly developing a village sociology which will soon be a science by itself.

The development of rural sociology has been accelerated by the pressure of social need. It has formed itself in the atmosphere of applied science. Experience has demonstrated that country welfare cannot be maintained merely by making farming more profitable. Country-life leadership has been forced to recognize the social problems, for the farmers themselves have repudiated a program exclusively economic. The demand for assistance from the colleges in solving the social problems of rural and village groups has been incessant and urgent. Students looking forward to residence or to social work in the country have elected rural sociology courses expecting the practical purposes of the courses to be given emphasis. This expectation has added to the courses' zest, but it has also at times removed the students from the atmosphere of scientific investigation into that of mere applied knowledge. The influence of the extension service of the agricultural colleges has added to the pressure upon the sociologist for propagable information, when, first of all, there has been need of gathering a substantial body of fact. As one would expect there has resulted a medley of counsel in regard to social uplift in country districts that has irritated some of the rural people and confused the social workers. This situation has disclosed itself in nearly every conference of national character where rural social problems have been given a place upon the program. The era of cocksureness with reference to the social panaceas to be gulped down by rural folk has about passed, and everywhere there is a disposition patiently to collect the facts regarding rural society and build up a science of understanding, even if meanwhile counsel regarding country life needs be given with less confidence and in less profusion. And this is the pathway of progress for the science. Nothing has more

certainly exposed the elementary attainments of rural sociology in the past than the dogmatic stressing by some would-be reformers of the "one thing needed" to cause rural society to flower in perfection. The student of urban social life has seldom been tempted to assume such an attitude because he has been forced to realize the complexities of the social demands of the cities. People who live in the country are no less human than their city brethren and they do not present in their grouping a single problem to be solved, but rather a complex social demand which requires reasonable satisfactions. No scientist would advocate solving the urban problem, for to estimate the needs of city social life as one problem would seem foolish. It has been the pressure for information regarding social needs on the part of propagandists and social workers for application in the rural field that has betrayed the student of rural society as a scientist and made him at times an overconfident advocate.

Farmers as a class are irritated by reformers who come forward with a "cure-all" for country-life difficulties. The vocation of soil cultivation teaches caution with respect to such simple diagnosis. The farmer learns from painful experiences that there are many factors that condition success in food production and he looks askance, even with deep hostility, upon anyone who appears with one solution for all the difficulties in any department of rural concern. His quickness to react against such preachment has occasionally led him to mistake emphasis and concentration upon one particular element of rural need as an assumption that were the one problem solved all would be well. In such cases the rural-welfare worker has had his message hindered by a greater obstacle than the conventional inertia to which the hostility has been charged. Urban folk may more easily be led into the fallacy of simplicity when diagnosing difficulties, economic or social, because they have isolated experiences that prevent their understanding the normal working of the causal laws of production. This fundamental difference between the thinking of people in the country and those in the cities has, in the past, been passed over lightly, and the farmer's mistrust of a one-idea program has been misinterpreted as mere conservatism. Poultry are more simple than

people and yet the farmer has listened patiently to social enthusiasts who have pictured all rural life made perfect by the consolidated school, or the union church, or the co-operative society when he would leave in disgust were a poultryman to declare that a single procedure would guarantee one's success in raising leghorn hens.

In fairness to the problem of the teacher of rural sociology it must be granted that the farmer has not assisted in the accumulation of social information as might have been expected. There are differences east and west, but generally the farmer is sensitive to any investigation of his social conditions. He seems to assume that he is on the defensive and is often quick to take offense when for his own interests he should be eager to co-operate. This by no means indicates that the average farmer is well satisfied with the social conditions of his environment, for he has no hesitation in telling you his complaints. When he is called upon, however, to assist in a cold, scientific investigation of the situation against which he complains, he frequently stands aloof or even bitterly protests. This attitude is rapidly passing, and perhaps the farmer's distrust has been of the scientist rather than of his science. In order to reduce this suspicion to its minimum, emphasis has been placed upon the need of the rural sociologist's having been himself in his boyhood a worker on the farm. It so happens that the understanding of people does not necessarily come from having shared their experiences, and too much confidence has been placed upon the value of personal, individual country-life experiences as a foundation for the rural sociologist in his intimate relations with farmers. Vocational experiences in early life may, as the newer psychology shows in detail, easily become a separating obstacle rather than a basis for friendly appreciation when the adult comes into association with a group of which he was once a member. The point of emphasis has been wrong. It is important not that the rural sociologist was once a farmer; it is imperative that he know without prejudice farmers as they are now in the section where he has contact with them.

The rural sociologist at the present time has need to keep in mind all the conditions that influence his teaching problem when he constructs his college program. In his classes he may expect men

and women who bring to the institution the impress of the social life of representative farming communities. Among his students also will be many who will return to rural communities and to a greater or less degree become leaders in their chosen localities. That the institution may contribute its just share to country-life progress the courses must also have definite motives. One such teaching purpose is the establishment of sound social standards for rural groups. No product of the classroom is likely to have a more lasting value than this. If the student by reports and discussions can be led to measure the failures and successes of his community in comparison with conditions reported by his class associates in other localities a wholesome basis is laid for future activities in community service. Under such circumstances it is difficult for a student to leave the course with the dangerous confidence that he fully understands the needs of a community and has nothing more to know. It is, of course, impossible for him ever to regard his community, after having made many comparisons between the social life as it is and as it might be, as a finished product. In this way the instruction removes both the contentment of conservatism and the simplicity of the would-be reformer.

By having reports made from time to time by the student regarding the social conditions of his own community with respect to the problem before the class for discussion there naturally develops a clear and vivid conception of the situation in various localities. This series of reports forces each student to become conscious of the failures of his own community as compared with the higher standards of others and he gradually tends to construct an extensive social program for the group life he knows best.

Another purpose of the courses in rural sociology is the furnishing of accurate information regarding social conditions and resources in the country. Future rural leadership must be given a clear understanding of the country-life situation in its many aspects. Here it is especially necessary that the student learn how to collect social facts, how to estimate the value and determine the significance of surveys, public reports, and other material from which the sociologist draws his conclusions. In the former pioneering days it has been difficult to give the student at this point the adequate assistance that he has had a right to expect. The instructor has

felt obliged either to depend upon lectures or upon a text to a degree that has diminished the student's opportunity for first-hand knowledge of the raw material of the science. The source books containing valuable collections of readings that are being prepared and are likely to be published soon will certainly be helpful, especially in institutions where the library material is inadequate. However, these collections, valuable as they will be, must not satisfy the instructor in his desire to bring the student into contact with original material. It will often prove profitable to require of the students a bibliography representing the collection that he himself regards as best for the purpose of outside reading. The instructor can, near the end of the courses, criticize these various collections and thus help the student in his effort to determine the value of articles and reports on rural conditions.

No course in rural sociology fulfils its purpose unless it has a part in increasing popular interest in the social problems of the country. It especially has an obligation with reference to the future leadership of the country communities. This seems so essential a part of the teaching program as to need little comment. In practice, however, the teacher in the state college sometimes finds himself limited by the lack of interest that his colleagues in agriculture take in the social side of country affairs. Courses in rural sociology have been added to the curriculum of agricultural colleges recently and they find the older vocational subjects in possession of the field. Unless checked by administrative policy, some departments encourage the student to attempt premature specialization and everything is done to discount the need of the student's having an adequate preparation for rural leadership as well as the basis for business success. The vitality of the courses in rural social matters best meets this situation which fortunately is rapidly passing.

Rural sociology is merely a division in a larger field and it has a purpose in giving the student of general sociology the rural viewpoint. It is certainly unfortunate if the courses of the department are elected only by those who look forward to living in the country. The attempt made at some of the agricultural colleges to deny the students any courses in urban sociology is the result of regarding the rural and urban environments as not having relationship. As a matter of fact, both rural and urban social conditions

need to be understood by anyone who wishes to have knowledge of either environment, and for this reason in our rural courses we need to keep in mind the interests of those who wish to see the social field as a whole. To construct the courses in a narrow spirit of regard only for the country-life student is to delay the progress of the science and to remove it from the current of inspiration. Courses of rural sociology should not be given for the purpose of furnishing rural self-satisfaction for the men and women who are destined "to return to the land" after having received from the college a prophylactic against the dangers of urban attraction. For the teacher the presence in the class of students whose major interests are outside the rural field proves a decided advantage, since, to win these students, the courses have to be taught in a catholic manner.

In developing his college courses the rural sociologist surely should not neglect their possible influence in attracting the more promising students into graduate study within the field of rural social science. The present difficulty that colleges experience in getting instructors qualified to teach rural sociology demonstrates that there is need of encouraging students who desire to teach college sociology to specialize along rural lines. The immediate future of the science will be largely decided by the character of the students that may at present become interested in rural sociology. No teaching method can do so much to win the attention of the best students to the significance of the rural field as the requirement of investigations from members of the class. In addition to the thesis, which may be presented at the end of the course and the reports frequently made concerning the social life of the student's own community, the use of topic questions for class discussions seems, in the experience of some teachers, more appealing to the majority of the students and more profitable than lectures and assigned readings. The larger the contribution of the student, the more acquainted he becomes with the raw material of the science, the more likely he is to realize the opportunity of graduate study. If the progress of rural social science is to prosper as it should, the college teacher constantly must send forward promising candidates for advanced study.

A COMPLETELY SOCIALIZED SCHOOL¹

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In the evolution of society it became necessary for some special provision to be made for the instruction of the youth, in order that the accumulated experiences and traditions of the race might be preserved and handed down to successive generations. The school as an institution of society was thus brought into existence and has gradually developed and enlarged its borders until today it may be affirmed that the school is charged with greater responsibility for the future welfare of society than any other institution. If this be true, and few there be who doubt it, it logically follows that *the school should be completely socialized*.

In discussing the socialized school I wish to submit, first, that *the curriculum should be socialized*.

To socialize the curriculum means to suit it to the present and future needs of the pupils. The first need of children, beyond the mere necessities of life, such as food and shelter, is a mastery of the tool subjects, viz., reading, writing, spelling, and arithmetic. Next the pupil should gain a reasonable amount of useful information from the fields of history, literature, and science, after which he is ready for a few years of "sampling" of as many of the vocations as possible, with a view of assisting to decide the most important question of life, aside from religion and marriage, viz., the question of one's vocation in life.

Having decided upon the vocation which he wishes to follow, which should be done while in the junior high school, or shortly thereafter, the pupil is then ready to begin acquiring the necessary skill with which to make his chosen life-work a success. But if we should know what particular "attitudes," "skills," and

¹ Address delivered before the Rural School Section of the Iowa State Teachers' Association, Des Moines, Iowa, February, 1919, and also before the Parish Teachers' Institute, Natchitoches, Louisiana, at the opening of the school year, 1919-20.

"knowledge" should be taught in the schools, we shall have to inquire as to what is commonly demanded of adult members of society. For example, what kind of arithmetic is used in everyday life? What sort of proficiency in handwriting will meet the demand of those who read handwriting? Or what words does one need to know how to spell in order to make himself understood in writing?

The first step in the socializing of the curriculum, obviously, then, is to eliminate all useless material from the subjects taught. This movement was inaugurated by Dr. Frank M. McMurry at the meeting of the Department of Superintendents in 1904. A decade later the Iowa State Teachers' Association appointed a committee to study and to make a report upon the elimination of obsolete and useless materials from the common school branches with a view that the efforts of childhood may be conserved and the essentials better taught. The report of this committee was published in two consecutive volumes and supports in general the recommendations made by Dr. McMurry, which were, briefly speaking, to eliminate (1) what cannot be shown to have a plain relation to some real need of life, (2) that which is beyond the child's comprehension, (3) whatever is unlikely to appeal to his native interests, and (4) whatever topics, or parts of topics, are so isolated or irrelevant that they fail to make connections with the chain of ideas that constitutes needful education.

It has been commonly known for many years that much of the *Lernstoff* in arithmetic, such as cube root, troy and apothecaries weight, true discount, greatest common divisor, least common multiple, various tables of foreign moneys, folding paper, etc., and most of longitude and time, compound and annual interest, etc., function little, if at all, in everyday life. But notwithstanding all these known facts, such topics are found in many textbooks in use throughout the country, after two decades of campaigning against such waste of time in school work.

Having thus purged the curriculum from all useless material, there is room for the introduction of much that is highly worth while in the traditional subjects, besides the introduction of new subjects of a vocational nature, such as domestic science, industrial

and fine arts. In a word, the tendency is to reduce the elementary-school subjects, especially the tool subjects, to a basis of "minimum essentials," which should be mastered by the average pupil in the first six years. The next three years properly constitute the junior high-school period and should be devoted largely to a sampling of as many of the vocations as possible and the further study of literature and science. Following this the senior high-school period will furnish opportunity for the acquiring of skill in one's chosen vocation, or for further preparatory study, depending upon whether the pupil expects to attend an institution of higher learning or drop out at the close of the high-school period. At present, of course, the masses drop out in the grades and early years of the high school, but since the high school is destined to become the "people's college" the curriculum should speedily be shaped to meet these requirements.

In the second place I wish to submit that the *teacher should be socialized*.

In an article prepared for the *Ohio Educational Monthly* some years ago it was argued that the "methods of teaching" should be socialized, but since then I have come to feel that, after all, the teacher and the method are but two aspects of the same consideration, hence are inseparable. The *teacher is the method*; hence the real proposition is to socialize the teacher, method and all.

The socialized teacher is one who conceives of her work in the schoolroom as a definite part of the larger work that is being wrought by the school in society, and who bends every effort to bring her pupils to behave accordingly. With such a conception on the part of the teacher and her pupils, school life becomes a real part of the broader life of society and is no longer looked upon as a mere preparation for life. To be sure, as Professor Coe has very aptly stated, "children should be schooled *for* something," but the fact still remains that schools exist primarily because children exist.

Social efficiency is now the commonly accepted aim of education, and since the school is the chief formal agency of education, the obvious task of the teacher is to guide in the development of the pupil to this end. A socially efficient individual must measure

up to three rather definite requirements: (1) pull his own weight in society, (2) not interfere with the rights of others, (3) be a missionary. That is, he must earn his own livelihood, without in any way hindering others, and endeavor to have a little left over to bestow upon others who may be less fortunate than he himself. A little of this world's goods, a little of sympathy, a little of helpfulness—a little of all that is needed to make the world a bit better.

In order to understand more clearly just what is meant by a socially efficient individual, let me illustrate by a brief analysis of human society. It is easy to divide society into two classes, the one class being socially efficient and the other not so. This rather trite way of putting it reminds one of the musical classification of Pat Murphy's tunes. Nobody had ever heard Pat whistle but one tune, yet Pat himself declared that he could whistle two tunes. Upon being pressed with the demand to name the two tunes, Pat extricated himself in a laudable fashion by saying, "Faith and begorra, the one tune is Yankee Doodle, and the other isn't."

So, like Pat, I insist that there are but two classes of people in the world, the one is socially efficient and the other isn't. But I propose to go Pat one better and describe the class that is not socially efficient, as well as the class that is. On the authority of Dewey, Bagley, Betts, King, *et al.*, I have already described the socially efficient individual as one who pulls his own weight in society, without hindering any one else and who stands ready to lend a helping hand to those of his fellows who are in any way unfortunate.

Obviously, then, the non-socially efficient are those who fail to measure up to the standards set by society in one or more of these respects. In offering this further analysis I am aware that no less an authority than Professor Giddings gives a threefold classification of society, viz., social, non-social, and antisocial. But for the purpose of this discussion I have made no provision for the middle-of-the-road, on-the-fence, buzzard sort of folk, who insist on living, but who endeavor to keep out of people's way by sitting idly by waiting for someone to die, or some other chance circumstance of life to take place, whereby they may fall into a lucrative position without effort, or be fed by the ravens without

so much as turning a hand. Righteousness should be laid to the plummet and judgment to the line in matters of this kind. A person is either socially efficient enough to be classed with those who are, or he is not.

Logically, therefore, the non-socially efficient class falls into three subclasses. The first of these I shall designate as the loafer class. These are the bums, the fellows who wouldn't work if they had a chance, the fellows who claim that the world owes them a living and all that they have to do is to collect it. At the present time their number is legion and they go by the name of "Bolsheviks." I would also include in the loafer class the hoboes, although Jeff Davis, the king of the hoboes, declares that his tribe is in no way related to the "bum" tribe and hence refuses to admit bums to the Hotel de Jinks. Measured by the socially efficient standard the "loafer" falls short in that he fails to pull his own weight. Therefore he must be classed with the "isn'ts."

The second class of the non-socially efficient I shall call the unfair class. These are the people who pull their own weight in society and who may even be liberal and beneficent but who pay no regard to the rights of others. They are the advocates of "personal rights," such as are frequently heard on the streets of our larger cities defending such notorious institutions as the legalized liquor traffic, regulated gambling, wide-open municipal administration, and oftentimes many of the more modern forms of social evil, such as the free love cult, radical forms of lockouts, strikes, etc.

The third class of the non-socially efficient I shall designate as the miser class. The real miser is more common in society than most people would admit. He is the person who pulls his own weight and does it in such a way as at least to keep out of the penitentiary, but when it comes to parting with any of his hard-earned "stuff" he is ultra-conservative and always prays for more time to consider the matter before making his contribution. The result is that the more he thinks it over, the more time he wants to think it over, and the more conservative he feels. He finally decides not to part with a foot of his real estate, even though it may be wanted for a private burying place or for a public park.

The Sunday school superintendent who, upon being solicited for a five-year pledge for church extension, finally decided that he would not make any pledge for the future and presumed to justify his action by referring to the passage of Scripture which says that "it is better not to make a vow than to make a vow and not keep it" was a typical miser in spirit. The citizen who claimed to be an American and yet refused to support the Liberty Loans, the member of the church who contributed but \$5.00 for missions on the plea that this was all the money he had, when as a matter of fact his check would have been good for any reasonable amount, the farmer who does not contribute to the county hospital fund because all the money he can rake and scrape is needed to meet the payments on the additional forty acres recently purchased, the citizen who declines to support the movement for better public schools on the ground that all of his children are through school and what was good enough for them is still good enough for anyone else's children, are all examples of the miser class.

The socialized teacher will put forth every effort to prevent the propagation of the non-socially efficient classes through the social heredity of the school. One of the first moves that a teacher can make in this direction is to socialize the recitation. Some of the specific things that may be done to socialize the recitation are such as the following: ask for movable chair-desks for the lower grades and tables and chairs for the upper grades, in order that they may be arranged in different ways, to suit the various kinds of work undertaken, and pushed aside when not in use. The writer has used this plan with great profit in normal-school and college classes. With this arrangement of the chairs the pupils recite to the class instead of to the teacher and are thus made to feel socially responsible to the group. Other devices for socializing the recitation are to encourage pupils to ask questions of each other, bring individual reports to the class, engage in self-organized group work, and the like.

Having given some attention to the socializing of the recitation, the teacher will carry out this same idea in the general activities of the school as represented by the club work, the team work, the athletics, and other forms of organized recreation. A community

that is so fortunate as to secure the services of a socialized teacher will feel the weight of her influence before the term is half over.

In the third place I submit that *the superintendent should be socialized.*

In order to have a thoroughly socialized school it is not only necessary that the curriculum and the teacher be socialized, but it is highly advisable to have a little social serum injected into the superintendent or supervisor, as the case may be. This may prove to be a painful operation, but nevertheless it should be done in order to insure a proper functioning of his administrative office.

The effect of the inoculation of the superintendent with social serum is usually first seen in his changed attitude toward the social life of the pupils. This is especially noticeable in the case of a superintendent who has to do with pupils of high-school age. Before the inoculation he is apprehensive, if not outspokenly afraid, that the pupils will pay too much attention to social affairs. As was brought out in an investigation of one hundred and twenty-five high schools in a middle western state and reported by Dr. Irving King, many of the superintendents and principals evidently considered that there was no problem of this kind at all in their schools, while others admitted that the problem was present, but stated that they were making no attempt to co-operate with the pupils in building any kind of a social program. Doubtless, says Dr. King, many shared the feeling of two who replied, one to the effect that "he had no use for any such thing," and the other that there was "too blamed much social life already."

After the superintendent or principal has become immune to the "scare" of too much social life, he manifests a desire to make the school a social as well as an intellectual center for the community. In much of the social activity, particularly athletics and entertainments of various kinds, the pupils of the school will naturally take the lead, the patrons of the community gathering to constitute an appreciative and enthusiastic audience. In certain other forms of activity, such as picnics, patriotic meetings, and meetings pertaining to civic welfare, the older folk will often take the lead, the boys and girls attending with reverence or with glee, as the occasion may require. The give-and-take spirit

among patrons and pupils should be cultivated more than it is in most communities.

Another important effect of the "social inoculation" of the superintendent is seen in the improved organization and supervision of his teaching force. He no longer is content to leave the young and inexperienced teacher to flounder about in a sea of uncertainties as to what constitutes good teaching, but proceeds by tactful and helpful means to further the training and improve the skill of every teacher under his supervision. A district supervisor in the state of Ohio related to the writer how he had turned the would-be failure of one of his teachers into a splendid success by simply relieving her of her schoolroom duties for a few days and taking her to observe the work of some of his better teachers. I later verified the report by visiting the school of the "made over" teacher and seeing for myself the improved work that was going on. At another time a county superintendent told of saving several of his teachers from disgraceful failures by timely and sympathetic help. Such a spirit of helpfulness is based upon a deep social insight into the nature of teaching and more especially of supervision.

Oftentimes a thoroughly socialized superintendent will even dare to perform verbal operations on his teachers in order to save their professional lives. This is, indeed, an unpleasant duty, as those who have practiced it will bear witness; yet as my major professor once said to me, after having giving me one of the worst goings over I have ever experienced, "Mr. Cummins, if I were not deeply interested in your future success, I should have simply flunked you and let you go." The socialized administrator is vicarious and gives himself in service to his teachers.

The socialized superintendent not only takes his teachers in hand for the purpose of helpful training, but he also recognizes their position and prerogatives. After each visit the pupils will respect the authority and leadership of the teacher all the more, because they observe that the superintendent himself believes in her. On the other hand the superintendent who has not acquired the broader social vision of his work will often unthoughtfully destroy by a single visit what little confidence the pupils may have

acquired in their teacher. We see, then, that the socializing of the superintendent insures the wholesome development of all the general activities of the school under a plan of teacher-supervision, which is at once both positive and exacting, yet sympathetic and free from any trace of domineering, driving, or drudgery.

Apparently I have completed the analysis of a socialized school, but the most fundamentally important factor has been purposely reserved till the last. The reader will doubtless have in mind as the fourth factor the socializing of the pupil. While the pupil is, of course, a logical presupposition of the school, yet in our discussion of "A Completely Socialized School" the pupil is thought of as the material which is to be run through the mill, so to speak. What we are discussing here is the socializing of the "mill." In order to complete the socializing of the school I submit finally that *the school board should be socialized.*

In a previous paragraph it was stated that the method is so closely bound up with the teacher that both must be considered as but two aspects of the same thing. So, also, it may be stated that the school plant is so closely related to the school board that it is impossible to discuss one without also discussing the other. Indeed, it may be said, *like school board, like school plant.*

Of course, it does not require a modern school plant in order to evolve a modern curriculum, but when it comes to the administering of any kind of a curriculum a well-arranged and well-equipped school plant is quite necessary. Of course, a socialized teacher will set about to make improvements in her work and will manage to develop in her pupils social habits of a desirable nature even though she is obliged to teach in a run-down schoolhouse. She will contrive to turn the dreariness of it all into the brightness of sunshine, but the brightness will necessarily appear in streaks and splashes, unless she has the advantage of an up-to-date room in which to work. She can put up a few pictures on the wall and hang the wall map over the crack in the blackboard, if there happens to be any wall map to hang. She can bring a bit of wall paper to paste over the place where the plaster has fallen off or where the rats have cut a hole through the wall; she can make a pasteboard cover for the common water pail, or provide a new

dipper to hang at the pump, but at best it will all constitute but a sorry makeshift.

Of course, the superintendent can inaugurate a program of athletics by clearing a patch on the hillside, or cleaning out the loft of a barn for basket ball; he can lay rough planks on the top of some of the school desks and allow the pupils to climb about over the remainder of the seats in an effort to enjoy a self-served dinner. Or he can work up an interest in public speaking, even though he is obliged to rent an abandoned room over a store in which to hold the oratorical contest, or he can ride on horseback over rough roads, or plow through the mud in his Ford in order to bring needed service to his teachers who are scattered throughout his territory, but all of this is far and away behind the progress of society and is but a sorry makeshift. Most of our city schools have long ago passed beyond the necessity of such poor service.

According to Professor Cubberley and other school men of far-reaching vision, any effort to improve the rural schools which stops short of consolidation is but an effort at patchwork. The only adequate method of improving our public schools is to begin at the beginning and this means to begin with the school board. Given a coterie of socialized school-board members in any section of the state and within a few years there will be found as fine a system of public schools as may be found in any city. The chief reason why we have better schools in the cities than in the rural districts is because the city school boards have spent more money on their schools. Statistics show that generally speaking throughout the country three times as much money is being spent on urban schools as is being spent on rural schools. (It should be borne in mind in this connection that villages and towns of 2,500 inhabitants or less are counted as rural communities.)

The first sign of the socializing of a school board is seen in the loosening of the purse strings. The raising of teachers' salaries alone will not solve the problem. This will naturally secure a better grade of teacher, but the better the teacher the better the use that could be made of good equipment and, vice versa, the better the equipment the better the teacher that is needed. "Birds of a feather flock together," and it is no less true of superintendents,

teachers, and school plants, for the best superintendents and teachers will gravitate toward the better supported schools.

With a completely socialized school board (and school plant), curriculum, teacher (and method), and superintendent the best possible product, viz., the socialized pupil, will logically, though perhaps not naturally, result. It must be remembered that the best institutions in the world, viz., the family, the church, and the school all together cannot succeed in every case, for by nature some are prone to evil as the sparks are to fly upward. No institution made up of imperfect and fallible human beings can ever be absolutely sure of turning out an acceptable product so long as it must deal with material which is itself not absolutely pure, for "who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?"

The foregoing discussion may be summed up in the form of a few general principles and a brief definition of a completely socialized school.

1. Every community owes it to the profession of teaching, as well as to the rising generation, to make adequate provision for the carrying on of the work of the public schools in the most approved and up-to-date manner—*the socialized school board*.

2. Every teacher owes it both to herself and to society at large to render an increasingly efficient service in her chosen life-work—*the socialized teacher*.

3. The content of the curriculum should be checked up by the demand made in adult society, but the organization of the curriculum should be psychological, i.e., should be made to fit the mind of the child that is to be educated—*the socialized curriculum*.

4. The whole school system should be administered according to the best approved business methods and the latest word in the science of education—*the socialized superintendent*.

5. The whole environment of the pupil as represented by the school, home, and church should be directed toward the complete education of each individual, i.e., the acquiring of such useful knowledge, right attitudes, and correct skills as will function in rendering him both a good producer and a good consumer. This is the *socialized product* that will logically result from a *socialized school*.

Definition.—A completely socialized school is one in which the school board, the teacher, the curriculum, and the superintendent have all been laid upon the altar of child welfare and dedicated to their needs, with a view of educating them to be socially efficient, i.e., able to pull their own weight in society, without interfering with the rights of others, and willing to contribute to those who are less fortunate.

WHY MEN STRIKE

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After the terrible disorganization throughout the civilized world that the war has caused one would suppose that industry would be disrupted, that prices would be out of proportion to production, that innocent people would suffer, and that scoundrels would bleed their fellows; but the war cannot be wholly to blame for the attitude of the workingman during this period of reorganization. One would think that everybody would so rejoice that the conflict was over that they would settle down into their niche and work to bring back the old order of things. Instead we hear of nothing but strikes and labor disputes in all sorts of industries. The war no doubt precipitated this state of affairs, but the cause is something more fundamental and deep-seated in the very nature of modern industry. This reason is the fact that *the work of modern tradesmen, craftsmen, and laborers is so specialized, so devoid of intrinsic interest that the workman finds no incentive to work except the pay he receives.* The nature of the daily work of most of the working people absolutely precludes the possibility of their loving the work. Most of them hate it, and how can they help hating a job which means, for instance, that they go through a set of motions (which they learned in a very short time) hundreds of times a day with the prospect of day after day, week after week, year in and year out doing the same thing?

A common notion is that men hate work, that instinctively they are lazy. Such a notion is itself a product of specialization of labor and has no foundation in fact. When such an opinion is expressed what is meant is that the individual does not readily apply himself to the conventional task. From earliest childhood the tendency to activity is repressed. As long as the child is too weak to get off its back, its kicking, waving of arms, cooing, and incessant activity are admired and no one wishes to stop it. When it gets old

enough to meddle with things its activity annoys elders and the repression begins. He is penned in a coop so that he cannot dirty the walls or pull off the table covers; he is put into a high chair for the convenience of his elders and strapped so that he will not fall. As he gets older he is taught not to climb trees, not to play as he would like to, not to fight if he is insulted because he must keep clean and be a gentleman. When he gets inquisitive and asks a thousand or more questions he is told to keep quiet. His play must be of a quiet, gentlemanly, grown-up variety. The poor chap has a hard life keeping from doing the things that he would like to do.

The school training is a continuation in the same process. He has to keep very quiet, ask nothing but consistent questions, and absorb information from teacher or books. He must not waste his time studying the things he desires to investigate for they are not important. His elders know what it is important that he learn and he must adhere to their program. When he goes into the world and gets work he is there also taught exactly what he must do and he is disciplined into doing it. *A good workman is one who gets to work on time, does with some signs of vigor what he is told to do, and keeps his mouth shut. He is nothing but a machine,* a machine easier to handle than his steam-driven comrades because he can be given oral directions and can take care of himself. He has the additional faculties of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, which to some employers are valuable. He is capable of more varied reactions than any other machine yet invented; but he has the inconvenient faculty of getting sick or failing to appear on time and is likely to make mistakes.

No human being could possibly be normal and be lazy in the sense of being inactive. The lazy man does things but does not fit into society; he does not do just as others want him to do. A man is less active at certain periods of his life than at others and throughout life more or less time has to be taken for sleep. There are differences in degree of activity above the threshold of laziness. When we think of a lazy man we get the picture of a man lying in bed to an unseemly hour, shirking his work, and really less active than others. This is due to the fact that the struggle between what he would like to do and what he ought to do keeps him from acting

at all. He hates to do the conventional thing and he is drilled against the unconventional so that he dares not do it; hence he does neither. *Laziness is an abnormality resulting from the conflict between desires to act in unconventional ways and fear of the results coupled with a distaste for conventional activity.*

What forces are brought to bear to make a workman constantly do the work he dislikes? At first the child is made to do the thing he dislikes through physical force; later such forces as shame, fear of being different from others, and ambition are brought to bear until finally as the boy becomes a man the economic motive becomes paramount. He learns that if he is to get from life what others do he must get money, and to get money he must fit into the scheme and work as others do. When a man sees that he must work as a machine and actually does it the distastefulness largely disappears. No man can constantly do a really distasteful thing and the distaste remain the same. He becomes adapted to it. If you taste something sour you get at first the full effect of the sourness; if you keep tasting the same sour thing the keenness of the sensation departs and you fail to notice that it is sour. The fact that the man does the routine job for so long makes him adapt himself to its unpleasantness and he forgets that he dislikes it. The fact remains, however, that it is distasteful and there is nothing in the work itself that induces the man to do it.

This is the asset that labor agitators can always depend upon. The agitator knows that few men love their work, so that when times get a little abnormal and the wages that the men get will not buy as much as they would like, it is an easy matter to get them in a frame of mind where they will be willing to quit. Why do not agitators work with teachers and preachers who are more poorly paid than the ordinary workman? For the simple reason that a large proportion of the people in these classes are in their work because they like it and work for the work's sake; they would sacrifice a great deal before they would quit.

Men are induced to do things through all sorts of external motives, but master-motives must be intrinsic in the work itself if the work is to go on to its best advantage. If the motive for work lies outside the work the least resistance or obstacle will check it, but if the motive is in the work itself the obstacle will

only stimulate the individual to increased efforts to overcome the obstacle, and the work will go on as before.

How can men be made to love their work? With conditions as complex as they are the situation cannot be wholly relieved. Men cannot be left free to do as they choose in a society such as ours. Yet when the truth is understood many improvements can be made. When employers know that attractiveness of work is more important than pay they will take pains to make the work attractive. *Money is not as strong an incentive as it is usually supposed to be.* When that is all a man gets from his work of course he will take any means possible to get all he can. When he works from other motives he will become less vividly conscious of the amount of pay he receives.

The only remedy that will lastingly overcome this social unrest is to make work interesting for all classes from the laborer to the professional man. We must forever get rid of the notion that anything interesting is for that reason either useless or conducive to inefficiency. The old theory of education used to be that the duller, uninteresting subjects were better for the student than the interesting ones because of the disciplinary value of making the student do what he disliked. The modern method, which has proven a better one, is to present the dead subjects in an interesting way. Psychology has shown that the way to do a thing quickly and well is to become intensely interested in it. Why not make work interesting? It can be done and the employer will eventually save by doing it.

If work is to be made interesting the recent stress upon efficiency with its consequent overspecialization will have to be curtailed. To be constantly stressing the quantity and quality of work done is to furnish a superficial external drive. The extra pay that the man gets will at first look large but it will appear less and less, especially when the scheme becomes more widely used and all men get more pay. The incentive will fail and the workmen rebel.

Enough variation must be left in each man's job to kill the monotony.

Each man should be taught about his job in relation to the others so that he will feel that he is a vital part of the organization.

Each man should clearly see a possible route for promotion. If a man is hired as a stoker with a beginning salary of so much, with the promises of periodical raises until a certain point is reached, all incentive for good work is killed in that man. He must be able to see where he could go beyond the stage of being a stoker. It does not matter if the man has but one chance in a thousand of making a certain step, let him know he has that chance and he will inevitably try to be the one.

When we were training our great national army each man was continually told that his job was important in the winning of the war; he was taught to love his job, the distasteful job of drilling. Besides he was filled with an ambition to do his best because he was shown the proper steps to gain promotion and saw others being promoted through tests of merit. After the signing of the armistice no one felt that he was vitally necessary and to cap this the War Department stopped all promotions. The spirit of the soldiers dropped like lead and it was almost impossible to get anything done. "What is the use since the war is over and I have no chance of any promotion?" was the cry.

All promotions should be based on merit alone and in such a way that every employee is convinced that it is merit alone that counts. Tell him what qualities are used in judging whether a man is to be promoted or not. Frankness on this one subject will work wonders.

Not only should the man be given a square deal but pains should be taken that he knows that he is being fairly treated, not by blatant advertising but by open straightforward organization. An employer may shower gifts upon his men in the way of recreation rooms, extra holidays, bonuses, etc., but if he is not manifestly fair the men will spurn his gifts and believe that he is trying to appease them for having robbed them.

When the workman was an artisan he was interested in the efficiency of the process in which he was engaged and took pride in the handling of his tools. Today the machine is the artisan and the workman the tool, and no intelligent man can take an interest in being an efficient tool. *The present industrial unrest will not cease until the workman is studied as a human organism with the purpose in mind of giving him some interest in his work besides the pay he receives.*

PROGRESS AND THE CONSTRUCTIVE INSTINCTS

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Modern psychology does not recognize any clear boundary line between instinct and intelligence. Each is an expression of the same life-energy seeking an adaptation to environment. It is true that the power of making and imitating reasoned adaptations is the unique characteristic of human evolution, yet this power is but a gradual flowering of the instinctive urge displayed throughout the animal kingdom. Through intelligence man has satisfied more abundantly his primal wants, and has learned new wants. His systematized reactions to his natural surroundings and his institutional co-operations with his fellows are, then, evolutionary outgrowths from the instinctive and intuitional core of the common heredity.

It follows that civilizations, though mediated by intelligence, are as much natural products as the forests. It was not due to whim, but to an innate necessity, that when man outgrew mentally his tribal communism he created property civilizations. Given the addition of intelligence to the urge of instinct, and the result was as inevitable as the maturing of the brooded egg. Because of its organic nature there was a typical structural symmetry about the social whole that the law of property and status reared. Hereditary rights to wealth served as a basis upon which to grow the balanced gradations of power from serf to noble and king. The social organism may be said to have acquired a vertebrate form and a brain. The protoplasmic mass of tribal life was speedily swallowed by the new order, and the ancient empires came into being. Admittedly the biological analogy may be over-worked, yet the figure graphically sets forth the facts.

Similarly every conspicuous advance of civilization is a consequence of instinctive energies thrown into new channels by increasing mentality. Just what, in a primary sense, is respon-

sible for the awakening powers is a baffling problem. Various writers have professed to see the cause in physiographic environment, race, religion, political principles, and so on. Yet the natural environment seems an occasion rather than a cause, and the social factors are manifestations of the more elemental force. Without attempting to pass upon so elusive a problem, it may be sufficient for present purposes simply to observe that certain environmental conditions of resources and communication serve to stimulate the latent racial capacities. A constructive instinct, radiating into invention and managerial ability is aroused. The awakening spreads by a process of crowd suggestion from individual to individual, until a tidal movement of humanity is initiated. Such an activity of the social mind is the creative agent in cultural evolution. It sweeps from its path the cobwebs of exploitation and superstition as it creates freer and more productive institutions. Into the inner nature of this collective spirit it is useless for us to attempt to penetrate, but its economic consequences and the obstacles it encounters may be worthy of our attention.

A primary condition upon which the organic relationships of society depend is the wide natural diversity and inequality of human nature. It is this inequality that makes possible and advantageous the division of labor, and the subordination of the masses to leadership. Biologists have shown that innate characteristics and abilities vary in somewhat pyramidal proportions, so that there is at all times the natural basis for a kind of feudal gradation of classes. Rivalry creates the pressure which masses men into the hierarchical form. Natural differences are still further accentuated by the inevitable fact that to him that hath shall be given. The artificial gradations of society follow upon the natural gradations.

When a dynamic advance of society is nascent, men of superior natural ability in the groups affected are developed to give direction to the movement. These leaders may assume a variety of aspects, according to their individual capacities and the tendencies of the times. In so far as the movement demands idealistic impulse, they may be preachers or philosophers, such as the early Protestant

clergy, and the classical economists. In so far as the demand is for political readjustment, they may be soldiers and statesmen, such as the founders of the American nation. But such leadership is ephemeral. Though vital to a movement and expressive of its intensest energies, the work is quickly done, and the phrases that stirred men's souls degenerate into formalism. The substantial work is done by economic leaders, such as the commercial and landed aristocracy which rose from the middle class in England as a consequence of the Reformation, and the capitalistic classes which have secured an, as yet somewhat precarious, ascendancy during the past century or two. Since man organizes his everyday world about the supremacy of capital, it is in the economic field that the tissues of the social organism are created. In this respect there is an identity of process in social growth since the disappearance of the tribal communisms.

No social element is more wilfully misunderstood than capital. It is certainly not to be apprehended by the mere statement of figures in a ledger, for it is essentially an expression of human organization. It means that those men who have developed practical intelligence in business management have secured authority over those who are less matured and those who have specialized more narrowly. The administration of capital is the government of men in their industrial life. The frontier, where men disperse over a new area, brings a temporary disintegration and equality, but integration sooner or later sets in, and a new leadership is elevated to a height commensurate with the widened base of the social pyramid. In the large scale banking and business connections of the present day the world is experiencing the inevitable reaction following the vast territorial expansions, both commercial and racial, of the Industrial Revolution. The basic fact is not, however, the centralization of wealth, but the growing interdependence of industrial organization.

We may see in the concrete the administrative function of capital if we consider the methods by which wealth is attained. Fortunes are not accumulated by the penurious saver of money, but by the dynamic organizer of business. The apparent exceptions, where wealth is derived purely from speculative chance, do not

invalidate the rule. The business leader who has acquired through experience the requisite standing throws his energies into some promising undertaking that will serve the public needs, as the manufacture of a staple commodity or the building of a railroad. He pays interest on borrowed capital and builds up his own fortune through his skill in putting men effectively at work. His invested capital, stated in terms of stock and bond quotations, rests in fact upon the organized energies of busy workers in factories, or of construction gangs wrestling to bring the wilderness under control. The movement of capital into this or that industry is in reality the movement of laborers and the products of labor. The active capitalist marshals the industrial host. Small investors turn over to the abler man the minor industrial control they have acquired. So, as trade relations ramify, requiring ever finer co-ordinations in manufacture and distribution, leaders of higher potentiality are produced. It is only in abstraction that the dynamic fact of leadership becomes the static fact of property rights.

A nation in which a spirit of intelligent enterprise rules may be called a functional society. The term implies that each individual subordinates himself to the attainment of some common object, that he serves others as he also is served through the processes of trade and through the development of his productive estate. In economic terms the completely functional society would be one in which each citizen was either training for or practicing the productive arts best suited to his capacity. It would be a society that fostered leadership, so as to secure for its own direction and for the control of its departments and sub-departments the best executive talent it afforded. Thus it would exemplify co-ordinated team work throughout. It would have weight and momentum in its directed movements because of the complete employment of each able-bodied citizen. By such employment it would also utilize all available capital power, for waste would be eliminated and surplus wealth reinvested.

In picturing the functional society thus at its utopian fulfillment, we need not impute to it any undue Spartan severity. Relaxation, amusement, and aesthetic joy in work are elements of social art. They therefore would be suitably provided for. Indeed, a

functional ordering of society would indirectly fulfil the requirements of a pure hedonistic philosophy, since it would satisfy to the greatest possible degree the instincts of mankind, the deepest of which are the inventive and organizing faculties of intelligent construction. Man is happiest when he spends himself in endeavors that link him in a common enthusiasm with his fellows and with the future of the race. To be used by the creative social mind is to have lived. Hence, the more functional a nation becomes, the more it succeeds in the pursuit of happiness.

It must be admitted that a state of society in which men are consciously members one of another in a living social organism is something seldom attained. Only rarely, in vital moments, is any considerable volume of population so fused. Perhaps a state of war, so far as the situation within a belligerent country is concerned, approximates the most closely such an ideal, but it is a negation of the ideal in its rupture of the wider social relations. More satisfactory as a suggestion of an ideal social organization, though lacking somewhat in systematic leadership, is an expanding democracy such as that which America has typified to the world. Here the joy of building a nation has been intensified by the escape from old-world conventionalities, and by the effectiveness of accumulated knowledge in the face of rich natural resources. Similarly every great forward movement of society has been democratic and functional. Witness the social spirit of the Greeks and the constitutionalism of the English.

Inherent in the very nature of social growth, particularly in the economic aspects, there may be discovered from the first, certain subtle forces which eventually may mature into paralysis or conflict. The social organism might almost be said to be subject to a structural cycle corresponding to the aging process in the individual. Superficially there may appear no such fatality attaching to the grouping of men as to the grouping of the body cells, yet in the past the fatality has proved almost as binding. The easy optimism which scorns the danger is based upon an ignorance of the intricacies of economic law.

The difficulty is not merely that economic law is inherent in human nature, in the vulgar sense that each man seeks his own

profit in trade. If this were all, we might expect a speedy solution of the historic tangle, since man is instinctively altruistic in a considerable degree. But economic law is something far more significant than individual selfishness. It is nothing less than the mode of adaptation of the social organism to a physiographic environment. It denotes an organization of industry under the sway of capital ownership, and a rule for the distribution of the products. No other practicable basis for industry has yet been discovered, nor appears in sight.

Briefly stated, economic law adapts itself to industrial requirements in a stage of rapid growth, for the following reasons. It stimulates activity by competition for desirable prizes. It throws men upon their own resources to find their places, whether among the leaders or in the ranks. It allows men of ability to rise into the expanding occupations and professions created by invention, thus raising the level of common wages. It is true that the transition to a new economy may bring suffering to those lacking the power of quick readaptation, as notoriously was the case in England at the advent of the Industrial Revolution. But the more permanent effect is the improvement of the conditions of labor through the more effective bidding of capital. With the relaxing of the pressure of population, so keenly felt in static periods, the stir of new life reaches to the very social depths. Further, the economic postulates of freedom of contract and the right of possession appeal to the energetic with the axiomatic force of the moral law, and so serve as a fundamental basis of agreement.

The lure of individualistic opportunity during a time of economic progress is greatly enhanced because of the rapid increase in capital properties. The new wealth is broadly distributed among the enterprising and creative, and even enriches the more passive properties through an increased demand. Hence any hostility to property as privilege that may linger from a more monopolistic epoch is disarmed. The pursuit of wealth is accepted as the normal end of existence.

The gateways of individual opportunity are kept open long after the subsidence of the initial innovating impulse by the spreading of the movement beyond the national boundaries. A country

that has reached a conspicuously high level of the industrial arts is like a city set on a hill. It becomes a model of imitation for its more backward neighbors, who seek its trade, copy its ways, and invite it to bring in permanently its goods and ways by the investment of capital. Or, if a fickle attitude oppose, an entrance may be forced. As the wave of progress spreads, the financial power of the center may rise to imperial proportions. Such is the beneficent operation of economic law, accomplishing by a seemingly unsystematic growth a result that could not have been attained by conscious planning.

Yet, axiomatic as the laws of trade may be, no more subtle trap has Nature ever laid for the unwary. It has been well said that with the law came death. For, when the tide of progress ebbs, as almost certainly it must do at times, then economic law changes into a tyrant. Just why the creative impulse should at times weaken is unexplainable. As we cannot tell whence it comes, so we cannot say whither or why it goeth. All we know is that the driving power of the constructive instincts becomes temporarily inadequate in the face of natural obstacles, such as scarcity of resources or barriers to further trade contacts. Then, from the spontaneous operation of economic law, quite a new set of phenomena arise.

As soon as progress slackens, the pathways inviting the individual to the heights begin to be blocked. The established professions are filled mainly by the sons of the prosperous, who have first access to the requisite education. Property, no longer increasing rapidly in quantity, comes to be highly valued, and is held tenaciously in hereditary possession. In default of the beneficent effects of expanding production, wages fall with the increase of population. Contrasts of luxury and poverty therefore begin to obtrude. There is an envious striving among the middle and lower classes to imitate the luxury-spending of the rich, with a consequent waste and demoralization. Insensibly the ties of idealism, sentiment, and patriotism which have united the people in a common spirit of endeavor give way. Group feeling prevails, throwing the owning classes into semi-monopolistic alliances, and employees into aggressively hostile federations. Energies that once were expended in work now are wasted in strife.

Just as success is stimulated by reason of success, so discord is increased by discord. Indeed, so striking are the effects arising from the psychological attitude of the public that this attitude is often taken as an original cause. It is a cause, but only a secondary one, consequent upon some subtler paralysis that has reversed the operation of economic law. So the evil cycle turns on itself; strife further retards progress, and retardation further intensifies the conditions that cause strife. Ancient civilizations are a witness to the fact that a failure to maintain progress means finally a retrogression to militaristic despotism. As a result of the continued disorders the strong man is at length welcomed as the only alternative to anarchy. The nation then comes to an equilibrium on the basis of an established ruling class, and in the clash of conflicting international interests a similar gradation of dependency is generated. Such is the spontaneous succession of events arising from human nature and economic law when the dynamic impulse fails. The fluid progress of modern times has made us forget that the same tendencies on a vastly greater scale are latent also in present-day society, and indeed are not entirely quiescent.

So unobtrusively does the dynamic impulse subside that practical men stubbornly refuse to recognize any change. The laws remain the same, the rights of liberty and property are still guaranteed, trade and the amassing of wealth seem to go on much as before. But an economic system in which a spirit of enterprise and industry prevails, is not the same as one in which that spirit has declined. When the dynamic energies relax, the functions of owner, manager, and worker draw wider apart. The owner becomes the absentee investor, eventually having little knowledge of or personal interest in the projects from which he derives his income. The constructive instinct which drove the former owner to live simply and devote his surplus to the expansion of business is now replaced by what the economist calls "time-preference"; that is, the willingness to invest only in view of a certain promised rate of interest. True, time-preference was implicitly present in the earlier stage, in that the business leader was investing his time and labor for results to be realized in the future. But the abstract preference for futures is a poor substitute for direct

participation in industry. So it happens that mature financial nations pay to investors far more interest in a year than they receive back in increased savings—yet interest is ostensibly justified as the necessary inducement for obtaining a supply of new capital. The interest income going to property becomes, therefore, an accumulating liability to society as a whole. Outwardly the property relation is as before, but the inward change of spirit has changed the essence of the fact.

A certain economic paradox may be observed in respect to the shifting of the interest rate. It is generally assumed on the basis of limited comparisons that a high interest rate is a sign of extravagance, and a low rate is a sign of thrift. Yet the dynamic period is most likely to be a period of high interest, as may be discovered in a growing frontier region; while a static period of leisure class display may be a time of very low interest. The paradox is explained by the observation that what makes interest possible is not simply the fact of a readiness to invest at low rates. Such a readiness may be merely the reflex of the high value set upon hereditary properties during static periods. Interest incomes are initially produced and are expanded as a direct result of the growth of practical intelligence. When the brains of managers and inventors are fertile, newly invested capital becomes an innovating machine or process, producing income sufficient both to bid up wages and to pay generous interest. It is this marginal rate which determines, by inversion, the capitalized values of established properties. Later, when progress has halted, and the methods of industry have been reduced to settled routine, the established properties will be bid up to a high figure by the eagerness of investors, the natural outlet for savings being closed. The resulting low interest rate should serve as an incentive to business, but it may utterly fail to stimulate that innovating self-reliance and spontaneity upon which progress depends. The timid investment by proxy on the part of a class absorbed in the luxurious expenditure of its investment incomes cannot hope to get the results obtained by the enthusiastic ability of the pioneering enterprisers.

A further observation may be made regarding the hereditary class that comes to receive the wealth income of society. The evil connected with such a functionless class is not necessarily proportionate to the size of the fortunes. A large number of small fortunes may dissipate social energies more effectively than a few great ones. The evils of functionless ownership, and conversely the benefits of administrative ownership, depend upon the spirit and ability of the owners. Hence the growth of a relatively few immense fortunes may immediately be a decidedly wholesome sign, for they may be the expression of a timely large-scale organization. A functionless condition is likely to be generated by the inheritance of these fortunes, but a redistribution would not necessarily change the situation. Small fortunes may have been functional, as a rule, under former conditions of small proprietorships, but the case is different under modern corporate organization.

It does not need to be argued that a progressive nation in whose activities all individuals have a functional place, constitutes the goal to be striven for. Such a goal is implied in the modern conception of democracy. But how is it to be permanently gained? Is there for the nation a fountain of perpetual youth? May eternal life be socially attained?

At this point the speculative mind is tempted into utopian dreams. Why should not some mechanical socialism be devised to prevent the gradual growth of functionless classes? Experience has answered the question. As a matter of fact, socialistic experiments have never made a successful appeal to the constructive instincts. Theoretical considerations, also, give just as conclusive an answer when once the immense obstacles are fairly faced. National socialism would leave the distribution of income to the whim of popular majorities. Syndicalism might possibly distribute the income of the local group in proportion to services, but the group on highly valuable land would then be privileged in comparison with other groups. Attempts to adjust matters through price regulation or through control of the migration of labor would lead into endless difficulties, breaking the uniformity of markets, or interfering with efficient production. So complex is modern

industry that the opening of new wheat lands, for example, registers itself partly in the rise of real estate values in the distant metropolis. What device could ever secure for the producer of the new wealth the exact reward of his services?

All schemes for the artificial distribution of income encounter the fundamental question, Who in reality is the creator of wealth? Is it the inventor whose brain conceived the method, the manager who put it into execution, the investor whose savings allowed the manager scope, the working masses whose subordination to industrial discipline was essential to production, or Mother Earth who gave the environmental conditions and the raw material? The process of production is evidently organic: the real Creator is the Spirit of the whole. An artificial system of control capable of directing in detail so subtle an organism as modern industry does not lie within the reach of man's present powers.

Yet the impossibility of an immediate reorganization of society does not at all leave us hopeless. The constructive instincts are at all times latent and may be aroused by appropriate means. They manifest themselves as a fusion of moral enthusiasm and practical intelligence, or applied science. They may be stimulated, therefore, by a clarifying of the moral perspective and by a fostering regard for science.

It should be possible greatly to clarify the public conception of morality in its economic implications. It is readily seen that the functional relation to society is the basis of morality. The good individual is the one who subordinates himself to that Super-Mind, latent in the universe, whose partial but growing revelation is the whole body of truth, including the basic social institutions. So also the good man will love his neighbor as himself, for he will recognize the unity of interests. An aggressive preaching of these long-established axioms of social righteousness will stir the laggards and shame the wasters. Loafers may be goaded to productive labor, and the privileged turned from frivolities to business or to political and social problems.

In relation to economic progress, devotion to science is of the utmost importance. There ought to be a clearer recognition of the essentially religious, as well as utilitarian, aspects of material

science. The scientist is a devotee of the spirit of truth, perhaps in a partial sense, yet in a vital sense, nevertheless. Research in the biological and physical sciences has already added incalculable wealth to the world, and the social sciences should be capable of no less worthy a contribution. Research, amply endowed, will constitute the vanguard of a rapid advance, leading to the creation of new wealth, opening wide the gates of opportunity to the ambitious, and rewarding amply the useful toiler.

There remains to be noted one essential motive power of a dynamic society—faith in the coming ideal. It is evident that the world has not attained its final organization. In fact it has not penetrated much deeper into the nature of justice than had the ancient Greeks and Romans. Easy conditions of rapid growth have made it careless. In many respects it is less socially intelligent—less aware of the difficulties of social organization—than were the ancient Hebrews. With a quickened conscience and a conviction of social sin there must be born a faith that is a laying hold on things to come. For—let us believe it with all the assurance of scientific insight—there must eventually dawn upon humanity such an illumination of the spirit of good will as shall utterly transform this saddened and disillusioned earth. In the Christian spirit has been laid the moral basis, and in the scientific spirit lies the promise of power. The Kingdom will come; in the vision and charity of the believing soul it is already here.

THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

International co-operation in the fields of the humanistic sciences, with the United States forced to abstain from participation because of the lack of a central academy of such sciences—such was the situation in existence until the formation of the American Council of Learned Societies in September, 1919. In 1900 at Paris there had been established the International Association of Academies, including both humanistic and strictly scientific branches. Here America was represented by the National Academy of Sciences, but this unfortunately was not at all concerned with the studies of such subjects as sociology, history, political science, economics, and philosophy. Great Britain also was represented only in the field of the physical sciences through the Royal Society. But this lack was made up in 1902 by the formation of the British Academy for the Promotion of Historical, Philosophical, and Philological Studies. No such society was established in America.

The war broke up this International Association, but in 1918 it was re-established in so far as the physical sciences were concerned by the formation of the International Research Council. Later a conference resulted in the formation of the International Union of Academies (*Union Académique Internationale*) for the furthering of the humanistic studies. M. Émile Senart of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres was chosen first president, and the regular place of meeting for the society is to be the Palais des Académies at Brussels. In the first of these two organizations America as before was represented, but in the second it could not be.

Many scholars, both here and abroad, rightly considered this isolation of the American humanistic societies from their foreign contemporaries to be unfortunate. Chiefly through the efforts of Waldo G. Leland, secretary of the American Historical Association, a conference was therefore called in September, 1919, to which thirteen of the societies of the proper type were invited and

which was attended by representatives of ten. A constitution was drawn up establishing an "American Council of Learned Societies devoted to Humanistic Studies" to consist of two delegates from each of the member societies. Eleven of the eligible societies have already voted to join the Council.

The first meeting of the new council was held on February 14, 1920, in New York and eleven societies were represented. The American Sociological Society was represented by its president, James Q. Dealey, of Brown University. Officers were elected and also two delegates were chosen to represent the United States at the May meeting of the International Association. The chairman of the Council elected at this meeting was Professor Charles H. Haskins, of Harvard University, a representative of the American Historical Association, and Professor George M. Whicher, of Hunter College, was chosen secretary.

American humanistic societies represented at this meeting were the American Sociological Society, the American Philosophical Society, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Antiquarian Society, the American Philological Association, the Archaeological Institute of America, the American Historical Association, the American Economic Association, the American Political Science Association, the American Oriental Society, and the Modern Language Association of America.

With a total membership in its constituent societies of over ten thousand it is evident that the American Council will prove to be a real force for the promotion of learning in this country. If in no other way, it will perform some good at any rate in that it will bring into some sort of unity a dozen or more societies, so naturally akin in interests and yet heretofore completely separated in organization. There is also America's share in international humanistic tasks to be considered.

There have been cases in which action by members of one nation by themselves meant that scholars of other nations were hindered in their attempts to perform similar or supplementary work. Such discrimination will in the future be tabooed by the International Union. Also the Union should prove advantageous in that it may provide a means for standardizing publications of a

national sort but of international interest, and in a uniform manner collecting in the different countries that material for some international work which is found in those particular countries.

So far the International Union of Academies or the U.A.I., as it is often called, includes representatives of the following countries besides the United States: France, Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece, Poland, Russia, and Japan. Representatives of Spain, Roumania, Portugal, Finland, and Czecho-Slovakia are expected to join soon.

NEWS AND NOTES

Notes of interest to the readers of the *Journal* should be in the hands of the editor of "News and Notes" not later than the tenth of the month preceding publication.

ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

The annual meeting of the American Sociological Society will be held in Washington, D.C., December 27-29 in conjunction with the Historical and Political Science Associations.

The general subject as tentatively announced is "Constructive National Movements in Their Social Aspects."

The following subjects and writers are announced: "The Community Idea in Rural Development," Kenyon L. Butterfield; "Sociological Evaluation of the Inter-Church World Movement," Edwin L. Earp; "Psychology of Nationalism," Max S. Handman; "Sociological Theory and Practice as Illustrated by Army Psychological Tests," J. P. Lightenberger; "The Future of Social Science," Albion W. Small; "Social Significance of the New Educational Policy of the Army," Scott E. W. Bedford.

Although not definitely decided, it is hoped the following will be part of the program: "Social Significance of Labor Adjustments"; "Radicalism and Our Social Institutions," William J. Kirby; "Some Problems in National Adjustment," Susan M. Kingsbury; "A Theory of Social Interests," Roscoe Pound.

Two Round Table Discussions are being arranged. "The Social Significance of Psychoanalytic Psychology," in charge of Ernest R. Groves and F. Stuart Chapin. Three-minute papers by Dr. Phyllis Blanchard, Bedford Hills Reformatory; Bernard Glueck, New York School of Philanthropy; Henry C. Morrison, University of Chicago; C. C. Robinson, Y. M. C. A.; Dr. Edith Spaulding, and Dr. William A. White.

The other Round Table Discussion will be on the subject, "Essentials of a Social Survey," in charge of H. S. Bucklin and Shelby M. Harrison. Three-minute papers by C. J. Galpin, Department of Agriculture; Allen T. Burns, Carnegie Corporation; Ernest C. Meyer, Rockefeller Foundation.

Three important committees will report. "Teaching of Social Science in the Public and High Schools," Ross L. Finney; "Standardization of Research," J. L. Gillin; "Plan for Preparation of Indexes, etc., of Social Science," F. Stuart Chapin.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF LONDON

The editor of the *Sociological Review* announces that the Sociological Society is again located in Westminster where it was originally organized. The building secured for the offices and meetings of the Society has been named Leplay House, after the noted French social scientist, LePlay. The spring number of the *Sociological Review* appropriately contains the first chapters of a biography entitled "LePlay and Social Science," written by the late Dorothy Herbertson, whose husband, a former professor of geography in Oxford University, was a devoted student of LePlay.

The lectures announced for the summer term of the Society include the following: "Exhibition of Methods of Organization," M. Bruce Williams; "The Smoke Curse and Our New Homes," Dr. Saleeby; "Social Finance," John Ross.

Communications to the Society should be addressed to the Secretary, Mrs. Fraser Davies, Leplay House, 65 Belgrave Road, Westminster.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY

The *Revue internationale de sociologie* in a recent issue calls attention to the deaths during the war of three of its illustrious members, Professors Schmoller, Wagner, and Simmel.

Gustav Schmoller was professor of political economy in the universities of Halle, Strassburg, and Berlin, and was recognized as the leader of the group known as "Socialists of the Chair." Schmoller was editor of *Staats- und Socialwissenschaftliche Forschungen* and *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung, und Volkswirtschaft*. Of his numerous writings, there is space here for mention of only one, *Grundriss der Allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre*. He was president of the "Verein für Sozialpolitik," and in 1905 was made president of the International Institute of Sociology.

Adolph Wagner was also a professor of political economy at the University of Berlin. Under the influence of the psychological school, he diverged from the theoretical position of Schmoller, who was inspired

by the historical school and state socialism. Each ended by calling the other "mein Hauptgegner."

Georg Simmel was originally a philosopher, teaching at the universities of Berlin and Strassburg. At a certain period of his career he devoted himself almost entirely to sociological work, writing articles for the *Revue internationale de sociologie* and for the *Annals of the International Institute of Sociology*, of which he was a member from the year of its organization in 1893. The comprehensive formulation of his sociological theories was published in 1908 in his volume *Soziologie*, many parts of which were translated into English by Albion W. Small, and appeared in the *American Journal of Sociology*.

SOCIOLOGY IN THE SOUTH

The organization of a department of sociology and school of social science at Tulane University and the expansion of the work in sociology with the creation of a School of Public Welfare in the University of North Carolina, as announced in this issue, mark a new period in the history of sociology and social work in the United States. The organization of two strong departments of sociology in the South represents also the culmination of an increasing interest in the South in the investigation and solution of social problems. The work of individual Southern sociologists, the Southern Sociological Congress, the effective educational and social service activities of the American Red Cross in southern states, the recent meeting of the National Conference of Social Work in New Orleans, are undoubtedly among the factors which have contributed to the establishment of these two fully organized departments of sociology and schools of social work. It is significant that each institution has established a chair of social technology. This emphasis upon applied sociology should insure the development of training for social service adapted to the needs of southern communities. At the same time, social theory and social research are also stressed. In the study and interpretation of American society, sociologists will welcome the increased co-operation and contribution now to be expected from southern universities.

BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

The Baylor University Press announces the publication in August of a textbook entitled "Introduction to the Principles of Sociology," by Professor G. S. Dow, head of the department of sociology.

BOWDOIN COLLEGE

Mr. Glenn R. Johnson has been appointed instructor in sociology and economics.

BUTLER COLLEGE

Dr. Howard E. Jensen has been appointed professor of sociology to succeed Dr. Lumley who has resigned.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Official announcement is made by the Board of Trustees of the University of Chicago of the adoption of a plan proposed by the Trustees of the Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy whereby the University shall take over the functions of the School and establish a graduate professional curriculum for students in civics and philanthropy, to be known as the School of Social Service Administration.

The Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy was founded eighteen years ago by Professor Graham Taylor, and among those who assisted in its early work was the late Professor Charles R. Henderson, of the University of Chicago. Among its later faculty have been Dr. Sophonisba P. Breckinridge, Assistant Professor of Social Economy, and Dr. Edith Abbott, Lecturer in Sociology, at the University of Chicago, who have had charge of the special work in social investigation. Nearly 3,000 men and women have been trained in the school, and it has furnished many investigators for expert service.

The Dean of the new school will be Dean Leon C. Marshall, of the School of Commerce and Administration of the University of Chicago.

Professor Scott E. W. Bedford has been in residence the Summer Quarter, giving his usual courses. The three quarters preceding he has been out of residence, with the War Department in the capacity of Development Expert in General Education. This work is in connection with the new educational policy of the army. He has helped to prepare the manual for the basic course in citizenship which is really all the social sciences in one course. He was also sent to study and consult the leading agencies doing any kind of work in Americanization and citizenship training. He has visited several camps and posts to aid in the general educational work and has addressed the recruiting personnel, commercial bodies, and civic organizations in the large cities.

Beginning September 1 the University has granted Professor Bedford a year's leave of absence in order that he might continue this work.

He will be in the eastern department of the army with headquarters at Governor's Island. His duties will be to supervise the work in general education in the eastern department, including Porto Rico.

At an unusually well-attended meeting of the Sociology Club addresses were made by Professor Charles A. Ellwood, of the University of Missouri, on "The Need for Scholarship in the Social Sciences," and by Professor Scott E. W. Bedford on "The Social Significance of the New Educational Activities of the Army."

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Dr. E. C. Hayes has gone for the summer to Colorado where he will lecture for a few weeks in the State Normal School at Gunnison. He will then go to Greeley where he will lecture for the summer-quarter session in the Colorado State Teachers' College.

Mr. S. C. Ratcliffe has been appointed as an instructor in sociology here to take the place of Mr. E. F. Reed, who is going to devote his full time this coming year to study.

LAWRENCE COLLEGE

Mr. F. A. Conrad, who for part of last year lectured in sociology at the University of Cincinnati, has been added to the staff here and will have full charge of the work in sociology.

LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY

Professor Walter G. Beach, formerly dean at the State School of Agriculture, Pullman, Washington, has been appointed professor of social science.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Professor Manuel C. Elmer, of the department of sociology, has been engaged by the Central Council of Social Agencies of Minneapolis to conduct a survey of a district in south Minneapolis to determine the question of the advisability of locating a neighborhood house in this section of the city. Professor Elmer and his advanced students have just completed a community survey of Stillwater, Minnesota, the results of which are being published.

Professor L. L. Bernard was advanced from the rank of associate professor to that of professor of sociology, effective July 1, 1920. Professor Bernard has also been awarded an Amherst Memorial Fellowship

for one year, amounting to \$2,000 without service obligation, to enable him to complete an investigation of the interrelations of personalities and institutions. His problem centers around the competing claims of instincts and acquired habits as factors in the development of personality and of institutional organization, together with a study of the method by which environmental pressures direct habit formation.

Mr. Charles E. Lively, instructor in the department of sociology, will spend the summer in a community study of the relationship between types of agriculture and the social life of the community. This study is expected to extend over two summers and is being made under the joint supervision of Professor Galpin of the United States Department of Agriculture and Professor Bernard of the department of sociology.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Professor Carl C. Taylor has resigned as associate professor of sociology at this university to become head of the department of agricultural economics in the North Carolina College of Agricultural and Mechanical Arts at Raleigh, N. C.

Professor Ellwood's book, *The Social Problem*, will be translated into Chinese by Professor Kenneth Duncan, professor of economics in Canton Christian College, Canton.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

Readers of the *Journal* will recall the spring announcement from the university of the enlargement of the department of rural social science under the direction of Dr. E. C. Branson, to include Assistant Professor Hobbes, with Miss Noa and Miss Smeades assisting in the work of the rural social science laboratory. The publications of this department have made a very definite contribution to the literature of the subject, and the efforts of Dr. Branson have contributed largely to the development of the new School of Public Welfare.

Then came the announcement that the Board of Trustees had authorized the establishment of a School of Public Welfare. Dr. Howard W. Odum was elected director of this school and Kenan Professor of Sociology, and with Dr. Branson, and other colleagues, began to work out plans for a very definite and enlarged program of university work and state service. This program will include a fourfold plan of

emphasizing the teaching of sociology and the social sciences in the regular university curriculum; a training school for social work; efforts toward adequate service to communities through social engineering; and university and social research and publication.

In the pursuance of the second purpose, namely, the training of social workers, the university will place the emphasis upon rural, town, and village workers. The American Red Cross has co-operated and will continue for a time a program of co-operation. In the selection of instructors the university has again been fortunate in obtaining Professor A. H. Burnett for community organization and Mary A. Burnett as supervisor of field work and lecturer on family case work.

Another announcement of importance from the University of North Carolina is the selection of Dr. J. F. Steiner as professor of social technology in their new School of Public Welfare. Dr. Steiner will begin his work in the winter quarter of the university, and becomes one of the outstanding additions to that university's original program of public welfare and social research. To his adequate university training and experience, Dr. Steiner brings an unusually valuable experience in the practical fields of social work, education for professional social work, and administrative work as National Educational Director of the American Red Cross.

The first special effort of the School of Public Welfare resulted in the summer institutes for public welfare in which more than fifty full-time students enrolled. Among these were some twenty-five county superintendents of public welfare in North Carolina, twenty of whom remained through the entire Institute prepared for them. An outstanding feature of the institutes was the participation by the state commissioner of public welfare and his staff, thus co-ordinating university and state department closely.

In its unusual and large program President Chase has followed up his initiative in getting the school established with continuous support and foresight; State Commissioner Beasley of Raleigh has shown a remarkable and well-guided enthusiasm, remaining the entire time of the institutes with his force and helping direct its work; the allied departments of community music, folk-drama, economics, commerce, government, and others offer strong courses; and the state at large seems willing to enter into an expanding program of public welfare, making possible for the university a place of its own in the teaching of the social sciences and the promotion of public welfare work.

OBERLIN COLLEGE

Professor Herbert A. Miller sailed for Europe in January to study conditions in the new Mid-European republics. In Czecho-Slovakia he was the guest of President Masaryk, with whom he was associated in the work of the Mid-European Union. In Vienna, Professor Miller had a conference with Professor Sigmund Freud, who expressed interest in the application of his principles of psychoanalysis in sociological thinking in the United States. After a tour of Hungary, Roumania, and Serbia, Professor Miller will return to this country to resume his college work.

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

Dr. F. E. Lumley, of Butler College, has accepted the position of assistant professor of sociology. Mr. W. E. Gettys has resigned to go to Tulane University.

SPOKANE UNIVERSITY

Mr. James G. Patrick has been appointed to take charge of the department of social science which will be reorganized and include courses in sociology, political science, and economics.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Dr. Walter B. Bodenhafer, assistant professor of sociology in the University of Kansas, has been appointed associate professor in this institution and will have charge of the work in sociology.

TULANE UNIVERSITY

Announcement is made of the organization of a department of sociology and school of social science. Dr. E. B. Reuter, formerly of Goucher College, has accepted the chair of sociology and has been appointed director of the school of social science. Professor R. J. Colbert, director of Educational Service of the Gulf Division of the American Red Cross, was elected to the chair of social technology. Mr. Warren E. Gettys, of Ohio State University, was appointed instructor in social technology. Dr. A. W. Hayes, who completed the work for his doctor's degree at the University of Wisconsin, has been selected instructor in rural sociology and rural organization.

One of the interesting features of this staff and the development of the work here is the understanding with which these men have been selected. Each will give half-time to the teaching, and the remainder

of his time will be devoted to the building up of teaching material and research work. Through experience it was found necessary to make provision for the collecting and organizing of teaching material related directly to the situation and the condition of the South. The findings of this research work will be made available to sociologists throughout the country who have had little opportunity in the past to obtain sociological data and teaching material upon the southern situation.

The development of this department of sociology, together with the creation of a chair in economics, marks the development of a new epoch in the southern universities. Social science has been practically undeveloped in southern schools, and as a result the southern opportunities which require sociological and economic training are usually awarded to students who come from the North and East. The development of this work will open a larger opportunity to southern young men and women, and at the same time will stimulate interest in the South in sociological and economic problems.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Professor E. A. Ross has been granted leave of absence for the first semester of 1920-21. Associate Professor William H. Kieckhofer has been promoted to a full professorship.

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Professor R. D. McKenzie, of the University of West Virginia, has accepted the position of associate professor of sociology in the department here. Professor McKenzie will develop the work in the applied field. During the summer he gave courses in community organization.

UNIVERSITY OF WEST VIRGINIA

Mr. George E. Hartman, of the University of Chicago, has been appointed assistant professor of sociology to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of Professor Roderick D. McKenzie, who goes to the University of Washington.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

Elizabeth Pinney Hunt, A.B., A.M., Bryn Mawr, has selected the subject, "Prenatal and Maternity Care in Relation to the State," for her doctor's thesis in sociology. In pursuit of this investigation, Mrs. Hunt will study the situation in Europe in 1920-21, and during the year will be in residence at the University of Stockholm.

REVIEWS

The Source and Aim of Human Progress. By BORIS SIDIS. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1919. Pp. 63. \$1.50.

The main thesis of Professor Sidis' work is, in his own words, that "the source and aim of true human progress are the cultivation and development of man's self-ruling, rational, free individuality." The corollary to this thesis is stated in his answer on how to overcome all of the great obstacles to human progress, "human sufferings, virulent mental epidemics, and other severe social maladies." His reply is that there is only one possible scientific answer based upon biology, sociology, and social psychology, namely: "Fortify the resistance of the individual by freedom of individuality and by the full development of personality. Immunize the individual against social, mental plagues by the full development of his rational reflective self, controlling the suggestible, automatic subconscious with its reflex consciousness. Put no barriers to man's self-expression, lay no chains on man, put no taboos on the human spirit."

The whole spirit of this interesting work fraternizes strikingly with the spirit of such a book as Brooks Adams' *Theory of Social Revolutions*. In one sense it is distinctly pessimistic—in its emphasis upon mob suggestibility, the prevalence of fear taboos, the hysteria of war, the reversion of society to primitive types, the crushing influence of institutionalizing, fear of over-legislation and government. While Professor Sidis ascribes the impetus to this book to his master, William James, he might well have added also a more or less unconscious inspiration and impetus from Herbert Spencer, for although Spencer's name is kept in the background his spirit is certainly present throughout the book.

While the author's emphasis is constantly upon the function of the individual in his contrasting of mass and class, and in his depreciation of mere bigness and boosting, yet it is not an apology of the crasser sort for the superman, à la Nietzsche. It is primarily a demand for members of a social order who have learned to inhibit their lower emotional and suggestible selves in order to give freer play to the selective, critical "voice and will" centers, an individualism that is not stifled by social suppression, an individualism that can hold fast its faith against the

"hysterical convulsions of mob-frenzies" or the "maniacal, nationalistic excitement with fixed paranoid delusions of national grandeur, demoniacal obsessions of world-dominion, resulting in homicidal and suicidal world-wars."

The second part of the book and the part which probably meets more nearly the crying need of these postbellum times includes the sections given over to upholding the value of freedom of opinion. The true value of an opinion, the author says, is not so much in its truth as in its freedom. The reviewer takes the same attitude. While he does not agree with either all the applications of biology and psychology, nor with all of the *obiter dicta* which are voiced in this book, he has felt a distinct stimulus of thought from it, and appreciates the freshness with which the author's opinions and scientific convictions are stated.

ARTHUR J. TODD

CHICAGO

The Philosophy of Conflict and Other Essays in War Time. By HAVELOCK ELLIS. Boston: The Houghton Mifflin Co., 1919. Pp. vi+299. \$2.50.

This collection of essays offers still further proof of the author's versatility. They cover a wide range of subjects, but while they differ on the score of profundity and length, all are marked by the same brilliancy of style and encyclopedic knowledge to which we have grown accustomed in this stimulating Englishman. Some of the essays cover a field of *belles lettres* somewhat remote from the social technician's everyday world, but the larger number of them are well within the scope of either theoretical or applied sociology. The title essay is by no means the best in the series, nor to the reviewer does it appear that the half-dozen essays treating more or less of the subject of war and civilization seem to measure up with those relating to the biological aspects of society with which we have associated the author's name for so long. Thus the essays on "Eugenics in Relation to the War," "Birth Control and Eugenics," "The Mind of Woman," "Equal Pay for Equal Work," "Psycho-Analysis in Relation to Sex," attain the highest mark in the whole volume, for they really add both new material and fresh, stimulating points of view to previous discussions of these subjects. For sheer pleasure, however, should be recommended the essay on the great South American man of letters, Rodó, for both this Latin genius and his English reviewer challenge to a certain extent the complacency of our North American utilitarian life. This might be summarized in the

quotation of a single sentence. "If it can be said that Utilitarianism is the Word of the English spirit, then the United States is the Word made flesh." From the point of view of the restlessness of a world in throes of reconstruction, there is a challenge to ponder Ellis' dictum (p. 33) that "the great wars of history are ambiguous for the most part, but when any meaning emerges, the moral is clear to see: Woe to the victors!" This book is attractively printed with only here and there a slip in proofreading and should prove valuable not only for general public consumption but also as collateral reading in courses on social conflict or the family.

ARTHUR J. TODD

CHICAGO

Thoughts of a Psychiatrist on the War and After. By WILLIAM A. WHITE, M.D. New York: Paul B. Hoeber, 1919. Pp. x+137. \$1.75.

The nature of this collection of popular essays on war and its social aftermath is well indicated by its title. Culture-immaturity, the struggle between the individual and the group, war and the social consequences of war are given a psychoanalytic interpretation. War is both good and bad. It releases primitive animal impulses. It serves also as "the preliminary process of rejuvenescence." With it comes social rebirth and introduction to a new line of progress. War always will be with us unless in some way we discover a rational method of sublimating the hate instinct as it arises between nations.

The brevity of the book will make it difficult for readers unacquainted with psychoanalytic literature. If it leads some of these into the more extended discussions of the psychology of war it will accomplish what doubtless was the purpose of the author.

ERNEST R. GROVES

NEW HAMPSHIRE COLLEGE

The Economic Consequences of the Peace. By JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. Pp. 298. \$2.50.

The prime importance of this book (now in its thirtieth thousand and under wide discussion) consists not merely in the authoritative positions held by the writer. As fellow of King's College, Cambridge, editor of the *Economic Journal*, director during the war of financial relations with the Allies, and later member of the Supreme Economic

Council, he has been in a position to write with rare insight of the economic conditions of Europe and consequences of the Peace Treaty. Nor does the importance of the book arise from its unusually keen and open-minded analysis of present conditions in Europe. The prime importance of the work consists in its vivid sense of the growing moral and economic solidarity of the world, and particularly of Europe and its detailed search for a sound economic basis on which a peace settlement can really be made, in view of that solidarity.

Through the seven chapters—Introductory, "Europe before the War," "The Conference," "The Treaty," "Reparation," "Europe after the Treaty," and "Remedies," Mr. Keynes relentlessly and fairly pursues the questions: What has really been done to right the war wrongs? What are the defects of these efforts? and What must be done to settle the issues fairly and really?

His delineations of the characters and circumstances of the chief actors at the Peace Council are picturesque, brilliant, and probably about as accurate as the conclusions of any close observer can be expected to be at the present time. He holds that Clemenceau insisted on a Carthaginian peace against Germany, as in a perpetual prize fight of European history; and states that his own "purpose in the book is to show that the Carthaginian peace is not *practically* right or possible." He holds that in this policy Clemenceau, backed by the reactionary forces of the hour, won nearly all of his main points, which will have to be undone or revised. Lloyd George, he holds, was forced by an unfortunate political situation in England, and against his better natural inclinations, into a somewhat similar position of untenable extreme measures. And Wilson, he claims, was in Paris to do nothing that was not just and right, as indicated by the "fourteen points," but was without a sufficiently detailed constructive policy or sufficiently experienced advisers (barring a few exceptions).

The interesting remedies for the present serious European situation, which Mr. Keynes convincingly sets forth, are in brief as follows: (1) A revision of the treaty should be made to provide a possible indemnity for Germany, and to include the Reparation Commission in the League of Nations. By the present terms, Mr. Keynes holds that the Germans would be required to pay the impossible sum of \$40,000,000,000, which should be reduced to \$10,000,000,000, in the interest of the actual resuscitation of Europe. On the shoulders of those who approve this, he says, the burden of detailed proof rests. (2) A free trade union should be established for Europe under the auspices of the League of

Nations. (3) All inter-ally indebtedness should be immediately canceled. (4) The pressing needs of Europe for food and business revival should be met at once by an international loan under adequate security by some method of organization that will prevent graft in any sense. (5) Russia must be given a chance to get on her feet again as well as Germany, if for no other reason than to prevent the wider spread of chaos through a union of radically revolutionary forces in Central Europe.

C. J. BUSHNELL

TOLEDO UNIVERSITY

A National System of Education. By WALTER SCOTT ATHEARN.
New York: George H. Doran Co., 1920. Pp. 132. \$1.50.

This book should be read by everyone interested in the complete education of American youth. The author believes that America must have an American education which is thoroughly spiritual as well as technical. Because of the division of state and church, there is the necessity of both a public-school system and a religious-education system. The scheme for both the public education and the religious education is thoroughly worked out in this book. With wonderful clearness the author points out how the public schools first grew up spontaneously to meet parish needs; second, how they were copied after the German scheme, a scheme which was devised to dethrone democracy and enthrone subservience to autocracy; and third, how the public schools are gradually throwing off these shackles and developing an American system with democratic attitudes and ideals as the goal of education.

The author also graphically portrays the development of church education from the beginning of United States history, shows how it has been organized and promoted, and gives the scheme which he thinks will adequately serve the nation in this hour of great need.

The virile approach of this book is much enhanced by the graphic charts which picture the actual development of both the public-school system and the church-school systems.

J. A. ARTMAN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Educational Sociology. By WILLIAM ESTABROOK CHANCELLOR.
New York: The Century Co., 1919. Pp. xii+422. \$2.25.

Chancellor has been known in the field of education for nearly a score of years as a very clever writer. Here in the field of sociology he is in his usual style: always original and often brilliant.

His system of social theory has little in common with any other that has ever been put into print. Part I, "Social Movements," comprises seventeen chapters, some with familiar titles such as "Public Opinion" and "Social Solidarity," but others with such novel headings as "Public Opinion in City and Country," "The Rules of the Game," "Social Gatherings," and "The Rise and Fall of the Individual Great Man." Part II, "Social Institutions," selects these twelve for a chapter each: state, property, family, church, school, occupation, charity, amusement, art, science, business, and war. Part III, "Social Measurement," has a chapter on "The Social Survey of a Community," but the other six chapters are rather a comparative study of institutions.

The title is misleading. Only two of the thirty-seven chapters treat of education, while the others rarely mention it or have any obvious connection with it. But every page bristles with epigrams or striking facts, so that one may dip into the book anywhere and become interested.

F. R. CLOW

STATE NORMAL SCHOOL
OSHKOSH, WIS.

Seventeenth-Century Life in the Country Parish, with Special Reference to Local Government. By ELEANOR TROTTER. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1919. Pp. 242. 10s.

Students of England in the seventeenth century are accustomed to devote their attention largely to revolutionary movements and constitutional changes. Ultimately these have had a profound effect upon the whole Anglo-Saxon race. But, according to Miss Trotter, "the machinery for administration of the laws and the maintenance of peace was so decentralized that the life of the average man flowed on undisturbed."

The author does not give us an intimate picture of this "life of the average man," but she does outline in an interesting fashion the more formal aspects of parish life. Churchwardens, Anglican priest, overseers of the poor, petty constable, surveyor and justice of the peace are treated at some length, as are laborers and apprentices, rogues and vagabonds. A single chapter is devoted to the "social life of the village community."

One gathers from the whole discussion the hopeful view that, having weathered the seventeenth-century storm, the English-speaking world at least may survive the terrors of the twentieth century.

STUART A. QUEEN

SIMMONS COLLEGE

Labor in the Changing World. By R. M. MACIVER. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1919. Pp. 230. \$2.00.

This is an indictment of the present industrial system on the following charges: first, waste in the form of unemployment, labor turnover, antagonism, and strikes; second, the fact that labor is treated as a commodity rather than as a personality; third, the loss of interest of wage-earners in any part of the process of production since the introduction of machinery has taken away the craft requirements and skill. On the basis of this indictment, a plea is made for an industrial democracy that will make production the common interest of wage-earners and capitalists, that will mean a business management in which labor participates, that will make labor feel like a partner rather than a hireling, that will treat labor as personality and consequently make the welfare of those who produce the first interest. Such an industrial democracy would be in the form of industrial unionism, shop stewards, labor legislation, and a labor party. Apparently the purpose of the program is to bring labor and capital together so that they can understand each other rather than to offer a ready-made solution of the conflict between wages and profits. The book is a very satisfactory popular presentation of a thesis which is not new but deserves a great deal of attention.

E. H. SUTHERLAND

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

The Problems of Labor. By DANIEL BLOOMFIELD. New York: The H. W. Wilson Co., 1920. Pp. xxi+436. \$1.80.

The nature of this work is clearly stated in the introductory note: "The aim of this volume is to present a useful and well-organized body of material dealing with the principal topics in what we have commonly learned to style the labor problem." The material is selected from current publications of a popular or semipopular nature. By virtue of a wide selection of readings, varied and even extreme points of view are presented. This is one of the commendable points in the volume inasmuch as these points of view, whether correct or false, are conditions with which the student of labor must reckon. The selection and organization of these articles is made from the point of view of the personnel administrator. It is the purpose of the volume to provide a basis of information for the practical administrator of personnel relations. The selections are grouped about the following general topics: causes of friction and unrest, cost of living, methods of compensation, tenure of

employment, trade unionism, labor disputes and adjustment, limitation of output, industrial insurance, housing, methods of promoting industrial peace, occupational hygiene, women in industry.

This should prove a convenient handbook to all persons interested in matters of personnel administration.

R. W. STONE

GOUCHER COLLEGE

The Turnover of Factory Labor. By SUMNER H. SLICHTER. With an Introduction by John R. Commons. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1919. Pp. xiv+460. \$3.00.

The study of labor turnover is probably the most important development that has been made during the present generation in the field of labor problems. Dr. Slichter has produced the first comprehensive book on this subject. He has rendered a distinct service by collecting the scattered materials, adding to them the results of his own extensive investigations, and making an unusually keen analysis of the whole thing.

The study is made from the point of view of scientific management and is distinctly limited to that. The author explicitly avoids the question of unemployment in its relation to labor turnover, as well as the broad social policies, such as home ownership, which might have a relation to labor turnover. He limits his study to the factory. His question is, How can the rapid shifting of the labor force be reduced? His answer is, By scientific management in handling labor. By this answer he means that the relations between employers and employees must be put on a scientific basis. An employment department must be organized, wages must be based on merit, etc. Perhaps the most important point he makes in this connection is his emphasis on the necessity of considering the broader interests of labor. But no provision is made in this scheme for collective bargaining or any representation of labor in the determination of wages or promotion.

The study of the causes of labor turnover is made from the same point of view. This is the least satisfactory part of the book. The information was secured by asking men why they resigned, or by taking the reasons given by bosses and superintendents at the time of discharge. The author recognizes that this is but an approximation to the truth. But even if the employees or the bosses try to answer truthfully it is doubtful if they could give the information that is needed. There must be a careful "case study" before the causes of labor turnover are understood, and no superficial explanation in terms of more or less

plausible excuses of men who are resigning will serve as a basis either for the construction of labor policies in a factory or of the broader social policies.

There are some detailed questions regarding the definition and expression of labor turnover that may be raised. It is questionable whether labor turnover ought not be defined as replacements rather than separations if it is to be considered from the point of view of scientific management; it may be readily admitted that from the broader social point of view it ought to be defined as separations. It is questionable also whether absenteeism ought not to be taken into account in the expression of labor turnover, as Paul H. Douglas has suggested (*American Economic Review*, June, 1919, p. 402). It is questionable, also, whether there ought not to be an attempt made to determine the conditions in which labor turnover may be considered desirable, in contrast with the conditions in which it is undesirable.

E. H. SUTHERLAND

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

The Joke About Housing. By CHARLES HARRIS WHITAKER.
Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1920. Pp. vii+234. \$2.00.

Mr. Whitaker's book on *The Joke About Housing* is a serious work and it is to be regretted that the title is not in harmony with the earnest, far-reaching interpretation of the causes of the housing problem in America and its effects upon health, industry, and the whole mechanism of community development.

This book is symptomatic of a new tendency in America toward a constructive policy in housing reform. It indicates a realization of the social significance of housing as affecting the whole of the population of the United States, rather than an effort to bring about by restricting building regulations the improvement of the living conditions of a minority of the population who have become the victims of slum life. *The Joke About Housing* deals mainly with the relation of our land policies of ownership, land values, and land control, and the effect these policies had, not alone upon the freedom of land use in the development of adequate housing provisions, but in the tribute that land exacts from industry in the form of wages and from labor in depreciation of wage values.

The fundamental principles of land control advanced by the author are not new nor startling. The method of presentation, however, is not only novel and interesting but brings forth angles of vision of the land

problem in relation to housing that so far have not been touched upon in housing literature of America, although England has crystallized much of this theory into actual legislation. The style in which the book is written should make this book one of the most popular works on housing, as it is replete with touches of keen humor and sharp sarcasm that help bring into striking relief the main issues dealt with.

Like all books devoted to the presentation and emphasis of one fundamental idea the work suffers from lack of perspective in so far as its use as a work upon which a thoroughly constructive housing program could be built. While land is fundamental to all housing, the economics of housing cannot be limited within the sphere of land economics alone. The housing problem, however, will never be solved without a full recognition of the principles advanced by Mr. Whitaker.

The appendixes contain several interesting articles on housing which serve to back Mr. Whitaker's theories. The only one of real value, however, is the essay by Mr. Robert Anderson Pope, which presents a valuable analysis of housing and town planning in relation to the development of a new social order. This analysis is both original and scholarly.

CAROL ARONOVICI

SAN FRANCISCO

An Introduction to Social Ethics; The Social Conscience in a Democracy. By JOHN M. MECKLIN. Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. Pp. ix+440. \$3.00.

The outstanding excellence of this book is that, from beginning to end, it keeps the reader in contact with actual processes of moral valuation. Ethical judgments in the making are the subject-matter considered from many angles. It is impossible either to prove or to disprove that this, that, or the other scheme of moral value was launched into this world out of some other world; and that it has authority "independent of experience," to use the Kantian phrase. Modern incredulity about such supposed origins of moral principles has resulted much less from formal argument about the subject than from perception, whether by the learned or the unlearned, that wherever we can actually trace out the antecedents of moral judgments they have been fabricated just as we have fabricated pottery or textiles or revenue bills. They have been the best attempts of the authors to adapt themselves to the conditions of adjustment in the given case. After we have found this out in a few

actual instances it becomes increasingly difficult to entertain the hypothesis that moral judgments have ever been formed in any different way, psychologically, from the ways in which we have seen them forming. That is the soul of modernism as contrasted with authoritarianism.

To men who have reached this point of view morals can no longer seem a superimposition upon life. Ethics is life at the best we have found in it reduced to formal expression. The great adventure is the testing out of moral values. The vindication of a morality is its release of human resource for completer realization. Morality therefore turns out to be merely one of the names which men of somewhat different minds have given to the standards of life which they would regard as ideal. We are all after that life-program which would satisfy the conditions of the human lot as we conceive it. To some it would be synonymous with "holiness," to others it would be "freedom," to others "democracy," etc. Whatever the type of human relations turns out to be that ultimately convinces men, it will have the commonplace content that it orders the relations of human beings to one another so as to reduce their interferences with one another to a minimum and so as to raise their helpfulness to one another to the maximum. But this is the desideratum of all positive ethics, and its process tends more and more to become avowed and unashamed social experimentation.

Professor Mecklin's book, like every other that is vital, contains many provocations to controversy, but from beginning to end it moves in a healthy atmosphere. It leads the reader into large room. It brings him into circuit with the essential process of knowing good and evil. It is an educative book, not a package of predigested dogmas. Its spirit may be sampled in one of the closing paragraphs:

The ultimate bond of the democracy of the future cannot be eternal principles of right embodied in a code of laws; it cannot be the selfish ties of business; it cannot be the coercive force of government and police control. The only enduring basis upon which a free people can rest their political loyalties is the conscious and reasoned conviction of the average man. The democracy of the future must be more than a body of laws, more than a social or political program; it must also be a faith, a loyalty. For, after all, the creative and forward looking elements in human life are our faiths. . . . To state the problem in psychological terms, we must secure in some fashion an effective organization of the sentiments of the average man around those comprehensive political and moral values lying at the core of the democratic ideal [pp. 435-37].

ALBION W. SMALL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

• *Social Theory*. By G. D. H. COLE. Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1920. Pp. 220. \$1.50.

This is truly an exceptional book. It goes far toward vindicating the rash hope of a few super-sanguine American scholars that eventually Oxford, yea possibly Harvard, may discover what has been going on since the middle eighteen-seventies in the minds of American sociologists. The publishers inform us that false doctrine need no longer delude, for a prophet with a new truth has arisen at Oxford, and his book has already been adopted as a text at Harvard. We open the volume with reverence and fear. We wish to be devout in the presence of new truth, yet we tremble at the prospect of blinding revelation. What the effect may be upon Oxford or Harvard vision we are unable to state, but after the experiment of facing the demonstration we are in a position to assure normal readers that we have issued from the ordeal without insufferable enlightenment.

The substance of this "new" doctrine turns out to be the inflammatory thesis that "relations of a man to the state do not furnish the whole, or even the greater part of his social existence" (p. 4). Inasmuch as this idea has been remaking social science since Treitschke supposed he had strangled it a-borning before 1860, and inasmuch as multitudes of people who have had their schooling in the United States since 1900 would be hard to convince that anyone ever had a different thought, the author need have no fear that his doctrine will be received as a stranger and an alien upon our shores.

To function as a shock-absorber, to break the force of sudden collision with the "new" truth, the second chapter is devoted to elucidation of seven words, viz.: "community," "society," "customs," "institutions," "associations," "members," and "purposes." In this case again the seed need not waste itself upon sterile soil. Since Professor Sumner began in 1874 to make Yale students acquainted with Spencer's version of facts to which these names have been applied, the number of Americans who annually learn about them, quite likely in more critical terms than these seven, and with more coherent exposition of them, has grown to thousands. Should fulsome advertising call the book to their attention, the reaction of the majority might conceivably be that of *Oliver Twist*—demand for a more satisfying portion.

In elaborating his novel version of Western society the author makes use of a bibliography of some forty titles. Of these, with a single exception, not one might be successfully impeached on the ground of an

American taint in its origin. This is well. Otherwise ingenuous American youth might fall under the illusion that Oxford notices American books. In spite of the fact that since 1883 Americans have been developing a literature which has brought to light much social reality that had previously been hid, and although it has long been a relatively belated American college in which the essentials of human association have not been analyzed with a creditable degree of competence, there is still room for a conspectus of the most commonplace sociological generalizations adapted to the comprehension of the youngest beginners. If teachers welcome the announcement of this book in the hope that it has met this want, they will be disappointed. It certainly does not fill any other gap.

From a first glance one receives the impression that the book has reduced profundities laboriously fathomed by many men to a simplicity of expression which had not previously been achieved. Further attention shows that the discussion is not aimed at a single public. At one step it appears to be addressed to children. A moment later it falls into a manner appropriate only in discussion with philosophers or seasoned politicians. In neither case does it "have the punch." Still closer inspection detects passages which might almost serve as samples of the sort of composition which deliberately exaggerates sententiousness into nonsense. On the whole candor compels the report that the author has brewed a few familiar concepts and some scattered observation into a turgidity against which adequate familiarity with the sociological analyses of the past two decades and a consistently observed purpose might have been a protection.

ALBION W. SMALL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

National Evolution. By GEORGE R. DAVIES. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1919. Pp. xii+159. \$0.75.

This little volume is a condensed treatment of social evolution or social progress, with the emphasis upon its economic features. In the first of its four chapters the author discusses the elements—especially economic—of social evolution, such as the establishment of the principle of private property, the centralization and integration of capital, and their culmination in the nations of ancient history.

Under the title "Christian Civilization" he considers Western civilization as the direct evolution from the Roman Empire, the cultural movement being Christianity. He traces the evolution of Christianity

from the Hebrew civilization; its solidification in the papal empire and its evolution through the Reformation; Puritanism, with its Calvinistic theology; its spread through the rise and domination of English power, under which arose a new aristocracy of money—of commercial and factory properties; the changes of the nineteenth century, bringing in the rise of Germany through centralized organization and specialization; and finally American democracy based upon individualism.

The chapter on "Modern Capitalism" is an attempt to condense the fundamental principles of economic laws in regard to capital into forty-six pages and of course is technical and crowded.

Under "National Progress" the author calls attention to the necessity of rebuilding the nation on the basis of competitive service and the socialization of society instead of private ownership of capital properties.

This brief, concise work is on the whole sound and constructive and will be of special value to the reader whose time is limited.

G. S. Dow

BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

Modern Science and Materialism. By HUGH ELLIOT. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1919. Pp. iv+211. \$3.00.

It is difficult not to be unjust to *Modern Science and Materialism*. Its science is above reproach and occupies the center of the author's interest and the bulk of the book. The attitude of the modern scientist toward the physical universe has been represented with the perfect faithfulness and profound, detailed knowledge of a member of the cult. Beginning with a frank acceptance of "scientific agnosticism," of "a philosophy . . . strictly based on facts" the author proceeds through the greater portion of the book to develop the cosmology of telescope and microscope. The problems, he finds, are: (1) the material structure of the universe; (2) the constitution of matter; (3) life and consciousness. These problems are treated convincingly; they can be unqualifiedly recommended to any reader who is interested in a bird's-eye view of modern astromomy, physics, and biology.

But it is impossible to say more of the author's "materialism" than that it is what physical science always is when it attempts to substitute itself for life. Granted that one's views should be strictly based on facts, but what are facts? Let us waive the author's omissions. Sociologists may, perhaps, wonder whether the philosophy of life need contain no reference to the facts of social organization and intercourse; theirs is very likely a narrow and sectarian interest.

It is the quality, not the identity, of the microscopic fact that gives offense. What are the facts of science? Conventions, says Poincaré; metaphysical entities, says Russell; preconceptions, says Veblen. In other words they are very like the ordinary facts of life—like the season's crop of profiteers and presidential nominees. There is nothing magical about them except the regard in which they are held.

The presumption is that life contains many things, some reduced to "science" and some not. "The majority of philosophers hold that there are other means to knowledge besides those of natural science" (p. 135). Quite so.

C. E. AYRES

AMHERST COLLEGE

Sovietism: The A B C of Russian Bolshevism According to the Bolsheviks. By WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1920. Pp. ix+220. \$2.00.

This book does well what it engages to do, viz., sift such evidence as is available from bolshevist sources in order to give the general public an authentic account of what the bolshevists themselves think bolshevism is. Mr. Walling has little sympathy with the men, like Alonzo E. Taylor, William C. Bullitt, Raymond Robins, and their kind, who virtually assume that bolshevism is to be judged by its utopian hopes rather than by its works and their total effects. He assumes on the contrary that the judgments of value which leading bolshevists have advertised are so repugnant to most Western minds that it is needless to wait for their refutation by the logic of events before condemning them. The book should do much as an antiseptic against the bolshevist poison.

ALBION W. SMALL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

New Towns after the War: An Argument for Garden Cities. By NEW TOWNSMEN. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1919. \$0.60.

A brilliant statement of the housing situation in England with an epigrammatic analysis of the remedies that might be applied should English conservatism be bold enough to realize the dangers that super-urbanism presents.

The book is mainly a plea for the distribution of population, the creation of garden cities with limitations upon populational growth, and

the decentralization of industry in order to bring workers in closer contact with rural life and rural resources for normal living.

The garden cities of the Letchworth type are held before the reader as the most successful experiment in the creation of new cities, and various methods of financing including co-operative methods, industrial financing, and government subsidy are advocated.

This small booklet, emanating from some friend or friends of the English Garden City movement, despite its brevity and somewhat propagandistic character, states clearly many of the recognized causes of our confused methods of municipal engineering and suggests practical solutions, which in the end are bound to find recognition in the city building efforts of both England and America.

CAROL ARONOVICI

SAN FRANCISCO

Inbreeding and Outbreeding: Their Genetic and Sociological Significance. By EDWIN M. EAST, PH.D., and DONALD F. JONES, SC.D. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1919. Pp. 285. \$2.50.

The first eleven chapters of this monograph consist of conclusions carefully arrived at inductively from much data observed by the authors and others. The conclusion is presented that inbreeding is not in itself harmful (p. 139). It produces unfavorable results only when it uncovers undesirable recessive characters and tends to build up a homozygous type around them. When properly controlled, inbreeding is a valuable method of purging the stock of unfavorable characters. Any consequent loss of vigor can be regained by outbreeding with other favorable qualities (p. 140). On the basis of these findings the abolition of laws against the marriage of first cousins is suggested (p. 235). The conclusions set forth in the last two chapters with regard to the breeding of people of superior ability and the control of race intermixture on a biological basis are more tentative and possibly will be open to more objection. The authors hold that exceptional ability, although defined as "skill in accomplishment" (p. 232), is hereditary rather than environmental in its origin. They assert: "The hereditary factors which contribute toward the possibility of genius are numerous. Only occasionally is the proper combination brought together" (pp. 233-34), but they admit that "no one knows what the component parts of these desirable qualities are, or can distinguish by external traits the individual who carries them" (p. 234). They explain adventitious genius on the

assumption of chance combinations of unrecognized traits of ability widely scattered throughout the race (p. 235). They even assert that this is the chief source of genius (p. 244). To all of this the sociologist with an environmental bias may answer that until the biologists produce data instead of assumptions based on analogy in support of their conclusions, Lester F. Ward's arguments (*Applied Sociology*) have as much evidence back of them as these.

In regard to the crossing of races they say: "The hybridization of extremes is undesirable because of the improbability of regaining the merits of the originals, yet hybridization of somewhat nearly related races is almost a prerequisite to rapid progress, for from such hybridization comes that moderate amount of variability which presents the possibility of the super-individual, the genius" (p. 263). Thus they would oppose the intermingling biologically of white, black, and yellow races, but they would urge the interbreeding of peoples of Western Europe and the United States, including the Jews.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

German Social Democracy during the War. By EDWYN BEVAN.
New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1919. Pp. x+280. \$2.50.

This book gives an interesting and enlightening narrative of the activities and deliberations of the Social Democratic party from the beginning of the war to the close of the administration of Chancellor Michaelis in October, 1917. The narrative is based on published documents, speeches reported in the Social Democratic press, etc. The attention centers about the split in the party—the varying struggle between the will to support the government and vote war appropriations and the conviction that Germany and Austria were the aggressors in the war and, therefore, that the government's war policy should be unyieldingly opposed. The troublesome minority grows steadily in influence under an ever-changing leadership, but this growth finds its explanation in the fact that the masses were worn out by the exactions of the war and were clamoring for peace. The author, in his Preface, calls attention to the fact that, with the collapse of Russian opposition on the Eastern front, this desire for peace changed to enthusiastic support of the government. One notes with interest the characterization of many well-known party leaders—and their dramatic outbursts against autocratic military domination.

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Extreme Urgence. By GEORGES BENOIT-LÉVY. Paris: L'Association des Cités-Jardins, 1920. Pp. 46.

The cost of construction in France has increased to threefold the pre-war prices, and Mr. Benoit-Lévy endeavors to discuss methods of cost reduction in home building. Unfortunately the emphasis is placed upon a reduction downward of standards rather than an adjustment of production costs. We are already facing such a situation in the United States with the result that the compactness of the homes demanded by increased costs is bound to react upon home life by producing a shrinkage in its social as well as in its future economic value.

If a satisfactory relation between wages and rents can only be maintained by a reduction in the size, character, and quality of the home the remedy is not to be sought in compromises and devices for the compact storage of the human family but in the economic system itself.

CAROL ARONOVICI

SAN FRANCISCO

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Durkheim's Contribution to the Reconstruction of Political Theory.—Durkheim's political theories are based upon the proposal to strengthen the occupational group at the expense of the economic functions of the state, and to make it the basis of representation in the law-making body. The state is too slow-moving, incompetent, and ill-adapted to deal with the highly specialized industrial activities and relations of the present day. Therefore (1) there is needed an arrangement for dividing the control of industrial relations between the state and occupational groups. In this way the evils of bureaucracy can be avoided and expert control of industry secured; (2) this method would avoid a centralized and all-powerful state and yet secure for labor a large degree of authority in regulating its own conditions; (3) as Durkheim would give his occupational groups a corporate organization, his scheme bears a close similarity to the theory of Gierke, Maitland, and Figgis which would make the state a union of lesser corporate groups; (4) and finally his notion of the supremacy of the functional organization of society over the segmentary or territorial organization is in harmony with Professor Giddings' contention that civilization is characterized by a constantly increasing subordination of the social composition to the social constitution. Durkheim's political theories constitute in one particular phase one of the most advanced and most satisfactory of sociological positions in regard to political and economic problems.—Harry E. Barnes, *Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1920. C. N.

The Principles in Accordance with Which Public Opinion Can Be Formed by the Church Democratically and Effectively.—Propaganda rules the world; but it is not the propaganda of the church. Up to the present, perhaps, this has been fortunate, because the church is only beginning to become truly Christian. The transition from non-Christian society to Christian society can only be effected by the formation and guidance of an effective public opinion, because that is the only mechanism by which conscious social changes are effected. The Christian churches must endeavor to create an effective Christian public conscience regarding all relations of individuals, classes, nations, and races. The problem of creating Christian society is essentially the problem of developing Christian mores, which are the product of public opinion. The mores of barbarism largely survive among us but they must be replaced by Christian mores. That means if we want a Christian society, we must capture public opinion for the Christian program. This public opinion does not imply uniformity of opinion—rather one which, requiring unity in essentials, would leave liberty in nonessentials. This public opinion must not be confused with public sentiment and popular emotion but is a more or less rational collective judgment. The principle in accordance with which such public opinion can be formed democratically and effectively by the church are first, it must be formed under conditions of freedom; second, it must be formed under conditions of obvious disinterestedness; and third, it must be intelligent. This means a greater appreciation by the church of social service. To form and guide public opinion the church may use various agencies such as oral discussion, the press, and the church school.—Charles A. Ellwood, *Religious Education*, April, 1920. R. G. H.

Church School and Public Opinion.—The church school as one of the educational institutions must raise the question, What is its responsibility in the formation of public opinion? The educational psychologists like Dewey and Thorndike tell us that culturally each generation is at the mercy of its informal and formal education. If the church of Jesus Christ is the one and only institution openly and frankly committed to the idealism of Jesus, then the burden of responsibility with reference to

the formation of public opinion centered in this idealism rests upon the church school. There are at least four things the church school needs to do more zealously and in a more Christian way. The first of these is to rejuvenate the Home Department. The center of responsibility in all education is the home. The second thing is to *socialize its own curriculum*. We are to have not Bible Schools, but schools of religion; that is, of life. We need to Christianize the attitude toward money and foreigners and colored people. In the third place there is a big opportunity to form public opinion *through the church school* in its worship. The average worship in the church school is of the individual salvation type and does not develop a social democracy saturated with the idealism of Jesus.

Finally, more work of a real practical nature needs to be done, not only in our thinking, but also in our giving, if we would expect a sane and workable practice of social service and internationalism. We need to develop a public opinion that goes deeper than philanthropy and charity. Only thus can the church school create such a public opinion and practice as will eventually Christianize all social, economic, industrial, national, and international ideals.—Fred L. Brownlee, *Religious Education*, June, 1920. R. G. H.

The Effect of the War on the Chief Factors of Population Changes.—There are three factors fundamentally concerned in producing changes in the absolute size of the population in a given area: (1) the birth-rate; (2) the death-rate; (3) the net immigration rate. Of these factors the two first are of the greatest biological interest. This is true of such political units as France, Prussia, and Bavaria, where in normal times net immigration makes no significant contribution to the population. The official statistics show that (1) in the year prior to the beginning of the war the death-rate of France was at nearly twice as high a level as in any of the other countries dealt with; (2) in all the countries here dealt with the death-birth ratio in general rises throughout the war period, i.e., the proportion of deaths to births increased as long as the war continued. In France it was slightly more than double in 1918 what it was in 1913. The same was true of Prussia and Bavaria. These states started from a very different base in 1913, and the relative rise was even greater; (3) in England this death-birth ratio increase was markedly slower than in any other countries dealt with; (4) the epidemic of influenza in 1918 seems to have had the greatest effect upon England and Wales. The biological reactions of the French and Germans in respect to this most fundamental phenomenon, the death-birth ratio, were essentially the same, though they started from different pre-war bases. England's biological reaction to war was much less pronounced, due to the better food conditions and to a different race psychology from that of the other belligerents.—Raymond Pearl, *Science*, June, 1920. C. N.

Om Geniet som Biologisk Problem.—Genius cannot be taught but is determined in the natural biological process. When the male and female germ-cells meet it is possible, but not probable, that new values may be created by a new constellation of the respective chromosomes. The determiners of heredity in the spermatozoa and egg-cell do not usually combine in the production of wholly new attributes. Genius can generally not be explained through the common laws of heredity. A partial explanation has come from an unexpected quarter, namely, the theory of degeneration which was set forth by Morel as early as 1859. Degeneration is a much misused word popularly having a derogatory meaning. Degeneration applies chiefly to the psychical but is also evidenced by certain bodily stigmata such as anomalies in bone-structure, especially the face and cranium, etc. A surprisingly large number of men of great genius have had serious physical defects. In the eighties, Lombroso put forth the startling theory that genius, despite its superiority, is closely related to degeneration, the stigmata of which are not to be mistaken. Nordau and Toulouse have followed Lombroso, the latter regarding genius as a kind of neurosis. Their generalizations do not seem to apply to all men of genius but their large collection of evidence seems to confirm the main thesis. In regard to offspring the relation of genius to degeneration is very apparent. Genius develops spontaneously its own destruction. A climax or culmination has been reached and thereafter there is an inevitable downward trend.—S. Laache, *Samtiden*, June, 1920. O. B. Y.

Der Nachwuchs der begabten Frauen.—It is not only a commonplace, but is shown by statistics, that talented men and women have fewer offspring than the ungifted. The same tendency that prevails among men is evident among women; the more gifted are less sexually inclined, and do not permit motherhood to interfere with their other activities. However, in this manner the continuation of the race is left to those women who have no other capacity. The observation that personal achievement is always accompanied by reduced sexual tendency among both sexes has, however, been subject to a twofold interpretation. In the case of man, the fact has simply been noted as self-evident; in the case of woman, the attitude has been quite different. All biologists are trying to impress upon woman that it is a crime against the race if she places the expression of her talents above her maternal function, even though, in the possession of the former, she is not naturally inferior to man. Especially the most gifted women are urged to make more than the ordinary contribution to the continuation of the race, in order to pass on to future generations their unusual abilities. The demand of Schallmeyer that woman must first of all perform her generative function, is, from the standpoint of eugenics, pure nonsense. How will the race benefit, if the woman gives up her abilities and devotes herself exclusively to bearing children of a father who is not her equal in generative capacity? For, if man is permitted to exhaust his virility in unrestrained pursuit of personal achievement, his contribution to the offspring must be inferior to woman's, and woman's sacrifice of her personal achievements is economically and culturally a great waste, and detrimental to the nation. In biographical studies of famous persons, it is, in the case of woman, invariably discussed whether her maternal functions were neglected; but in the case of man, it is rarely asked whether the paternal function has been unfavorably affected. From the standpoint of racial biology, the prevalent tendency to emphasize this eugenic factor in the case of women only, can be explained solely on the basis of a social order in which men have superior control. Such one-sided control always leads to illogical conclusions. The anxiety concerning a talented woman's fulfilment of her sexual duty, only arises where these women have chosen the path of personal achievement. Ehrhard Riecke in "Der Mediziner u. die sexuelle Frage" (*Zeitschrift für Sexualwissenschaft*, 1914, S. 109) has called attention to the fact that often not the worst women become prostitutes, but women who might have been highly valuable in the evolution of the race. But do men wage a campaign against prostitution to prevent this social waste? Here, no mention is made of the importance of the continuation of the race. Prostitution is legally established. In conclusion, there can be but one law applicable to both sexes: the harmonizing of individual and generative capacities.—M. Vaerting, *Die neue Generation*, September, 1919. L. M. S.

Der Konflikt zwischen der individuellen u. generativen Leistung beim Menschen.—In the past, the tragic import of the conflict between individual achievement and generation has not been fully comprehended and therefore no efforts have been made to harmonize both activities. The former has been relegated to man as the chief function of life; to woman, the latter. The folly of this procedure can be measured by its results. Particularly in the family of the most gifted, man's intellectual achievement was put above all else, while woman denied herself all creative expression except that of bearing children and catering to the comforts of her family. The progeny of such unions, with few exceptions, are even below the average; within a few generations, they have completely degenerated. Raibmayer, in "Genie u. Talent," has made a careful study of the rapid extinction of the families of talented men. Pontus Fahlbeck, in a study of Swedish aristocracy has shown that it became extinct even in the fourth generation after it achieved historical prominence. Lorenz has shown the same to be the case among the peasant stock of Saxony. Every disease of races, which resulted in their extinction, had its final cause in the division made between personal accomplishment and purely generative activity, in which the latter was chiefly relegated to woman. The eugenic failures of the past, instead of being viewed in the light of terrible warnings of nature, have been viewed as inexorable biological laws; and their causes continue to flourish. Only recently, Bumm said in his address on "Frauenstudium," "Our children must be born of women who have *rested* brains, and time for the rearing of numerous offspring. Thus woman is of greatest service to herself, the family, and the state." But woman has had a "rested brain" for thousands

of years. Her "rested brain" is useless where man undermines his virility in the pursuit of individual achievement. In vain has woman sacrificed her personal accomplishments where man pursued his to the detriment of his parental activities. In man, the sexual capacities attain their highest development before the intellectual. Due to economic conditions and the prolonged preparations for a vocation, the maximum capacity of both phases of his activities are allowed to pass unutilized. In woman, the periods of maximum mental and physical ability coincide, but develop later. In the past, neither of her capacities has been fully utilized. She was practically excluded from personal achievement, and her generative powers were not realized to the best advantage because an early marriage occurred before the maximum intellectual powers were developed. The state should enable woman to realize both capacities to the best advantage. Woman must remember that it is not significant who bathes the child, or looks after its physical needs generally, but what sort of mother gives birth to it. Her functions as the giver of life are vastly more important than those of mere caretaker.—M. Vaerting, *Die Neue Generation*, January, 1920. L. M. S.

A Study of Multiple Criminal Factors.—A program of psychiatric and psychological examining for correctional institutions of the state of New Jersey has recently been initiated by Commissioner Burdette G. Lewis, under the authority of the State Board of Control of Institutions and Agencies of New Jersey. It provides for applying the army group-test methods, supplemented by extensive individual examinations. In the psychological examinations a special information blank has been developed as a supplement to the diagnostic clinical syllabus. This is employed in clinical examinations to render the examinations as informal and unobjectionable as possible to the prisoner who tends to resist formal examination. The statistical analysis of the results obtained in the clinical psychological examinations by direct tests and the information blank yields valuable data for the investigation of the interrelation of criminal factors. The New Jersey state prison has instituted a card-filing system for each man and the data from these cards have been tabulated in statistical fashion in such a manner that, not only is a summary obtained regarding the distribution of each of these factors, but also a graphic portrayal of the interrelation of each factor to any other factor.—Edgar A. Doll, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, May, 1920. O. B. Y.

Improper Use of the Intelligence Quotient.—There is a marked tendency in recent literature to use the intelligence quotient for purposes to which it is not directly applicable. This use of the intelligence quotient is improper from the scientific standpoint and very greatly restricts the value of many otherwise valuable contributions. The intelligence quotient is founded on two important assumptions which psychology cannot at present afford to concede and which have as yet very little foundation in experimental evidence. The first of these assumes that the average limit of the growth of intelligence is 16 years; the second assumes that intelligence growth is constant for the individual throughout the developmental period, or at least between 4 years and 16 years. The assumption that the average level of intelligence of adults is a mental age of 16 is apparently founded on the fact that the median intelligence of 32 high-school students and 30 business men is 16 years. But high-school students and business men are not "average" adults. Psychological examination in the army has clearly indicated that the typical or average adult has a mental age between 13 and 14 years. As to the second assumption it may be said that the intelligence growth is constant on the average only in relation to a scale of tests whose fundamental principle of standardization presupposes this constancy. In the second place, significant variations in intelligence growth are obscured in the intelligence quotient expression of intelligence status because any change in mental age from year to year is "liquidated" or spread out over the entire previous ages of the individual.—Edgar A. Doll, *The Journal of Delinquency*, May, 1920. O. B. Y.

The Origin and Cure of "the Bad Boy."—The factors connected with criminals are heredity and environment. The analysis of the genesis of crime is exceedingly difficult. Yet from the comprehensive studies of recent years it can be ascertained

that thirteen is the age of greatest delinquency among boys and fifteen among girls. Again it is agreed that there are two classes of criminals, (1) the accidental who is betrayed into a solitary crime, (2) the habitual—the man who makes crime a profession and lives by it. It is also admitted that not only the health, but also the age, of the mother has an influence upon the child's vitality and physique. The maternal capacity for nourishing the embryo requires some time to attain its maximum, and then undergoes a gradual decline. Children and youths reared in city slums or who work in stuffy offices or ill-ventilated workshops are retarded in physical and mental growth. The first condition of treatment is to understand the genesis of the offender, for every abnormal or delinquent child represents some failure of function in one or more social agencies—home, school, church, state. And with this more comprehensive diagnosis of evil as a defect of life goes a mode of treatment that increasingly seeks for preventives and remedies in removing inhibitions, and liberating the pent-up energies of life.—Claude C. H. Williamson, *The Sociological Review*, Spring, 1920. C. N.

Causes of Delinquency among Fifty Negro Boys.—"Truancy among the fifty Negro boys investigated was partly due to poor heritage, but principally to environmental conditions under which they were forced to live," is the conclusion of the monograph. The subjects of this report were inmates of parental schools in Los Angeles. The immediate causes for their commitment were: truancy, 42 per cent; incorrigibility, 24 per cent; stealing, 16 per cent; other causes, 18 per cent. The average age was 12.5 years. Three-quarters of this group of boys disliked going to school. The author offers as reasons for such a condition the unsatisfactory nature of the elementary-school curriculum; failure to interest boys in some industrial pursuits; unfair treatment of certain boys by teachers; and lack of encouragement. Only fifteen of the group "like to work." One reason offered is that Negro boys are discriminated against, being debarred from the most remunerative and congenial jobs. The author graded the boys physically: normally good, 62 per cent; fairly good, 12 per cent; poor, 14 per cent; and very poor, 12 per cent. Mentally he graded them: keen mind, 8 per cent; normal, 49 per cent; dull, 18 per cent; feeble-minded and border line, 24 per cent. Of the group 26 per cent came to school hungry, 56 per cent of them had brothers or sisters in Juvenile Hall. Of the fifty homes from which the boys came, 68 per cent were "broken homes." Economically, 50 per cent were classed "very poor" and 22 per cent "poor." Considering the total number of homes, after the average rent was paid the average amount left for all the other necessities of life was 23 cents per day per individual. Twelve of the families had fairly substantial incomes, which means that the majority were badly off indeed. Only six of the homes were free from immoral influences. Twenty-one of the families were rated "bad" morally and these were in the poorest economic conditions. From such home conditions, the writer asks, what chance has a boy "to live right, shun evil, and be a credit to himself and his race"?—H. K. Watson, *Studies in Sociology*, University of Southern California. S. C. R.

Verbrechensprophylaxe und Psycho-technik.—The importance of every man's finding his proper place in the industrial world has become an urgent necessity in Germany since the war and gives greater prominence to experimental determination of fitness in vocational guidance. The work of the Taylor school and of Münsterberg can be made of service in the field of criminal prophylaxis. The prevention of accidents due to criminal negligence in the field of transportation, particularly, will not only prevent economic loss and deaths resulting from such accidents, but will also help to diminish the number of those liable to punishment for such acts. The number of those restrained from liberty because guilty of criminal negligence is appalling, and a decrease in acts of delinquency of this nature would be highly welcome. A systematic application of psycho-technical methods of investigation would result in the elimination of the unfit before they have harmed themselves and others; it would prevent economic waste, and benefit the state in its efforts to administer justice.—*Gerichtsassessor Dr. Mannheim, "Koenigsberg in Preussen," Deutsche Strafrechts-Zeitung*, May-June, 1919. L. M. S.

War and Mental Disorders.—Various factors may come into play in producing nervous disorders. Among such causes are overexertion, the lack of proper sustenance, and atmospheric disturbances, such as violent explosion shocks and physical injuries. The factors of causation are numerous, and since the individual's power of resistance varies it follows that there is difficulty in placing many of the cases in the apparently definite categories of disorders at present in use. The following classification may be employed: (1) the condition described as neurasthenia, often produced by shell-shock, an early stage of some grave disorder of the nervous system; (2) acute alcoholic insanity, or delirium tremens, caused by excessive use of alcohol; (3) a confusional state in which the patient becomes dazed, disorientated; (4) attacks of mania or of melancholia, either in association with wounds or without apparent injury; (5) mental derangement leading to suicide, usually among those suffering from melancholia. Various forms of treatment were tried to cure patients. Both the treatment by suggestion and psycho-analytic methods were not of much utility.—Hubert J. Norman, *The Quarterly Review*, October, 1919. C. N.

Pauper Burials and the Interment of the Dead in Large Cities.—This pamphlet begins with a statement of the ancient origin of burial observances. It points out that burials are a social and economic problem regarding which very little investigation has been carried on. Industrial insurance, it asserts, arose largely from the need of providing funeral expenses. With its growth pauper burials have decreased, the figures for thirty-eight American cities showing a decline from 171 per 100,000 in 1880–84 to 74 per 100,000 in 1915–18. On the basis of this last-given figure there are approximately 40,000 pauper burials in a year. A significant statement is found on page 22: "The social and individual demand for the decent burial of the dead, free from the taint of pauperism in any and every form, is a sentiment than which perhaps no other is more deeply rooted in the human heart or in human experience."

Funerals are made a means of conspicuous consumption of which the pamphlet gives a few illustrations. The funeral of the late King of England cost £40,500, while in 1907 caskets in New York were on sale at upward of \$2,000. There is some effort at funeral reform, the most radical step having been taken in Switzerland, where five cantons give to every deceased citizen a free decent burial. The pamphlet proper closes with an account of burial customs in a number of European cities and finally pleads for reforms in burial observances. There are seven appendixes; one gives the rules of the burial society of Lanuvium in 133 A.D.; a number are statistical; one deals with the anatomical law of Pennsylvania, and one with pauper burial abuses.—F. L. Hoffman, Prudential Insurance Company of America. S. C. R.

The Recognition and Better Treatment for Mental and Nervous Injuries.—The feeble-minded group of workmen is responsible for many accidents despite the fact that the higher grades of feeble-mindedness have been considered consistent with good routine industrial work for years. But the psychopathic employees or cases of *dementia praecox*, are difficult to handle because of a lack of proper classification due to inexact diagnosis. This in turn impedes treatment. The subdivision, or working classification of psychotics, is: (1) hysteria after injury; (2) psycasthenia after injury; (3) depressed states and melancholia after injury (the cases of the latter type are more frequent than is generally believed); (4) paranoiacs; (5) querulents. By proper diagnosis and thorough understanding of the patient proper treatment may be applied to each case and many psychotics may be remedied.—Francis D. Donoghue, *Modern Medicine*, December, 1919. C. N.

Some New Problems for Psychiatric Research in Delinquency.—To give a partial list of the well-organized psychiatric clinics dealing with crime and delinquency that were operating before we entered the war serves to indicate the rapid growth of this method of studying crime. Besides the clinics connected with the children's courts, the clinics of Fort Leavenworth, Sing Sing, the police department and Department of Corrections in New York City, the municipal court in Boston, the Bedford Reformatory, and the Westchester Department of Charities and Correction, represent a field of useful and practical work. Most of the psychiatric workers entered the army

or navy during the war. In the army they found a fairly definite special service, but in the navy there was no special psychiatric division. In recent discussion of court-martial procedure none of those interested seem to have inquired whether any relation exists between the terrific experiences these soldiers have gone through and control of conduct. In spite of examinations in the camps, the A.E.F. contained many men of less than normal intelligence or of unstable make-up, and these soldiers, like their comrades, were often exposed to almost unbelievable fatigue, to the effects of being knocked about by shell concussion and to long emotional strain. Account should be taken of the extraordinary effects of modern warfare upon the human nervous system, which in some of the armies in France were responsible for 20 per cent of all discharged for disability. Recent progress in psychological medicine have provided us with new resources for the understanding of human behavior, not only in the mentally ill, but in "normal" people and particularly in those whose conduct differs so much from that approved by society that they have to be segregated.—Thomas W. Salmon, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, November, 1917. O. B. Y.

Social Aspects of the Family Court.—The Department of Commerce, through the Bureau of Census, has recently published a report on marriage and divorce for the year 1916. According to this report 112,036 divorces were granted, showing an increase of 55.5 per cent in 1916 over the year 1906. The report is undoubtedly free from serious errors, but in the aspect of affording data upon which Congress may act in formulating uniform marriage and divorce laws it is misleading. No scientific inquiry has been made as to the causes of divorce. The report groups the causes of divorce under a few broad heads, such as adultery, cruelty, desertion, drunkenness, neglect to provide, combinations of the preceding causes, etc., and all other causes. It is evident that in this report only the *symptoms* of family dissensions are considered and no attempt is made to classify *basic causes*. Nothing is revealed as to the social, psychological, and pathological conditions that impelled behavior leading to divorce. The report shows that of the 108,702 divorces of which a record has been obtained, 33,809 were granted to the husband and 74,893 to the wife. From this we would infer that men are more anti-social in their marital relations than women. This is not true in fact. Of the 108,702 cases, only 14,779 were contested, and it is stated that in many of them the contest did not go beyond the filing of an answer. In cases in which investigations have been made, it has been found that in at least 75 per cent of the cases the defendant had a good defense and that the plaintiff had no more valid grounds for divorce than the defendant. The determination of men and women to be relieved of that which they believe to be intolerable marital conditions places a premium upon fraud and perjury and encourages cruelty, neglect, and infidelity, because they lead to marital liberation. Has the sum of human happiness been increased or decreased by reason of these 112,036 divorces? Is it possible to answer this question until we have reliable, exact, scientific information as to the causes of this unfortunate social condition?—Judge Charles W. Hoffman, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, November, 1919. O. B. Y.

Plan of Safety Instruction in Public and Parochial Schools.—Safety is a matter of education and should begin in the schools. Children can be made responsible for conduct of the school community by engaging in actual safety work. The procedure in the education of a child is totally different from what it is in the education of an adult. The adult can interpret bare precepts on the basis of his experience; if we would educate children we must induct them into the experience. There are three methods of safety education: by working it into various branches in the school curriculum, by having children construct plays or pantomimes illustrating accident situations, and by organization of children for community welfare. Much is gained by visits of delegations of children to coroners' inquests over accident cases, by the children's inventing problems by using the figures in census reports, by making drawings and slogans, and by reading lessons self-selected from current periodicals.—Dr. E. George Payne. *Published by National Safety Council*. R. W. N.

Some Future Issues in the Sex Problem.—The orthodox sex morality is being gradually discarded and a new tendency of loose sex relationship is coming to be in vogue. The causes of this change are diverse. The control of venereal disease as the result of the social hygiene movement has removed the fear. The elimination of commercialized prostitution constitutes another factor. The general knowledge of birth control did away with the stigma of illegitimate mating. The *Mutterschutz* propaganda involving the social stigma on illegitimate motherhood and childhood has reduced the motive for abstinence on the part of persons not married to one another. The growing independence of women from any need of marriage on economic grounds tends to revolutionize the conventional form of present family life. The prevalent Freudian psychology of wish, be its doctrines true or false, has created a notion among the populace that the "sex urge" if suppressed in certain ways may express itself in ways injurious to the individual and society. The combined effect of all these factors appears to be that of breaking down traditional standards by the elimination of the fear of results. In order to cope with the situation three courses seem to be open: (1) to combat the tendency by the force of moral discipline; (2) to acquiesce in the popular verdict as inevitable; or (3) to guide and formulate the new state of affairs into a code of "morals." To choose the first is to assume that the orthodox moral code is perfect and final. And yet an examination of the basis of such morality proves that irrational tradition or class interest plays a large rôle. To resort to the second policy is to let social forces drift without rational control. If social research should definitely foreshadow the partial or complete abandonment of old sanctions of sex conduct, it will certainly be wiser to foresee, formulate, interpret, and thereby recognize and absorb and socialize the new state of affairs than to play the ostrich, to acquiesce supinely, or to stand across the path of the inevitable changes.—Thomas D. Eliot, *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1920. K. S.

Dem Ziele Nahe?—Recently the view has gained ground that the work of private organizations formed in the interests of illegitimate children and their mothers has become unnecessary because the state has legally made some concessions to illegitimate children of men who participated in the war and to the mothers of the former. Motherhood now has some claim to protection and support of the state. It is intended to provide for the illegitimate child the same conditions for development as for the legitimate. The unmarried mother has a right to claim the title of *Frau* in professional and business intercourse. Plans are on foot to establish and regulate the legal and social position of the illegitimate child in the same way. Unfortunately, the conditions which gave rise to these situations still exist and cannot be suddenly altered by legal measures. The goal is still far off, and much social opposition must be overcome before it is reached. Before and during the war the state directed its attention to these children as a matter of political policy. But do the more recent measures really touch the root of the matter? Are they destined to combat the double standard of morality, the disregard for and desecration of motherhood, the lowering of the sense of responsibility in sexual affairs? These measures show no consideration for the fact that the problems of illegitimacy affect not only marital relations, and that sexual morality cannot differ for the legally or illegally married. They do not recognize the weighty social injury which results because children lack homes and parents. They treat children as though they were material things that can be disposed of at will. When one considers that it is one-tenth of the whole population that is considered inferior on account of the accident of its birth, it is painful to contemplate that in the past women and mothers have been excluded from participating in legislation which primarily concerns motherhood. It is a matter in which only woman can add new valuations, and one which, from the standpoint of morality, is decisive for the nation.—Marie Hübner, *Die Neue Generation*, September, 1919. L. M. S.

Illegitimacy as a Child-Welfare Problem.—This pamphlet, of slightly more than one hundred pages, is divided into three parts of about equal size. Part I is chiefly a statistical study under the title "Extent of Problem." Part II is entitled "The Child's Status and Right to Support," and Part III is a bibliography. Legitimate

and illegitimate live births per 1,000 married women fifteen to forty-nine years of age and per 1,000 single, widowed, and divorced women of the same ages, are as follows: Austria, 1908-13, 213 and 30; Hungary, 1906-15, 198 and 38; German Empire, 1907-14, 196 and 23; England and Wales, 1906-15, 171 and 73; Ireland, 1909-12, 250 and 4; Scotland, 1906-15, 202 and 13; Sweden, 1908-13, 196 and 26; The Netherlands, 1905-14, 233 and 5. Table III shows the average annual percentage of illegitimate births in a group of European cities from 1905 to 1909. The percentage for Amsterdam, Belfast, Birmingham, Bristol, Dublin, London, Manchester, Rotterdam, and Sheffield was less than 5. For Budapest, Copenhagen, Lyon, Moscow, Munich, Paris, Petrograd, Prague, Stockholm, and Vienna it was more than 20. Statistics for the United States are given for the year 1915 for sixteen states of the Union. Legitimate live births for 1,000 females fifteen to forty-four years of age range from 92.6 in Nevada to 213.5 in Utah, the average being 180.7. Illegitimate live births per 1,000 females range from 1.8 in South Dakota to 5.2 in Pennsylvania, the average being 4.3. Two states separate the figures for whites and negroes, with a decidedly unfavorable showing for the latter. Mortality tables show that the death-rate among illegitimate children far exceeds that of children born in wedlock. Until comparatively recent times illegitimate children had no legal rights and are still greatly discriminated against. The highest legal standard is found in Norway, where a child born out of wedlock has the same right of inheritance as is accorded to the legitimate child and the responsibility for maintenance is placed upon both parents. The Minnesota law of 1917 is the nearest American approach to that ideal. Its aim is to see that the illegitimate child begins life under the least possible amount of handicap.—*U.S. Children's Bureau*, No. 66. S. C. R.

The Recidivist or Habitual Offender.—One of the most difficult problems that confront the criminologist is recidivism, how it should be dealt with, and what are its causes. The increase of delinquency is due to the wrong methods of prison life, the failure to adjust the recidivist to the environment of modern civilization with its complex laws and associations, heredity, and the decrease of restraining influences. The criminal age is between sixteen and twenty-five, and criminals may be divided into five classes: (1) born delinquents, who have a congenital tendency toward crime. In the born criminals the evolutionary defect is developmental. Under favorable conditions he can be modified or educated into a respectable member of society; (2) insane delinquents; (3) delinquents from acquired habit, the criminality in this case being derived from their organization and social conditions; (4) occasional delinquents; (5) passional delinquents with a mania of fixity of idea and exhibition of a defect of sensibility. The first offense of the young delinquent should be met with a warning from the Bench, the second with a short term of imprisonment from the boys' prison, and the third offense should consist of a sentence for an indefinite period in an institution similar to that of the Borstal Institution. Every case should receive special treatment. Good nutrition, satisfaction of the real requirements of life, education, and proportionate labor facilitate the maintenance of equilibrium in the development of the brain and the proper adaptation of the individual to his environment. By assimilation of the good and dissimulation of the bad we gradually remove the large army of wasters from our midst.—J. E. Marshall, *The Nineteenth Century and After*, May, 1920. C. N.

Criminal Gynecology.—Gynecology is service to woman; but under the influence of a political theory of expansion by force, it has been perverted into "service for the state unfavorable to woman and her private interests." Woman has been desecrated to become an instrument to bear children for the state. Even before the war agitation began against the declining birth-rate. This was in itself a crime against the nation, because it was a campaign waged with utter disregard of the principles of eugenics. Von Winkel and others attempted a veritable police control over married life. Gynecology became militarized; it was compelled to serve the state and to serve woman only in so far as militarism permitted. Before the war, in a book entitled *Ärztliches Recht*, the author calls attention to a tendency which had begun to prevail in France, namely, the principle that the fetal life should have consideration prior to that of the mother. Under the pressure of war psychosis, this attitude has crept into

Germany. It depends upon woman how much longer it is to prevail, now that millions of women have political influence. Although no country has such carefully prescribed laws regulating operations as Germany, in the case of gynecology, the attempt is made to suppress the principle of consent. It is concealed from woman that she has the right to determine the time and method of operation for herself. The military system is to blame for the starvation of numerous children, their under-nourishment and all its accompanying horrors and evils, as much as the blockade. In the future, Germany's efforts must be in the direction of creating humane conditions for those already in existence.—Dr. J. H. Spinner, *Die Neue Generation*, October, 1919. L. M. S.

Americanization: The Other Side of the Case.—Several state legislatures have already passed laws, more or less practical, to satisfy this hysterical cry, Americanize the foreigners! The greatest obstacles to the speedy Americanization of "foreigners" are the ridicule of, contempt for, and prejudice against them on the part of native Americans. The Czecho-Slovaks in the hard-coal regions of Pennsylvania offer a concrete case to show how far discrimination is carried on against these immigrants. He is very seldom called by his name, is always referred to as "hunkie," or "dago," or the like; he is made to feel that he is despised, that he is a stranger and unwelcome. The methods of Americanization can be divided into two groups: (1) Educational means combined with tolerance and kindness. A self-respecting foreigner hates to be made a public spectacle, to be exhibited like some rare bird to boost the standing of some professional Americanizer, so that his salary may be increased. Teach the American-born children to treat the others as their equals to remove the friction between native- and alien-born children. (2) The legislative program forcing the "foreigners" to learn the English language is a great mistake. Raise the bars against immigrants as high as public policy demands, be stringent in granting the foreign-born the supreme privilege of citizenship, but the language test is the poorest test that could be thought of. It is just as futile as the literacy test in the immigration legislation. To abolish the foreign-language press and to force the "foreigner" to learn the English language only impedes natural process of Americanization.—John Kulmer, *The Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1920. C. N.

The Larger Function of State University Medical Schools.—Within recent years there has come about a changed conception in regard to the responsibility of the general public for welfare policies, such as public education, public improvements, standards of living, and health. Within the last century we have seen America develop a great public educational system in which the state has undertaken to make provision for the education of persons of types of ability ranging from the subnormal to the keenest student in the land. Paralleling this development in education has come an ever-increasing conception of public responsibility for the care of certain defectives, the insane, the tuberculous, and others. There has come a growing consciousness of the importance of the period of youth and it is but a step farther for the state to interest itself in the health of the children. Not only the states, but the federal government is assuming this responsibility. The experience in Iowa suggests that this type of work can most successfully be done in connection with the college of medicine. The conclusions are (1) that any state in attempting to provide this type of service should make comprehensive plans on the material side; (2) future plans should include ample provision for the vigorous prosecution of medical research, lest the teaching staff be overwhelmed with routine; (3) since the success of the work is absolutely dependent on the skill and devotion of the staff, it is essential that many adjustments in the conditions of teaching must be made.—Walter A. Jessup, *The Journal of the American Medical Association*, April 17, 1920. V. M. A.

The Obligations of Medicine in Relation to General Education.—After the dissipation of life incident to all great wars, men invariably turn to the importance of saving life and prolonging it. The public schools must become the health centers of their communities. Every measure carried out in them should be fully explained so that the wisdom of preventive measures shall be fully appreciated by the pupil, making him an advocate of them for the rest of his life. The history of the Public Health

Service illustrates how the government has been able to promote public health through acting in an ancillary capacity, and its members have from purely medical practice assumed more and more an educational function. But public health is not yet of first importance with the government, though it is a national matter. Shall we be content to rely upon the public spirit of liberal and enlightened millionaires, of a Carnegie or Rockefeller, to do for us, with all our boasted wealth and civilization, things which smaller and less rich nations regard as essential obligations or the governments they maintain; and is it not devitalizing, corrupting, enervating, in every way demoralizing influence in our national life to trust for essentials of national happiness and success to what we must admit are accidental agencies? When our schools generally come to view the premedical standing as one to be deeply investigated we shall have fewer graduates, perhaps, but a relatively larger number of real physicians.—W. C. Braisted, *The Journal of the American Medical Association*, May 1, 1920.

V. M. A.

Sociological Aspects of Housing.—Housing conditions are largely determined by family income, and the problem is the same whether under rural or urban conditions. The relation of housing to health comprises various factors influencing the physical, mental, and moral development of the family and family life. In its broadest sociological aspect, housing is a determiner of personal, family, and communal health. To secure the maximum benefits of housing, several steps are necessary: (1) an appreciation of the sociological and health significance of hygienic dwellings; (2) the education of the public as to the natural value and importance of sanitary dwellings; (3) the rigid enforcement of laws, regulations, and ordinances dealing with home construction and house alterations; (4) the promulgation of minimum standards of housing construction, of maintenance and repair; (5) the establishment of some form of supervision or control that would prevent the exploitation of tenants through profiteering rentals and unwillingness to make necessary repairs required in the interest of family health and safety; (6) the determination of rules and regulations for proper disinfection and fumigation following the presence of contagious diseases, when such might prove a source of contagion to a new occupant; (7) the encouragement of subsidized or non-subsidized programs of housing construction that would make available modern hygienic dwelling-places at low rentals; (8) the support by health departments of those measures tending to increase family incomes so as to bring about a minimum standard of living wage, consistent with the cost of living, in a manner that is conducive to health and comfort.—Ira S. Wile, *American Journal of Public Health*, April, 1920.

C. N.

Standards of Living: A Complication of Budgetary Studies.—A great many budgets which differ widely are presented to the reading public. They might be roughly classed as follows: A, the pauper or poverty level, usually compiled by charity workers; B, the minimum-of-subsistence level, which ignores the social well-being and confines itself to the physical; C, the minimum-of-comfort level, which is supposed to recognize both physical and social demands. A study of six hundred actual family budgets of shipyard workers in New York in 1918 showed the average expenditure to be \$1,386.00 for the year. The minimum budget of the New York Factory Commission in 1915 was \$876.00. By adding the increases due to the advance in prices that same budget stood on June 1, 1918, at \$1,356.00. By scientifically determining what a family should have the budget worked out (June, 1918) at \$1,396.00. A proposed budget of level above minimum subsistence is given in detail. Its total is \$1,760.50. Cost of food for one month on a "minimum to maintain health" basis was, in 1907, \$27.00, and in 1917, \$45.00. A budget proposed by Seattle and Tacoma Street Railway employees (1917) was \$1,917.88. The Board of Arbitration dealing with the case figured their budget at \$1,505.00. The Philadelphia Bureau of Municipal Research issued a budget in December, 1917. It totaled \$1,200.00 and the Bureau said that "it is decidedly the minimum on which a family can exist." The cost of the navy ration for enlisted men was, in 1916, 37.06 cents per man per day; in 1917, 43.08 cents; in 1918, 49.06 cents; but during the last quarter of 1918 it was 52 cents. A table of Canadian Budgets is given based on average prices in sixty cities. In 1900 the weekly budget was \$9.37; in May, 1919, \$21.98. The pamphlet closes with a

discussion of various items entering into the budgets and how advanced prices have affected the use of the various commodities. Many poor people, forced to abstain from certain necessary foods, have substituted others only to find that their medicinal bills were heavier.—*Bureau of Applied Economics*, Washington, 1919. S. C. R.

The Dispensary Situation in New York City.—The very magnitude of the dispensary field in New York City justifies a thorough inquiry into the numerous medical, social, and economic problems which it raises. There are in Greater New York 65 out-patient departments of hospitals, 34 independent dispensaries, and 6 college dispensaries. In addition the Health Department maintains 21 tuberculosis clinics, 8 dental, 10 eye, and 3 rabies clinics, and the Children's Aid Society maintains 6 school dental clinics, making a total of 153 licensed dispensaries in New York City. In this list are not included the 3 occupational clinics, the 12 venereal disease clinics of the Health Department, and 60 baby health stations. The total number of treatments given at the 153 dispensaries for which statistics are available exceeds four million annually. It is recommended that a uniform maximum fee for treatment be adopted; that a special division for diagnosis be established; that physicians serving should be remunerated; that medical records should be more adequate, and that the social service department should be extended. The opportunities for disease prevention and public health education are great. People applying for relief to the dispensary are more in the mood to accept and follow hygienic advice than the average person in good health. There is need for a department of preventive medicine in the dispensary system.—E. H. Lewinsky-Corwyn, *Medical Record*, January, 1920. O. B. Y.

Motion Pictures Not Guilty.—The National Board of Review has been concerned in finding an answer to the following questions: (1) Are motion pictures influencing young people to an appreciable extent toward excesses of conduct which constitute at present a menace to society? (2) Are they so warping their moral growth as to militate against development into normal, useful citizens? With the co-operation of the American Probation Association the National Board in July, 1919, addressed a letter explaining the situation to the chief probation officers of cities throughout the United States of over 10,000 population, having juvenile courts. Forty-two probation officers replied. Of these, twenty-seven set forth the opinion that motion pictures were not directly responsible for juvenile delinquency; ten replies were more or less noncommittal, owing to lack of records which would throw light on this subject; five indicted the motion picture as an important factor in the commission of juvenile delinquencies. Many of these admitted that they had no direct evidence and that their replies merely expressed their opinion. The Board finds that in many cases where it is established that the motion picture is a factor in delinquency it is not the initial cause. More frequently its suggestive power has beneficial results.—*Report of the National Board of Review of Motion Pictures*, 1920. O. B. Y.

Success and Failure as Conditions of Mental Health.—The essentials of physical health are the most common things of daily life—fresh air, good food, exercise, sleep. One of the simple conditions of mental health is success. In the healthful development of the child and in the efficient activity of the mature individual, this and to a limited extent failure also are health conditions of fundamental importance. The stimulus of success begins with the baby in the cradle trying to free himself from the bands that fetter him, and the psychology of success is the same for the baby as for the adult, namely, the matching of a mental image with reality. Continued success develops an attitude of confidence but continued failure is liable to produce an unsocial attitude, a shut-in personality, which may lead to mental disorder. Our school system, the author claims, completely ignores the importance of these two factors and foreordains many children to repeated failure. The need of success as a wholesome stimulus is universal and children have an enormous appetite for it. The diseased are often cured by it. The teacher's business should be to see that all children achieve some successes and that sometimes they get an honest gauge of themselves by failure. The physician and the social worker also should strive to find opportunities for their patients to do something at which they can succeed, for of such simple things mental hygiene consists.—William H. Burnham, *Massachusetts Society for Mental Hygiene*, No. 37. S. C. R.

La Reforme pénitentiaire en Chine.—The movement of penal reform in China commenced at the same time as did judicial reform. That is to say, decrees were issued beginning the work in 1906. In 1909 work was begun on the model prison of Peking and the following year an edict was issued to establish such a prison in each province. Since then many new prisons have been completed or are now under way. First of all as to penal administration: The central administration is in the hands of the ministry of justice, having at its head a director, and subdividing into three bureaux charged with different penal questions. Local administration is vested in the attorney general of the court of appeal of each province. Other officers actually concerned with the prison operation are chosen from among the graduates of the special penal school. The prisons are built on the model of Western prisons, either in the form of a star or a cross. Their capacity varies from two hundred to one thousand prisoners. Women, youths under eighteen years, and the sick occupy separate quarters. It was desired to build an institution at Peking for young offenders, but lack of funds has prevented the realization of this project. The cell system is used in the prisons. In the daytime work is done together in a common room, but at night the prisoners are returned to their cells. In modern Chinese prisons the reformatory idea prevails. To this end a system of triple education is given to the prisoners—moral, intellectual, and physical. Instruction is given either in groups or singly as the case may require. Classification for teaching is also made according to age and the nature of the offense for which the person was imprisoned. Work is the best method of reform. It is obligatory on all except the sick. The articles made by the prisoners are disposed of at public sales which take the nature of an exhibition or fair, and great success has been achieved in disposing of them. The money received from the sales goes into the national treasury, although a small amount is credited to the prisoners. Many of them have acquired a liking for work, and in some cases new trades have been learned which will permit the earning of an honest living on being released. The health of the prisoners is maintained by a strict observance of the rules of hygiene. Clothing is frequently washed and regular baths are required of the prisoners. No cruel punishments may be inflicted for infractions of discipline, but a curtailing of privileges is used, as well as the knowledge on the part of the prisoner that disobedience will injure his chances for pardon, parole, or commutation of sentence. On the other hand added privileges are the reward of obedience. Prisoners who are paroled are under the observation of the local police, and a violation of the parole results in being sent back to prison. In summarizing we may say that penal reform in China is in plain view. Those who have occasion to visit the modern prisons of the country will verify the statement that considerable progress has been made in the last few years.—Tsien Tai, *Revue pénitentiaire et de droit pénal*, July-October, 1919. C. V. R.

American Experience with Workmen's Compensation.—Experience under the American compensation statutes has justified in fair measure the hopes and claims of those who have advocated the legislation. It has not been millennial, but it has realized in no small part the advantages which were predicted. The speed with which the system was adopted in Europe has even been surpassed in the United States, for in nine years compensation statutes were enacted in forty-two states, and in Alaska, Porto Rico, and Hawaii. Before the introduction of the system many employees and employers were opposed to it. The laboring classes had dangled before their eyes the occasional large awards made by the courts in case of injury, while employers feared the financial burden would be hard to bear. Now, after a practical test with the system at work in a great diversity of industries, both employers and workers are willing to indorse it heartily. Investigations have shown that in many cases lump-sum awards were used to purchase homes or small businesses, and in the case of monthly payments, the income enabled the children of the family to continue in school a longer time than would otherwise have been possible. Two objections raised before compensation became very widespread consisted in the assertions that malingering would result, and secondly, that since the state paid for accidents, employers would be less careful in providing safety devices on machinery. The very opposite has been the case. There will always be some malingering but it has not been found to be an appreciable evil. On the other hand, employers have

taken precautions to reduce accidents, for it gives the industry a lower rate when the premiums are set for the coming year. When employers "carry their own risks," there is of course a very definite incentive for keeping the accidents down. A defect deserving of special attention is the inadequacy of the schedule of awards. Although injured workmen are now receiving much more on an average than they would as a result of a suit for damages, the compensation is in many cases less than one-half of the current earnings. Two-thirds is a rate given in some states. Another greater defect of American statutes is their lack of comprehensiveness. Mr. Carl Hookstadt estimated that in the so-called compensation states there were not less than 7,400,000 employees who were not covered at all by the statutes. A million and a quarter are in interstate commerce, and many of the remainder are, for good or bad reasons, classed as being in non-hazardous occupations. The method of improvement for the future will therefore need to provide more liberal awards and the inclusion of a greater number of employees.—Willard C. Fisher, *The American Economic Review*, March, 1920. C. V. R.

Will the Wage System Last?—The wage theories which have predominated from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution down to the present are four in number: (1) the so-called "iron law" of wages, which held that general wages tend to be fixed at the minimum point necessary to enable the laborer to maintain himself and rear a family to supply the laborers of the next generation. This theory fitted in well with the social and economic conditions of the early nineteenth century; (2) the "wage-fund" theory held that at the beginning of each year or season of production the employers set aside a portion of their capital to be paid as wages during the ensuing period; (3) the "productivity" theory maintained that wages are the return to labor of that part of the product which is actually created. This was acceptable to the capitalist because it gave the laborer to understand that he was getting all he deserved; (4) the "bargain" theory took something from each of the others. The modern industrial unrest signalizes labor's eventual acceptance of the bargain theory and simultaneously registers a protest which takes two forms: (1) labor accepts the bargain theory unreservedly and proposes to carry it to its logical application; (2) labor believes there can be no satisfactory economic conditions as long as one class of producers is paid by another class of producers, i.e., as long as the relation of master and servant persists in the economic field. To solve the problem entirely, a new system of relationship between labor and capital must be established, i.e., labor must share with capital in both the control of production and the ownership of the product.—Henry Pratt Fairchild, *The Unpartizan Review*, July-September, 1920. C. N.

Un Aspect de la loi du 24 Octobre 1919 sur la protection des femmes allaitant leur enfant.—One law of the last legislature should not be passed by without notice; it is that of October 24, 1919, on the protection of women who are nursing their children. It presents a two-fold interest. First to encourage mothers, now becoming more and more rare, who still remember that the mother's milk is the best nourishment for the child. A general interest follows: that of putting into the hands of vigilant administrators a simple and practical means of bringing about the realization of a reform in our methods of aid which consists of creating in each commune a liaison organ between public and private charity. It is from this last and larger aspect that we will examine it here. It is an incontestable fact that the new law will give results only where the control of the nursing and the observance of the hygienic prescriptions will be strictly assured. To give the physicians exclusive charge would be too burdensome, and all that remains is to ask for friendly aid, preferably of women. This aid virtually exists, being provided for by two former laws. The eight weeks period of aid is too short to excite more than a passing interest, but the new law, in extending assistance to the mother until the twelfth month, will permit a much longer contact with the visiting nurse. If the law is properly administered it will result in saving many precious lives and will secure more births in the future. This law is in fact the culmination of the decree of February 28, 1919, which established co-ordination between public and private assistance. The administration of the law is placed in the hands of a commission of eight members representing both sexes.—F. Lebaulanger, *Revue Philanthropique*, March 15, 1920. C. V. R.

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THE COMPARATIVE RÔLE OF THE GROUP CONCEPT IN WARD'S *DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY* AND CONTEM- PORARY AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

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I. THE GROWTH OF GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS

A study in social theory cannot ignore the fundamental fact of the social life, which is the source of all sound theory as it is the test of all results of reflection. The attempt to separate social life from social theory is one that has resulted in disaster both for the theory and for the on-going life-stream.¹ On the one hand it creates a theory which, like metaphysical philosophy, finally exhausts itself in fruitless evanescent speculations; and on the other hand, by failing to furnish the developing life a working and tested technique, it has allowed the social life to develop as an undirected and wasteful process. If one accepts the conclusion arrived at by Herbert Spencer in his *Social Statics* and developed

¹ For one of the best illustrations both of the fact and the results of such separation one might call attention to Germany. Professor John Dewey, in his *German Philosophy and Politics*, makes this attempted separation on the part of German thinkers the key to his interpretation of the German nation. The German attempt to reconcile esoteric intellectual freedom, an ideal freedom, with an autocratically dominated social and industrial life was an impossible attempt, and one which led to German ruin and a shaken world.

by Sumner, namely, that the social process¹ goes on irrespective of social control or direction, then indeed, the second of the consequences of the separation of theory from social life is probably a desideratum, for it brings about the result aimed at, namely, non-interference in the workings of a process of natural laws. But society at large, social scientists in general, and sociologists in particular, have swung away from the laissez faire philosophy and are more and more given to a refinement of their technique of social control on the assumption that such tools will have an actual use in modifying the social process.² The conclusion seems to be sound that social theory and the social process are somehow interrelated, and can never be wholly or to any extent separated if thought is to remain sound and instrumental, and if the activities of life are to be saved from the wasteful and costly results of uncontrolled movements.³ Whatever valuation may be put on the place of social theory, whether one regard it as performing the function of leadership in mediating group crises and as thus shaping and influencing social development, or whether one regard it as merely a rationalizing of, and speculation on, past events, and relatively ineffective and futile both as an academic pursuit and as a practicable matter, one must assume that there is some connection more or less vital between social theory and social life. We may take it for granted, then, that the development of social theory in general, or of any partial phase of social theory, has been more or less closely related to the actual social life which has developed. We should expect, if that were our present problem, to find that such

¹ The concept "social process" is used here in the sense in which it has been largely standardized by Dr. Small in his *General Sociology*.

² Dr. Small has called attention (*American Journal of Sociology*, XXI, 755) to the fact that L. F. Ward's most significant contribution to sociology in America is his emphasis on the psychic factor as a new and controlling factor in human development. On this Ward joined issue with Sumner and Spencer and became a pioneer in this respect in social science in the United States.

³ One might call attention here to the nature of thought and its function as described by that group of writers who are referred to by such terms as functionalists, behaviorists, pragmatists, instrumentalists. The essence of this view, I take it, is (in so far as this point is concerned) that thought is conduct, reflection is a type of *conduct* and arises in mediation of crises, i.e., conflict situations. On this assumption then social theory must be organically and functionally connected with the social process. They cannot be separated.

shifts as may be shown to have taken place in sociological thought during the last four decades have had a direct relation to the enormous changes that have taken place in our industrial, technical, agricultural, and, in a word, our whole social structure and function. To trace out that relation is not our present problem. Such a task remains to be done in a separate work. The assumption upon which succeeding chapters rest is that those who rely almost exclusively on social theory on the one hand, and those who scoff at theory as relatively futile and archaic on the other, are both wrong; that a better working hypothesis is that the true relation is a constantly developing reciprocal, a give-and-take process. A well-rounded discussion must include them both. Instrumentalist philosophy and psychology discover in social theory and the social process two phases of a more rational societal evolution.

Without attempting further to investigate the problem of the causal relationship between social theory and social life since 1880, it is essential to give in bold strokes some of the more striking changes in American social development since the date mentioned, in order that there may appear the whole complex background for the consideration of one phase of the shift in social theory. In general it may be said that *such changes indicate a growing consciousness of the fundamental nature of the group* in all the multiplied forms of social activity. It is the purpose of the rest of this chapter to point out such facts in more detail.

First of all one must note the changes that have taken place in the economic processes of society, particularly in industry, and the group organizations of persons interested or employed in those processes. The possibilities latent in the principle of the division of labor have reached a realization since 1880 such as was undreamed of in the earlier periods of our industrial development. The application of inventions to productive processes, the utilization of steam power, the increase in means of transportation of the earlier part of the last century, prepared the way for an industrial expansion, following the panic of 1873, which altered our whole life, created what is known as big business, made the factory the dominant mode of industrial production, conditioned the appearance of the various forms of combination, made necessary the readjustment

of labor problems, stimulated the concentration of people in cities, and resulted in the transition of American life from an agricultural to a predominantly industrial type. On the whole, then, however long the factors had been preparing for the shift, the four decades since 1880 have seen enormous changes in our whole life. The individualism so characteristic of American life began to give way to a collectivism of fact in which group solidarity began to rise into consciousness as a matter of practical importance and significance. Individualism began to break down in business, in community life, in actual governmental practice, in religious and social organization of all types; and in the place of the atomistic nature of our previous social organization there developed what Dicey has called, in speaking of England of the nineteenth century, the central fact, namely, the trend to collectivism. This trend has not been a movement carefully planned and directed by a foreseeing leadership. It has been largely a result of a crude and blind change brought about by the new factors arising in the whole social situation. What these factors are has been suggested. The chief ones are the development of the means of communication and transportation both within the country and with other countries. Speedy and wide diffusion of intelligence makes possible the formation of great industries, while the development of transportation facilities both in capacity and in speed is essential for the handling of the products of those industries. By means of such improvements the western part of the country became economically incorporated into national life, the frontier of free land disappeared, no longer affording an outlet for the economically suppressed.

It is not without significance that the development of communication and transportation finds a corresponding development in what is known as business combinations. The latter are confined almost wholly in their important phases to the period beginning after the panic of 1873.¹ There were, of course, "agreements" prior to that time, but the year 1877 saw the birth of the

¹ "The panic of 1873 again accelerated the movement toward industrial combination by forcing many small concerns into bankruptcy; and soon after the recovery from the panic of 1893 the rush toward integration of industries began." Carlton, *History and Problems of Organized Labor*, p. 68.

great railroad "pools" which were the dominating form of consolidation down to the nineties.¹ The form of combination of capital has varied, viz., amalgamations, mergers, etc., but the development has been steadily toward a larger and more finished consolidation of capitalistic enterprise. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 is an evidence of a growing consciousness of a new and important change in American industrial life. It indicated a pronounced trend toward capitalistic solidarity and community of interest. Out of the actual experiences of life and the increased technical facilities there has arisen a new sense of group solidarity which is essential for industrial progress. This necessarily has conditioned profound changes in every form of social life, and enters into and shapes the form and content of the smallest primary groups in society.

Thus far in the discussion of economic changes, attention has been directed primarily to the organization of capital, of industries, and their increased consciousness of economic solidarity. Before leaving this part of the discussion, however, attention must be given to that other large factor in industrial enterprise, namely, labor. One might term this the reverse side of the shield; for along with other industrial changes there have come many changes in the quality of labor, the nature of labor, the racial composition of laborers, their forms of association, and their philosophy of labor and life. The chief interest for us at this point is the development of group consciousness and group solidarity among laborers and of combinations of laborers for various ends. Possibly no part of our population shows more clearly the growth of a practical recognition of the essential part that a group plays than does the labor movement.

The movement toward organization and combination among American laborers began very early in the nation's history, but it is practically true that the important development of labor organizations has come since the Civil War and particularly since 1880.²

¹ Haney, *Business Organization and Combination*, p. 165.

² Unions had been formed as early as 1825, workmen's parties had been organized, papers had been published, but all were sporadic and short lived.

"All the labor movements of the pre-Civil War period were ephemeral and soon disintegrated."¹ It was not until the last quarter of the past century that conditions were ripe for the appearance of powerful labor groups paralleling chronologically the appearance of combinations of capital and large-scale industry. Professor Carlton summarizes the point thus:

In the Civil War period labor was never strongly organized. No clear vision of the solidarity of the laboring classes had as yet caught and held the attention of the wage earners. But the Civil War made permanent labor organization inevitable. The Civil War marks a transition period in our labor history. Concentrated capital, the extensive use of the subdivided labor, the influx of the cheap labor of Southern Europe, and the peopling of the West have given organized labor its big problems. Henceforward, the United States was destined to be "an industrial community which organized its industries on a large scale." With the panic of 1873 unionism suffered a temporary check only to be followed by a new era in the history of labor organization.²

It is not essential to the purpose here to trace out in detail the various stages in the subsequent development of labor organizations. The chief endeavor is to make clear the new era which was ushered in at the close of the panic which began in 1873. Following that period the order known as the Knights of Labor grew up. Its first general assembly was held in 1878, when it reported 80,000 members. By 1885 its members exceeded 100,000, and the next year it reached the high-water mark of its career with a membership of more than 600,000. With its purposes, organization, and work, we are not here concerned. It is sufficient to point out that it subsequently gave way to another organization founded in 1881, the American Federation of Labor, which grew slowly but surely until it became and still is the dominant force in the labor world. The history of this latest body is a study in itself, and is outside the limits of this investigation. As it stands it is an interesting commentary on, and witness of, the enormous changes that have taken place in industrial life since its inception. It is particularly interesting in so far as it shows the steady trend toward the group basis of labor activity, and the increasing consciousness of

¹ Carlton, *History and Problems of Organized Labor*, p. 41.

² *Ibid.*, p. 64.

the occupational group as a factor in individual development and social organization.

Although passing through various crises and varying fortunes, the authorities in control of the Federation have pretty generally maintained the policy of trade unionism as against industrial unionism, and have pretty consistently refrained from political organization and action to attain their ends. It has been pointed out¹ that the trade-union type must eventually give way to the industrial type as a result of the changes that have taken place in industrial organizations. The increased concentration of the latter, and the abolition of skilled trades in great factories through the introduction of more complex and efficient machinery, have paved the way for a different type of labor group organizations. One writer expresses the view thus:

These facts point toward the conclusion that the industrial union is an effective form of organization. The evidence, moreover, leads almost inevitably to the further conclusion that the old line type of separate trade-unions, even when loosely affiliated with each other through the American Federation, cannot effectively cope with hostile trusts and strong employers' associations expect in those cases in which skill or a particularly strategic situation gives them an advantageous position. Greater solidarity than craft unionism is necessary to cope with the trust employing minutely subdivided labor.²

If the conclusion just stated be true, and the industrial union gradually supplants the trade-union in all except the particularly skilled trades and those involving unusual responsibility as well as skill, then a new type of labor solidarity arises, that of the particular industry rather than that of disparate trades within an industry. Such a transformation brings about new attitudes, new group consciousness and new powers. It dissolves the basis for the older trade-union aristocracy, and supplants it with a more democratic type of group alignment and group control. It makes possible one of the first steps toward the organization of all or a large majority of unskilled workers for positive action. It supplants the older conception of democracy as a rule by individuals in the mass with the sounder conception of the group as the unit

¹ Parker, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XXXIV, 564-69. Cummins, *American Journal of Sociology*, XIII, 759.

² Carlton, *History and Problems of Organized Labor*, p. 77.

and agency of democratic progress.¹ Political theorists are giving increasing attention to the occupational group as a basis for representation, on the ground that such groups constitute more effective units than geographical districts, and that representations from such groups come nearer to representing some definite factor in the social organization. If future experience proves the need for greater permanence of such shifts in the method of representation, one of the preparatory steps is that of the organization of the unskilled workers on an industrial rather than on a trade or craft basis. What may be the final issue is not to be predicted; the purpose here is merely to call attention to a perceptible shift in the type of group organization that is going on in a relatively blind and unreflective manner among the workers, as a result of certain new and changing factors in the whole industrial situation, and to suggest a simultaneous parallel in political theory. It is another signpost pointing to the changing society that has been arising since Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* was in the making.

Another significant implication of the growth of practical group organization among labor is that such organization becomes essential if labor is to assume a share in control of industry. An unorganized mass of unskilled laborers is unfitted for any voice in control or management. The labor group is the first essential, and this is being developed practically by labor itself.

Certain forces in American society seem to be breaking down the second policy of organized labor, namely, non-political action. There can be little doubt that hitherto the leaders of the American Federation have reflected the actual spirit and sentiments of the great mass of laborers as against a militant minority who favored political action. Our type of industrial life, the presence of a large agricultural class, the absence of serious and widespread poverty, etc., have induced a conservative labor opinion and labor leadership. The Great War with its general loosening of bonds, its stimulation of labor's expectations, the rising cost of living, and the labor movements abroad created a new group consciousness in labor ranks. Following the war employers assumed a hostile attitude, government adopted a reactionary policy of

¹ This will be expanded in later chapters. See also Follett, *The New State*.

intimidation, denial of free speech, assembly, and press, reverting to a repressive attitude and the use of legal methods which made clear to a larger part of the workers that mere trade-union warfare even cannot be carried on so long as hostile forces make such trade-union activity impossible. Labor seems forced, therefore, merely in order to preserve and make effective its former policy, to embark upon a political policy to protect its methods from interference and nullification. If such a departure occurs it will mark an increasing importance of economic groups as a factor in social and political life.

The foregoing pages have attempted to present some phases of the economic background for our study of the group concept in social theory since 1880. The central thought throughout has been to call attention to the growth of industry, and of group organizations immediately in connection with industrial life. It is now in order to call attention briefly to the change in governmental practices and policies arising out of the industrial changes during the same period.

One of the most illuminating evidences of the vital changes that have taken place in our whole national life is the change that has taken place in the quality and quantity of governmental "interference" in the industrial processes of our society. Though bitterly contested by industry and hampered by the constitution and the courts, the country has steadily passed from an individualistic laissez faire policy to one of vigorous control of industry and protection of the dependent classes employed in such industries. This transformation has come in response to needs developing out of the actual life of society, and expresses a new consciousness of social solidarity—of the fundamental importance of the group life. In general, one may say that with minor exceptions the bulk of such legislation lies within the period beginning since the seventies. It was a concomitant of those fundamental changes in our industrial life which have been suggested above. On every hand one finds evidence of the collectivistic practice. The government has gone into business. It has created postal savings banks, parcel post; municipalities have extended their control over water plants, the production of gas, heat, and light. Regulation has grown steadily.

The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Sherman Anti-Trust Law are significant in showing the newer attitude of American society. The regulation of railroad rates, services, and business practices, the extension of control over corporations, the pure food laws, reservation of public lands, the conservation of resources, the imposition of inheritance and income taxes, are some of the eloquent witnesses of the increasing insistence upon the social interest in all the manifestations of our industrial energies. The socialization of industry, whether by ownership, as in the case of municipal power and light plants, or by regulation as in the case of the railways and trusts, or by the still less tangibly coercive method of publicity, is a definite working hypothesis that has developed almost wholly in the last half-century. It is an evidence of a new sense of social solidarity, of group consciousness which has evolved naturally out of the actual social experiences of American life.

In addition to this direct type of social control of industrial life, there is another large and noteworthy class of legislation which is an important part of social interest in economic organization. This includes that body of legislation which has to do with the protection of the labor element in industry. Here again the development of this important program has been almost wholly a phenomenon of the period following the panic of 1873. With the exception of a few isolated and unimportant attempts to limit the hours of labor for women and children, there was practically no labor legislation of importance until after the Civil War period. Even laws relating to child labor did not assume any importance until some time after the Massachusetts acts of 1866 and 1867. It was in the period of expansion following the panic of the next decade that this elementary type of protective legislation became a real factor in legislative control of industry. The same holds true of laws relating to hours of women and of men in public service, to laws regulating conditions of labor, prescribing safety appliances, and protective devices. In addition, workmen's compensation laws, accident insurance, and minimum wage laws for women and children are still more recent.

The strength of the movement for social legislation of these types is clearly shown when it is recalled that they have come in

spite of the strenuous opposition of three powerful influences, namely, first, the owners of the industries themselves; second, the constitution and the courts; and third, the traditional individualistic attitudes of American life.

Still another extension of the principle of group solidarity in legislation is found in the social treatment of disease, both by preventive sanitation, and dissemination of information, and by public and quasi-public agencies and institutions. The growth of the consciousness of the social nature of disease and of group responsibility for the prevention of disease is relatively new. The inclusion of national vitality by the National Conservation Commission¹ as among the chief, if not the chief, national resource is deeply significant in that it shows in another way the increased appearance of group consciousness and group responsibility as a result of scientific discoveries and actual experience in a rapidly intensifying group life. Probably no other period has seen such a rapid recognition of the principles of the social nature of disease and of group responsibility for its prevention and cure as the last four decades.

Another striking example of group consciousness in dealing with a specific problem is the interesting experiment of prohibitory measures in the case of intoxicating liquors. This again is a product of the last few decades. The consummation of this type of social control marks a decided step away from an individualistic attitude, and negative legislative policy, toward a social or group attitude and group assumption of responsibility.

Mention has already been made of the fact that municipal ownership of certain productive enterprises has been accomplished in many cities and towns over the country. The chief forms of municipally owned productive enterprises are those concerned with the manufacture of electricity and gas, the furnishing of water and transportation. The essentially social nature of such activities in municipal life is becoming increasingly clear. Municipal ownership of gas, light, and water plants has become so much a part of the ordinary course of life in many cities as to be no longer

¹ See *Bulletin 30 of the Committee of One Hundred on National Health*, being a report on national vitality by Irving Fisher.

in the field of consciousness—there are no competing moral or political values or plans. Along with these rather stereotyped examples of municipal group activity there have developed the great municipal park systems, municipal improvements of lake fronts and waterways, municipal bathing beaches and pleasure resorts, municipal libraries and restrooms, municipal hospitals and asylums, municipal reference, statistical, and research bureaus, municipal legal aid and welfare associations. These constitute but a partial list of essentially municipal activities which indicate a marvelous growth of the conception of a municipality as an organic unity. On the whole, these developments are relatively recent, coming for the most part since the Civil War and reconstruction period. Speaking of the subtle way in which such a transformation has come in England, Dicey quotes the following statement, reported to be the language of Sidney Webb:

The practical man, oblivious or contemptuous of any theory of the social organism or general principles of social organization, has been forced by the necessities of the time into an ever-deepening collectivist channel. Socialism, of course, he still rejects and despises. The individualist town councillor will walk along the municipal pavement, lit by municipal gas, and cleansed by municipal broom, with municipal water, and seeing, by the municipal clock in the municipal market, that he is too early to meet his children coming from the municipal school hard by the county lunatic asylum and municipal hospital, will use the national telegraph system to tell them not to walk through the municipal park, but to come by the municipal tramway, to meet him in the municipal reading room by the municipal art gallery, museum, library, where he intends to consult some of the national publications in order to prepare his next speech in the municipal town hall in favor of the nationalization of canals and the increase of government control over the railway system. "Socialism, Sir!" he will say, "don't waste the time of a practical man by your fantastic absurdities." "Self-help! Sir, individual self-help, that's what's made our city what it is."¹

Without much change this statement would be true of numerous municipalities in the United States.

Turning aside from the strictly official or governmental agencies, such as the foregoing, which have arisen, there is found a large list of community activities which are properly voluntary move-

¹ Reputed to be the language of Sidney Webb by George Eastgate in the *Times*, August 23, 1902. Quoted by Dicey in *Law and Public Opinion*, pp. 286-87.

ments, but which are essentially expressions of the same practical interest in and consciousness of the unity of community life in a more restricted geographical extent than the municipally owned and controlled industries and agencies. The establishment of community centers, of neighborhood groups for various economic, social, and educational ends, is one of the more recent phases of the growth of group consciousness in various areas of cities of all sizes.¹ The use of the school as a social center and the creation of other institutions around which the community interests may center and develop are among the most hopeful evidences of a solution of numerous municipal problems. In the main, this type of development has not arisen out of a theoretical scheme clamped down on a given community, but it has arisen out of the actual growth of the community problems and interests. It has come about through the discovery of a community of interest and a recognition of social solidarity, while almost unconsciously pursuing disparate individual ends. In so far as leadership in the form of community plans has arisen, it has largely arisen in response to the developing needs as revealed in the crises of the local group life. Church life and structure, school curricula, and programs of other agencies have responded to, rather than created, the essence of the group life. But whatever the relative place of the theory and practice in this particular case, it seems quite clear that a new sense of group solidarity has arisen and is arising out of the practical life as it is developing in cities and towns in the United States.

Another very interesting example of the way in which organizations have responded to the demands of practical situations is revealed in the experience of charitable organizations. The charity organization movement, for example, was introduced in this country, following the English precedent, immediately after the general business depression of 1873-77. Possibly the difficulties incurred in relieving the destitution of that period may have hastened the organization movement.² At any rate the movement for charity organization was a democratically stimulated one.

¹ One of the most interesting experiments is the "social unit" plan recently established in Cincinnati. See *Survey*, November 15, 1919.

² Warner, *American Charities* (1908), p. 442.

It had its basis in the need for co-ordination of competitive and conflicting agencies, and in the essential fact that any pathological maladjustment requiring some kind of aid or assistance is fundamentally a social or group matter.¹ The schedules of causes of poverty, for example, that have been published by the Charity Organization Society since 1888 reveal very clearly a striking growth of the essentially social or group nature of what is called poverty. A comparison of the various revisions with the first schedules of 1888 shows in a very convincing fashion the revolution in theory and practice in charitable work which has followed as a result of the experience of forty years in actual contact with concrete, living problems. That revolution may be summarized in the statement that the shift has been one from a subjectivistic, individualistic basis to a group basis; practical charity work had discovered the group and the meaning of the fact of group solidarity as the point of departure. In place of the individual as a unit there arose a plexus of group relations out of which the individual could be separated only by an abstraction.

Without further illustration of the change in municipal life and consciousness, we may turn to a similar development in rural districts. The community-life movement is a recent and growing one. The rural-community movement offers a peculiarly striking example of the growth of the recognition of the group, because in the rural districts the individualistic attitude reached its greatest development and permanence. But the forces at work are tending to incorporate the rural life not only into the economic and thought life of the larger national and state groups, but are creating local solidarity and a community interest which furnishes the necessary preparation for effective community organization. First among the factors which have made this possible are the increased means

¹ Devine suggests the fact of this change in these words: "Within the past few years a noticeable change has taken place in the conference of charities, in the discussions among social workers, in the special periodicals devoted to social problems, and in the more general daily and periodical press. A new unity has been discovered underlying various charitable activities which center in the homes of the poor. It has become apparent that relief societies, charity organization societies, religious, educational, and social agencies, and public departments charged with the care of dependents, form practically a single group with many common interests, methods, difficulties, and dangers."—Devine, *Principles of Relief*, p. 10.

of communication and transportation. The coming of the telephone, rural free delivery of mail, the development of better roads, better electric and steam railroads, and the invention of the automobile have made the rural districts part of the social organism to a remarkable degree. Economically the farmer has become intricately dependent on numerous remote and varied industries. Like the city dweller his home has been invaded again and again by industry, and one by one occupations have been removed from it to other specialized industrial agencies. The rapid extension of communication has made possible the creation of a different and better type of mind in rural life and the development of a real psychic national unity.

As a result of the modifications that have taken place in means of communication and in the economic life of rural communities, and with the discovery of the economic and social solidarity of the rural districts, there has developed the rural community social life. There is an increasing tendency on the part of rural communities and their leaders to recognize not only the legitimate function of amusement and entertainment but also, which is of chief interest to this discussion, the essential fact of the *group*, the community as the true local unit.

This same spirit is seen in the field of education, where more, modern types of educational effort are being carried on. The development of the school as a social center, in some places, the readjustment of the curriculum to meet the needs prescribed by local social conditions, the attempt to create a community interest and loyalty which will attract and retain the rising leadership, the broadening of school activity to include a closer relation with community activities: these are all expressions of a community sense, of a consciousness of group needs and of an interest in a social agency which is designed to supply them.

The extent to which the same community spirit is finding expression, is shown in the way in which religious attitudes and organizations are being modified in so many rural districts. This is seen in several ways, first, in the growing emphasis on the importance of the local group as a religious end; secondly, the way in which pre-existing sectarian division lines are melting away

before the group solidarity; and thirdly, the way in which the religious organization is being broadened to include, in an increased measure, the group activities. All of these, of course, have been influenced by leadership and by outside programs and experiments, but they show quite clearly a shift of emphasis and attention not only from an individualistic to a group type of religion, but also from a conception of religious institutions as divisive agencies to a conception of such institutions as a group concern and group unifying agency. Here as elsewhere, the central feature of religious programs and practices that show most signs of life in rural communities is the recognition of the solidarity of the group and of its place in practical life.

The foregoing pages of this chapter have been designed to point out some of the more patent ways in which American life since 1880 has been undergoing a transition. The effort has been to present this transition as the background of changing *mores* and practices which give color and meaning and setting to the chapters which are to follow. The picture is necessarily incomplete. The complete picture would involve the whole social history of the United States. The central feature which has characterized the transition is the growth in practical, living experience of group solidarity, the increasing recognition on the part of the practical man of the essentially social nature of many of the phases of living, and of an almost unconscious increasing use of the principle of group solidarity in meeting concrete problems. The central place of the group as a matter of actual life is a working principle which has been developed as one of the interesting achievements of the last four decades. The transition is not yet complete; it has not yet been realized fully in any one line nor at all in some others, but that it has been and is going on seems quite plain. The subsequent chapters will attempt to show that a similar transition has taken place in social theory between 1880 and the present time.

II. WARD'S USE OF THE GROUP CONCEPT, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO HIS "DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY"

This chapter will attempt to summarize, first, the leading examples of Ward's explicit use of the group concept, or of synonymous terms as a tool of sociological thought; secondly, the implied

use of such a concept; and thirdly, the results upon his sociological system of his use or failure to use such a tool of thought.

Before proceeding further with the discussion it will be well to point out the reasons for the selection of Ward, and chiefly his earliest work, *Dynamic Sociology*, as a point for comparison with contemporary sociology. The aim in the study is not to present an evaluation of Ward's contribution to sociological thought, but to utilize his work as a convenient point at the beginning of sociology in America to make clear the shift in method that has taken place in respect to the use of the group concept. Ward is generally conceded to be the first of American sociologists in point of time at least. The appearance of his *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883, the writing of which occupied the preceding ten years, marked the beginning of the study of sociology in America.¹ Whatever value sociologists may attach to Ward's work, there can be little doubt of the inspiring rôle he has played among American sociologists.² Whatever new developments may arise in social theory, whatever changed methods subsequent sociology may introduce, Ward's work will always claim a considerable place in the continuity of that stream of thought which we call sociology.³ Just what that place is, is without the province of this discussion, except in so far as it relates itself to one particular inquiry.

The selection of Ward acquires added significance from the facts that have been presented in the preceding chapter, that the period since Ward wrote his first book has been a period in which

¹ Cf. Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXII (1916), 748 ff.

² For evidence sustaining this point see "Appreciation of Ward," *American Journal of Sociology*, II, 61-78 where some present-day sociologists give an estimate of the place of Ward in their own intellectual history.

³ Professor Small has called attention in his "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI (1916), 750, to Ward's isolation from the stream of thought embodied in the social sciences in Europe, particularly the work of the German thinkers. Dr. Small has performed a unique piece of work in showing the continuity of that stream with modern sociology. Without challenging the correctness of Dr. Small's view of Ward's isolation, the suggestion may be hazarded that a development of the Comtean stream in the case of Ward's intellectual ancestry might relieve a part of the isolation which seems so abrupt. Possibly after some sociologist has done for the line of thought via Comte what Dr. Small has done so ably for the German connection the former may assume greater relative importance.

American life has been undergoing fundamental social changes in every phase of its existence. Not only has there gone on this marvelous transformation of the social life in general, as a practical growth, but also the same period marks the growth of the scientific spirit which has affected the thought life of America in every phase of its development. The period marks the application of the evolutionary philosophy and the scientific method not only to the physical and biological sciences, but latterly also to the social sciences, to philosophy, and to religion. The period has been one of rapid intellectual readjustment, of crumbling hypotheses and points of view and of methods of such a far-reaching nature as to mark practically the birth of a whole new era in both theory and practice.¹ The thought may be expressed in Dr. Small's words as the "drive toward objectivity." The roots of the new currents of thought which we now see about us go back far into the past. The new trends were long in preparation, but their coming to prominence in American thought life has been almost wholly confined to the period since Ward wrote his first book in sociology. In few, if any, periods of the world's history have changes of such momentous implications for all types of thought taken place in such a brief period of time.

The development of the scientific method in the various sciences, and the fruitful discoveries that have taken place in the last four decades, were emphasized by the papers presented at the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Sciences. Almost without exception the speakers find in this period the coming of a new age for those sciences.²

¹ Robinson points out that two facts of transcendent importance were discovered in the second half of the nineteenth century, namely, Darwin's doctrine of the descent of man from lower organisms and Lyell's collection of geological evidence to show the antiquity of man. *The New History*, p. 80.

² "In his recently published autobiography, Herbert Spencer asserts that at the time of issue of his work on biology (1864), not one person in ten or more knew the meaning of the word; and among those who knew it, few cared to know anything about the subject. That the attitude of the educated public toward biological science could have been thus indifferent, if not inimical, forty years ago, seems strange enough now even to those of us who have witnessed in part the scientific progress subsequent to that epoch. But this was a memorable epoch, marked by the advent of the great intellectual awakening ushered in by the generalizations of Darwin, Wallace, Spencer,

In the field of religion the period includes the older conflict between the developing scientific method and the older theology. More recently there has appeared the important swing of religious thought to the social approach not only to religious origins in general but to Christianity in particular. The appearance of the so-called social interpretation of the whole Christian sacred literature, and of the lives and personalities of its founders and outstanding characters, marks but one phase of the vital changes of religious thought in America in the closing quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century. Not even the Protestant Reformation, with all its historic importance and convulsive upheavals, created changes and modifications in religious thought of such deep and fundamental significance as those that have peacefully permeated the American religious world during the period mentioned.

To do more than make the briefest general reference to these elements in the transition period is beyond the purpose here. They are cited merely for the purpose of pointing out the transition nature of the intellectual life of the period which this paper has under consideration. The movements in the thought of the period and the course of the actual life of the country during the same time have gone along together. The causal relation between the two is an intricate and important problem, but it too is outside the limits of the present discussion.

With reference to the particular attention to be paid to *Dynamic Sociology*, several reasons justify such a course. In the first place, the chronological fact of its appearance at the beginning of what has been termed the transition period gives it prominence. This is especially possible because, as stated before, the whole of Ward's sociological structure is not under review, so that a selected part may be taken for the purpose in hand. The purpose relieves one from the discussion of each of Ward's writings. Furthermore,

and their coadjutors. And the quarter of a century which immediately followed this epoch appears, as we look back upon it, like an heroic age of scientific achievement.

. . . . It was an age during which most men of science, and thinking people in general, moved forward at a rate quite without precedent in the history of human advancement."—Woodward, "The Unity of Physical Science," *International Congress of Arts and Sciences*, St. Louis (1904), IV, 3.

there is justification for the choice in the view expressed by Dr. Small that Ward's whole system is contained in *Dynamic Sociology*, viz.:

Although Ward afterward wrote three major works, besides two minor ones and numerous monographs, in exposition of his views, I have never discovered that, in any essential particular, they added to or subtracted from the system contained in *Dynamic Sociology*. Ward's sociology seems to have received form and substance, as the Germans say, *aus einem Gusse*. All that he did later was the enlarging of replicas or details.¹

For convenience therefore one may take his earliest work as a basis, and utilize subsequent works as elaborations and elucidations of his central system. With this preliminary outline by way of introduction we are now prepared for a more detailed study of Ward's use of the group concept in his sociological system.

This analysis seeks to discover the extent and nature of the use made of the group concept in Ward's thinking, particularly in the initial formation of his system of sociology. In general, the most striking thing about the work under review is the absence of an express use of the group concept as a tool of analysis or explanation. As such, the group concept is absent in Ward's earlier work and largely so in his whole system. This does not mean that he has neglected the factors of association or of all groups whatsoever is his thinking. On the contrary, as will be pointed out later, he takes note of the social factor in general, but his sociology is never related to such a concept as the group as its central feature, at least not in express terms. Though modified in some respects, his sociology remained as it was in his first book, essentially an individualistic one. His thinking was fundamentally based on what Professor Ford² has called the individual hypothesis as against the social hypothesis. The whole of the contrast between the sociology of Ward and the newer sociology in America may be summarized in the contrast suggested by these two hypotheses. The conception which underlay the first volume of *Dynamic Sociology*, namely, aggregation, though modified in minor details, remained the corner stone of Ward's thinking. Whether dealing

¹ Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI, 752.

² *Natural History of the State*.

with the problems of social origins or the development of an individual, the hypothesis was that of the individual rather than the group, as the starting-point. The details of these general observations will receive elaboration in subsequent pages.

The term "group," as intimated above, occurs rarely, if at all, in *Dynamic Sociology*. It finds more frequent but still relatively rare expression in *Pure Sociology*. To assume from the absence of this express term that the social factor was not a part of Ward's system of thought would be a most serious error. In order to estimate properly, therefore, the place which the group occupied in Ward's thought, one must take account not merely of specific references to it as such, but also of such other terms as have a synonymous or similar meaning. The end sought here is to discover the use made of a fact that might be called indifferently a group, or society, or association, etc., rather than to discover a use of a mere *term*. We are interested in the concept rather than the word, and are led to include such terms as society, troop, horde, association, state, race, which indicate a conception of some kind of situation in which persons are in an interacting plexus of relations, a stimulus and response situation. To attempt to catalogue all such terms used by Ward even in his first work alone would be a large and relatively fruitless task. Attention will be centered rather on the treatment of certain problems in which use is made of the concept in order to see just how far it penetrates, how adequately it serves as a tool of analysis, and in how far it is faulty in scope and application. Possibly the contrast with contemporary sociology which may appear as a result of the study will prove to be one mainly of degree rather than of kind, or of less emphasis as against greater emphasis. In pursuance of this plan of study we shall take up several problems which occupied Ward in his earliest work, such as the problem of the origin of language, of society, of ethics, of the mind, of the state, the problem of education, and the problem of legislation and of government. These will show quite clearly the central factor we seek, namely, the place of the group in *Dynamic Sociology*.

As an approach to the discussion, the first interesting point is the origin of society. Society, as defined by Ward, "in its literal

or primary sense is simply an association of individuals."¹ Without further investigation of the nature and origin of society, one could see in this statement the essence of Ward's whole sociological viewpoint, namely, the priority of the individual. This atomistic viewpoint, as will appear throughout this investigation, runs through the whole of Ward's study. The group is a result, the individual, a datum. Lest too much be anticipated, it will be well to inquire further into Ward's conception of society and of the group, and particularly of the question of the "social nature" of man. It will be well to cite Ward's views at length at this point, because it is a vital issue in the whole discussion.

If, then, one take the definition of society as given by Ward, the questions naturally arise how and when and why did society originate; if the group is subsequent, a result, how did it arise; if men were originally anti-social, how did they become social? To most of these questions one can discover pretty definite answers.

Man is not naturally a social animal, although apparently so. "The fact, that throughout all historic time man has been found associated, has naturally given rise to the general opinions that he is by nature a social being. And this is doubtless true, for man as he is, and has been ever since the earliest traditions. But whether he was originally social by nature is quite another question and one which, as we have just seen, most probably demands a negative answer."² In this respect Ward refused to follow the dictum of Comte as to the essentially social nature of man; in other words, he insists on the individual, even the rational individual, as a datum from which the whole social process may be built up on a rational basis of socialization. Concerning the Aristotelian statement that man is a social being,³ Ward says:

We are compelled to reject the doctrine of Aristotle so prevalent everywhere, that man is naturally a gregarious animal, or, as it is less objectionably stated, that man is naturally a social being. Civilized man is undoubtedly a social being, but this quality has been the result of long and severe experi-

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 460.

² *Ibid.*

³ Whether Aristotle intended or had in mind the same conception which his phrase is usually assumed to connote is not material here. We accept the interpretations usually given it because we are interested in Ward's conceptions rather than Aristotle's.

ence, by which a great change has been produced in his constitution. Not only so, but he is utterly incapable of social existence in a native state, unless protected in his life, his liberty, and his property by an artificial system of government.¹

Although he admitted that none of the living forms could have been the immediate ancestors of man, and, therefore, "there will always remain the possibility that his true simian ancestor may have been a gregarious animal, still the probabilities are against this view, and it seems likely that throughout his purely animal career man possessed the associative habit only so far as was necessary for the maintenance of the race."² This quotation indicates that in no respect did the essential feature of this point undergo any change in Ward's subsequent thinking. While we find man in association wherever we see him, there could be no association without first the development of the individual to a point where he could perceive the advantage of such association. "Although we now almost always find him associated, yet, . . . this is for the purposes of protection, and seems not to have been his condition until after his intellect had become strong enough to appreciate and devise a scheme of protection."³ In regard to the point in human development and social evolution at which association arose, on a still broader basis than that of protection, Ward applies the same test, namely, when the intellect had developed to a point sufficient to perceive the advantages of such association. "I regard human association as the result of the perceived advantage which it yields and as coming into existence only in proportion as that advantage was perceived by the only faculty capable of perceiving it, the intellect."⁴ We shall have occasion later to revert to the difficulties and implications of these views. They are adduced here to show the negligible part the group plays in Ward's fundamental problem of social origins.

The problem of the social or anti-social nature of man brings into the foreground of discussion the question of the existence and origin of a gregarious instinct, sentiment, or impulse. Ward flatly rejected the position that there was any gregarious instinct

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, II, 221.

² *Ibid.*, I, 463.

³ *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 90.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 90-91.

or impulse which was a part of man's original nature. "That there existed in primordial man or his immediate animal ancestors an innate social sentiment which naturally drew any considerable number of men together is not only improbable a priori, but is disproved by the actual condition of the apes, from which family, as we have seen, man has undoubtedly descended."¹ This same thought is expressed in a later work as follows: "I am inclined to the view that man is not *naturally* a social being, that he has descended from an animal that was not even gregarious by instinct, and that human society . . . is purely a product of his reason, and arose by insensible degrees, *pari passu* with the development of his brain."²

If there was no such thing as a social instinct, and if then the individual somehow developed *in vacuo*, Ward recognized that an account of social origins must solve the problem created by his atomistic approach. With reference to the part the social instinct, which is itself a result of the conflict of desires,³ played in the formation of the social nature of men Ward states:

The social instinct must have had to battle long and hard against the momentary selfish desire of individuals, and its triumph was due to the fact that the desire of each to protect himself by sustaining the community gradually came to exceed the desire to gratify immediate personal wants which were incompatible with the existence of society. . . . The maintenance of the social state, which was at its origin, and still is, opposed to the gratification of many strong personal desires, depends upon the degree to which its benefits are realized, whereby the counter-desire of a higher order antagonizes the anti-social tendencies and finally subordinates them. . . . These influences, coupled with the advantages, which an ape ought to perceive as clearly as a wolf, gradually gained for the social tendency an ascendant which secured its ultimate triumph.

The desire or instinct to associate arose after the advantages of such association were apparent to a comparatively highly developed intellect. But this desire was in conflict with the original and natural desire of man. Out of this conflict, which is not yet completed, there is developing the socialized individual who is gradually,

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 451. For a summary of some of the evidence putting in question Ward's genealogy of man see Ford, *Natural History of the State*, chap. iii.

² *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 90-91.

³ *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 395.

under the influence of his intellect, losing his original anti-social nature and habits.¹ In so far then as the group can figure in the process of evolution, it is relatively secondary in both time and influence. The defects in this view will occupy the discussion later in the critical summary of other of Ward's views.

In order to illustrate the principle upon which Ward founded his thought in his sociological system, which remained essentially the same to the end of his career, it will be worth the time consumed to consider briefly his theory of aggregation as it runs through his *Dynamic Sociology*, and particularly as it has to do with that phase of the evolutionary process which may be called the human period.

The phenomena of sociology, unlike those of anthropology, but equally with those of biology and psychology, present us with an additional instance of the great cosmic process of aggregation which we have sought to trace out. Just as the highest chemical aggregates forming the chemical substance "protoplasm" are compounded and recombined in the formation of physiological and then of morphological units, and just as these are further recombined to form organic aggregates of the first, second, third, etc., orders, so are the highest of these organic aggregates, or men, compounded anew, on precisely the same principle, to form society. And this is the last and highest step with which we are acquainted of this long unbroken series of cosmical aggregations leading from the ultimate material atom up to social aggregate.²

This passage reveals pretty clearly the essentially atomistic principle upon which all Ward's thinking was based. He followed quite consistently the individualistic hypotheses. There are passages in which he seems to concede more or less the importance of the group or social hypothesis, but in the last analysis of his thought there is essentially an assumed priority of the individual. In other words, the group concept, which has come to be such a useful tool in the hands of contemporary sociology, never found an adequate place in the sociology of Ward. In subsequent discussion the implications and elucidations of this criticism or observation will appear more clearly. The preceding pages have sought to show the relative absence of the group as a means of

¹ The conflict of impulses is of course a vital factor in modern social psychology, but such a conflict situation is different from the conflict of which Ward is speaking.

² *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 450-51.

explanation of the development of man, and to point out that the rôle of the group was relatively secondary.¹

The large group called the state or government received considerable attention in Ward's writings, not only because he was interested in cosmic evolution and found in the state a problem of origins, but also because he was a firm believer in the ability and necessity of governmental interference in, and control of, social evolution. His use of this large group concept requires a brief treatment of his theory of the origin of the state and its possible functions.

Ward's treatment of the origins of the government or state as given in *Dynamic Sociology* followed consistently the logic of his individualistic hypothesis. Government was a phase of the development of society. The primary function of government was protection, which became essential as conflicts between individuals became more and more serious. Society was the necessary result of populousness and was not for the protection of individuals as was often thought. Society is the result of blind circumstance, not at all due to design. Government, on the other hand, is a product of genius, an invention. Government arose for protection against the conflicts of anti-social beings. Applying his idea of aggregation, Ward finds four states in the progress of social aggregation. The first state was the solitary or autarchic stage, which characterized the period between animals and human beginnings. The second or constrained stage is represented among the lowest existing tribes. It shows the beginning of constraint of anti-social beings into some kind of group relations. The third stage, the national or politarchic, is the present one. The fourth and future stage, the pantarchic, will result from the inevitable conflicts of the present national stage, thus following the law of aggregation to its ultimate mundane limits.²

¹ It should be noted that Ward's thinking is at times confused by his use of association to cover both those facts in social life which MacIver in his *Community* has distinguished as "community" and "association." Community is defined by MacIver to be any area of common life, or town, or district, or country, or even wider area. An association is an organization of social beings for the pursuit of some common interest or interests. At times Ward is thinking of the one rather than the other of these two terms and falls into apparent contradictions. The real source of confusion, however, seems to be his atomistic prepossessions.

² *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 464-67.

Government was an invention which brought some order into a state of incessant strife and conflict, which otherwise would have resulted in the decimation of the race. Without government there could have been no society. But government, being an invention, was an individual product, not a social one, and, once discovered, was imposed on the masses. The political history of the past has been largely the history of attempts of the few to impose the burden of government on a rebellious people. Progress has been along the line of removing the burden of government.

With the further details of his theory of the origin of government we are not concerned. The theory as outlined above was largely given up after Ward became acquainted with Gumpłowicz' group-conflict theory, which Ward adopted as the most important contribution to sociology:

Gumpłowicz and Ratzenhofer have abundantly and admirably proved that the genesis of society as we see it and know it has been through the struggle of races. I do not hope to add anything to their masterly presentation of this truth, which is without question the most important contribution thus far made to the science of sociology. We at last have a true key to the solution of the question of the origin of society.¹

In his subsequent writings he utilized the group conflict as the fundamental concept in treating of the origin of the state as we now know it.² Although accepting this theory he did not alter his earlier position regarding the anti-social nature of man. On this point he says in a later work:

In *Dynamic Sociology* I took strong ground against the Aristotelian idea that man is a gregarious animal and the Comtean doctrine that he is by nature a social being, and pointed out a large number of what I called "anti-social" qualities in his nature, and I also worked out what I conceived must have been the several steps which the race has taken in its passage from the purely

¹ *Pure Sociology*, pp. 213-14.

² Ward, however, never accepted the multiple theory of the origin of races as did Gumpłowicz. Positing a single origin of the human race he then finds a period in which disintegration takes place, "they soon came to differ in all their details" (*Pure Sociology*, p. 201). But later a process of integration began in which group conflict played a part. It is at this period of development that he would utilize Gumpłowicz' theory. It is interesting to note that it was Ward's personal contact with Gumpłowicz that caused the latter to abandon his theory of multiple origins. See Gumpłowicz' article of appreciation of Ward, *American Journal of Sociology*, X (March, 1905), 643.

animal state to the developed social state. I do not adhere to that position now merely because I assumed it then, but rather because, notwithstanding the little real evidence, subsequent indications have tended to confirm it. I will here emphasize only one point. Human government is an art only possible in a rational being. No animal possesses a government in any such sense. The primary object of government is to protect society from just these anti-social influences, and it is generally admitted that without it society could not exist. This means that even in the most enlightened peoples the anti-social tendencies are still so strong that they would disrupt society, but for an artificial system of protection. To call man of whom this can be said a social being by nature is obviously absurd. No doubt strong social impulses exist among men, but they are the product of ages of constraint. Man may be in process of becoming a social being, but he will not have really become such until it shall be possible to dispense entirely with the protective function of government. Universal education and further centuries of custom may ultimately transform human character to this extent, until habit shall become at least a second nature, and accomplish the same result that natural selection has accomplished in making gregarious animals and social insects; but thus far society, which is the product of the collective reason working for its own interests, is still dependent upon the momentary exercise of that reason in preventing its own overthrow.¹

A few more words should be said concerning the function of this large group organization called government. Ward was careful to distinguish between actual government in the past and possible government in the future. The former was a necessary evil as protective device, while the latter is an art. By utilization of the principle of attractive rather than repressive legislation, by placing the government in the hands of social scientists as an instrumentality of social control, it could be made the chief agency in directing social development toward desired ends. It would thus become the agency whereby the psychic factor could shape the group life. Ward's elaboration of this form of group activity and control has made him one of the most inspiring factors in the development of sociological thought in America.

For the purpose of paving the way for presenting the contrasts in the use of the group concept as between Ward and contemporary sociology in the United States, it is worth while to take up Ward's discussion of the nature and origin of religion, of morals, of language, and of the human mind. These will bring out quite clearly the

¹ Ward, *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 91-92.

point of view and the method of approach of the contrasted positions. The four problems will be taken in order.

Ward's discussion of religion is one of the stimulating portions of his *Dynamic Sociology*, both to those who agree with him and to those who do not. We are not concerned with the merits of the controversy, but rather with the way in which he accounts for the social phenomena which are grouped under the term religion. This should show quite clearly and concisely the way in which he uses or fails to use the group as a tool of thought for his genetic account. In defining his term religion, after reviewing a long list of proposed definitions by various writers, he adopts Tylor's definition, namely, the belief in spiritual beings, as the essential feature of the term.¹ This definition narrows the field of what most sociologists of the present time would mean by the same term. In itself it also suggests the rational approach to the religious problem which was characteristic of his discussion, as subsequent references will show. Not only is religion rational, and thus a late development, but it is also an individual matter, coming largely from the achievements of more brilliant individual speculators upon the mysterious phenomena of human environment and human subjective experience. The presence of the rational idea in Ward's thought is illustrated in the following statement of the position of religion:

Looking back now over the whole field, there remains no difficulty in recognizing the true position of religion as a social factor. It was simply a necessity of the condition of things that it should have come into existence as it has done. The placing of a rational being in a world such as this constitutes the all-sufficient explanation of the development of a religious sentiment and religious institutions. The fact was pointed out with some care in the Introduction, that the phenomena of the universe present to the untaught mind a maze of incomprehensible data for speculation. The true nature of phenomena can only be known after ages of profound scientific thought and labor. . . . Religion owes the possibility of its existence to the paradoxes of nature . . . to the incontrovertible fact that in the nature of things a rational being must, as a direct and inevitable consequence of his rationality, be led into most vital errors, for which he must further be deceived into cherishing the most intense regard, until, by the slow march of solid

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, pp. 262-63.

knowledge and the ultimate adoption of the scientific method of laborious research and crucial tests, truth at last emerges and the clouds of errors vanish.¹

In pursuing the argument, Ward points out that the belief in deities was a part of the speculative efforts of seers to explain the phenomena of nature for which there could be no true explanation. In accounting for the creation of deities or gods or spirits he accepts both the objective and the subjective explanations. By the former he means the tendency of primitive peoples to attribute to phenomena of nature, particularly the unusual and strange events, their own characteristics. By the subjective origin of deities he means essentially the Spencerian theory of deductions based on individual experiences such as dreams, trances, etc.² It is only with the coming of the scientific method and point of view that the regular and non-spectacular occurrences of nature attract the attention of the student, in the effort to explain such movements by the principle of law rather than by reference to an erratic unseen being. Ward's thought in this respect is along the line of Spencer's statement of the decreasing province of the unknown.

This summary is sufficient for the purpose of showing that Ward's approach to the problem of the origin of religion is essentially individualistic. The group finds no place in the process at all. In so far as it has a function, it is merely the receptive and conserving agency, once the more able members of the race have projected their speculations. Coming after the developing of the "rational faculty" religion could have no part in the formation of that part of the mind. Being essentially a philosophy of origins based on false premises, it necessarily acted as a barrier to the development of science and truth, and is bound to dissolve as each of its preserves is taken away by scientific explanations. The error which comes to view so clearly in Ward's discussion of this particular problem is his failure to utilize the group as the center of his thinking. The contrast between the modern discussions of the origin and nature of religion and that presented by Ward is essentially that presented by the use of the group concept on the one hand, which implies an adequate social psychology, and the neglect of the

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, II, 270.

² *Ibid.*, 263-64.

group concept on the other hand.¹ Ward's discussion of this particular problem reveals very clearly his need of the group concept in his thought, and the difficulties in which his lack of it involved him.

Closely allied with the problem of the origin of religion is that of the evolution of morals, and of moral codes. Both problems have been a source of never-ending speculation. Like the problem of religious origins, the problem of morals affords an opportunity to bring out distinctly the extent to which Ward has made the most of the group as a concept of sociological thought. The contribution of sociology to ethics rests largely upon the assumption of the group approach to the whole moral problem, both for an explanation of the origin and for the tests of validity of ethical codes. We shall be interested chiefly in discovering how far Ward has gone in that direction rather than in attempting to set forth a rounded discussion of his system of morals as he has sketched it in his first work.

Ward was much influenced by Spencer's treatment of ethics from the utilitarian standpoint. Happiness is the ultimate end of all effort,² whether the actor be an individual or a group. Those acts which promote the greatest happiness in general are good; those which do not are bad.³ From this test of happiness all acts and all codes must find their final moral authority. The absolute systems of ethics can have no standing except in so far as they conform to the fundamental test of happiness. In that respect Ward's thinking marks a step away from the theological systems toward a more pragmatic theory of moral criteria. In general his system shares the advantages as well as the limitations of the utilitarian school.

Ward recognized, of course, that certain acts of man as well as acts of animals are of a non-moral nature. Man's acts approach

¹ Space prevents a discussion of the way in which the growing recognition of the group and the use of an adequate social psychology have changed the whole religious perspective. As illustrations of the point, the following are suggested: King, *The Origin and Development of Religion*; Ames, *Psychology of Religion*; and Coit, *The Soul of America*. The contrast between these books and Ward is too apparent to need further comment.

² *Dynamic Sociology*, II, 108.

³ *Ibid.*, 133-34.

those of animals (1) during childhood, (2) in idiocy, and (3) in savagery.¹ The distinction between man's acts in general and those of animals is that the latter are impulsive while the former are rational.² The latter spring from the intellect and can take place only after the intellect has been evolved.

In so far as man is concerned, a moral situation arises when there is a conflict of desires. These desires may be either internally or externally stimulated. The conflict is one that is finally settled by the triumph of the strongest desire determined on a pleasure-pain basis.³

In other words, "Ethics is the science of psychological mechanics."⁴ The individual reason may be mistaken in its pleasure-pain valuations, but once the reckoning is made, it acts on that line which apparently offers most pleasure. In so far as a moral instinct appears like the social instinct, it is a result of a conflict of desires⁵ running through a long period of history. In tracing the genesis of sympathy and the altruistic attitude, Ward shows how in the lower stages of mental development the egoistic attitude and egoistic actions predominate. As we rise in the scale of mental development the altruistic interest increases in power and tends more and more to control conduct as civilization advances.⁶ The savage represents a stage midway between the lower forms and the highest forms of human development. This whole progressive movement is a result of a developing intellect which perceives an ever wider range of happiness, including the welfare of others besides the actor. In developing this idea of the progressive ascendancy of altruism Ward seems to be following Comte, whose sociological view, according to one writer, has two distinct characteristics, of which one is "that it takes for granted as an empirical fact the existence of two tendencies in human nature, the egoistic and the altruistic, of which the latter, either naturally and unconsciously or assisted by intellectual knowledge and control, is gradually gaining the ascendancy over the former."⁷

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, II, 331.

² *Ibid.*, 328.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 395.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 329.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 328.

⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 445-47.

⁷ Merz, *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, IV, 534. The other characteristic referred to is that of the law of the three states.

Ward recognized the fact of diversity of moral codes and the consequent fallibility of conscience. Moral codes are "built up from the united judgments of men of all ages."¹ These codes display varying degrees of perfection both as to their content and their application. But all moral codes and rules are but the reflection of the actual morals, not the creators of them. Since moral action depends upon intelligence, the real moral education is the education of intelligence, the education of information.² The surest moral guide for conduct is knowledge of the relation one sustains to his fellows, to society, and to the world in general.³ Complete knowledge of the relative competing desires would lead inevitably to the choice of the good.⁴

Without going into Ward's discussion further, enough has been given to suggest the almost complete absence of the group as a method of approach to the moral problem. The social or group approach to the problems of morals and religion, which is the central method in contemporary study of social origins, was not present in his treatment of either. With him the whole problem of the origin of moral codes and standards was solved by the individual intellect passing upon the relative worth of competing desires, which in themselves were essentially individual phenomena. On this point Ward again reveals clearly the contrast between his fundamental conception and that of the newer sociology. The former approaches his problem from an individualistic standpoint. The group is nearly ignored, while in the latter the group is the fundamental concept upon which the sociological structure is being reared. It goes without saying, almost, that Ward's discussion of morals is a logical result of his individualistic psychology. The purpose here is merely to point out the fact that in so promising a field as the problem of the evolution of morals, Ward almost completely ignored the fundamental tool—the group concept.

Ward's discussion of the origin and significance of language is a defective treatment of an admittedly difficult problem. We shall

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, II, 144.

² *Ibid.*, 360.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Although it is beside our problem, it is interesting to note that Ward always has in mind, when speaking of a conflict of desires, disjunctive values only. That is, the choice is either one or the other. He never considers a very common type of valuation problem in which the problem is that of reconstructing the whole conflict situation so as to save both competing values.

endeavor to discover how far he has made use of the group concept in his discussion of this fundamental factor in human development. In order to present a basis for certain remarks it will be well to summarize briefly his theory of the origin of language. Language is a much broader term than speech.¹ Language is the product of thought and includes forms of communication other than speech.² The latter is a "mode in which language presents itself in man who happens to possess the organs which render it possible."³ "Language, therefore, includes four distinguishable forms of communication, namely gesture language, oral speech, written language, and printed language."⁴ These also represent an ascending scale of evolutionary progress of the most important kind. The course of evolution from the lowest to the highest form of communication was a gradual and natural one. Even at that point where the psychic phenomena begin there could be no hiatus:

If at this particular point where psychic phenomena begin there is an absolute break, and something is introduced whose elements are not contained in anything that preceded it, I do not see why we should find fault with the introduction of any number of such external elements or factors, and there seems to be no reason for stopping short of the most arbitrary theological explanation of all the phenomena of the universe.⁵

One might say in passing that Ward did not succeed in bridging that gap which he feared. Admitting the pre-speech type of communication or language, which is called the gestural form of language, he furnished no process or explanation of the process whereby the gestural type of language took on meaning, and became "significant." Right here of course is the fundamental problem of social psychology, the key to the whole problem of the origin of language, of mind, and all that those terms signify in human evolution. Ward could not furnish this because he was involved in his individualistic prepossessions. He had no tools of thought or analysis by which he could save himself from the hiatus mentioned above. The thing that he lacked was the group concept as the starting-point for his thinking and an adequate social psy-

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, II, 180.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Pure Sociology*, p. 123.

chology to elucidate the process. He recognized, of course, that it would be wholly impossible for a "race leading what is understood as a 'solitary life, i.e., a life in which there is the least degree of association consistent with the continuance of the species,' ever to acquire the art of speech,"¹ but of the essentially social origin of speech through the process of stimulus and response and the resultant development of meaning he was entirely unaware. It remained for contemporary social psychology to fill in the breach which has been so conspicuous in sociological thought even up to the present time.²

As in all the problems of origins of which we have treated, Ward falls back upon the development of individual intelligence as the explanation of the origin of speech or human communication. The individual first developed intelligence through the acquisition of a brain and then proceeded to form a language. As he stated it:

The pressing need for some means of intercommunication sufficiently accounts for the development of language. With the advance of brain mass and brain structure, there grew up ideas and thoughts. These demanded expression and this demand constituted a new set of desires. The same influence which created these new desires furnished the faculty whose exercise devised the means for their satisfaction. Thought was not content simply to struggle for expression. It applied the indirect method. Unable to think in such a manner as to convey the nature of the thought directly to other minds, it devised means by which its character could be manifested through the physical organs of the body in such a way as to affect the senses of others, and be conveyed through these to others' minds.³

These words give a pretty good summary of Ward's point of view upon the matter now under discussion. He assumes the priority of the individual mind which has thoughts it wants to express. The group comes in only secondarily as furnishing the field for the expression of thoughts. Of the fundamental importance of the group in creating thought and mind, Ward has no

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 454.

² The point suggested in the paragraph is the key to the whole criticism which I am trying to make. It is capable of wide expansion beyond the possible limits of this part of the discussion. For elucidation I refer to the lectures and published articles of Professor George H. Mead, who has made this his peculiar contribution to the field of psychological sociology.

³ *Dynamic Sociology*, II, 182.

conception. The position which he takes is exactly the opposite of that of modern social psychology. In other words, Ward starts with the individual, while the latter starts with the group. Here again we see the pitfalls into which the lack of a proper understanding of the group as the fundamental sociological concept led Ward. He could give us no adequate account of the origin of language, just as he could give us no adequate account of the other human phenomena, partly because of his failure to grasp the significance of the group as the starting-point of social analysis.

The difficulty of the traditional point of view which Ward followed is suggested by Ford in these words:

Even those who adopt the Individual Hypothesis generally admit social conditions as a proximate phase in the genesis of man. But if the argument employed to account for the transition from an unsocial ape to a social man is examined it is found logically defective. Reduced to its simplest form it comes to this, that as man becomes man he is man. The formation of society is attributed to perception of advantages through increased mental development. As one writer of this school puts the case, it dates from "the dawn of intellectuality." What caused this dawn? The affirmation imputes to the antecedent animal species a specific characteristic of the human species, and is a case of reasoning in a circle. When it is stated that man was not originally a social animal, but that later on man engaged in social intercourse, and developed speech, a primitive condition is imputed to man in which he could not have become man, but the logical hiatus is veiled by applying the term "man" to an animal of specifically different character. It is like talking of a bird that did not originally breathe air but acquired the habit through flight. *Homo alalus*, or speechless man, is a pseudo-concept. Even Haeckel, who invented the term to indicate a hypothetical phase in human genesis, says, "Man originated from the preceding stage in consequence of the gradual improvement of inarticulate animal sounds into true articulate speech." That is to say, man did not precede speech, but speech preceded man, and as speech is unquestionably a social product, the formation of community was a condition precedent to the formation of the human species.¹

The discussion of the problem of the origin of language leads directly to the problem of the origin and nature of the mind, because of the close relation of the two. As has been stated above, Ward assumed, or rather attempted to prove, the development of the mind as the precursor of language, the latter being an inven-

¹ Ford, *Natural History of the State*, pp. 127-28. The reference to Ford does not imply that the writer of this paper shares Ford's views of the state or of sociology.

tion of the mind to express thoughts and ideas which already existed. In that respect he was following the traditional view which prevailed then and which still infests a good deal of sociological theory. The essential factor in the evolution of the mind was the increased brain capacity which is sufficient to explain the whole human era of evolution:

Without inquiring how it happened that the creature called man was singled out to become the recipient of this extraordinary endowment, we may safely make two fundamental propositions, which tend to show that this question is not as important as it seems. The first is that if the developed brain had been awarded to any one of the other animals of nearly the same size of man, that animal would have dominated the earth the same way that man does. The other is that a large part of what constitutes the physical superiority of man is directly due to his brain development.¹

The way in which the brain was developed through the process of individual survival is summarized in this way:

That extraordinary brain development which so exclusively characterizes man was acquired through the primary principle of advantage. Brain does not differ in this respect from horns or teeth or claws. In the great struggle which the human animal went through to gain his supremacy it was brain that finally enabled him to succeed, and under the biologic law of selection, where superior sagacity meant fitness to survive, the human brain was gradually built up cell upon cell, until the fully developed hemispheres were literally laid over the primary ganglia and the cranial walls enlarged to receive them.²

While increase of brain was the cause of so many qualities which are regarded as strictly human, Ward recognized that it was also an effect of the tendency of human beings to associate. He suggests, however, that this tendency to associate may not have arisen until after the brain had been sufficiently increased by other causes to enable the individuals to perceive the advantage of association.³ In other words, as shown in the discussion of the origin of society, the group enters in as a serious factor in human development only after there had been a considerable development of the reflective powers of man. Once that stage had been reached, the social factor became one, and possibly the most important, factor

¹ *Pure Sociology*, p. 67.

² *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, p. 262.

³ *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 438.

in future development. The individual gradually becomes transformed into a more and more social being, but always starting with a considerable development of what is called mind as the first step in the series of development.

In general it may be said that both phylogenetically and ontogenetically Ward takes the mind as a datum. It is a thing in itself. It is dependent on, a function of, the brain mass, but it is something more. It has an existence. It is an entity.¹ It may be developed and allowed to improve, but it is not created by a social environment. The group merely furnishes the material upon which it may work. In other words, his psychological view was both individualistic and non-functional. To illustrate some of the indications of his limitations with particular reference to the group factor, several quotations may be adduced. These are drawn from that one of his later works in which he is particularly interested in showing the fundamental part played by the environment in the development of genius. There, if anywhere, one would expect a correction of his individualistic prepossessions. Of the general relation of the "mind" to environment he says:

But if they (natural forces) are to accomplish anything they must be freed. It is the same with the forces of mind. They are ever pressing and only need to be freed in order to achieve. But that from which they must be freed is the environment. Tarde was right. The environment represents opposition. The material surroundings are perpetually checking and repressing the spontaneous efforts of mind.²

This statement shows quite clearly the psychology running through Ward's thinking. The mind to him is a thing in itself; what it needs is room to unfold. The self is given as an imprisoned power which needs but to be freed. It may be stunted and maimed by an unfavorable environment, but it is there to be realized. It might be objected to this criticism that Ward is merely crediting each biological organism with the characteristics embodied in the germ plasm, which are the energy deposits of the past but require a favorable nurture before they can survive and grow. If Ward

¹ In a later book, *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, pp. 225-26, Ward refers to the conception of the mind as an entity, as the chief error in social thought. His own writings confirm his judgment in this respect.

² *Applied Sociology*, p. 128.

means no more than that, his view is sound so far as it goes.¹ It stops short then, however, with a negative interpretation of the development of the mind or self. It fails to utilize the whole field of the positive development of the mind or self in a group life. The problem is more than one of removing an oppressing environment; it is the problem of the positive creation of a mind through the interstimulation and response between social beings.²

Speaking further of the importance of the environment in social development, Ward says:

The real question is, what kind of minds would persons thus isolated have? (That is, persons shut off from association.) It is only too obvious that their minds would be almost completely blank. No amount of native mental capacity could prevent this. A Bacon or a Descartes, if made the subject of such an experiment, would get no farther than one of moderate powers. He would appear to ordinary persons a fool. Locke was right. Mind without experience is a blank sheet of paper or an empty cabinet. The substratum of mind is nothing until it is supplied with something to exercise itself upon.³

This statement displays a pretty clear conception of the significance of what has been called social inheritance, or knowledge, as Ward would prefer to call it. Mind is still, however, a thing which comes into possession of, or exercises itself upon, external

¹ Since the criticism attributes no exception to Ward's whole viewpoint there is no reason to believe that the criticism does him an injustice. He is thinking of the "mind," not the germ plasm.

² The criticism of Ward's general position is suggested in the following brief quotation from Dewey: "Speaking in general terms, there is no more a problem of the origin of society than there is of the origin of chemical reactions; things are made that way. But a certain kind of associated or joint life when brought into being has an unexpected by-product—the formation of those peculiar acquired dispositions, sets, attitudes, which are termed mind. This by-product continually gains in relative importance. It increasingly becomes the significant acquisition among all the varied reorganizations of native tendencies. That anything which may properly be called mind or intelligence is not an original possession but is a consequence of the reorganization of instincts under the conditions supplied by associated life in the family, in the schools, in the market place, and the forum, is not remote inference from a speculative reconstruction of the mind of primitive man; it is a conclusion confirmed by the development of specific beliefs, ideas, and purposes in the life of every infant now observable."—"Need for Social Psychology," *Psychological Review*, XXIV, 272.

³ *Applied Sociology*, p. 270.

objects. Ward has no psychology by which to explain the process of the development of the self. His persons are still isolated individuals which appropriate knowledge. The mechanical nature of the educational process is illustrated by his use of the box analogy. According to this analogy, the brain is a kind of receptacle into which knowledge enters as a content. The boxes may be of varied quality; some of mahogany, some inlaid with precious stones, while others are of cheaper material down to the very poorest strawboard incapable of holding anything. The varied boxes, except the very poorest, are capable of holding the same contents, the greatest truths ever discovered. A mahogany box with poor contents is inferior to a cruder, less perfect box with better contents. The contents are knowledge, the acquired qualities. The mind is represented by both the box and its contents. Ward's educational program rested upon the problem of bringing the mind, the knower, into possession of truths to be known, the problem of epistemology.

The criticism to be made against Ward's position is not to question his appreciation of the part played by accumulated human experience in the development of people, nor of the part played by environment and opportunity in the creation of diversities in achievement. His criticism of the hereditarians was sound, yet his approach remained essentially individualistic, on account of his lack of an adequate social psychology. In other words, he possessed no basic process by which he could explain the essentially social nature of the mind even if he had so desired. His individualistic approach to the whole problem of evolution precluded an adequate grasp of the essence of his problem. He was unconscious of the essential place of the group in sociology.

Before leaving the study of Ward's sociology in relation to the group concept, attention must be called to the fact that those important groups, which have been called the primary groups, receive practically no attention in *Dynamic Sociology*. More attention was given, as pointed out above, to the larger political groupings such as society and the state. The small groups such as the family, the neighborhood, the "borough," the community, have come to be recognized as fundamental and primary in their

relation to human behavior. In comparison with these local groupings, including the occupational groups, the larger political units are relatively unimportant. Ward did not perceive the significance of the smaller groups as factors in the development of human nature, and in social control. In other words he failed to use the group concept at the most vital part of social analysis. His thinking was that of an individualistic biologist attempting to create a sociology without the group as its chief corner stone.

In his conception of evolution his unit was the individual. The individual carried on and was the end of the selective process. The struggle was always an individual one. The individual side of the process was stressed to the neglect of the factor of co-operation as a concomitant of all struggle and as a serviceable characteristic. The place of the group unit in the evolutionary process is suggested by Darwin.¹ Macfarlane expresses the same view:

We accept it then, as a proven principle amongst animals lower than man, that the co-operative or social plan has ever tended to evolve and select forms which have possessed resulting advantages over the competitive plan and that such caused them to become, in spite of their apparent weakness, truly dominant groups alike in high organization, in capacity for defence, and in reproductive capacity. So it is safe to say that, for every individual which lives a keenly competitive life, a dozen can be found that are united in such social activities and in general provision for the species that the common welfare of each individual is nearly always assured. Furthermore, with advancing mentality and social organization this principle is the more perfectly exhibited.²

Baldwin refers to the factor of the group in the process of evolution in similar words, emphasizing the group side which Ward did not sufficiently appreciate. He says:

This gives, as I conceive it, a sort of selection and survival which is quite different from that recognized in the strictly biological sciences. We find that the utility to be subserved is one of conscious co-operation and union among individuals; and the unit whose selection is to secure this utility must have the corresponding characters. This unit is not the individual but a *group of individuals who show in common their gregarious or social nature in actual exercise*; each is selected in company with certain others, who survive with him and for the same reason. Thus the selective unit, considered

¹ *Descent of Man*, chaps. iii, v.

² Macfarlane, *The Causes and Course of Organic Evolution*, p. 776.

from the external or social point of view is a *group of individuals*, greater or smaller as the utility subserved may require; and from the point of view of the subjective or psychic process it implies the mental attitude which brings the individual into useful co-operation. Calling this latter the "personal" aspect of social fitness, we may define it by using the term "*socius*." The psychological unit is a *socius*, a more or less socialized individual, fitted to enter into fruitful social relations. And the objective requirement remains that of a group of such individuals making up a social situation. These two conceptions, then, become the watchwords of our evolutionary social psychology and sociology respectively—the "*socius*" and the "*social situation*."¹

Ward's failure to use the group concept in his account of evolution is but one of the defects which we have seen to follow from his individualistic point of view. The group, as the fundamental fact in sociology, had not yet been discovered at the time Ward's system was built up, consequently it assumed only a secondary and insignificant place in his thinking. To what extent contemporary sociology has reversed his method of approach will be the question that will occupy the next chapter.

¹ Baldwin, *Darwin and the Humanities*, p. 43.

[To be continued]

PROGRESS IN PHILADELPHIA

CLINTON ROGERS WOODRUFF
Philadelphia

For many years (since 1854), Philadelphia's governmental machinery was burdened by a double-chambered legislature of 146 members—48 in the upper branch and 98 in the lower, making it one of the largest of its kind not only in America but in the world. To expect satisfactory results from such a body modeled on the federal plan of government was to expect the impossible. It made "organization" or "boss" control necessary and inevitable. In 1919, as a consequence of years of incessant agitation and activity, a new charter was granted the city by the state legislature which represented a victory for strong, simple, representative government, thus fairly completing the great movement begun in 1900 at Galveston. The outstanding achievement of this new charter, which by the way is a model of conciseness, consisting of 23,282 words and likewise a model of admirable draftsmanship, is a small council of twenty-one. The members receive a living wage in the shape of an annual salary of \$5,000. The members of the old council served without pay—from the city. In some instances they held other administrative offices, mostly under the county government; sometimes a federal office; sometimes in an important corporation. Practically all of them were in a position where strong outside influence could be brought to bear upon them if they showed signs of dangerous or embarrassing independence.

Under the new charter the councilmen are elected for a term of four years from the eight senatorial districts which are as nearly homogeneous and compact as it is possible to make political subdivisions.

We now have a South Philadelphia district, a West Philadelphia one, a northeastern district, a central district, a Germantown district, and so on through the list, all with substantially

similar needs and composition. There is at least one councilman from each district and one additional councilman for each 20,000 assessed voters. So as to keep the council small, and as a recognition of coming events, the charter contains an interesting provision that "if at any time hereafter the women of the Commonwealth shall be given the right to vote, the unit of representation shall be 40,000 assessed voters instead of 20,000, so that the council shall continue to be composed of twenty-one members."

One of the arguments most frequently urged for a small, compact municipal legislature has been the facilities it affords the voter to understand his government and run it directly without the intervention of a great corps of practical politicians. While advocating the charter before the people of Philadelphia it was maintained that such a body would constitute a form of representative government which the voters themselves could handle with a minimum of political organization. My gratification can be easily imagined when I read that Congressman Vare, one of the two brothers at that time controlling the political organization in Philadelphia, declared before the Young Republican Club: "Abolish councils and you lose your trained politicians; and if that happens where will we ever get a candidate for mayor?" Certainly our experience with mayors for some years prior to the new charter had been such as to contemplate such a possibility with a considerable degree of equanimity!

To be sure it is too soon to speak with positiveness as to the extent to which anticipations have been met, but it is a fair question to ask, "To what extent has the new council made good during the first six months of its operation?" It is equally fair to reply that the results thus far have not been such as to make the advocates of the charter unduly proud. At the same time, for one I believe that the new provisions represent the embodiment of the representative district, the substitution of an effective instrument for a clumsy one, and the establishment of a legislative body that will in time become not only a real policy-determining body, but the basis of a city-administrator form of government. I hesitate to use the term "city manager" for that might be too considerable of a jolt. It is inevitable though that development of public opinion along those lines is in order, as I shall hope to show later.

No one can maintain, successfully, that the new council is boss-ridden. It certainly has made discussion possible and inevitable. It is no longer a mere machine for the registering of the previously determined will of an organization. It embodies an opportunity for the people to express *their* wishes if they desire. It abolishes dual office-holding in the legislative body, which for a generation had been the corner stone of "organization" control of councils and a curse and an obstacle of great resistance to forward movements. Now no person may hold the office of councilman while holding any other office, position, or employment of profit under the city, county, or state and no councilman shall be eligible to any office under the city during the term for which he shall have been elected. This means much in the way of political freedom, for councilmen are no longer compelled to serve two masters.

Incidentally it is interesting to note that the bicameral council is happily almost extinct, only Baltimore, Atlanta, and Kansas City among the larger cities of the country continuing them. There are also a few New England towns which cling to the federal plan—but all these are doomed, as the movement for simplified local government continues on its triumphant way.

In estimating the advantages of the new council, the breaking down of the influence of the ward must not be overlooked. Many of the wards have not been changed since the year of consolidation (1854). Consequently in the old bicameral body they continued to exercise the same influence as when the first alignment was made. This was manifestly unfair as it gave wards with less than 1,000 registered voters the same weight in the upper branch as the newer wards with 15,000 to 18,000 registered voters. The senatorial districts are not only more homogeneous but have been more frequently rearranged. Moreover, the establishment of a quota for representation makes it possible for those districts which increase their population between reapportionment periods to secure the additional representation to which their increased population entitles them.

Coupled with this prohibition of dual office-holding in the new charter is a modern civil service chapter introducing up-to-date methods of selecting public employees on a basis of merit administered by a commission elected by the council instead of appointed

by the mayor, the chief appointing power in the city. The commission chosen by the council at its organization entered upon the discharge of its highly important duties with a full realization of the employment problems involved. It has begun the classification and standardization of the approximately 15,000 positions, an obligation imposed upon it by the charter. This work will be completed in time to be available for the mayor's use in the preparation of the budget, which the new charter requires him to make. It is the hope and ambition of the Civil Service Commission that in time the council, the administrative branches, and the people generally will come to regard its work as that of the city's employment agency and as the means for placing public service upon a dignified, honorable, and useful basis.

Philadelphia's commission aims to find a substitute for the term "Civil Service Examination," which has proved a positive hindrance to the cause of the merit system. Its connotation is certainly most unfortunate. To most people it suggests a classroom ordeal in which one's chances of survival vary in inverse ratio to the length of time he has been out of school or college. It is quite to be expected, therefore, that any proposal to fill high-grade positions in the public service by civil service methods should meet at first with a considerable degree of skepticism in many quarters.

In a striking leaflet entitled *How Far Can Civil Service Go*, the Philadelphia Bureau of Municipal Research "confesses that at this time it is unable to think of a more suitable term. It throws some additional light upon the real nature of an up-to-date civil service examination and thus helps to introduce a new meaning into an old term. The more progressive civil service commissions have long ceased to rely, to any appreciable extent, on the somewhat academic test used so largely in the early days of the merit system. They now use a series of different tests of a very practical character designed to gauge different qualifications and appropriate for the filling of different types of positions. Carpenters and painters, for example, are no longer asked when Columbus discovered America. They are required to demonstrate their skill by doing an actual job of carpentering or painting. Applicants for high-grade professional, technical, or administrative positions, in like

manner, are no longer quizzed in schoolroom fashion with regard to textbook facts. They are invited to enter a dignified competition in which their past career and their personality are determining factors rather than any feat of memory. In examinations of this character, applicants frequently never meet together in a single room, but prepare their statements of training and experience in their own private offices or in their homes and send them, together with any books or articles they may have published, to the civil service commission by mail. In addition they may be asked to discuss in writing some important technical or administrative problem, which may also be delivered through the mails. All of these evidences of the qualifications of the various applicants are rated by a board of special examiners who themselves are professional men or have had long experience in the kind of work for which the examination is held. Those applicants who receive a passing mark in this part of the test may then be summoned before the special examining board for a personal interview in order that their personal qualifications may also be taken into account. Finally, the grades for the various parts of the test are averaged and the successful applicants are placed on a list of eligibles in the order of their rating. In civil service parlance, this is what is known as the "unassembled examination."

It is no longer necessary to argue the efficacy of this kind of test. It sounds like a sensible method, and experience has demonstrated over and over again that it produces results. Many important public posts with salaries ranging from \$3,000 to \$10,000 have been filled, not only by the federal Civil Service Commission, but by state and local commissions as well. Men of high standing and national reputation have not hesitated to enter an examination when conducted on such a dignified plane. It has been possible, moreover, for persons living in entirely different parts of the country to compete.

In view of the success of this improved type of civil service examination is there any good reason, the bureau most pertinently asks, why we should not proceed with confidence to extend the merit system just as high up in the service as the present law permits us to go? By so doing we shall take a long step toward

making public service not merely a blind-alley employment but a dignified and honorable career.

This new charter not only makes all this possible, but it deals in an up-to-date way with the highly important question of promotion within the municipal service. One of the new city officials came out in opposition to the proposal of the civil service commission that city employees should be promoted in the order of merit as determined by a competitive promotion examination, a limited choice (the first two on the list) being permitted from among those having the highest rating. His argument was that an employee's fitness for promotion can be determined better by his superior than by a civil service examination. As the Philadelphia Bureau of Municipal Research observed, there is nothing at all novel either in the proposal of the commission or in the argument of the protesting new official. Wherever an effort has been made to insure to the young men and women of the community an opportunity for a career in the public service, a rule similar to the one adopted by the Philadelphia civil service commission has been followed. In such cities as New York, Chicago, Buffalo, San Francisco, and Cleveland; and in such states as Ohio, New Jersey, New York, and California, employees in the service are given a reasonable assurance that promotion will be according to merit by requiring that when an appointing officer wants to make a promotion he must select one of the three persons whose names stand highest on the list of eligibles. It would be well, as the bureau says, "for this new official who made his protest against the promotion rule to wait until he has an opportunity of observing its results. He may find the promotion examination a much better instrument of selection than he ever dreamed it to be. As a matter of fact the promotion rule in effect in Philadelphia during a considerable period just prior to 1916 was essentially the same as the one now under consideration, and the results during that period appear to have been highly satisfactory."

Political activity of any kind and payment of political contributions by policemen and firemen are made misdemeanors punishable by fine and imprisonment under the new charter, and those convicted of such practices are debarred from office-holding for a

period of two years. Moreover, any taxpayer may bring proceedings to have the employment of the offender declared illegal and to restrain payment of compensation to him, a powerful lever for the effective enforcement of the law.

As originally introduced the charter bill made political activity on the part of any city or county employee punishable not only by dismissal but also by fine and imprisonment; and the enforcement of this provision was strengthened by giving any taxpayer the right to go into court and by writ of mandamus to compel dismissal. Under the charter as passed, however, only policemen and firemen engaging in political activity are to be punished by fine and imprisonment and may be dismissed by taxpayer's action. The sole punishment of other city employees is dismissal from the service, and it is not made enforceable by a taxpayer's action.

These provisions, however, represent long steps forward, and while there are those who wanted all office-holders placed in the same category, the most dangerous, the police and the firemen are taken completely out of politics. This again represents the triumph of a generation's effort. The significance of the gain is fully appreciated when one recalls the notorious Fifth Ward scandal of 1917, where gunmen imported from New York operated under police protection to carry a ward and succeeded in murdering a policeman who was courageously trying to do his duty. For years one of the chief obligations laid upon a Philadelphia policeman had been to serve his political sponsors.

In commenting on this liberating feature of the new charter, the *North American* said:

The criminal classes and large number of the foreign-born population have been voted under police control, being corrupted by grants of immunity from prosecution for lawbreaking or coerced by threats of punishment. The murderous political outrages perpetrated in the Fifth Ward in September, 1917, when an uncorrupted policeman was killed and public officials were assaulted by imported gunmen, aroused a public sentiment which demanded a sweeping away of the atrocious system.

Philadelphia is now in a position where she can depend upon her policemen to do police work and leave politics alone, likewise her firemen. Thus the power and psychology of the uniformed office-holder bids fair to become a thing of the past. Per contra

a new look of independence and efficiency is coming into the eyes of policemen and firemen. They are beginning to realize and appreciate at its real value that they are public servants and not slaves of selfish political interests.

In the platform upon which Hon. J. Hampton Moore was elected, the first mayor of Philadelphia under the new charter, there was this plank:

Second. *Contractor rule.* For many years Philadelphia has been misgoverned by a contractors' combine; public officials have been selected and appointed by contractors who take enormous profits from the city treasury. There can be no condemnation too severe for a system whereby a politician nominates and elects the officer of a city, who, in turn, awards valuable contracts to him and oversees his work. The result is an increase in taxes and the waste of public money. Out of these profits a vast corruption fund is created which is used to bribe and intimidate voters and win elections for the contractor's candidates. This condition is intolerable, and any candidate put forward by the contractor interests must be opposed and defeated, however respectable he may appear to be.

For a full generation Philadelphia had "contractor rule" or "rule by contractors," whichever way one may choose to put it. The same set of men secured the contracts and were potential in selecting those who had supervision of them. Certainly a nice arrangement—for the contractors who seem to have profited greatly by the arrangement, both politically and in fine houses and fine raiment and in substantial bank accounts. During the mayoralty campaign of 1911 the *Philadelphia Record* declared that one of the contractor bosses was worth at least three millions of dollars, and I do not recall that the editor has withdrawn the statement.

In commenting on this situation *Public Works* (formerly known as *The Municipal Journal*) pointed out that it is not necessarily objectionable from the citizens' and taxpayers' standpoint to have such work done by contract but

in this particular case the awarding of contracts for these purposes has become one of the greatest municipal disgraces to be found in the country. Each of these services requires an enormous equipment for a city as large as Philadelphia, while the disposing of the garbage requires a very expensive plant, which, if not used for this purpose, is of practically no value for sale or other use; and yet it had become the practice to delay advertising these contracts

until a very few weeks before the letting (sometimes only two or three), and to let contracts for only one or possibly two years at a time, thus making it impracticable for any bidder to offer reasonable terms except those who were already doing the work and accordingly had the necessary equipment, or else those who felt satisfied that their pull with the powers in control would be sufficient in the future to guarantee their obtaining the contract for several years to come. No contractor could safely make a contract for one year, with no guarantee that he would be able to renew the contract for the succeeding year or years, without including in his price a sufficient amount to entirely reimburse himself for the cost of the equipment. This was one of the most outstanding features which condemned the Philadelphia system of awarding these contracts, but the politicians in control had numerous other methods of rewarding favorites, punishing those who rebelled against their control and entirely eliminating from the competition those whom they did not favor.

It is true that, with the work done by city forces, opportunities for graft are by no means eliminated; but at least the contemptible politicians who have acquired millions through their control of these public services, although themselves holding no position in the government, will be required to reveal themselves, or the grafting methods can be traced more directly to the officials personally responsible for them, who can be gotten at directly by the votes of the public if not by the law.

An effective way of getting rid of the contractors therefore was for the city to do its own work. Philadelphia of all the large cities of the country has been allowing contractors to clean its streets and remove its waste of various kinds. Hereafter the city shall do these things except in special cases when a majority of all the members elected to the council, with the approval of the mayor, may authorize and direct otherwise. This great change in public policy is to be borne in mind when reading the praises of the spokesmen of the Vares (the contractor bosses) when they realized that they could not defeat the charter. These statements represent study in political opportunism. State Senator Vare resorted to every known political expedient to defeat the measure: delay, objurgation, chicanery, wire-pulling, and so on through the whole long list of twisting and turning to which designing politicians resort were brought into play for weeks and months. All to no avail, however. Then *volte face*—their floor leader—one John R. K. Scott, known as a "tenderloin lawyer," praised the bill and Governor Sproul, who had steadfastly stood by the charter from the beginning.

Here is one interview with Senator Vare which is illuminating in more ways than one, and interesting, although lacking the pungency that seasoned the utterances of George Washington Plunkett and Richard Croker. After declaring the measure ridiculous he said:

If the new council wanted the city to do its own work how could it get ready in the middle of the summer? It will take at least a year to raise the necessary funds to finance such a big enterprise. Plants and equipment will cost the city between \$5,000,000 and \$10,000,000. If the charter revisionists had their way, the city would face a situation whereby the job of doing its own street cleaning would be forced upon it with no funds available to carry it out.

The proposal to deprive men of their constitutional rights by prohibiting them from taking any interest in party affairs simply because they hold office under the city is asinine. Their rights should be guarded and protected under the constitution the same as those of any other citizen who has interest enough in the affairs of his own city to want to have some say in its government.

I want to take this opportunity to warn the taxpayers that the taxes will go sky-high, under this bill prepared by impractical people if it should happen to become a law. Every person who has had anything to do with the bill will be ashamed of it and trying to run away from it within six months after it is in operation.

The contractors presented the interesting feature of having certain of their adherents praise the measure (and all of them, with two exceptions, voting for it on final passage) and having certain others find mare's-nests in the bill. "When the devil was sick," and all the rest of the doggerel, was aptly illustrated.

At the present moment the chief of the bureau of street cleaning (a former army officer who was selected from an eligible list resulting from a civil service test) is conducting the necessary preliminary study into the advisability of having the streets cleaned and garbage, ashes, and refuse collected by city force. In the words of the editor of *Public Works*:

Without being over-sanguine, we hope that this may be the beginning of a movement for the improvement of public service conditions in Philadelphia which will end in the public's finally casting off the strangling embrace of the two or three "old men of the sea" whom they have for years been carrying as unofficial recipients of a large share of their taxes.

Article 8 of the new charter act creates in Philadelphia's government a new department, the Department of Public Welfare. This article outlines the powers of the department but leaves the details of organization and administra-

tion to the council and the department head. Briefly stated the main functions of the department are:

1. To "have the care, management, administration, and supervision of all charitable, correctional, and reformatory institutions, and agencies (including any house of correction, but not including hospitals), the control or government of which is entrusted to" the city;

2. "To create, organize, manage, and supervise the various playgrounds, recreation centers, municipal floating-baths, bathing-grounds, and recreation piers, . . . and to plan and recommend . . . and, after appropriate action by ordinance, to create and develop, an adequate and complete system of playgrounds and recreation centers and related activities"; and

3. To "have jurisdiction over such other matters affecting the public welfare as may be provided for by ordinance."

Under the old law the more distinctly social-welfare activities of the city were scattered among various departments and boards. The bureau of correction in the department of public safety had control of the house of correction at Holmesburg; the bureau of charities of the department of public health and charities, managed the general hospital and almshouse; the board of recreation had charge of playgrounds and other recreational activities. Under the new charter all these activities were placed under a department of public welfare. This department may be authorized by the council to take over other welfare activities also. The creation of this department is in line with modern practice in many cities, notably Kansas City and Dayton. In all of these cities highly beneficial results have followed the establishment of welfare departments. The creation of the department of public welfare left the bureau of health as the only bureau in the present department of public health and charities. That bureau is a very large one, containing several divisions—medical inspection, housing and sanitation, dispensaries, vital statistics, child hygiene, food-inspection laboratories, and contagious-disease hospitals—and is of sufficient importance to be a separate department. The charter accomplished this, at the same time abolishing the double-barreled department of public health and charities.

It remained, however, for Senator Vare to point out the iniquity of such a management. In an interview he said "the charter bill notwithstanding some corrections made by Governor Sproul is still ridiculous. Picture the paupers in the county almshouses

and the children in our public playgrounds associated under one department."

Some other features included the shortening of the ballot by making the city's law officer (the city solicitor) an appointive rather than an elective one; the creation of a purchasing agent in place of a department of supplies, and provision for a city architect to take over all the routine architectural work of the city. The more important architectural work however may be handled by outside architects specially chosen by the city architect with the approval of the mayor. Besides co-ordinating a highly specialized part of the city's work now widely scattered among the departments, this arrangement will undoubtedly effect a considerable saving in money.

This new instrument of municipal government has great possibilities, which the first administration chosen to carry into effect, is proceeding to use for the advancement of the true interests of the city. Fortunately the people were sufficiently aroused to the situation and sufficiently well organized to secure the election of a capable man to the mayoralty in the person of J. Hampton Moore. He beat the so-called "unbeatable Vare machine" in the Republican primaries but only by the narrow majority of 1,313. His election in November was by an overwhelming majority. Mayor Moore had made for himself a place high in the federal Congress by reason of his intelligence, industry, and persistence. Moreover, he is not afraid to be known as a politician and his foes know him as a valiant fighter. All of these qualifications he is manifesting in his assumption of the great powers as mayor of Philadelphia.

How came he to be nominated over the popular candidate of so powerful an organization? To his own personality and ability as a campaigner there were added the backing of the independent forces of the city and the Penrose Republican Alliance. All worked together with the result that there was elected a man to carry into effect the highly prized charter of whom the *North American* could say:

The citizens of this city pay a fine tribute to Mayor Moore in accepting at face value his assurances that he intends to make the welfare of the city paramount to all other interests. Philadelphians have heard former mayors

make solemn pledges and virtuous protestations, only to be cast aside for political and personal advantage. But Mayor Moore has already given satisfying proof that his chief aim is to serve the city honestly. This proof lies in his wise and courageous course in meeting every important test which thus far has confronted him as mayor-elect and mayor.

He has shown that he is not only unalterably opposed to the sinister contracting interests which he was pledged and elected to combat, but he has proved that in his official acts as mayor he has been absolutely independent of all other political and special interests.

The most impressive illustration of how his administration is regarded by those who have most at stake is the bitter antagonistic attitude of the Vare political machine. Senator Vare, as dictator of the city Republican organization, defined his attitude toward the new mayor some weeks ago in language intended to intimidate Mr. Moore. This was before the cabinet appointments had been made, and the purpose of the Vare outbreak was obvious.

After the names of the new directors had been announced, disclosing to Senator Vare the disconcerting fact that the mayor had not been moved by the contractors' threats, open war was declared on the new administration. Every effort was made to hamper and even to prevent the orderly reorganization of the city government under the new charter.

The character of a mayor's cabinet appointments may be accepted as an almost infallible index of his aims and purposes, as well as an earnest of the character of the administration.

Whence this admirable charter, about 90 per cent of which became a law in the shape in which it was originally drafted?

Four years ago a charter committee prepared a series of bills to accomplish the reforms embodied in the law of 1919. There were nearly a score of them, which represented close study, hard work, and a very long step forward—but they fell by the wayside. In fact they did not even get out of the committees. Senator Vare was "very much on the job" and had a friendly, not to say a docile, governor in the executive mansion in the person of Governor Brumbaugh. Senator Penrose who favored them was kept in Washington because of the war situation and so Senator Vare took the first set 6-0. The latter does not understand the progressive and never will. He is as defective in his psychology as the Prussian whom he undoubtedly follows in his methods. The charter revisionists were merely delayed, however, in their efforts—not defeated. They renewed their work in the autumn of 1918, got the new governor, William C. Sproul, interested, and kept him

interested to the end. The new movement was inaugurated at a great charter dinner in December, 1918, nine hundred men and women being present—among them Governor-elect Sproul and his attorney-general, William I. Shaffer. From that dinner until the signing of the bill he took a leading part, and it was due to his interest, activity, and forcefulness that Philadelphia has a charter that may properly and conservatively be regarded as a most substantial contribution to the better government of America's third city.

A single measure was agreed upon, a codification of the Bullitt Bill and its amendments with such changes as have been noted and many others of a less conspicuous character necessary for the easy running of the city's machinery. The committee not only drafted the measure, but actively advanced it throughout the city and state, on the stump, in the press, by pamphlet, in the legislative halls, everywhere that an audience could be gathered, and, although the charter revisionists only had ten votes out of forty-one in the Philadelphia delegation to the House of Representatives and two out of the eight senators from the city, they broke legislative precedent and secured the passage of the bill by an overwhelming vote and finally by a practically unanimous vote. When the Vares saw the handwriting on the wall, during a series of test votes, they made virtue of a necessity and "turned in."

How was such a result achieved? There is no doubt among those most closely in touch with the situation that United States Senator Boies Penrose was the greatest single factor in securing the passage of the bill. He brought the weight of his personal influence and of the state organization to bear at critical times. It is only fair to say that without his personal help the measure would have foundered on the rocks. There are those who feel that his interest was primarily a political one—but as I have said on another occasion such overlook the fact that he is a long-time student of city government and that he has long cherished a desire to give to his native city a charter worthy of the city's need and opportunities. So active has he been in recent years in federal affairs and state politics that his fellow-townsmen forget that his first contribution as a publicist was an account of the government of the city of Philadelphia, which he prepared in conjunction with

his then partner (the late Edward P. Allinson) for the Johns Hopkins University series. This book, a model of concise and accurate statement, remains to this day as the most satisfactory statement of Philadelphia's government from the early days of the enactment of the Bullitt Bill. It is to be hoped that this interesting and important publication will be brought up to date so as to include this new charter, which bears the name of Senator Woodward, who introduced it into the Senate and was its sponsor through the legislature.

Those in the confidence of Senator Penrose feel, I am told, that he is not through with his efforts to improve Philadelphia's governmental machinery and that he is studying other ways and means of giving Philadelphia the most modern and up-to-date form of government which can be devised. He feels, I believe, like many others who have given the situation their serious consideration, that the present charter, while it represents a long step forward, is only a step, and by no means the last word. The mayor is still too powerful as an appointing officer and it is out of keeping with modern efficiency methods to make the chief executive of a great corporation subject to the winds and whimsies of politics. When public sentiment is ready for the next step (and we must not overlook the fact that sound public sentiment is leisurely in its development), it will be in the direction of a chief administrator chosen by the council. On several occasions the senior senator has spoken along these lines and it is to be hoped that he will be sufficiently free of other obligations in the near future to give the weight of his personal influence to the active advocacy of these views.

Accompanying the charter bills and enacted through the same influences were a series of electoral reform measures designed to curtail the power of organization control in Philadelphia. Among them was one giving effect to the marking of the ballot so that the voter who marked a straight ticket and a candidate in some other column will have his vote for that candidate counted. Certainly a fair and proper thing to do. Another revised the registration law and opened the door to the reorganization of the Philadelphia board which had become a mere appendix of the Vare organization and revised certain of the onerous provisions that had been inserted

in the original bill (see *American Journal of Sociology*, XIII [1907], p. 252).

Another act for the preservation and return of all ballots which may have been soiled, spoiled, mismarked, mutilated, or rejected for any cause is regarded as an important check on election officers and a preventive of fraud and ballot-box stuffing. The practice of changing polling places arbitrarily for factional political reasons, which has obtained in the past, is ended by the third measure, which requires a petition signed by a majority of the electors in a division before a polling place can be changed.

In reporting on progress in Philadelphia mention must be made of certain of its organizations which have been devoting themselves with ability and public spirit to the city's problems. Easily chief among these is the Bureau of Municipal Research, to which reference has already been made. It concerns itself primarily with problems of administration and in the technique or mechanics of government rather than in "reform" or political activities to secure good men in office and to expose and punish corruption. Bureaus of municipal research are dedicated to the idea that citizens are ultimately responsible for their governments regardless of who is in office, and they therefore seek solutions for problems with as little emphasis as possible on personal or partisan considerations. The Philadelphia bureau has had a long record of accomplishment, and is regarded as having met with commendable success in spite of peculiarly difficult traditions. Like most of the other bureaus it started out with specific studies of governmental departments, with constructive recommendations as to their improvements. In the beginning it met with hostile suspicion on the part of most of the officials, but it gradually established working relations with a great many of the more important officers, and for the first six or seven years it submitted a number of carefully prepared reports which have led to concrete improvements in Philadelphia's local government. Among the permanent results that stand out prominently in this earlier work of the bureau are the following:

The Board of Education reorganized its bureau of compulsory education and made it an effective and serviceable part of the educational system instead of a haven for broken-down henchmen.

The greater part of the early activities of the bureau were in the field of accounting and finance. Prior to 1909 the accounts of all city departments (including the controller's office) were in effect merely memoranda of cash transactions. The bureau co-operated with the controller for several years in installing modern fund and expense accounts in his office and the work was extended to a number of other bureaus and departments. This was accomplished through the assistance of Will B. Hadley, then in the bureau, but subsequently made deputy controller and finally controller. The bureau also co-operated in the preparation of the controller's manual of accounting, which was hailed the country over as a great step forward in municipal accounting.

Budget work has occupied its attention for nearly every year since its organization, and it is interesting to note that the very word "budget" was not even used in connection with municipal finances prior to the bureau's appearance on the scene. Great advance has been made in budget procedure, although the progress seems imperceptibly slow at times, the last signal advance having been made in connection with the financial provisions of the new city charter.

A piece of work done in the Bureau of Health resulted in great benefit. It was the compilation of a digest of all the laws and ordinances pertaining to the public health. These were formerly scattered through numerous volumes and the health authorities and their employees were in frequent difficulty for the lack of a comprehensive guide. Because of the fact that the health officials' time was already fully taken up with their usual duties, they found it impossible to give the amount of time, as well as energy, needed for such a job as making a digest, and the proffer of help from the bureau was heartily welcomed. The work proved so satisfactory that the department printed the digest—a 250-page octavo volume.

For seventeen years there had been no revision of the manual carried by each patrolman for his guidance. A new manual, up to date in every respect, and containing in compact form the vast amount of information needed by every policeman, was drawn up and a copy given to every member of the force. Some of the work on this manual, as well as most of the installation of

the other plans for improving methods in the department of public safety, was done by Captain Martin H. Ray (formerly in the United States Army), who was detailed to serve as special aide to Director George D. Porter, but who remained on the bureau staff and pay-roll.

The bureau had an opportunity for rendering service in a type of governmental unit in which few bureaus of municipal research and civic bodies have as a rule done little. In February, 1915, the municipal court, which had begun operations only about a year previously, found that its domestic-relations division was having difficulty in taking care of its records and social statistics. President Judge Charles L. Brown realized the difficulty, and invited the bureau to survey the division with a view to introducing the Hollerith system of compiling information. The invitation was accepted with the proviso that it need not confine itself merely to the problem of tabulation, and it proceeded to make a report on the organization, methods and procedure of the division. It devised a new system for keeping case records and installed a complete system of mechanical tabulation of the social and procedural data of the domestic-relations cases.

These are illustrations of the bureau's activities and are selected, primarily, for their diversity, but also to show the permanent and cumulative value of this kind of work. Some of the later activities were made possible when the agency had won a place of greater service in the community, and had established itself as a definite civic force through the patient and persistent efforts of its first years.

Reference has already been made to the bureau's interest in civil service matters to which it has made and is making substantial contributions. The Civil Service Reform Association is another organization which has been actively at work along constructive lines co-operating with the various officials and especially with the Civil Service Commission. It and the bureau co-operated in the drafting of the new charter and are now helping Mayor Moore and his colleagues to give it real force and effect.

By and large Philadelphia is making progress, the rapidity and extent depending as always on the activity and co-operation of the citizen.

A PSYCHOANALYTIC INTERPRETATION OF GROUP FORMATION AND BEHAVIOR

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I

In 1918, Dr. W. F. Ogburn presented to the American Economic Association at Richmond an analysis of the psychological background of the economic interpretation of history.¹ His paper furnishes a starting-point for the statement of some further social implications of the biogenetic psychology which may prove new and useful in the interpretation of events and in the synthesis of political, economic, and psychological theory.

As with Dr. Ogburn's paper, no attempt is made to prove the points herein made. For the most part, in fact, they are simply applications of some of the new concepts in psychology to perfectly familiar events, in a way which links two or three fields of learning and makes psychology a helpmeet and illuminator of social science.

Briefly, Dr. Ogburn's thesis was that the frequent apparent obscurity of economic causes in history is due to the stigma which civilization, especially Christian civilization, has usually attached to selfishness in politics, and, one might add, the more immediate pressure which politicians are always under of winning support by assurances of common interest in the good of the whole group. The social disapproval and disadvantage imposed upon the free expression of greed or self-interest have led to the camouflage of motives which are basically economic.²

Dr. Ogburn recognizes in these political processes certain common mental tricks or mechanisms which have long been

¹ *American Economic Review*, Supplement, March, 1919.

² Interesting parallels of this thesis were ingeniously illustrated by Dr. Patten, in his *Development of English Thought*; cf. pp. 15 ff., 108-9, 112 ff., 131-32, 145 ff., 205-6, 257, 277 ff.

classified by the psychoanalysts in work with individuals. By followers of Machiavelli and Treitschke, perhaps, the tricks are consciously employed. Many politicians, however, find it necessary to deceive themselves before they can deceive their public. The subconscious holds in leash the real wish which gets its fulfilment or compensation by justifying itself in the name of social welfare, patriotism, revenge, culture, religion, rescue, necessity, or self-defense.

According to Dr. Ogburn, however, all these motives are fundamentally economic in origin or necessarily become economic before they are transmuted, rationalized, or re-evaluated by politicians and historians.

It is at this point that further inquiry is suggested; viz., in the psychoanalysis of the economic motive itself. It is complex, built up of various simplex motives rooting in instinctive needs or mechanisms of behavior for which there is no apparent expression or release at present except through economic channels. Carleton Parker's paper of the year previous partially covered this ground. He stated the well-known economic and psychological causes of industrial unrest and analyzed the process from cause to effect in terms of modern psychiatry—impulse, suppression, psychosis. But he confined his analysis to anti-social groups, especially the I.W.W. of the Northwest. Similar analysis can, it seems to the writer, be applied profitably to group motivation in general. An attempt at such analysis will here be approached through a brief preliminary description of personality in terms of the "new" psychology.

II

The individual may be roughly symbolized for our purposes (Fig. 1) by a circle inclosing arrows representing impulses, wishes, strivings, "motor sets," as Holt phrases it. At birth we may assume that these impulses are largely inchoate, being temporary "amoebic" expressions of the total prenatal biochemical energy of the individual pushing out to the environment in various instinctive responses, the chief of which are nutritive and "auto-erotic."

These impulses do not tend at first to be introspective. Many of them are at mutual odds, but they are not even organized

enough to realize much mutual conflict. What conflict there is, is normally not deep seated; it is easily forgot. The child soon gets over a cry. But, because the directions of these impulses are widely distributed, there is an approximate equilibrium, an unstable equilibrium, such that a stimulus from nearly any quarter will bring a quick response in that direction, yet diverted with comparative ease in another direction by a different stimulus. The undeveloped personality is *suggestible*, whether child or savage.

Yet even in undeveloped personalities there is often a "trend" or "bent"—a predominance of certain strong instincts, or groups of impulses which, by composition of forces, give the individuality




FIG. 1.—Symbol of an undeveloped personality. A general trend to the right is indicated, but the wishes are unorganized, at cross-purposes. The dark center represents the original font from which life-energy (soul, libido, élan) wells up and out at various levels. (Cf. Jelliffe, *The Technique of Psychoanalysis*, diagrams.)

a certain initial direction. In any case, the equilibrium is soon broken, whether from within or from without; and certain desires are subordinated more or less permanently, more or less successfully, to others. Crude organic impulses are refined, combined, recombined into the more complex interests, specific desires and wishes. The real dynamics of these interests still, however, root back into primitive, often unconscious, sources.

It used to be the fashion to conceive society as created in the image of an organism. It may be useful, at least, to reverse the analogy and to conceive the impulses in the individual as in some sort a society, proliferating, gradually differentiating into groups,

"high-brow" and "low-brow," with its subconscious roughly corresponding to the inarticulate public, its suppressed complexes to the "submerged tenth" or "rebel reds," and its focus of consciousness and behavior to society's dominant class activities. Sanity (a state approximated but never absolute) in the individual is comparable to social justice.¹ Some individualities (the idiotic) fail ever to organize. Still others (the neurotic) organize unsuccessfully or disastrously their warring impulses.

The foregoing analogy will not hold good throughout, but will make clearer the concept which follows. For the formation




FIG. 2—Symbol of a developed personality. Strong polarization of impulses into a life-purpose; other impulses (a) expressed as hobbies, (b) modified to serve main purpose, (c) suppressed, and (d) dodging or delinquent.

of personality may be stated in terms of the organization of its impulses into a working whole, just as the formation of a state may be stated in terms of the harmonization of conflicting interests. (See Fig. 2.) Some impulses are suppressed, some are diverted, some are sublimated, some are encouraged and draw others to them. Some outlaw impulses escape, or remain concealed in respectable company. The whole becomes shot through with a purpose or design, like the lines of force in a magnetic field. The more highly organized personalities are recognized by their drawing or driving power, their concentration, equanimity, and singleness of purpose, and their effective relation to their environments.

¹ Cf. Giddings, "The Ethical Motive," in *Democracy and Empire*.

They have acquired "character." In psychological terms, they have synthesized, organized, and sublimated their total energy in relation to a reality principle. Their energy is economized by self-knowledge and conscious control of impulse, and a surplus is available for definitely influencing the environment. The will becomes free in the degree that this process is accomplished.

This pattern of personal organization is not, however, determined merely by competition between impulses within the individual. That competition is itself largely set in motion and the handicaps set by the conditions of the environment.

Relative normality of an individual would then consist (to adapt Dr. Patten's definition) in the harmonious organization of one's impulses in relation to a given environment; an ideal environment would make such normality possible for everyone. Under present conditions such normality is possible for very, very few, though many can attain it in such measure as to be indifferent or hostile to social change. Such are our conservative classes. Stand-patters are not necessarily happy or content, but their problems of personal adjustment do not seem to them possible of solution through any change in society at large. They may of course, be quite as wrong in their judgment as the I.W.W. are in theirs. They may fantasy a Utopia of the past instead of a Utopia of the future.

III

Conscious thought may be roughly defined in terms of mental behavior at a point of relation or adjustment between an individual and his environment. The personality may be conceived as a bunch of stored and potential behavior of this sort, conforming to "distribution curves," with modes and variants. Conscious thought, however, seems in general to follow the point of stimulation; though stored internal stimuli or reinforced (over-determined) impulses and interests are often sufficiently powerful to override immediate sensory stimuli.¹ Thought occurs as a function of adjustment, and is most conscious in the actual process of adjustment. Delay often seems to increase the keenness of desire and of satisfaction, by accumulation of affect.

¹ An artist fails to notice a mosquito bite when absorbed in his sketching.

If a given state of affairs thwarts or fails to give an expression to some native instincts of an individual, we have at once a damming of flow, a congestion of wishes (affect-laden complexes), and probably acute consciousness and thought.¹ If the given state of affairs causes a similar conscious want in many people, it is a social condition causing a social problem. Max Eastman once wrote, in substance, that in politics the important thing is not what men think but what men want; the purpose of thought is to tell them how to get it. This fits in well with the concepts outlined above, and leads to their application in the field of political and historical interpretation.

Various processes of socialization may be interpreted in terms of wish-fulfilment mechanisms, oftentimes unconscious. These will be discussed here under the general headings of group formation, maintenance, and growth; group composition and solidarity; group interrelation, competition, and success; group sovereignty and control; group conflict, compromise, and amalgamation; and group secession and decomposition.

GROUP FORMATION, MAINTENANCE, AND GROWTH

Consciousness of resemblance, like consciousness of difference, develops from biological sources in response to organic (later economic) needs. It is a socializing factor in that it serves to release instincts in social behavior and permits their satisfaction in group activities.

Imitation is not altogether blindly mechanical. It follows lines of least resistance. Or, rather, stimuli are responded to and behavior imitated with relation to the adjustment-needs of the organism. Imitation implies original similarity of behavior mechanisms which crave exercise. But imitative behavior may not occur or will not become habitual unless it prove organically satisfying, i.e., wish-fulfilling.

¹ Though, occasionally, in the face of unique circumstances the individual (or group), lacking appropriate behavior mechanisms, fails to react until too late, or only vaguely "doesn't know what ails him." Just as chemists, lacking radio-sensitive nerves, were burned by radioactivity before they knew it; and just as savages ascribed bullets or diseases to devils, or conservatives fail to adjust to a new social order.

Whenever an environment is such as to stimulate a similar set of behavior mechanisms with similar affects in a considerable number of people, group formation has its natural soil. There seem to result naturally awareness of wants, concomitant reaction to similar stimuli, like-mindedness, consciousness of kind and of common interest, and collective behavior or co-operation. There arises a true social group, possibly an organization or even an institution, or a social movement, if the co-operation prove permanently effective in satisfying needs and wants. Individuals may join already existing groups for similar reasons. (See Fig. 3, p. 340.) Further aspects of group growth will be taken up under the heading of group competition.

GROUP COMPOSITION AND SOLIDARITY

A group may serve interests far different from its ostensible purpose. Furthermore, the individuals in a group may be in it from fundamentally widely variant motives. One thinks at once of examples such as the readers of a given book or newspaper, or the difference between Senator Lodge and an Alabama dorky as co-members of the Republican Party; but the differences may be more subtle. The real motives served, or wishes expressed, in the choice of a college or a club, for example, are far more complex than is the obvious educational or recreational purpose of the group, which is merely a net resultant of the behavior through which the various wishes of individuals find expression. The motives of group-joining may not even be conscious. Such is, perhaps, the condition of neurotics in social work, "purity" work, or suffrage campaigns.

It is in the motives of group composition that we shall find the most important phases of socio-analysis suggested by Dr. Ogburn's paper. For, while the ostensible purpose of a group or "movement" or campaign is obvious, its growth may have been fostered by those who consciously and deliberately, or subconsciously and hypocritically, or unconsciously and naively, are using its collective strength for very different ends, personal or factional. And, inasmuch as economic motives are admittedly powerful, especially when backed by wealth, it is natural to find




FIG. 3.—Symbol of the possible group affiliations of an individual as means to his wish-fulfillments. The diagram is similar to Figure 2, but each impulse or desire is followed out into its fulfillment in group activities, symbolized by the clusters of triangles which represent other individuals with a similar interest. Dotted lines represent interlocking memberships because of which certain minor groups were selected to serve the individual's dominant purpose.

those so motivated and backed using, for example, patriotic "drives" to serve their private interests. This fact does not preclude the active presence of many, even a majority, of sincere patriots. In fact it is their presence which leads both to the camouflage which Dr. Ogburn analyzes and to the usefulness of the group for ulterior purposes.

I think a concrete illustration will be of value at this point. (See table, p. 343.)

The example taken is a selection from the membership of an imaginary church. A similar analysis could be worked out for a political party, a chamber of commerce, or any other group.

To represent diagrammatically in two dimensions dynamic conditions which demand at least four dimensions is obviously impossible. Many complex psycho-social relationships have to be omitted entirely. Enough cases are given to exemplify the common psychological mechanisms of combination, compensation, compromise, substitution, rationalization, transference, and sublimation, conscious or unconscious.

The stages of recognition of kind, perception of common interest, concurrent action, combined volition, organization, and co-operation are here assumed to have taken place. The group is a going concern or even a chartered institution, with a definite ostensible purpose.

In each member certain interests may be consciously dominant. These interests may or may not root back into more primitive but less conscious or repressed material—instinctive demands which the individual unfamiliar with unconscious mechanisms might not admit even to himself. In each member there may also be subordinate interests, more or less conscious. The group, in this case the church, may serve either the dominant or the subordinate needs of the member. Religion itself (the ostensible purpose of the group) may be either a dominant or a subordinate interest in the life of a member. Religious association is indulged in by many for whom religion is not a dominant wish-harmonizer or integrator. Religion, being itself highly complex, will serve to satisfy a variety of instinctive material, much of which is in an otherwise unexpressed condition. The appeal of the church is to

all the types just described. Further, with the increasing fulfilment of people's instinctive desires in worldly reality, those controlling the church extend its appeal to include interests not primarily spiritual, in order to increase or maintain solidarity, mass, and influence, and thus serve the purpose of the dominant group. Members joining on the basis of these special appeals, like those who join from shrewd "ulterior" motives, merely use the church organization to help fulfil their special interests, whether dominant or subordinate. Institutional churches extend these appeals indefinitely.

Such "use" of an organization to fulfil irrelevant desires of its members is apt to be relatively harmless if it is not exercised by a subgroup powerful enough to pervert the primary social purpose of the group and thus betray its members and the general public. Such factions are often self-deceived. Other factions if disillusioned may secede individually or collectively.

Church members as typified in the accompanying table therefore fall into three rather loosely classified groups: (1) those in whom religion is, at least ostensibly, the dominant conscious motive; (2) those in whom it is a secondary motive, involved in church membership and activity; and (3) those in whom there is no real religious interest, the appeal being on irrelevant grounds. Founders and active members will be apt to be found in the first and second groups, though a shrewd self-seeker from group three might also be a founder. Ordinarily they are persons in whose lives religion serves as a harmonizing, energizing, assimilative principle which is therefore projected as a dominant interest. Some members, on the other hand, are mere drifters, who could hardly tell why they belong. Many, again, are thwarted or secretly disappointed in life; to them religion is primarily a reconciler, a consolation, a hope of wish-fulfilment in a future life, or by proxy.

What interest is sincerely dominant in a church member depends upon the individual and the occasion. The interests indicated in the schedule (see table) indicate merely general trends, or net resultants of behavior. The final column gives the formula of the psychological mechanisms through which various interests are satisfied by membership. In many cases it is a "substitute

COMPOSITION OF IMAGINARY CHURCH

Church Members	Suppressed Interests, If Any, Involved in Church Connection	Conscious Dominant Interests	Subordinate Interests, If Consciously Served	* Mechanisms of Wish-Fulfillment
Clergyman	May be any of several listed for members in same column	Religion	Personal ambitions; self-preservation; family affection	Personal tastes and demands as well as life-purpose fulfilled by profession
Clergyman's daughter	Strong father image	Religion	Interest in a young assistant minister	Waning interest in church may be supported by loyalty and by a new "transference"
Broad-minded, well-rounded layman	Religion	Other interests consciously correlated to service of God	Co-ordination of wishes promoting harmonious satisfaction
Church "pillar"	Inferiority complex; desire for prestige	Religion	Social service	High position in church will vindicate self-esteem
Mystic	Introverted libido; fantasies; mother-fixation	Religion	Aesthetic Tastes	Satisfaction, in symbolic theology, of longing for escape and security
Bachelor	Thwarted in love long ago	Religion	Unconscious substitution
Spinster (founder)	Strong father image	Religion	Transference to God image
Woman (founder)	Sex interest in minister	Religion	Unconscious fulfilling of suppressed interest
Neurotic	A major suppressed complex	Religion	Resolution of conflict by confidence and consolation
Neurotic	A secret "sin" to be overcome	Religion	Self-esteem	Acquisition of self-respect through imitation and self-control fostered by church
Former drunkard	Suppressed complexes causing drunkenness	Religion	Self-esteem	"Emmanuel Movement" straightened out suppressed conflicts; escape from reality in religious symbols
"Misfit"	Various internal conflicts and resistances	Religion	Disappointed hopes reconciled	Compensation in belief of future rewards
Negative personality	None	Herd instinct	Church is the "proper thing"
Clergyman's wife	Self-assertiveness	Love of husband and children	Religion	Identification of interests with husband's, vicarious ambition, great family love, greatly strengthen attachment to church; religion alone insufficient thereto
Widower	Longing for wife	Religion	Partial compensation by conscious substitution; also hope of reunion
Childless parent (founder)	Longing for children	Religion	Partial compensation by conscious substitution
Mother	Love for children	Religion; morality	Sunday school will conserve children's morals

COMPOSITION OF IMAGINARY CHURCH

Church Members	Suppressed Interests, If Any, Involved in Church Connection	Conscious Dominant Interests	Subordinate Interests, If Consciously Served	Mechanisms of Wish-Fulfillment
Soldier	Mother's code against fighting	War; success in army	Religion	Church sanctions fighting
Architect	Desire to display or project personality; desire for immortality	Ambition for creative work	Religion; aesthetic tastes	Contacts bring contracts; church group and building please temperament
Scholarly teacher	Same as above	Same as above	Religion; intellectual appreciation	Brainy sermons and church forum are stimulation
Poor author	Instincts for display	Ambition	Religion	Consolation for thwarted ambition and lack of fame; made much of in the church
Social worker	Interest in suffering	Service	Religion	Religious challenge to service and faith in future; victory through self-sacrifice
Unselfish capitalist	Power through finance	Religion; altruism	Stewardship doctrine reconciles interests
Professor	Inferiority complex	Ambition for power	Religion	Church of same denomination as the college helps prospects
Laborer	Complex of inferiority	Self-preservation	Religion; social instincts	Lonely, enjoys company but usually afraid to come, or too tired or poor; projects a grudge
Poet	Aesthetic life	Introvertive imagination	Ritual, symbol, atmosphere are congenial and suggestive
Selfish manufacturer	Poverty complex; self-centered childhood; thwarted altruism	Money	Love of wife	Family life helps starved instincts; church attendance keeps wife's esteem
Young merchant	Business profits	Church brings trade
Lawyer	Love of wife	Ambition to succeed	Church brings contacts and clients; wife likes church
Corrupt politician	Guilty conscience	Politics; ambition	Self-esteem	Attendance and contribution mask guilt from others and from self
Society belle	Display	Social ambition	Sex, self-assertiveness	Fashionable contacts in church
Young man	Sex interest	Shifting interests	Conformity to morality of parents	Church sanction on dancing permits indulgence and releases from parent image
Boy	Domineering temper	Athletics	Family affection	Desire of parents and chance to organize church baseball team

formation" or "compromise" expression for some more original impulse, which gains a partial or total outlet through the church, whether or not there be in addition a sincere interest in religion.

In the case of an ostensibly non-economic group like the church, there is obviously much complexity of motive underlying its membership. Even, however, in the case of frankly economic groups, the motivation may be very complex. They are composed of individuals whose motives if analyzed would prove to be non-economic in the ordinary material sense. Love of power, prestige, or display, of comfort, leisure, or pleasure; parental and sexual instincts; the instincts of workmanship and achievement—all these may enter as dominant or subordinate motives in industry.¹

In the case of a non-economic organization the appeal to motives for membership other than the ostensible purpose of the group seems like bastard social economy. In political economics the appeal for members on non-economic grounds may be equally insincere. It may, however, have a legitimate basis, if it be an appeal through the economic to the real impulses which give rise to the "economic motive."

GROUP INTERRELATION, COMPETITION, AND SUCCESS

The same individuals may be aligned in scores of different ways, with the same or other individuals, for the fulfilment of sundry strivings. (See Fig. 3.) They form the interrelating links between many groups. Some people are habitual "joiners."

A group of any degree of complexity may be, like the organized personality of Figure 3, roughly likened for illustrative purposes to a magnetic field, polarized around the major purpose of the organization, which is a net resultant of the specific stimuli, the nature of the units affected, and the general environment; the environment would (in the case of the group) include the wishes of persons and groups external to the immediate group, such as contributors, prospective members, "public opinion."

Groups are regrouped in larger groups, with less definite bonds of common interest but interrelated by individuals who belong to more than one subgroup. (See Fig. 4.)

Whether a purpose is ostensibly or actively dominant in a group depends upon the general social situation, which therefore

¹ Cf. Ordway Tead, *Instincts in Industry*.

determines which groups "fall off" in membership. Large circles in the diagram indicate roughly larger groups or classes within which there are certain common wishes and therefore interlocking membership. Each smaller group is symbolized by a small circle. Overlapping circles represent interrelated groups. Infinite dimensions would be needed to represent the actual situation. Net




FIG. 4.—Crude symbol of group interrelation based on wish-fulfilment

resultant purposes of groups are indicated by heavy arrows, lesser motives by smaller arrows. The direction of arrows represents, in a crude way, the direction of each interest with relation to the broad contrasts between social classes.

The analogy is that of composition of forces in physics: the class purposes are resultants of group purposes; group purposes are resultants of individual wills; and individual wills are resultants

of the conscious and unconscious wishes of the individual in relation to any given situation.

The more thorough and complex the system of interests and of interrelated wish-fulfilling groups, the more "advanced" the evolution of the society. Progress, however, of course involves increasingly harmonious and economical readjustments, rather than mere complexity.

Most groups in present society require money or work for their activities; one's "joinings" and the social fulfilment of wishes go, therefore, according to the principles of comparative marginal utilities and diminishing returns. Magazines, parties, athletics, churches, alumni associations, festivals, charities, levels of the leisure class, come to mind as easy examples. (Cf. Figs. 3, 4.)

When, however, a given group finds a "common interest" in some unfulfilled wish, it seeks to forward its purpose by increased membership. If there be two groups with similar ends, there will be competition for membership in so far as the real wishes are selfish to each group. Frequently this involves appeal to different motives in other people, who may thus be persuaded that the desired result will also fulfil some supposedly legitimate wish of theirs. This leads to rationalization—the writing of plausible publicity. Witness the range of motives appealed to in Liberty Loan or prohibition campaigns. For selfish interests, however, the substitutions and excuses furnished are usually such as to appeal to some motives which are less intense but more generally shared than the special interest which primarily motivates the campaign. The suppressed wish then gets its fulfilment through some less inhibited wish-channel. The ostensible purpose is true in a sense, but less dominant or dynamic, and not alone capable of motivating the behavior demanded by the affect-laden wish.¹

Hypocrisy might be defined in terms of such substitution. Thus, a self-analytic person may feel a sense of guilt (internal conflict, repression) when perfectly legitimate motives are evenly balanced or mixed in his conduct. But, on the other hand,

¹ Cf. Bernard Shaw's criticism of the British Ministry's elaborate justification of war in contrast with the popular simplicity of motives, or, the defense of tolerated prostitution by the "best citizens" under the old régime.

the selfish motives may, by these very processes, become sincerely obscured or secondary in the minds of the "disinterested" or "indifferent" people whom we call the "public," in relation to a given issue.

It is in the foregoing way that political and economic and even moral theories gain currency and power. Some theories are advanced "before their time": i.e., they do not rationalize the cravings of an existing group. Even if, in origin, they be purely "scientific" (a possibility which the extreme psychoanalyst might deny), theories "prove true" only in so far as they meet and rationalize the desires of a successful group. Success itself may be defined in terms of wish-fulfilment or organic wish-harmony.

GROUP SOVEREIGNTY AND CONTROL

A well-organized minority in a group gains a majority by more or less skilful appeal to the interests of the bulk of the group. Such behavior implies a previous clear-cut consciousness of common interest on the part of the dominant minority with respect to some unfulfilled desires, and especially regarding the means of fulfilment which has been thought out in relation to those desires. The more fundamentally similar the unfulfilled wishes, the more permanent and powerful a group or faction is likely to be.

Sovereignty or power rests not so much on physical force as in the control or potential release of force. Ultimately, dominant minorities are responsible to the power of their constituency. They retain control of that power by catering to the wishes of their followers; by use of the father image or mechanism of authority; by skilfully rationalized theories of wish-fulfilment through the *status quo*; by suppressing facts which would release conflicting impulses; by offering substitute expressions for anti-group desires, distractions from thwarted needs, or promises, compromises, and sops; or, *in extremis*, preventing new minorities becoming new majorities by using their existing power to prevent temporarily, though ultimately to increase, the development of common interest and collective action among the oppressed variants. The Prussian Militarist Junkers since 1849 have furnished examples.

GROUP CONFLICT, COMPROMISE, AND AMALGAMATION

While competition for membership may reach the point of conflict when membership becomes an end in itself, group conflicts are usually due to mutually antagonistic wishes, either with respect to a common interest (such as hunting-grounds or a doubtful state), or with respect to some policy or behavior which is doing or will do violence to the interests of one or the other group (such as trade relations with Russia).

It may often occur that, without the existence of another group whose "liberty" (wish-fulfilment) is curtailed by the very existence of its antagonist, either group would be entirely "normal." That is why the ideal business man and the ideal socialist are both so lovable when you take them separately.

When two groups have a grievance or conscious thwart in common, they will make common cause in their immediate activity, even though logically at odds in other respects; for the immediate activity is due to a wish which strives for fulfilment because of some current stimulus or thwarting, and the other differences, being less insistent for adjustment or satisfaction, are subordinated or suppressed into a less conscious sphere. Party and church, inter-college and sectional rivalries, inter-racial and international realignments, especially in the recent and present wars, suggest themselves as examples.

Groups with a similar interest not selfish to each group but common to both and capable of joint fulfilment will rapidly and easily amalgamate in the absence of egotistic minorities, or eventually in spite of them. The fusing of suffrage organizations, of parties, and of corrupt interests are examples in politics.

When two groups both have wishes, and their fulfilment is mutually exclusive, both are thwarted acutely and there is war—orderly or violent as the case may be. It is a function of civilized government to make such struggles few and orderly. Court decisions and arbitration boards attempt to harmonize thwarted interests—and occasionally succeed. They repress the crude pugnacity of injured personalities and, theoretically, give it a channel for relatively sublimated expression. Legislation and treaties attempt compromise, reciprocal concession, and substitution, just

as a mother does between two quarreling children. Reason is, for good or ill, secondary to wish-fulfilment. Witness the Peace Conference.

The so-called "social mind" ordinarily develops more slowly than that of individuals, because there are infinitely more complex adjustments and readjustments to be made before internal friction can be eliminated and a combination or organization of wishes can be found which will afford a *modus vivendi*—a psychological basis for group life.

GROUP SECESSION AND DECOMPOSITION

If a person finds a group to which he belongs committed to some policy or conduct which would thwart another of his interests he may have a mental conflict. He must take his choice. He may try to "swing his group." He may succeed if he can find or create a powerful enough faction. He will not often succeed if there is a real thwart or "grievance" widespread and dominant among the group. The most plausible arguments will not much avail, nor will the most logically unanswerable refutations of the group's "reasons." If he can persuade neither himself nor the group to reconcile, repress, or gloss over the conflictive wishes he must then sacrifice his personal wish to his loyalty-wish or herd instinct; or, he must secede or "get kicked out," and if possible join another group, whose dominant desires are similar to his own.¹

If a man finds two groups to which he belongs striving for things which are mutually antagonistic he must make a similar choice.¹

When some unforeseen set of conditions suddenly thwarts in a large number of people a certain set of desires which were previously fulfilled and therefore less conscious, new groupings are likely to develop, old groups are likely to "lose interest," and alignments shift as attention concentrates on the motives now thwarted, which thereupon become the dominant motives in all group activity.¹ Old grudges now repressed project their cumula-

¹ The opening years of the war furnished many tragic examples of these generalizations. In groups where conjugation or fission is in process, whether the conflict of interests is considered external as between two groups or internal as between factions of a single group will depend upon the degree to which consciousness of common interests has waxed or waned in the social mind.

tive affects into new channels and upon new objects, often overdetermining the new group behavior all unconsciously.

IV

Political consent and "social justice" may be conceived as a function of the amount of freedom and fulfilment available for the wishes and interests of a population. For intimidation can only prevent rebellion or secession by making the instinct of self-preservation dominant over all thwarted desires. Fear, if it be the sole sanction of a government, must be increased at an accelerating rate; for thwarted impulses bring concentration of thought and feeling, and are thereby strengthened even while they are thwarted. Fear, therefore, has diminishing returns, reaches its natural limits as a deterrent, and brings revolution or crime. Justice, on the other hand, is the harmonization of wishes and of wish-fulfilment.

The unitary or highly centralized state finds it increasingly difficult to please all of the people all of the time. The "democratic empire" partly solves the problem through local geographic autonomy. The so-called pluralistic state of which Laski and others are writing might go farther in the same direction, by a further distribution of sovereignty and loyalty.

Thought, closer study of the environment, theorizing, point out to group leaders ways in which the unfulfilled or thwarted wishes of the given group can be fulfilled, if possible without thwarting the activities or desires of any other powerful group. Still closer study and experience may prove a given theory "false," i.e., unworkable or provocative of worse maladjustment, but until such time it serves. It is usually for or against the *beliefs* of others, rather than their desires, that the favor or antagonism of men (at least ostensibly) is directed. The psychoanalyst might call this process "projection." The Christian attacks ideas, not men. We cannot often "fight it out," so we attack each other's theories and try to "argue it out"—a sublimated kind of fisticuffs. And for very similar sets of unfulfilled wishes one man may claim economic remedies, another political, another religious. The various arguments about slavery and crime and

freedom of speech are typical. It is true that goods and services will satisfy most wishes, and many wishes can be satisfied in no other way. This is the real rock upon which the economic interpretation of history is founded. But all theories, including economic theory, are based ultimately upon the wishes themselves¹ rather than upon their means of satisfaction, which is itself often the subject of theorization; and the theories of a group may, therefore, in some cases be as sincere as any theory can be when held by a whole group, even though they may not refer to economic changes, appropriations, or acquisitions necessary to their fulfilment.

It may be any one of a dozen groups of impulses in unnumbered permutations that leads to a social theory and social action, and these impulses may in origin be entirely non-economic or only indirectly or secondarily economic. The social hygiene campaign, the men and religion forward movement, the factory legislation movement,² are possible examples. An economic basis may, to be sure, be the indispensable condition for the success of a reform of which the original motive was sincerely moral. In fact, the economic motive is frequently used by social workers as a camouflage for altruistic motives—witness the Bolshevik bogey and the economic arguments for playgrounds.

But only where the economic motive is recognized as or accused of being selfish or wrong does conscience or social censure inhibit it and give rise to camouflage and hypocrisy. And for such social hysterias publicity and discussion furnish the salutary catharsis of the body politic and psychoanalysis of the "public mind."

¹ Value might be defined in terms of power to fulfil or thwart wishes—one's own or others'.

² Certain altruistic wishes, if expressed in some theory which if acted upon would thwart powerful groups, can seldom find expression except in people who can "afford to be radical." The same wishes may be present in others, who can only express the same wish through some other theory which justifies the wish on some popular economic grounds.

CO-OPERATIVE INVESTIGATION AUTHORIZED
BY THE
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

We wish to remind you of the investigation described briefly in the March, 1920, number of the *Journal*. If you have time for research work or if you direct investigations by students, we hope you will consider some aspect of the subjects which many groups will be studying during the coming year. Dr. Lucile Eaves, the director of this first co-operative study authorized by the Society, will give assistance by correspondence, or in personal conference during the sessions of the annual meeting, to any members of the Society who wish suggestions which will enable them to prepare material suitable for publication in the final report. She will be glad to supply the questionnaires used by the full-time workers who are investigating the subject under her immediate supervision.

Professors of sociology in different colleges or universities will be the best judges of the abilities of their students and resources of their environments, but the following topics may prove suggestive when discussing with students the possibilities of co-operation in this nation-wide investigation:

1. Institutions giving care to aged women.
2. The policies of large employers of women in dealing with older workers.
3. Study of women who have left positions because of old-age incapacity.
4. Study of the older female employees to discover their plans for old-age support.
5. Retired school teachers. Are their pensions adequate? How are they being cared for?
6. Insurance carried by self-supporting women. Do they buy annuities?
7. Women depositors in savings banks.
8. Family relations of self-supporting women.
9. Do the wages of women permit a saving for old-age support?
10. Interesting plans by which self-supporting women have provided, or are planning to provide, for their old age.

The final report of this study which will be prepared in Boston under the direction of Miss Eaves will be a great pooling of experiences for the purpose of throwing light on this important subject. The studies made by individual contributors should be limited in scope but should cover completely and accurately the field chosen.

Address correspondence to Miss Lucile Eaves, 264 Boylston street Boston 17, Mass.

ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

The following program has been announced by President James Q. Dealy for the fifteenth annual meeting of the American Sociological Society to be held in Washington, D.C., December 27-29, 1920. At the same time and place the following organizations will meet: American Historical Association and related organizations, American Political Science Association.

MAIN TOPIC FOR DISCUSSIONS: "SOME NEWER PROBLEMS, NATIONAL AND SOCIAL"

(All meetings, except the business session, are open to the public)

MONDAY, DECEMBER 27

- 8:15 P.M. PROFESSOR EDWARD A. ROSS, University of Wisconsin, presiding.
Address: "Eudemics, a Science of National Welfare." J. Q. DEALEY, President of the American Sociological Society.
Address: "A Theory of Social Interests." DEAN ROSCOE POUND of the Harvard Law School.
Members of other Associations are especially invited to be present.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 28

- 9:30 A.M. Professor ALBION W. SMALL, presiding.
Address: "The Community Idea in Rural Development." President KENYON L. BUTTERFIELD, Massachusetts Agricultural College.
Address: "The Inquiries of Sociology." PROFESSOR FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, Columbia University.
- 11:00 A.M. Reports of Committees, J. Q. DEALEY, presiding.
Committee on the Teaching of Social Science in the Public and High Schools. PROFESSOR ROSS L. FINNEY, Chairman, University of Minnesota.
Committee on the Standardization of Research: PROFESSOR J. L. GILLIN, Chairman, University of Wisconsin,
Committee on Social Abstracts: PROFESSOR F. STUART CHAPIN, Chairman, Smith College.
Discussion of these reports.
- 2:00 P.M. Round Table, Professor U. G. Weatherly presiding.
"Sociological Significance of Psychoanalytic Psychology." In charge of PROFESSORS ERNEST R. GROVES AND C. E. GEHLKE.

- 3:15 P.M. Round Table:
 "Essentials of a Social Survey Plan." In charge of PROFESSOR HAROLD S. BUCKLIN and DR. SHELBY M. HARRISON.
- 4:30 P.M. Meeting of the Executive Committee.
- 8:15 P.M. Presidential Addresses: American Historical Association and American Political Science Association.
 Members of the American Sociological Society are cordially invited to attend.
- 10:00 P.M. Smoker at Cosmos Club, open to members of all the Associations.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 29

- 9:30 A.M. PRESIDENT KENYON L. BUTTERFIELD, presiding.
 Address: "Sociological Evaluation of the Interchurch Movement." PROFESSOR EDWIN L. EARP, Drew Theological Seminary.
 Address: "The Mexican Revolution and the Standard of Living." PROFESSOR MAX S. HANDMAN, University of Texas.
- 11:00 A.M. PROFESSOR F. W. BLACKMAR, presiding.
 Address: "The Social Significance of Mental Levels." PROFESSOR J. P. LICHTENBERGER, University of Pennsylvania.
 Address: "The New Plan of Education in the Army." PROFESSOR SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD, University of Chicago.
- 2:15 P.M. Business meeting of the society.
- 3:00 P.M. PROFESSOR FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, presiding.
 Address: "The Family in Relation to Industry." PROFESSOR SUSAN M. KINGSBURY, Bryn Mawr College.
 Address: "Processes of Radicalism." PROFESSOR WILLIAM J. KERBY, Catholic University of America.
 Address: "The Future of Sociology." PROFESSOR ALBION W. SMALL, University of Chicago.
- 7:00 P.M. A subscription dinner, under the auspices of the American Historical Association and the American Political Science Association, will be opened by courtesy to those members of the American Sociological Society who desire to attend.

Papers should not exceed 20-25 minutes in length; the time limit for prepared discussion is 7 minutes; for discussion from the floor 5 minutes.

Local committee of the American Sociological Society: Dr. William J. Kerby, Catholic University, Chairman; Miss Julia C. Lathrop; Dr. Charles J. Galpin; Dr. R. R. Kern; Miss Grace Abbott.

Local committee of the Historical Association: Dr. H. B. Learned, Chairman; W. B. Bryan; Miss Frances G. Davenport; Rev. Dr. Peter Guilday; Gaillard Hunt; J. Franklin Jameson; Constantine E. Maguire; Charles Moore; Helen Nicolay; Ruth Putnam; Admiral Charles H. Stockton; George F. Zook.

Local Committee of the Political Science Association: Dr. L. S. Rowe, Chairman; Wilbur Morse; Dr. W. M. Collier; Mr. William F. Culbertson;

Mr. Henry James Ford; Rev. Thomas I. Gasson; Dr. Franklin Jameson; Dr. C. E. Maguire; Dr. Henry Learned; Right Rev. Thomas J. Shahan; Dr. Charles D. Walcott; Dr. W. F. Willoughby; Dr. James Brown Scott.

The privileges of the National Clubhouse of the Association of Collegiate Alumnae, 1607 H Street, will be extended to the women of the various associations for the period of the meetings. Guest cards can be obtained at the headquarters of each association.

A reception for the members of the various associations will be given at the National Clubhouse of the Association of Collegiate Alumnae, 1607 H Street, on Tuesday evening, December 28, beginning at nine-thirty.

Headquarters.—The headquarters of the American Sociological Society will be The Washington, Pennsylvania Avenue, opposite the Treasury.

Cars from the station pass in front of the hotel.

Hotel accommodations may be secured as follows:

Hotel Ebbitt

Single room with bath \$3.50 and up; without bath \$2.00 and \$2.50. Double room with bath \$6.00, \$7.00, and up. Either twin beds or double beds. Double room without bath, \$4.00 and \$5.00.

Hotel New Willard

Single room with bath \$5.00 and up. Without bath \$3.00 and up. Double room without bath \$5.00 and \$6.00. With bath \$7.00 to \$12.00. Double room (twin beds) with bath \$8.00 to \$12.00.

Hotel Raleigh

Single room with bath \$4.00 and \$5.00. Without bath \$3.00 and \$4.00. Double room without bath \$4.00 and \$5.00. Without bath (twin beds) \$6.00. Double room (twin beds) with bath, \$5.00 to \$10.00.

Hotel Washington

Single room with bath, \$5.00 and up. Double room with bath (twin beds) \$8.00 to \$10.00. Double bed \$7.00.

Franklin Square Hotel

Single Room \$2.50; single room with bath \$3.50. Double room \$3.50; double room with bath \$5.00.

Shoreham Hotel

Single room \$3.00; single room with bath \$5.00. Double room \$5.00; double room with bath \$7.00.

Powhatan Hotel

Single room \$3.00; single room with bath \$4.00. Double room \$4.50; double room with bath \$6.00.

Bellvue Hotel

Single room \$2.00; single room with bath \$3.50. Double room \$3.00; double room with bath \$5.00.

NEWS AND NOTES

Notes of interest to the readers of the *Journal* should be in the hands of the editor of "News and Notes" not later than the tenth of the month preceding publication.

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF STATISTICS

Announcement is made of the establishment of an international review of statistics entitled *Metron* under the direction of Professor Corrado Gini, University of Padua, Italy. The review will be issued quarterly, each number containing 180-200 pages. It will contain original articles of statistical methodology and of its application to various branches of sciences, and reviews of or discussions on the principal results obtained by statistical methods in the various fields of science or otherwise interesting statistics. The articles and reviews may be written in Italian, French, English, and German. As this review is published in Italy and consequently a majority of the editorial staff are Italians, no doubt the Italian language will at first preponderate in its pages. But the other great international languages are admitted to its pages on terms of complete equality. It rests with contributors from other countries to increase their share in its pages and to cause to disappear, any such difference. It is the wish of the editors that the participation of non-Italian writers shall become larger and larger.

UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE

The Public Health Service announces the organization of an institute on the control of venereal diseases to be held in Washington, D.C., beginning November 22 and continuing for two weeks. Among the courses offered are "the delinquent women and the law," "sex in education," "protective work for girls," "sociology and social hygiene," "methods of public education," "methods of law enforcement," "sex psychology," and "clinical social work." Among the forty lecturers and instructors are the following, Dr. John A. Fordyce, Dr. John H. Stokes, Dr. Hugh Young, Dr. Edward L. Keyes, Jr., Dr. Katherine Bement Davis, Mrs. Martha P. Falconer, Prof. Maurice A. Bigelow, Dr. Thomas M. Balliot, and Dr. William A. White.

THE SURVEY

The *Survey* announces that beginning with the issue for October 2, 1920 there will be offered a special type of service to teachers and students of sociology, economics, social ethics, politics, and history. This department will contain a "Social Research Outline" based on current social developments, suggesting definite lines of investigations and offering bibliographical helps from historical and correlated current materials. This department is in charge of Professor Joseph K. Hart, who has been professor of education in Reed College and has recently had six months experience with the War Camp Community Service.

BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

Mr. Guy B. Johnson has been appointed as an assistant in the department of sociology. Mr. Johnson will have charge of some of the extra divisions of Sociology 1.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Professor Ernest R. Groves, head of the department of sociology and dean of the arts and science faculty of New Hampshire College, has accepted the appointment to a chair of sociology in the department of social science.

BROWN UNIVERSITY

Professor Daniel H. Kulp of Shanghai College will lecture in sociology at Brown University during the second semester of this year. He will conduct the classes of Professor Dealey, who plans to spend several months in China next year.

Professor J. Q. Dealey has rewritten and enlarged his *Sociology*; the new edition will be issued in October through Appleton & Co. In January through the same firm he will publish a work to be entitled *The State and Government*.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

A new book by Professor Franklin H. Giddings, entitled *Studies in the Theory of Human Society* has been announced by the Macmillan Company.

NEW YORK STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

In the department of Rural Social Organization Mr. E. L. Kirkpatrick, who has recently been doing graduate work in sociology in the

University of Kansas, has been appointed assistant and Mr. C. W. Whitney, who has been doing graduate work at the University of Chicago, and was formerly of the extension staff of this institution, has been appointed extension instructor. Mr. Whitney will give special attention to extension work in rural recreation. Professor Dwight Sanderson is making a study of the rural neighborhoods in Otsego County in co-operation with the division of Rural Life Studies, Office of Farm Management and Farm Economics, United States Department of Agriculture.

GRINNELL COLLEGE

Mr. Jakub Horák, of the University of Chicago, has accepted a position as instructor in economics and sociology.

MASSACHUSETTS AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE

Professor Newell L. Sims, formerly of the University of Florida, now occupies the chair of rural sociology in this institution, having been in residence since the first of the year. During the summer Professor Sims taught courses in sociology in Columbia University. The *Journal* has recently received for review a work by Dr. Sims entitled "The Rural Community," which is a sourcebook in rural sociology.

The Massachusetts Agricultural College is projecting a school for the training of rural social workers. Announcement of the plan of work will be made in the near future.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Mr. Royal G. Hall who was an instructor in the University of Kansas during the summer term has been appointed assistant professor of sociology. He will have charge of the work in rural sociology which for some time was under the direction of Professor C. C. Taylor who recently resigned.

UNIVERSITY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

Dr. Maurice Parmelee has been appointed by the Department of State of the United States as Economic Adviser to the American Commission in Berlin. Dr. Parmelee sailed for Europe October 7. His address will be, % American Commission, Berlin, Germany.

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

Mr. Warner E. Gettys, instructor in sociology, resigned in July 1920 to accept a position in sociology in Tulane University. Dr. F. E. Lumley of Butler College, Indianapolis, Indiana, was appointed assistant professor in sociology for the current year. He received his Ph.D. at Yale. Miss Carrie Wright, A.M. from the University of Chicago, was appointed an assistant in sociology. Mr. H. M. Scott was also appointed an assistant in the department of sociology.

ROCKFORD COLLEGE

The social science department has increased its staff by the addition of Miss Florence E. Janson, A.M., who takes the courses in government and introductory economics. Professor Seba Eldridge, head of the department, is giving an extension course in social legislation which has special reference to the forthcoming session of the state legislature. Labor conditions, public health, education, housing, child welfare and care of the feeble-minded are the principal topics dealt with. It is expected that the results of the investigations undertaken in connection with this course will be made available, in printed form, to legislators, social workers, editors, and others who are interested in the problems considered.

SMITH COLLEGE

The Macmillan Company announces the publication of a book entitled *Democracy and Assimilation: the Blending of Immigrant Heritages in America* by Assistant Professor Julius Drachsler.

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Dr. William C. Smith is offering new courses this semester in the field of ethnology, race psychology, and eugenics. Mr. M. J. Vincent has been appointed instructor in sociology. The total enrolment in the sociology classes this semester, inclusive of duplicate enrolments, is 850.

SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Professor John C. Granbery has terminated three years of war work in Europe and the Near East (France, Germany, Old and New Greece) under the auspices of the Y.M.C.A. He has resumed his duties in Southwestern University, Georgetown, Texas, where he has the chair of sociology and economics.

WASHBURN COLLEGE

The department of sociology in Washburn College is in its twentieth year. It has a department library of slightly over 4,000 volumes, and nearly 4,000 lantern slides, as illustrative material, including a new accession of 250 in the field of social pathology, just purchased, or taken from life, in New York City. Dr. D. M. Fisk has been head of the department for twenty years. He printed three of his texts the past year—*Sociology I.*, *The Sociology of Jesus*, and *The Rise of Democracy*.

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

The department of sociology has been reorganized along three lines: (1) anthropology and ethnology, offering fourteen hours per quarter, under Dr. Leslie Spier; (2) social problems and methods of reconstruction, offering fourteen hours per quarter under Associate Professor McKenzie; and two courses of field work under Miss Olive McCabe; (3) social theory and methods of investigation, offering the general introductory course and eight hours of advanced work under Professor Woolston, assisted by Mr. Herbert Sturges.

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

Assistant Professor C. E. Gehlke was on leave for a year serving as educational director of the Southwestern Division of the American Red Cross. Recently he was made Director of the Division of Statistics of the Cleveland Foundation. He continues his work in the department of sociology, but will give half of his time to the supervision of the statistical work of the Foundation.

Professor J. E. Cutler and Assistant Professor C. W. Coulter gave courses in the summer session of the Cleveland School of Education this year. Professor Cutler was also the Director of the Institute of School Hygiene which was conducted by the Cleveland School of Education during the summer session.

Dr. M. R. Davie was engaged in research work for the Cleveland Foundation during the past summer.

Every course offered by the department of sociology is being given this year. The number of students who have elected some of the more general courses is so large that less effective methods of instruction are likely to be necessary. In common with the experience of teachers of the social sciences in other American universities a more extensive use of the lecture method seems unavoidable.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

W. Russell Tylor, fellow in sociology last year in the University of Wisconsin, has been appointed as assistant in sociology to assist Professor J. L. Gillin in his course in criminology.

Dr. J. O. Hertzler, who received his Doctor's degree in sociology in the University at the close of the summer session, has been appointed instructor in economics and sociology and is assisting Professor Gillin in his course in social origins. The number in both these courses has become so large that it is impossible for one man to handle the work properly.

Professor J. L. Gillin is to give a course of lectures to the Officers of the Wisconsin State Industrial School for Boys at Waukesha during the coming winter. He is also supervising a series of institutes for the training of volunteers in connection with local Associated Charities at a number of places in Wisconsin. The course will occupy a month at each place and will be in direct charge of a teacher employed by the University Extension Division.

Professor J. L. Gillin expects to have ready for the publishers about March 1, a textbook on *Poverty and Poverism and Its Treatment*.

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Since the cost of printing the *American Journal of Sociology* and the *Proceedings* of the Society has risen to almost double that on which current arrangements were based, and since it was necessary to advise members in advance, in order that renewals might be made without interruption of subscriptions, the Advisory Council of the Society has taken the responsibility of assuming that the annual meeting would indorse an advance of the membership fee to four dollars a year.

REVIEWS

The Spirit of Russia. Studies in History, Literature, and Philosophy.

By THOMAS GARRIGUE MASARYK. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1919.
2 vols. Pp. xxii+480; xix+585. \$12.00 net.

This remarkable work by the president of Czecho-Slovakia deserves the attention of all sociologists. First published in German in 1913, it is one of the few books which the Great War rendered, not out-of-date, but prophetic. The title of the work is unfortunate, as it gives little idea of its sociological character. It is really a history of Russian social and political thought, though the first half of the first volume is taken up with a sketch of Russian political history. The development of Russian sociology receives especial attention, and the whole history of Russian social and political theories is sketched in a masterly way, with a wealth of learning and scholarship which astounds. As one reads, one is made to realize vividly the forces which lay behind the Russian Revolution. The book is undoubtedly, as one leading student of Russian affairs remarked to the writer of this notice, the best work yet produced, though written several years before the event, for the understanding of the Russian Revolution. It is much more, therefore, than a work of theoretical and historical interest. Its portrayal of the growth of that revolutionary philosophy, which finally culminated in bolshevism, and of the political and economic imbecilities which stimulated it, has a tragic interest for all peoples of Western civilization. If we would avoid Russia's fate, we surely need to learn from her mistakes.

The book is noteworthy also because Dr. Masaryk does not hesitate to discuss questions which are supposed to be of interest only to technical sociologists. As regards the controversy between subjectivists and objectivists, for example, he says, "My decision is in favor of a mitigated subjectivism," meaning by that, of course, that he holds that it is the social mind, the social tradition, the *mores* which immediately determine social behavior. In accordance with this position, though a critic of existing forms of organized religion, he finds that great importance must be attributed to religion in the social process as the sustainer of the *mores*. "Religion," he says, "constitutes the central and centralizing

mental force in the life of the individual and of society. The ethical ideals of mankind are formed by religion; religion gives rise to the mental trend, to the life-mood of human beings." (Vol. II, p. 557.)

This is only a slight indication of the sociological interest of this book.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

The Skilled Labourer, 1760-1832. By J. L. and BARBARA HAMMOND. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1919. Pp. ix+397. \$4.50.

There is a tendency among the newer historians to look for a broader group of causations than is to be found in governments and politicians, and to listen to the half-articulate, confused, voices of the larger groups of the "lower orders" for an explanation of the dominant element in historical development. Of course the politician is no less really important than before, and so strangely is our world organized that a generation may show more modification from the quarrel of a duke with a party leader than from the fall of wages a shilling per week. Yet there is a growing conviction that if we are really to understand the life-story of a people through the course of a century, we must learn how things went with the great substratum upon which the more talkative part of society rests.

It is to this newer class of histories, which form the province almost equally of the historian, the sociologist, and the economist, that *The Skilled Labourer* belongs. It is the last of a trilogy of books dealing with the intimate history of the British laboring man in the time of the great flux caused by the Industrial Revolution. The first volume, *The Village Labourer*, appeared in 1911. The present volume has a general community of subject-matter with the second of the series, *The Town Labourer*, but the aim is here at telling more in detail the experiences of particular labor groups during the period whose general characteristics *The Town Labourer* attempts to treat. It is, in fact, a series of group case-studies selected where evidence was found fullest, and covering groups as diverse as pitmen in coal mines, and silk-stocking weavers.

It has been the plan of the authors to trace the developments in each of these trades and subgroups as a unit of study. Such a plan involves obvious difficulties of presentation. Despite the unity of causes which makes the experience of the different groups very similar,

one feels that the interrelations between them are left hazy. A reading of *The Town Labourer*, at least, is presupposed. So, despite the singularly felicitous style which is the endowment of the Hammonds, and despite the human interest of the book, it will not, probably, prove as charming to the general reader as *The Village Labourer*.

The book is written to substantiate a thesis. That thesis is frankly stated on page four of the Introduction. "For all these classes of workers it is true that they were more their own masters, that they had a wider range of initiative, that their homes and their children were happier in 1760 than they were in 1830." The immediate cause was the introduction of machinery into most lines of industry. Its influence was felt by those already on the verge of pauperism, but more by the more skilled whose closed crafts no longer saved them from ruin. The effect was so similar upon the different groups that it gives a unity to the story of the period. Into one general class of depression may be put cotton and woolen workers, spinners and weavers, worsted workers and stocking knitters, lace makers and the shearmen who cut the nap from woolen cloth in the finishing process. Each group has its own story told, but it differs from the others only in the detail of local circumstance. In each, machines appeared which made the labor of a few men vastly more productive. As soon as one manufacturer adopted such a device his competitors were compelled to do likewise. With the machinery went what seemed to be a new spirit in the manufacturing group. It was made manifest by better co-operation of the manufacturers, and often by shady trade practices, such as flooded the market with worthless knitted goods about 1810. Volume of production increased, "time was saved," yet the laborers found themselves working more hours per day for less wages in a factory, or starving on poor relief in their cottages. No wonder those in the old domestic industries "no longer had the heart" to do work which had ceased to be remunerative. In some industries the mechanization was slower than in others. In some localities resistance held back the process for a time. But in general it spread as relentlessly as an infection.

The resistance was the more hopeless because the period of change coincided with a period dominated by war psychology. A government which was at once the champion of national integrity and class interest used the power of its position without much scruple. It put down violence with the iron hand, and it forbade by law the combinations of workers that might have secured redress without resort to violence.

Desperate, unable to make themselves heard politically, the North made itself felt in the Luddite riots of 1811 and 1812, and again when the close of the war was found only to make misery the more apparent. The insurrectionary tendencies were hopeless. To some extent they were prompted, as they were betrayed, by government spies. With their collapse, and the beginnings of a hope that parliamentary reform would bring relief, this chapter of the labor life of England closes.

The case of the coal miners of the Wear and the Tyne is an exception to the general rule. They faced an impossible situation caused, not by new machinery, but by improved organization on the part of their employers. Inexperienced as they were, they seemed for a time likely to improve their position. But their final defeat is typified by Hepburn, their best leader, who was driven by hunger to purchase work from his old foes at the price of a pledge to organize no more.

This exception is important as showing that the real root of evil was not the introduction of machinery—though the idea is left inchoate by the Hammonds. The real evil was the concentration of political power in the hands of the same class which was just realizing its opportunities for unprecedented economic exploitation. It must be felt that the authors are too bitter against an innovation whose immediate effect was blighting, but which compelled men to new experiments in co-operation for control, which promise to make of the new technique a means for the attainment of more liberty, a wider range of initiative, and happier homes and families than were known in 1760, or at any other time.

WARNER F. WOODRING

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Social Purpose: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Civic Society.

By H. J. W. HETHERINGTON and J. H. MUIRHEAD. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918. Pp. 317. \$3.50 net.

It is difficult to understand why these lectures, delivered before the University College of Wales in the summer of 1916, were published in book form. The avowed purpose of the book is "to restate the essentials of the classical idealist" of society (p. 10). To this end Plato and Aristotle are made starting-points for the discussion of present civic society. While there is much good sense in the discussion, it seems quite out of touch with the spirit of modern science. It would be unfair to say that the book ignores the whole development of scientific

psychology and sociology, but it makes little use of their methods of approach to its problems. Rather its method is still that of "dialectic." Only one American sociologist receives any attention, Professor Cooley. Blackmar and Gillin's text is cited once, but the names are given in the footnote as "Blackmore and Gillen" and in the index as "Blackmore and Sillers."

The attitude of the book toward objective scientific method seems to be well indicated by the following quotation from Professor J. A. Smith, which the authors place just before their own preface: "The world of fact, artistic or aesthetic, scientific, moral, political, economic, is what the spirit builds around itself, creating it out of its own substance, while it itself in creating it, grows within Nothing is or can be alien, still less hostile to it, 'for in wisdom it has made them all.'"

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

Personal Beauty and Racial Betterment. By KNIGHT DUNLAP.
St. Louis: C. V. Mosby Company, 1920. Pp. 95. \$1.00.

The point of view of this book in eugenics is that of an experimentalist in physiological psychology. Personal beauty is defined as the evidence of fitness for "the function of procreating healthy children of the highest type of efficiency according to the standards of the race, and ability to protect these children." The author inadequately justifies his omission of moral qualities in his description of "the beautiful individual." The chief suggestions in the author's program of racial betterment are: eliminating the unfit through the use of education and publicity, insuring that marriages shall be made on the basis of mutual attraction of "beauty" alone, taking care that the unions of the most fit shall be fruitful.

This "personal beauty" treatment of eugenics contains several generalizations which are open to challenge. For example: All dark races prefer white skin (p. 20). The basis of power is muscular (p. 25). In a family one person must control (p. 27). Language is the principal means of thinking (p. 31).

E. S. BOGARDUS

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Current Social and Industrial Forces. Edited by LIONEL D. EDIE.
New York: Boni and Liveright, 1920. Pp. xv+393. \$2.50.

This is an interesting and valuable collection of source material prepared for courses on "Current Historical Forces" in the history

department of Colgate University. It has distinct value, also, for courses in sociology and economics.

The book carries an introduction by James Harvey Robinson, who concludes with the following admirable characterization of Professor Edie's work: "His anthology forms a really imposing stock-taking of current speculation upon pressing economic quandaries. It does not attempt to prove anything or defend anything, except the necessity of considering the pass in which humanity finds itself with the hope that with new knowledge and fuller understanding our policies of reform may be more prompt and less bungling and expensive than they might otherwise be." Professor Robinson is also represented by a six-page quotation from his *The New History*.

About sixty writers are represented, besides numerous reports and official documents. Hobson leads the field with five quotations, followed by Weyl and Croly with four, and Veblen, Bloomfield, King, Bertrand Russell, Hoxie, Wallas, and Woodrow Wilson, with three each. The following chapter headings indicate the arrangement of the material: I. "Forces of Disturbance"; II. "Potentialities of Production"; III. "The Price System"; IV. "The Direction of Industry"; V. "The Funds of Reorganization"; VI. "The Power and Policy of Organized Labor"; VII. "Proposed Plans of Action"; VIII. "Industrial Doctrines in Defense of the Status Quo"; IX. "The Possibilities of Social Service."

PACIFIC UNIVERSITY

ROBERT FRY CLARK

A Group-Discussion Syllabus of Sociology. By DANIEL B. LEARY, PH.D. Buffalo: University of Buffalo, Niagara Square, 1920. Pp. 42. \$1.00.

Dr. Leary, professor of psychology in the University of Buffalo, has contributed to the steadily increasing materials for the teaching of introductory college courses in sociology by preparing a syllabus of thirty-two sections, containing five to eight questions each, and supplemented by reading references. The point of view is "objective, historical, non-individualistic, dynamic." Social evolution, social control, and social problems are the main sub-divisions. An extended bibliography is prefixed. The syllabus is designed for the use of mature students. The questions, which constitute the chief contribution of the syllabus are as a rule well phrased. At times they stress philosophic rather than scientific considerations.

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

E. S. BOGARDUS

The American Red Cross in the Great War. By HENRY B. DAVISON.
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920. Pp. xii+303.
\$2.00.

This book by the chairman of the War Council appointed by President Wilson, also president of the Red Cross, is a clear and fascinating recital of the work of the Red Cross from the outbreak of the war between the United States and Germany in 1917. It begins with the story "When the Storm Burst" and closes with an account of the League of Red Cross Societies.

Sitting at the very center where every move in the development of the Red Cross from a small society with only six-hundred chapters and a few thousand members at the outbreak of the war to one with over thirty-seven hundred chapters and twenty-two million members at the time of the signing of the armistice, Mr. Davison is well equipped to tell the story of this great organization. He tells it well. As one reads the first few chapters which describe the expansion of the organization to meet the obligations laid upon it by the government in accordance with its charter, he feels again the breathless haste and high resolve which moved us all as the nation girded itself for the battle with its foe. The organization and reorganization which characterized the first months, the chaos which reigned and withal the order which finally evolved, the devotion of rich and poor in the various services of the Red Cross, the building of buildings in camps, the selection of personnel, crowding upon the organization with a prodigality which created a real problem, and the enlisting of nurses and social workers for Europe and America—all is here portrayed in vivid and fascinating form.

Mr. Davison divides his work into two parts, the first dealing with the work of the Red Cross in America—work for the soldier and sailor at home, home service, the work of the Junior Red Cross, and the care of the disabled soldier; the second part dealing with the work of the Red Cross abroad, in Italy, in France, in Great Britain, and in Eastern Europe. The book is not a critical history; it is a report by one who was the directing genius in its war organization, the War Council. It is to be hoped that sooner or later it may be supplemented by a more critical study of the work of the Red Cross, pointing out not only the achievements, but, what is of as much value to those who would learn also from its mistakes, also its errors of judgment, where it failed in its organization and in its highly centralized control in the division

offices, what can be learned from the fact that in the early days, at least, it was manned by volunteers, and from the fact that the managers and many of its divisional heads of departments were "big business" men.

J. L. GILLIN

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

The Human Costs of the War. By HOMER FOLKS. With illustrations by Lewis W. Hine. New York: Harper Bros., 1920. Pp. 1-325. \$2.25.

Believing that only an "infinitesimal fraction of reality" concerning the suffering of war-stricken Europe has ever found its way into print, the author assays an adequate appraisal of the damages to humanity which the war brought.

On the basis of a survey made by himself and staff following the armistice, a picture of the people of Serbia, Belgium, France, Italy, and Greece as the war left them is drawn. The results in terms of childhood, home, and health are then effectively summarized, and a chapter on "War versus Welfare" concludes the book.

Written for the general reader, the book gives a vivid impression of the appalling cost of the war in life and suffering. Although mostly estimates, the data are perhaps as accurate as any we shall ever get.

The survey is somewhat defective, however, because confined chiefly to the five lands named, and would have been more valuable had all the belligerent countries been included.

NEWELL L. SIMS

AMHERST, MASS.

British Labor Conditions and Legislation During the War. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Division of Economics and History. "Preliminary Studies of the War, No. 14." By M. B. HAMMOND. New York: Oxford University Press, 1919. Pp. v+335. Bound, for \$1.00; paper, gratis from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

This study of labor conditions and labor legislation in Great Britain during the war gives us in convenient form a great deal of information regarding the changes in trade unionism, unemployment, wages, hours of labor, welfare work, relation of the government to labor, and other labor problems. The author states that it is purposely "a narration rather than an interpretation" but he presents enough of the historical background to make the book intelligible to persons not acquainted

with earlier conditions in England. It is a book of importance because of the significant changes that took place during the war, and also because the interruption of communication with Europe during the war made it impossible for us by the ordinary methods to keep up with the changes in this field of labor problems.

E. H. SUTHERLAND

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Consumers' Co-operation. By ALBERT SONNICHSEN, New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1919. Pp. xix+223. \$1.75.

In this little volume the author has attempted to write a brief history of the co-operative movement explaining in detail the relationship between consumers' co-operation and productive co-operation, farmers' co-operative societies, profit-sharing, labor copartnership, etc. In part two of the book he discusses consumers' co-operation and the labor movement and consumers' co-operation and socialism.

In tracing the early history of co-operation he indicates very clearly his sympathy for consumers' co-operation as against all other forms of co-operation which must be tolerated as a part of the co-operative movement however irrational or inconsistent their programs are. Consumers' co-operation will succeed when the Rochdale principles are followed and when all other factors political, economic, and social are excluded from the program. The above is another of many attempts which have been made to explain why consumers' co-operation has uniformly failed in the United States with the exception of the recent experiments which have not had time to demonstrate whether they will endure or not. However much we may wish to see consumers' co-operative societies succeed, in the light of American experience we cannot accept his enthusiastic conclusion that consumers' co-operative societies will always succeed when established on the Rochdale principles.

In the author's discussion of the Purity Co-operative Bakery of Paterson, N. J., the author states that the Federal Food Control Board fixed the price of bread at a point which enabled this society to make too much money and although the Federal Food authorities were appealed to they would not change their ruling with reference to the price. In the interests of accuracy the price of bread in each state was not fixed by the National Federal Authorities but by the State Federal Authorities and the prices fixed were usually maximum prices. Nearly everywhere chain stores and others sold bread at prices below the maximum fixed by the authorities of the Food Administration.

The author has a keen imagination to conclude that the political views of Thomas Jefferson are very similar to those of Michael Bakunin and Lenine.

The book is well written and is a clear exposition of consumer's co-operation.

J. E. HAGERTY

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

The Human Factor in Industry. By LEE K. FRANKEL and ALEXANDER FLEISHER. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920. Pp. 366. \$3.00.

This work is a sweeping survey of the popular and technological literature covering selected problems in the field of personnel administration. The authors have given us very little that is new, either in point of view and method of analysis or in subject-matter. The text is organized around a list of subjects including: "Hiring and Holding"; Education"; "Working Hours"; Working Conditions"; "Medical Care"; "Methods of Remuneration"; Refreshment and Recreation"; "The Employer and the Community"; "Insurance, Savings, and Loans"; "Organization of the Department of Labor Administration." Each of these subjects is developed by describing the current industrial practices as revealed in the literature of the subject. There is little searching of these practices to discover and formulate the fundamental principles and policies that must be developed before either a satisfactory science or art of personnel administration can be developed. By definition, the authors exclude some of the most troublesome problems and conditions that confront the industrial manager. Labor administration is defined as "those activities carried on by employers and employees jointly or separately which benefit both, have as their unit the industrial plant and are not enforced by law or by organized labor." There may well be difference of opinion as to the relations that should be established with organized labor, but it seems highly artificial to remove, by definition, this problem from the field of personnel administration. Neither is it correct to assume, as the authors do, that labor legislation and union activities are merely negative factors. No small part of the progress made in matters of labor administration has been the direct result of the activities of these agencies.

Although there is little in this book to interest the more sophisticated students of labor administration, it is a valuable survey for the general

reader and for those industrial managers who have not had time to keep abreast of the developments to date.

R. W. STONE

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

The Science of Labour and Its Organization. By DR. JOSEFA IOTEYKO. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1919. Pp. viii+196. \$1.60.

In this little volume are collected a series of articles, published in certain French journals in 1916 and 1917, and the substance of certain lectures on fatigue, delivered at the Collège de France. The author seeks in this collection to throw light upon certain points in industrial psycho-physiology. To the results accomplished by research into the working of the bodily organs with the view to discover their best working conditions, to detect fatigue, and to lay down a basis for industrial work, he applies the caption "Science of Labour." The book is a summary of experiments and researches into the physiological and psychological aspects of personnel administration.

The discussion is divided into four parts. The first is concerned with the problems of apprenticeship, the economical methods of working, and the measurement of industrial fatigue. The second part is an evaluation and criticism of scientific management. Particular emphasis is placed upon the shortcomings of the Taylor system in respect to psycho-physiological factors. The third part presents data bearing upon the human power and aptitudes for work. The final section is devoted to an exposition of the Belgian methods of technical education.

The work is by no means a complete or final analysis of the personnel problems in industry. It is, however, a contribution to the literature on that subject. Those interested in the scientific study of the human factors in industry will find much that is new and valuable in this book.

R. W. STONE

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY

Lectures on Industrial Psychology. By BERNARD MUSCIO. New York: Dutton, 1910. Pp. iv+300. \$3.00.

The author defines industrial psychology as a study of methods for selecting workers on the basis of natural fitness and for obtaining from any expenditure of energy a maximum product. To these ends he advocates the establishment of a vocational laboratory in connection with every educational plant or system. It shall be the duty of the

advisory committees of these laboratories to give information (1) about the capacities of the persons who are being examined, (2) about the capacities required for any kind of labor for which there is a demand, and (3) about probable demands for various forms of labor.

Mr. Muscio discusses the main objections to scientific management such as (1) mere speeding up, (2) the increase of production about 300 per cent, and of wages only 30 to 100 per cent, (3) the interference with collective bargaining, (4) the destruction of craft skill, and (5) the undemocratic result of throwing undue industrial power into the hands of "the management." The author advocates the creation of committees of workers who shall co-operate with the "management" in putting the principles of scientific management into practice.

The tone of the book is fair-minded, scientific, and constructive. Although sympathetic with the workers, the author does not point out the function which industrial psychology may perform in showing how the personalities of the workers may be developed through their occupational activities and interests.

E. S. BOGARDUS

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Socialism in Thought and Action. By HARRY W. LAIDLER. The Macmillan Company. Pp. xviii+546. \$2.50.

This is an exposition of socialism by the secretary of the Inter-collegiate Society. The author does not try so much to express his own views but to give those of the acknowledged spokesmen of that party; these are expressed in a brief, clear, and direct manner. The book begins with a criticism of the wastefulness and inefficiency of the present system as the result of competition in production and distribution, resulting in waste of human life and energy through unemployment, industrial accident, and illness. The indictments against the unequal distribution of wealth, the wage system, and social maladjustment are ably stated and backed up by strong proof.

Chapter iii begins the statement of the socialist theory. This follows the Marxian theories of economic interpretation of history, class struggle, surplus value, and the labor theory of value, although modern limitations and interpretations are placed upon all of these. He defines the labor theory of value as "the amount of socially necessary labor contained therein, that is the amount of average human labor which is necessary for society to expend upon its reproduction, not the

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labor which might accidentally be embodied in a particular commodity as a result of some peculiarity under which the laborer worked (p. 117). By disappearance of the middle class, he explains, is meant especially the middle-class employer, and the increasing misery as not so much physical degeneration as the worker's recognition of injustice and his decreasing share in society's product.

The aims of socialism are defined as the "collective ownership and democratic management of the socially necessary means of production and distribution"; that socialism does not advocate the return to a handicraft stage; that private enterprise should continue where there is not exploitation and that voluntary co-operation would be encouraged, that the state would be controlled by the masses and not by a few individuals; that socialism does not intend to interfere with religion or the family.

Syndicalism is recognized as the left wing of the socialist movement and is frankly treated with its theory of general strikes and sabotage as striking at the socialist conception of democracy.

Under tendencies toward socialism are included the modern corporation, social reforms, co-operation, public ownership, advances in education and general health, the growth of the labor union, and the improvement of working conditions. The author argues rather skilfully against such objections to socialism as the absence of incentive, the probable inadequate accumulation of wealth, and political corruption.

Part II takes up the development of the socialist movement beginning with the organization of the different internationals and extending down to the present day. Here emphasis is placed upon the development and changes during and after the world-war, especially in Russia and the Central Empires, although its progress is traced in all nations. This part of the book contains much detail and is not nearly as interesting or as well written as Part I, possibly due to the uncertain material to be dealt with.

Throughout the entire work differences of opinion are given; arguments are sound and the proof offered scientific. In fact it is a splendid presentation of this movement. An adequate bibliography of the best books on socialism with their publishers and comments is added. Not only does the book deserve serious attention but it would make an excellent text.

G. S. Dow

Man or the State? By WALDO R. BROWNE, compiler and editor.
New York: Huebsch, 1919. Pp. xii+141. \$1.00.

Mr. Browne has brought together selected readings from Kropotkin, Buckle, Emerson, Thoreau, Spenser, Tolstoy, and Oscar Wilde, which support the thesis that state control is a failure and that social salvation lies in the deification of "personal liberty," which will culminate in "a really free society."

I believe that the compiler misses the main problem in his field today which is not "Man or the State?" but "Man," "the State," or "Man and the State." The current problem is to find out how the individual and government can work together to the best advantage of all.

E. S. BOGARDUS

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Religion and the New Psychology. By WALTER SAMUEL SWISHER,
B.D. Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1920. Pp. xv+259.
\$2.00.

The value of psychoanalysis for the religious worker was demonstrated some years ago when Pfister brought forth his "Psychoanalytic Method." Pfister's book drew attention to the need of religion itself receiving psychoanalytic interpretation. Such a study of religion is attempted by *Religion and the New Psychology*. From a viewpoint almost exclusively Freudian the book treats such topics as the nature of the unconscious and its influence on the religious life, determinism and freewill, mysticism and neurotic states, the problem of evil, pathological religious types, conversion, and attendant phenomena.

Jesus, except for certain masochistic tendencies, is declared free from neurosis (p. 34). Paul, who had the determining influence in the early church, was first strongly sadistic, then masochistic, and to the end neurotic (pp. 35-37). Conversion represents a mind-state "always and everywhere indicative of a neurosis" (p. 147). The most useful part of the book deals with religious education and illustrates the baneful effects of early religious fears. The author is dogmatic in his statements regarding the religious and non-ethical life of primitive people. Most of the readers, familiar with psychoanalytic literature, will turn from the book with the conviction that a satisfactory discussion of religion and the new psychology is hardly to be expected from within the ministerial profession.

The book would serve a useful purpose were it not unlikely to be read by those who need it most.

ERNEST R. GROVES

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Six Thousand Country Churches. By CHARLES OTIS GILL and GIFFORD PINCHOT. New York: Macmillan Co., 1919. Pp. xiv+237. \$2.00.

It would seem from this survey that Ohio in its 1,170 rural townships is suffering from a plethora of churches and a dearth of religion, and that this is lamentably true in the eighteen counties composing the southeast section of the state. Where social decline and degeneracy are most marked, it is the native born of native parentage that are involved and where denominational competition has brought Christianity to a standstill, orgiastic or emotional substitutes, like Holy Rollerism, thrive. The statistical tables, maps, and faithful treatment of detail set a high standard for church surveys and represent the projection on a larger scale of the methods employed by the authors in their former book, *The County Church*.

From the few examples given of federated or community church experiments one may hope that the problem is not insolvable; while perhaps the chief value of the work, which was sponsored by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America through its Commission on Church and Country Life, lies in its impartial exhibit of the zeal and stupidity of denominationalism gone to seed.

ALLAN HOBEN

CARLETON COLLEGE

Education through Settlements. By ARNOLD FREEMAN. London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1919. Pp. 63.

Education through Settlements is a pamphlet of sixty-three pages defining education and religion, not in the conventional language of the pedagogue or the preacher.

In the Preface by Arnold S. Rowntree we are introduced to the "Settlement Movement" described in these pages as "peculiarly adapted to present day needs." "It provides," he states, "a method of approach towards the solving of our many problems along the lines of local effort, and seems destined to play a useful part during the next few decades in the 'intellectual and social emancipation of the people.'"

"The virtue of this little book," Mr. Rowntree says, "is that, while informed from actual experience, it is alight with a healthy and

refreshing imagination." "It is hoped," he adds, "that what is written here may not be without its influence upon the future policy, both of the universities and our churches."

The central idea, Mr. Freeman tells us, is expressed in the phrase "education through fellowship for service." In fancy he brings back to communities in England the spirits of those civilized men and women who, if reincarnated, would, after seeing the conditions as they are after the war, write a manifesto expressing the faith of those who long to throw off their chains and be spiritually free to serve the community in which they live.

Their idea of a "settlement" is a place where not the poor but everybody is to be educated. Rich and poor, elementary school, and college graduates are to enter this "new university which will set itself to establish the Kingdom of God by distributing culture among the mass of the people."

This settlement center of education for service is to be "more interested in religion than the university, more interested in culture than the church."

It is stimulating to have a call to such practical, yet such idealistic service as Mr. Freeman sends to us from England. He believes that in every community there is a group of men and women who will ignore their religious, political, social, and educational differences if they can see "beyond the solid blackness of the present into the golden splendors of the world that is even now in the making." To educate for this propaganda of fellowship for service he would have settlements established wherever two or three can come together in this faith. It may be a cottage—a single room that may grow and develop "about a person with imagination. Even if he begins without a penny in his pocket or a friend in the locality, he will make an outstanding settlement."

In Part III Mr. Freeman gives methods of socializing "spiritual treasures." The settlement stands for an education for all citizens that makes "education used for selfish benefits a torture to the man himself." "It must stand for an education which turns out not book-worms, dilettantes, theorists, talkers, but men and women who are capable workers, responsible heads of households and who are citizens who love their city too much to be *satisfied with it*."

To further these ideals of *education through fellowship for service* the members of this center or "settlement" must be missionaries of a new kind—they must be prepared to propagandize, "to impress their ideals, to inform the minds and stimulate the wills and fire the con-

sciences of as many people as they can reach. They need not talk about the settlement, but in their own persons they must *be* the settlement."

It is his idea that the "settlement" is to be the "aggregating center for the spiritual and social forces of construction." As one reads these pages so full of spiritual inspiration one realizes that only those who went through the awful war and kept the faith could have written these words of idealism that the writer believes may become a reality.

It strengthens one's own faith to have quotations from such as Arthur Henderson, R. H. Tawney, and our own Jane Addams. Arthur Henderson, the labor leader, speaking of these settlements where all who want to serve in fellowship meet together, says "We have to extend the range of their power, and to develop their activities as a means of promoting the unity of classes, and of spreading a new conception of brotherhood amongst all sections of the community."

Mr. Freeman appeals to men and women who are not afraid of ideals, and not bound by conventionalism. The war and its effect on the community has brought him face to face with reality; he says "I do not know if there will be a revolution, but I do know that it could be avoided."

Social workers, church workers, university men and women of imagination in America will find here a message if they want it.

MARY E. McDOWELL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO SETTLEMENT

New Schools for Old. By EVELYN DEWEY. E. P. Dutton & Co., 1919. Pp. xi+337. \$2.00.

"Sentimental attachment to the 'Little Red Schoolhouse' of yesterday does not justify the maintenance of an anachronism today. Mrs. Harvey, by her work in Porter Township, has proved that the plant and equipment surviving from a formerly prized institution may be so utilized even in our communities as at present organized that the school may again touch every interest of old and young."

With this statement Miss Dewey closes her discussion of the Porter School, located near Kirksville, Missouri. It is an account of the work done by Mrs. Marie Turner Harvey in the regeneration of an out-at-the-heels, one-room rural school. It is more than a mere description, however, being in reality a study of the country-life problem in the concrete and an interpretation of the regenerative power of a socialized rural school.

There can be little doubt that the one-room rural school must be made over or abandoned. Mrs. Harvey set out to demonstrate that it can be made into a vital force in the building up from within of an ordinary rural community, economically, socially, and educationally, within the present generation. She has so far succeeded that Porter School has served not only as a sort of national rural-school experiment station but as a model for thousands of rural teachers. While it would be foolish to expect the poorly trained young girls in charge of most of our rural schools to do what a zealous and talented woman has done, yet Mrs. Harvey, in her seven years' work, has done much to stimulate general interest in a vital problem and to restore the faith of the expert.

Miss Dewey has shown genuine insight into rural problems and has given a valuable interpretation of the school approach to their solution. Her treatment is lacking in concreteness and seems unnecessarily long drawn out but it is penetrating and sound. Anyone interested in country-life problems or in the rural school would do well to read it.

WALTER R. SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

American Marriage Laws. By FRED S. HALL and ELIZABETH W. BROOKE. New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1919. Pp. 132. \$1.00.

Those who are interested in the too-much-neglected topic of marriage legislation will appreciate the convenience of this simplified and comparative arrangement of our American statutes on the subject. Part I gives proposals for marriage-law reform, using as its chief authorities the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, George Elliott Howard, Willystine Goodsell, and Frank Gaylord Cook. Part II summarizes existing laws by topics, making a comprehensive comparison of the legislation of all the states on the fundamental points involved. Part III gives a digest, arranged by states, of the marriage laws in each state of the Union. In a most striking way are brought out the numerous weaknesses in the diverse regulations of the various states, which probably constitute the most defective system of any great modern nation. More important to social welfare than the laws themselves is the question of their administration, a subject to be treated in a later volume to be published by the Russell Sage Foundation, to which this volume is preliminary.

EARLE E. EUBANK

Y. M. C. A. COLLEGE, CHICAGO

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

The Sociological Method of Durkheim.—Emile Durkheim proposed to make of sociology a far more strictly empirical science than it had ever before been conceived. Yet he is as rationalistic in sociology as Descartes was in physics and physiology. He approaches his subject with a scheme readymade for carrying on the investigation of facts, and a framework into which the results of his investigation shall fall. The method is proposed as one that has grown out of the personal experience of the writer, and Durkheim expressly declares that with the growth of his own and other peoples' further experience the method doubtless will be revised. But as feature after feature of the method is expounded he declares for it that it is absolutely indispensable—that on no other basis is a science of sociology possible. Therefore the main outlines are fairly to be regarded as permanent. The rules that constitute Durkheim's method are of two kinds: those belonging to empirical sciences generally, and those peculiar to sociology. Among the rules of the first kind stands the demand that the objects of the science shall be studied directly as facts. Even if the objects in question are ideas, they must be approached in the same direct fashion. However useful science may be in its applications, it is essentially and fundamentally theoretical. Its question is not *What ought to be?* but *What is?* The former question belongs to science only when and in so far as it has been transformed into the latter. But abstractions must not be substituted for facts. Durkheim declares that no psychological explanation of any phenomenon is ever sufficient. It is what he calls the *internal social environment* that counts. Durkheim's views on the relation of psychology will seem paradoxical or even plainly false to many who sympathize with his general positivistic position, but the author is inclined to think that the author is here essentially right. His use of the analogy between society and the organism and his definition of the *normal* and the *pathological* is open to criticism. Despite his announced purpose, Durkheim's alternative to ideology amounts to a new ideology.—Theodore de Laguna, *Philosophic Review*, May, 1920. O. B. Y.

The Basis of Human Association.—A society is not formed whenever a number of human individuals under the promptings of the same impulse engage together in the same pursuit. The division of labor with exchange of products does not constitute genuine association. Nor do the reciprocal activities originating in the sex and gregarious instincts of themselves constitute a true society. The semblance of social and political authority may even be exercised and obeyed without really associating the individuals involved. The basis of community is communication. Personal communication in the concrete means discussion, co-operation, and concordant emotion. In discussion the medium of transmission is language. The essential condition of co-operation is to be found in the ability of the human individual to realize purposes common to the choice of himself and others through the instrumentality of bodily movements freely controlled and initiated. Emotional concord becomes a form of personal communication when it springs from a source that is mutually understood by the participants. It is more than sympathy or the instinctive reaction to the visible signs of another's pleasure and pain. Perhaps the first and fundamental instance of emotional concord as true association is furnished by friendship or love.—Henry W. Wright, *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, July 29, 1920. O. B. Y.

The Modification of Instinct from the Standpoint of Social Psychology.—Social Psychology is as interested in the experimental facts concerning instincts as is normal human adult psychology, but it seeks more insistently to put the data together in a

manner significant to the understanding of human nature so far as this is modified by its social environs. The social significance of instincts cannot be brought out by analysis of the nature of specific forms of response, but must come largely from a consideration of the types of modification that instinctive forms of behavior undergo. These variations come fundamentally from the influence of habit and other forms of intelligent behavior. The topic is further elaborated with reference to the following points: (1) modification of the structural elements, including (a) changes in the stimulus in its internal and external aspect, (b) changes of the somatic or of the visceral response, and (c) combinations of these in sublimated behavior; (2) the temporal position of the modification as it occurs before or after the initial appearance of the instinct; and (3) modification of the biological purpose or adaptive value of the response.—Walter S. Hunter, *Psychological Review*, July, 1920. O. B.Y.

Motives in the Light of Recent Discussion.—There are still psychologists who believe that pleasure and pain, either experienced or anticipated, are the moving powers of all human activity. There are others who adhere to the ideo-motor theory of the intellectualists. Others again seem to feel no need for any theory of action and are content to regard all human activity as merely chains of complicated mechanical reflexes. This discussion starts from the assumption that the innate constitution of the human species comprises an array of conative dispositions. These may be called instincts or (with Mr. Shand) emotional dispositions, or merely conative tendencies. In *Social Psychology* the author has argued that these native tendencies are the mainspring of all man's activity. Several psychologists have accepted the author's account of these native tendencies as in the main correct, but some propose to supplement them by recognizing other springs of thought and action of a different nature. Professor Woodworth has raised the question in the most definite form in his *Dynamic Psychology*. He agrees that the instincts furnish motives of much human activity but he maintains that there are other motive forces in the mind. In the organism or the mind we may distinguish structure from the activating forces; and he speaks of the former as "mechanism" and the latter as "drives." He maintains that all "mechanisms," whether innate or acquired, contain their own driving power and are not wholly dependent upon "drive" coming from the instincts. McDougall holds that the motor habit contains no intrinsic drive. It determines how we shall execute our purposes, but does not prompt and sustain the doing. The motor habit is originally acquired in the service of some extrinsic purpose or motive and then operates only as a part of some larger complex activity, i.e., it has become a channel through which some impulse finds a ready outlet.—W. McDougall, *Mind*, July, 1920. O. B.Y.

Neo-Realism and the Origin of Consciousness.—The close association between conscious life and neural organization supports the conclusion that consciousness originated as a method of biological adjustment. Just as the principle of the conservation of energy is a regulative principle in physics, so the theory that consciousness is a product of evolution may be regarded as an important regulative principle in the study of the nature of consciousness. The new realist believes that sense-perception discloses to the percipient objects as they really are; representationalism believes that all qualities apprehended by sense are mental versions or symbols of the realities perceived. Perception may be incomplete, but for new realism it faithfully presents reality. A desire to guarantee a possibility of absolute knowledge at its source is the underlying motive of neo-realism. If consciousness originally adapted the actions of organisms to their environment, it only secondarily adapted them to apprehension of reality. Neo-realism must face the prospect of being compelled to maintain that from the first it was obligatory on consciousness to perceive things as they really are, however incomplete this perception. The origin of perception as a mode of adjustment between organism and environment is assumed by many to confirm neo-realistic estimates of its direct apprehending power. But if conscious experiences are habitually used as cues to action or as inducement to it, it is quite possible that the most original sensation may simply intimate, induce, or prompt movements that adjust the organism to its surroundings without conveying to it the

impress of reality. The representationalistic view is that "things-in-themselves" are represented in consciousness as mental versions or symbolisms. Every conscious experience may mean, in the final issue, simply pleasure or pain.—Joshua C. Gregory, *Philosophical Review*, May, 1920. O. B. Y.

Some General Aspects of Family Desertion.—The family is the oldest of our social institutions, and yet the scientific study of the family has until recent years been sadly neglected. The chaotic condition of our divorce laws has done much to undermine and disrupt our homes. The reports of social agencies indicate that 12.5 per cent of dependency is due to desertion. The census statistics indicate that the wife deserts more frequently than the husband. In 1916, 23,082 out of a total of 74,893 divorces granted to wives, or 36.8 per cent, were for desertion, while 16,908 out of a total of 33, 809 divorces granted to husbands, or 50 per cent, were caused by desertion. This is only the assigned reason. More reliable statistics refute the foregoing figures. The causes of desertion are sexual, economic, psychological, psychopathic, and hygienic. The treatment for the determining causes of desertion are: (1) a federal marriage and divorce statute with concurrent uniform legislation by the states; (2) the prevention of hasty and ill-considered marriages; (3) proper ethical and hygienic instruction, both in school and home, as to marital and parental duties; (4) the establishment of municipal desertion bureaus, in charge of desertion experts; (5) vigorous enforcement of the law on the part of district attorneys and public authorities; (6) the creation of "family courts" with full jurisdiction in all family matters and with properly organized social service and probation departments, working in conjunction with psychiatric clinics.—Walter H. Liebman, *Social Hygiene*, April, 1920. C. N.

The Unadjusted Girl.—The child of twelve to fifteen who becomes so socially "unfit" as to make it necessary for the court to intervene began as a "misfit." Heredity plays an important rôle in the development of the child. The second factor in maladjustment is the house which the girl is expected to call "home." In Texas it is apt to be a covered wagon or "shotgun" house, i.e., three rooms in a row opening into one another with no hallway. She does not fit into such a house because it plays havoc with modesty, and makes privacy and individuality an impossibility. The third factor that has a direct bearing on physical degeneracy and consequent delinquency is the miserable quality of food that is the sustenance of the average family representing the class from which delinquents are recruited. It is utterly impossible to produce a normal physical body on an unbalanced ration. And still another factor connected with the delinquent girl is the inadequacy of the public school for proper education. The child whose school life is supplemented by a normal home life may not suffer; but the unfortunate whose only chance of culture is the doubtful one of the American public school ceases to receive the useless solicitude of orators on "Americanization," and becomes instead the very definite responsibility of the local tax-payers.—Carrie Weaver Smith, *Social Hygiene*, July, 1920. C. N.

Colonies for Mental Defectives.—For some years there has been a growing interest in the plan of caring for mental defectives in groups apart from the parent institution for economic and social reasons. There are three types of colonies: (1) the farm colonies which are situated on state or private land, either rented or purchased. The grade of labor utilized varies from that of imbecile to the high-grade moron. According to the figures given out by Dr. Berstein the farm colonies have been self-supporting institutions in the state of New York. (2) The industrial colonies where only high-grade cases of either sex live under supervision and work in a factory, shop, or other industry. This type of colony is best illustrated by one established at Oriskany Falls, New York, by Dr. Berstein. The chief claims for the industrial colony are: (a) it provides employment for the class of border-line defectives; (b) it meets a demand for labor which is especially emergent at this time; (c) it constitutes one method of making remuneration to the state for public wards. (3) The domestic colony, the first one of its kind, was opened in the city of Rome in 1914. The inmates are girls who go out by the day or week for domestic service in private homes. Wages

are paid through a collector into the colony fund. Colonies can be made to solve the problem of removing the feeble-minded prostitute from the community and defectives can be made law-abiding, self-respecting, and self-supporting members of society.—Ethel Anderson Prince.—*Social Hygiene*, July, 1920. C. N.

Malnutrition and Health Education.—In such a study of malnutrition and health education, ignorance both on the part of the parent and of the child as to desirable conditions under which food should be taken was assumed as a causal factor. First-hand experience and opportunities for self-expression are as valuable in nutrition as in other fields, so a system was worked out which embodied these features in the study. Two open-air classes, of which the children should as far as possible be those who had been in the nutrition classes the previous year and who were still underweight, were selected for one part of the tests, while the fifth-grade pupils—226 children, as compared with 48 in the other group—were chosen for the other part. In some instances children made progress when they failed to obey the instructions given; on the other hand, those who most faithfully lived up to the instructions failed to gain weight. Both of these situations created difficult problems of explanation to the children, who watched their charts each day. It was found that the psychology of failure was quite as important as the psychology of success. We must know the amount of food not only necessary to maintain life but also to supply the energy used up in various life-activities. It is also necessary to consider the attitude of the child toward food and the emotional characteristics of children and their associates. People have thought they were starving because the type of food was changed, even though the caloric value of the new diet was superior to the old. Certain emotional factors such as rage and fear have a marked effect upon nutrition processes. We are in approximately the same condition in respect to the problem of the mental development of undernourished children as we are in considering the causal factors of undernourishment. A frank confession of ignorance is all that can be made. We do not know why many children fail to gain in weight, neither do we know that between the failure to gain in weight and school progress there is any clear connection. It may be that biological variations shown in decreased weight may be compensated for by greater ability and adaptation, i.e., by greater readiness and response to the stimuli of new situations. An answer to these questions will require much more extended and at the same time intensive investigations. We may not cure malnutrition by education but we can develop habits and methods of living which will have a decided influence for good with our next generation.—David Mitchell and Harriet Forbes, *Pedagogical Seminary*, May, 1920. W. F. B.

A Program for Organizing and Co-ordinating Industrial Clinics.—The industrial world faces the problem of how to offset a decreased labor supply and how to lower the costs of production. In some industries where plant medical and surgical departments have been established, the workers have developed a strong dislike for the physical examination, claiming it is used as a basis for discrimination between union and non-union men on the one hand and against the employment of the handicapped on the other. Irrespective of the accuracy of the contention, the suspicion forces the need of a neutral agency such as the industrial clinic. The present determination of occupational poisons is absolutely unreliable and we must have accurate information before legislation dealing with the matter is enacted. The industrial clinic should be able to collect a vast mass of information which, when analyzed, would uncover occupational diseases and hazards as well as the diagnostic character and therapeutic and prophylactic technique pertaining thereto. They would also permit of engineering research to eliminate or reduce to a minimum the hazards discovered. The most thoroughly organized and equipped clinic with the most comprehensive program is located in Milan, Italy, while less elaborate but unique is the clinic of the Joint Board of Sanitary Control, New York City, organized in 1910 for the benefit of the Garment Workers' Union. However, there has been no concerted or general movement to open clinics in industrial centers throughout the country. Discretion must be shown in its organization and management. It must be a neutral ground where dominance is neither with the employer nor the employee. Both will have to pull together with

the records of the physical examination treated confidentially, except in special cases. The community should benefit through the preservation of the health of its citizens; industry should benefit through increased regularity and efficiency, while the wage-earners should benefit through the knowledge furnished them about their health and the advice given as to proper treatment of the ailments discovered. Of great importance to the nation will be a system of well co-ordinated industrial clinics, for they will be invaluable in the discovery of hazardous processes and methods to be adopted in dealing with them.—Bernard J. Newman, *American Journal of Public Health*, August, 1920. W. F. B.

Community Medicine and Public Health.—Something is known concerning the extent of sickness in this country as a result of surveys made by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and the New York City Department of Health, the "Report on Disability according to Age and Occupation" by Dr. Boris Emmett, and several other studies made in the same field of investigation. Obtaining in their censuses certain "round number figures which must of course be taken with a grain of salt," it was estimated that at any one time in the United States there are two and one-half million sick persons, and of the seriously ill at least one-fourth are without doctor's aid. Further, a considerable portion of those who do come in contact with a doctor in private practice or through a hospital receive inadequate care. There seems to be no dearth of doctors, and the chief reason why such large numbers receive no attention is the failure of the public to appeal for medical service. The solution of the problem lies in the reorganization of medicine. Community medicine is cheaper and more efficient than is medical service rendered by private practitioners, and it will stimulate the movement for health insurance. The pay clinic would meet the need of the great middle class with ability to pay something but unable or unwilling under existing conditions to pay for medical service in terms offered by private practicing physicians. Free medical supervision at the University of Wisconsin has brought about a great reduction in sickness and absenteeism from classes. Community medicine, by decreasing sickness and death, signally increases productive capacity, actual production, and total net savings. It will be of exceptional value to the local health administration in its efforts to control communicable diseases. It will decrease the need of hospital service, reduce the amount of self-administration of medical service, and cut down the enormous consumption of patent medicines. There is, of course, opposition from some branches of the medical profession. The spirit of individualism is in conflict with the spirit of co-operation, but the world appears to be moving on to the new phase of co-operation where community interests largely take the place of individual interests. This change would seem to be evolutionary and, being evolutionary, quite irresistible.—Ernst Christopher Meyer, *American Journal Public Health*, June, 1920. W. F. B.

Government Housing in Canada.—The Canadian government decided to inaugurate a loan of \$25,000,000 for the purpose of national housing. This money was to be distributed among the nine provinces, pro rata to the population, at 5 per cent interest, and the provinces were to accept the responsibility of administration of the loan. The legitimacy of municipal housing has been established in Canada through the logic of an urgent human need. The housing act has been in operation for over a year. With the aid of the federal grant, about 1,600 houses have been built and these houses are expected to pay for their construction. The province of Ontario has raised a loan of \$2,000,000 in addition to the federal loan of \$8,753,291 and has completed 1,184 houses. New housing acts have been adopted by the provinces of Ontario and of Nova Scotia. In the province of New Brunswick fifty houses have been built; in Quebec, twenty houses; in Manitoba, over seventy houses, and about twice that number are in course of construction; in British Columbia about fifty houses have been built and ninety are under construction. Through the application of town-planning principles to the problem of housing, the home can be made attractive and pleasant. Town planning gives to the humblest resident the chance of outdoor home life, and this is a part of the Canadian policy.—Alfred Buckley, *National Municipal Review*, August, 1920. C. N.

La Société des Nations et la Religion de l'Humanité.—Universal peace can be guaranteed only by the League of Nations, and the League of Nations can only be founded on justice. But true justice which one considers as a privilege to recognize, as an obligation to fulfil, is already something infinitely superior to general interest and to the sound knowledge of the advantages which will accrue to all through universal harmony. It is the recognition of the rights of all, as a respectable and sacred thing, and therefore a religious object in itself, as well as moral and human. Such a notion of justice implies a universal brotherhood of man, which is therefore religious in nature, since this is the ideal which religion strives to realize. It is, therefore, that we do not hesitate to say that the League of Nations demands a religion of humanity, and that this will be supplied when the League becomes fully conscious of its unity, in the same way that the people, united under the Roman Empire, acquired religious and moral consciousness of their unity in Catholic Christianity. This will not be the work of a day. It will be the work of a new era just commencing under the League of Nations. But it presupposes among all people a certain capacity for putting universal and spiritual things above selfish, material, and transitory interests.—Alfred Loizy, *La Paix par le Droit*, March-April, 1920. C. V. R.

Psychology and the War.—When students of psychology turned their attention to the mental processes which underlie social activity they found that they were helped but little by the systems of the academic psychologists, for they found that reason and the intellect take but a secondary place in determining the behavior of man in his social relations, and that collective conduct is determined by a mass of preferences and prejudices which can only be explained with reference to instincts, desires, and conative trends. Still more important and far reaching is the study of man's behavior when afflicted by disease. The psychoneuroses can be brought into an orderly and intelligible system when we regard them to be due to the loss or weakening of certain mental functions, or to the reawakening of other functions which are normally held in abeyance as the result of suppression and control. The war has shown that human behavior in the mass is determined by sentiments reacting upon instinctive trends and traditions based on such trends. The sexual instinct in times of peace provides the most potent agent in the mental conflicts upon which disorders of the mind depend. The war brought into action the instinct of self-preservation. The danger of the destruction of the social framework in each person acted as the stimulus to re-awaken tendencies connected with the instinct of self-preservation. The re-awakening of danger-instincts produces a state which may be regarded as a universal psychoneurosis, which explains much that is now happening in human society. The social disorder is taking various forms in different countries. We hope that America and Great Britain are suffering from nothing worse than the fatigue and exhaustion. There are, however, some national symptoms in Great Britain which suggest the danger of a more definitely morbid state.—W. H. R. Rivers, *Scribner's*, August, 1920. C. N.

America's Troubled Hour.—America is the country in which are to be studied the most startling revelations of what is called, more or less accurately, the mass mind. It is also the country in which, above all others, external uniformity of conduct and expression is not only imposed and enforced but is, in the popular view, harmonized without difficulty with the cardinal doctrine of the Republic. English people should realize that there are reasons lying deep in the social structure and tradition which go far to account for the great difference that exists between the British and American attitude toward individual heresy and a dissentient minority. No country has ever been called upon to grapple with so huge and baffling a social problem as the one under which America is staggering today. Considered in the complex terms of immigrant communities, of capitalist power, of labor and social organization, of city life and the cost of living, of the Negro and the swiftly changing South, of a stupendous population moving irresistibly toward a higher material standard than has ever been touched by any people, and finally of a great nation puzzled and shocked by the convulsions of the Old World, we have the most overpowering prospect ever offered to the mind of man.—S. K. Ratcliffe, *Contemporary Review*, June, 1920. O. B. Y.

Die Unzufriedenheit als Massenerscheinung eine sozial-psychologische Studie.—The history of man shows how important a function discontent has played in his evolution. It was the foundation of every impulse to progress and cultural advance. In class conflict, too, discontent has played an important rôle; the class consciousness of the proletariat is the result of its dissatisfaction with the existing order. The *laissez faire* philosophy of capitalism under which economic inequality increased, accompanied by the despair of the masses, gave rise to the theory that the diseased social body could be cured by nothing less stringent than a revolution. Gradually, as governments began to exert wholesome influence through economic and social legislation, there came the realization that improvement might be gained by reforms rather than by revolution. The agitation of radicals had no effect; the masses realized that they had made gains, and that these gains were at stake. In August, 1914, it was this realization which determined German labor to stand together for the defense of the fatherland—not war-psychosis. During the course of the war, however, this attitude gradually changed. While profiteers flourished, the economic struggle of the lower classes grew more unfavorable. Conditions at the front were similar. Comparisons between the conditions under which the common soldier lived with those of the officers back of the lines gradually produced resentment and rage. Letters from home which told how the profiteers reveled in their spoils while the families of the common soldiers at the front were suffering but added fuel to the flame. Prussian discipline no longer sufficed to hold in check the wave of discontent; militarism collapsed of itself, at the front. It was the military revolt at the front and in the garrisons, uninfluenced by socialism or socialistic demands, which resulted in the political revolution in Germany. A social-democratic republic was established. Unfortunately, the economic freedom of the masses could not keep pace with the political, for unconquerable difficulties had to be met. Dissension among the proletariat itself made impossible as thoroughgoing a reform as was desirable. There was the agitation of the radicals to overcome. Even the desire for constructive measures is met with such difficulties as the low monetary value, the lack of raw materials, the inferiority of our means of production and transportation and the scarcity of food. Reactionaries pointed out to the discontented masses that they were better off under the monarchy, as if existing conditions were due to the revolution alone, instead of the war. The masses want immediate relief; but the problem of democratization and socialization cannot be solved so rapidly. The power of the proletariat to make reforms under present conditions is over-estimated, while the resistance power of capitalism is under-estimated. The increasing discontent of the masses is utilized by the enemies of social democracy. It should be used positively, not negatively; its actions should be guided by insight and the will to assist in the process of reconstruction.—Franz Laufkötter, *Die Neue Zeit*, May 28 and June 4, 1920. L. M. S.

The Formation of Public Opinion through Motion Pictures.—According to statements by prominent film men, in 1914 there were 12,000 commercial motion picture theaters in the United States. A recent newspaper estimate places the number at 16,200; but 12,000 to 15,000 is probably more nearly correct. Some have reckoned that one-third to one-half the population of the United States enter motion picture theaters weekly; others as high as ten million each day. The vast majority look to the screen for amusement, but the number who are instructed is constantly growing. Professor Ernest W. Burgess of the University of Chicago summarized observations by 237 teachers of over 100,000 schoolchildren, and concluded that 50 per cent of the children were vitally affected by the motion picture and that in relative influence on their lives the home stood first, the school second, the movies third, and the church fourth. An examination of the list of 840 feature films produced between September 1, 1918, and September 1, 1919, reveals only 15, or 1.7 per cent, suspected of specific propaganda purpose. Motion pictures may serve as propaganda by showing only the things wished to be emphasized. The use of the caption also furnishes opportunity for "coloring" news films. The use of educational films by governmental agencies is on the increase. The religious film is still in its infancy, but the adoption of the motion picture by religious organizations has been slow but apparently sure. The motion picture is finding a use in industrial and commercial life. Big business

interests have used the motion picture to great advantage in solving internal problems of accident, wastage, and holding employees. According to an article in the *Educational Film Magazine*, August, 1918, some 34,821 men saw the Safety Film at the Ford plant, and there was a resulting 27 per cent decrease in the number of lost-time accidents. Films produced for specific propaganda purpose, not commercial, play an important part in the formation of public opinion. This was shown during the war.—Harold A. Larrabee, *Religious Education*, June, 1920. R. G. H.

Private Rights and Civic Beauty.—No city planning can get anywhere unless directed to the constructive character of the buildings of which the city is made up. Without municipal control public-spirited effort merely wastes itself against a massed ignorance and selfishness falsely dignified with the name of rights. The American city stands impotent before "the paramountcy of private rights." In continental countries cities have adopted regulations regarding street lines, balconies, height, the style, material, and other matters of appearance of the building. In America city planners confront the blank wall of the Constitution, i.e., no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The courts have interpreted these provisions in favor of individual cases. No survey of civic aesthetics in this country would be complete without taking cognizance of the individualistic and decentralized character of Anglo-Saxon democracy. The antagonism encountered in this field will already have shown itself to involve sociological first principles. Back of court and constitution lies the Anglo-Saxon's highly developed sense of freedom. So jealous is our love of liberty that we have made individual rights the corner stone of our constitutional structure. *E pluribus unum* is with us a political rather than a social maxim.—Stephen Berrien Stanton, *The Unpartizan Review*, July–September, 1920. C. N.

L'Idéal Democratique et La Chambre Nouvelle.—The word "democracy" still frightens some individuals, and to them a democratic régime has been synonymous with a régime where the ideal was that of a dupe. The Great War has largely caused this presumption to fall, but one of the biggest problems to face any democracy is the problem of competence, that is, to see that public affairs are efficiently managed and at the same time in a democratic manner. The means by which the democratic ideal is attained is summed up in four points. First, democracy has to appeal to the co-operation of all the people. The first appeal is made to the simple citizen whose means of co-operation is his vote. Hence, to deprive any class of citizens of the right to vote is to work against the interests of the country. A system of plural voting based on differences of ability, education, etc., while it may have much in its favor, is not the best for democracy. Instead, the single vote system combined with the device of proportional representation is to be recommended. Secondly, if the democratic ideal is to be achieved, it will require the election to office of those most competent. They should have the skill of technicians and jurists, but judging from past parliaments this has not always been the case. Thirdly, the democratic ideal rests on the loyal and upright aims of the official representing authority, the statesman, the minister. That France has not always had such men in power is also but a matter of history. Lastly, associated in the direction of the government, but not elected, is the official or *fonctionnaire*. Under the present system he is often nameless and his responsibility is lost in that of his minister. This has often resulted in grave errors being covered up. To remedy this condition, only such persons should be appointed who are manifestly fitted for the work, and they should be allowed to put their own personality into prominent relief. The question now is, "Has the new Chamber the ability to carry out these reforms without friction and without check?"—M. L'Abbé Siguret, *La Reforme Sociale*, June, 1920. C. V. R.

Der wirtschaftliche Wiederaufbau Deutschlands.—In spite of the many achievements which the revolution has brought, the new Germany has not been able to cope successfully with all the demands which the consequences of a defeat have made upon it. Germany is not only suffering from grave errors in the diplomatic and political policies pursued by its leaders during the war but also from a lack of

raw materials. The low exchange value has made it difficult to procure raw materials and has forced many industries to idleness, in spite of heavy contracts; only those establishments which, owing to their participation in war production, were enabled to lay in a supply of raw materials are able to meet the high demand for production. The scarcity of goods has resulted in an enormous rise in prices. The high cost of living has caused strikes for higher wages, which permanently hinder production. The desire to profit at the expense of the consumer controls the capitalist of today more than ever, and the consumer is more and more at the mercy of large combinations. In spite of a trend toward industrial democracy, capitalism has never flourished more than today. The measures which the government is adopting to cope with the situation are utter failures, because they are derived from the old capitalistic régime. The most important problem for Germany today is that concerning coal. The production of coal has been diminished owing to the prolonged war, and the unfavorable attitude of the workers, who object to working for a capitalistic clique. In spite of governmental control and distribution, no relief can be found, especially since the necessity of delivering immense amounts to the entente reduces the supply at the disposal of Germany. If Germany is to be brought out of economic chaos, a change in the management of production of the mines must be undertaken. No other branch of industry has been developed to a stage so highly favorable to the transference of the means of production to society as this. A private monopoly exists; competition is at a standstill. The ownership has become so removed from the productive process that, in many cases, it is not known who the stockholders are. The director of the "Harpener Bergwerksaktiengesellschaft" declared that last year thirteen million marks of dividends had not been collected, and that this stock is probably in the hands of foreign capitalists. Why not abolish absentee ownership altogether? Similarly, other branches of industry must be brought under more rigid control.—Theodor August Schmidt, *Die Neue Zeit*, June 4, 1920. L. M. S.

Russian Co-operative Movement.—Russia is over twice as large as the United States, with fully 93 per cent of its population rural and only about 7 per cent urban. Due to the strenuous climate and lack of means of transportation, the people have lived in small communities and the spirit of co-operation has always been present. There are four modern types of co-operative enterprise in Russia: consumers', producers', savings or credit, and insurance co-operative societies. The local consumers' societies are united into regional unions, some of which build and conduct their own factories. The regional unions unite into an All Russian Central Union of Consumers' Societies. In 1918 its membership consisted of 500 federations, comprising 40,000 local societies, and about 12,000,000 individual members. The producers' societies are organized for the marketing of eggs, butter, flax, hemp, etc. These local societies are members of central bodies organized according to their general specialties. Credit societies exist that the farmers may have a place to deposit their savings, or that they may obtain credit to make improvements on their homesteads. The various co-operative societies also make use of the credit societies to carry on their business. These credit societies are also organized on the regional union and central head plan. The Moscow People's Bank is thus owned and controlled by the unions and local societies. Co-operative insurance came into existence during the war, and has already been managed on a large scale by co-operative societies. The educational activities of the co-operatives include courses of instruction to prepare young people to become instructors, lecturers, bookkeepers, etc., while the peasant universities teach agriculture, home economics, and civics. The success of the Russian co-operatives seems assured and permanent, since even during 1918 over \$5,000,000,000 (par) worth of goods were handled. The movement is deeply rooted in the history of the country, and is not hostile to any political system which will simply leave it alone.—A. J. Zelenko, *Monthly Labor Review*, June, 1920. C.V.R.

The Trend toward Industrial Democracy.—This trend, which is analogous to the political movement toward democracy, can best be studied in England. A hundred years ago England was controlled by a political aristocracy. At the same time the industrial life of the nation was dominated by a small circle. The new inventions of the industrial revolution went into the hands of a few, which gave them a

great advantage. When the workmen began to organize, the employers appealed to an aristocratic and therefore sympathetic legislature, and a great body of class legislation favorable to the industrial aristocracy resulted. The capitalists were credited with being the producers of wealth and with making England rich; but she was becoming rich only at the top, while at the bottom there was poverty to the extent of absolute destitution. The effect of the introduction of machinery and large amounts of capital and the adoption of a new industrial organization was, under the influence of laissez faire, deleterious to the masses. By a series of parliamentary acts the suffrage has been extended so that since 1918 England stands out in form the most complete democracy of any large nation. There have been breaks also in the industrial aristocracy, but this is a more complex process. The first Factory Act was passed in 1802 and since then the government has gradually narrowed the field of the old aristocratic control. The government has also entered industry by taking over the telegraphs, parcel post, etc. Since 1844 the co-operative movement has been gaining power and, in combination with the rising Labor party and the trade union movement, the political potentialities in the future are great. This great democratic system of industry is being built up to take the place of the capitalistic management when it fails to function satisfactorily. The trade union movement has been growing for more than a century until the old aristocracy of economic life has come to an end. At the present time no employer can carry on his industry without dealing with a union. This trend is a continuous one. There has been no period of twenty years, during the last hundred years, in which the old control by the employers was not intruded upon by a more socially controlled treatment of industrial conditions. Such a continuous movement, so wide in its extent, cannot be expected to stop short of some great epoch-making change. It obviously has all the characteristics of evolution in human society. This same spirit of democracy is coming into the public attitude toward industry in other countries as well as in England. It is a movement which has all the characteristics of long continuance, of wide application, of continuity, and of rising force as the years have gone on.—E. P. Cheyney, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July, 1920. W. C. S.

Employees Representation in Standard Oil.—A few years ago the strikes affecting the Standard Oil Company, and also the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, challenged the attention of the whole country. Managers of labor began to look for the causes of industrial strife and found that before the introduction of power machinery the workman kept his identity, but that since then the trend is to take it away from him. The principle of employee representation was introduced to restore this identity to him again. Men are to feel that they are individuals and not check numbers, and that the right of appeal is open to them for the just settlement of all grievances. On April 1, 1918, representatives of employees and management of the Standard Oil Company met and adopted a joint agreement in all matters in which the employees and management were mutually concerned. The agreement created an employment department which outlined the acts for which discharge without notice might be the penalty, and protected employees from immediate discharge for other acts requiring disciplinary measures. All wage adjustments are made in joint conferences, subject to the approval of the board of directors. Everything concerning working conditions can be brought up before a joint conference, and if any man has a grievance he can have it settled by the conference, with the privilege always of appealing to the higher executives, up to the president of the company. Some of the topics which have come up for discussion in which adjustments have been made are wage adjustments, hours, working conditions, the representation plan itself, etc. The results of the plan show first that the employees are learning some of the difficulties of management. They are more broad minded and they see the other side of the business. Secondly, they are not continually grabbing for themselves. In certain instances the employee representatives actually voted against wage increases asked by their constituents. Thirdly, the workmen have learned that it is no longer necessary to strike in order to attract attention to a grievance, but that adequate machinery exists for its orderly settlement. Finally, in proof of the above contention, the company has eliminated every strike of importance for the past two years.—Burton Kline, *Industrial Management*, May and June, 1920. C. V. R.

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SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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I. SOCIOLOGY AND "SCIENTIFIC" HISTORY

Sociology first gained recognition as an independent science with the publication, between 1830 and 1842, of Auguste Comte's *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. Comte did not, to be sure, create sociology. He did give it a name, a program, and a place among the sciences.

Comte's program for the new science proposed an extension to politics and to history of the positive methods of the natural sciences. Its practical aim was to establish government on the secure foundation of an exact science and give to the predictions of history something of the precision of mathematical formulae.

We have to contemplate social phenomena as susceptible of prevision, like all other classes, within the limits of exactness compatible with their higher complexity. Comprehending the three characteristics of political science which we have been examining, prevision of social phenomena supposes, first, that we have abandoned the region of metaphysical idealities, to assume the ground of observed realities by a systematic subordination of imagination to observation; secondly, that political conceptions have ceased to be absolute, and have become relative to the variable state of civilization, so that theories, following the natural course of facts, may admit of our foreseeing them; and, thirdly, that permanent political action is limited

by determinate laws, since, if social events were always exposed to disturbance by the accidental intervention of the legislator, human or divine, no scientific prevision of them would be possible. Thus, we may concentrate the conditions of the spirit of positive social philosophy on this one great attribute of scientific prevision.¹

Comte proposed, in short, to make government a technical science and politics a profession. He looked forward to a time when legislation, based on a scientific study of human nature, would assume the character of natural law. The earlier and more elementary sciences, particularly physics and chemistry, had given man control over external nature; the last science, sociology, was to give man control over himself.

Men were long in learning that Man's power of modifying phenomena can result only from his knowledge of their natural laws; and in the infancy of each science, they believed themselves able to exert an unbounded influence over the phenomena of that science. . . . Social phenomena are, of course, from their extreme complexity, the last to be freed from this pretension: but it is therefore only the more necessary to remember that the pretension existed with regard to all the rest, in their earliest stage, and to anticipate therefore that social science will, in its turn, be emancipated from the delusion. . . . It [the existing social science] represents the social action of Man to be indefinite and arbitrary, as was once thought in regard to biological, chemical, physical, and even astronomical phenomena, in the earlier stages of their respective sciences. . . . The human race finds itself delivered over, without logical protection, to the ill-regulated experimentation of the various political schools, each one of which strives to set up, for all future time, its own immutable type of government. We have seen what are the chaotic results of such a strife; and we shall find that there is no chance of order and agreement but in subjecting social phenomena, like all others, to invariable natural laws, which shall, as a whole, prescribe for each period, with entire certainty, the limits and character of political action: in other words, introducing into the study of social phenomena the same positive spirit which has regenerated every other branch of human speculation.²

In the present anarchy of political opinion and parties, changes in the existing social order inevitably assume, he urged, the character, at the best, of a mere groping empiricism; at the worst, of a social convulsion like that of the French Revolution. Under the

¹ Harriet Martineau, *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, freely translated and condensed (London, 1893), II, 61.

² Harriet Martineau, *op. cit.*, II, 59-60.

direction of a positive, in place of a speculative or, as Comte would have said, metaphysical science of society, progress must assume the character of an orderly march.

It was to be expected, with the extension of exact methods of investigation to other fields of knowledge, that the study of man and of society would become, or seek to become, scientific in the sense in which that word is used in the natural sciences. It is interesting, in this connection, that Comte's first name for sociology was *social physics*. It was not until he had reached the fourth volume of his *Positive Philosophy* that the word sociological is used for the first time.

Comte, if he was foremost, was not first in the search for a positive science of society, which would give man that control over men that he had over external nature. Montesquieu, in his *Spirit of the Laws*, first published in 1747, had distinguished in the organization of society, between form, "the particular structure," and the forces, "the human passions which set it in motion." In his preface to this first epoch-making essay in what Freeman calls "comparative politics," Montesquieu suggests that the uniformities, which he discovered beneath the wide variety of positive law, were contributions not merely to a science of law, but to a science of mankind.

I have first of all considered mankind; and the result of my thoughts has been, that amidst such an infinite diversity of laws and manners, they are not solely conducted by the caprice of fancy.¹

Hume, likewise, put politics among the natural sciences.² Condorcet wanted to make history positive.³ But there were, in the period between 1815 and 1840 in France, conditions which made the need of a new science of politics peculiarly urgent. The Revolution had failed and the political philosophy, which had directed and justified it, was bankrupt. France between 1789 and 1815

¹ Montesquieu, Baron M. de Secondat, *The Spirit of the Laws*, translated by Thomas Nugent (Cincinnati, 1873), I, xxxi.

² David Hume, *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Part II, sec. 7.

³ Condorcet, *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (1795), 292. See Barth, *Die Philosophie des Geschichte als Sociologie* (Leipzig, 1897), Part I, pp. 21-23.

had adopted, tried, and rejected no less than ten different constitutions. But during this period, as Saint-Simon noted, society, and the human beings who compose society, had not changed. It was evident that government was not, in any such sense as the philosophers had assumed, a mere artifact and legislative construction. Civilization, as Saint-Simon conceived it, was a part of nature. Social change was part of the whole cosmic process. He proposed, therefore, to make politics a science as positive as physics. The subject-matter of political science, as he conceived it, was not so much political forms as social conditions. History had been literature. It was destined to become a science.¹

Comte called himself Saint-Simon's pupil. It is perhaps more correct to say Saint-Simon formulated the problem for which Comte, in his *Positive Philosophy*, sought a solution. It was Comte's notion that with the arrival of sociology the distinction which had so long existed, and still exists, between philosophy, in which men define their wishes, and natural science, in which they describe the existing order of nature, would disappear. In that case ideals would be defined in terms of reality, and the tragic difference between what men want and what is possible would be effaced. Comte's error was to mistake a theory of progress for progress itself. It is certainly true that as men learn what is, they will adjust their ideals to what is possible. But knowledge grows slowly.

Man's knowledge of mankind has increased greatly since 1842. Sociology, "the positive science of humanity," has moved steadily forward in the direction that Comte's program indicated, but it has not yet replaced history. Historians are still looking for methods of investigation which will make history "scientific."

No one who has watched the course of history during the last generation can have felt doubt of its tendency. Those of us who read Buckle's first volume when it appeared in 1857, and almost immediately afterwards, in 1859, read the *Origin of Species* and felt the violent impulse which Darwin gave to the study of natural laws, never doubted that historians would follow until they had exhausted every possible hypothesis to create a science of history. Year after year passed, and little progress has been made. Perhaps

¹ *Oeuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin* (Paris, 1865-78), XVII, 228. Paul Barth, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 23.

the mass of students are more skeptical now than they were thirty years ago of the possibility that such a science can be created. Yet almost every successful historian has been busy with it, adding here a new analysis, a new generalization there; a clear and definite connection where before the rupture of idea was absolute; and, above all, extending the field of study until it shall include all races, all countries, and all times. Like other branches of science, history is now encumbered and hampered by its own mass, but its tendency is always the same, and cannot be other than what it is. That the effort to make history a science may fail is possible, and perhaps probable; but that it should cease, unless for reasons that would cause all science to cease, is not within the range of experience. Historians will not, and even if they would they can not, abandon the attempt. Science itself would admit its own failure if it admitted that man, the most important of all its subjects, could not be brought within its range.¹

Since Comte gave the new science of humanity a name and a point of view, the area of historical investigation has vastly widened and a number of new social sciences have come into existence—ethnology, archaeology, folklore, the comparative studies of cultural materials, i.e., language, mythology, religion, and law, and in connection with and closely related with these, folk-psychology, social psychology, and the psychology of crowds, which latter is, perhaps, the forerunner of a wider and more elaborate political psychology. The historians have been very much concerned with these new bodies of materials and with the new points of view which they have introduced into the study of man and of society. Under the influences of these sciences, history itself, as James Harvey Robinson has pointed out, has had a history. But with the innovations which the new history has introduced or attempted to introduce, it does not appear that there have been any fundamental changes in method or ideology in the science itself.

Fifty years have elapsed since Buckle's book appeared, and I know of no historian who would venture to maintain that we had made any considerable advance toward the goal he set for himself. A systematic persecution of the various branches of social science, especially political economy, sociology, anthropology, and psychology, is succeeding in explaining many things; but history must always remain, from the standpoint of the astronomer, physicist, or chemist, a highly inexact and fragmentary body of knowledge. . . . History can no doubt be pursued in a strictly scientific spirit, but

¹ Henry Adams, *The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma* (New York, 1919), p. 126.

the data we possess in regard to the past of mankind are not of a nature to lend themselves to organization into an exact science, although, as we shall see, they may yield truths of vital importance.¹

History has not become, as Comte believed it must, an exact science, and sociology has not taken its place in the social sciences. It is important, however, for understanding the mutations which have taken place in sociology since Comte to remember that it had its origin in an effort to make history exact. This, with, to be sure, considerable modifications, is still, as we shall see, an ambition of the science.

II. HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL FACTS

Sociology, as Comte conceived it, was not, as it has been characterized, "a highly important point of view," but a fundamental science, i.e., a method of investigation and "a body of discoveries about mankind."² In the hierarchy of the sciences, sociology, the last in time, was first in importance. The order was as follows: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, including psychology, sociology. This order represented a progression from the more elementary to the more complex. It was because history and politics were concerned with the most complex of natural phenomena that they were the last to achieve what Comte called the positive character. They did this in sociology.

Many attempts have been made before and since Comte to find a satisfactory classification of the sciences. The order and relation of the sciences is still, in fact, one of the cardinal problems of philosophy. In recent years the notion has gained recognition that the difference between history and the natural sciences is not one of degree, but of kind; not of subject-matter merely, but of method. This difference in method is, however, fundamental. It is a difference not merely in the interpretation but in the *logical character* of facts.

Every historical fact, it is pointed out, is concerned with a unique event. History never repeats itself. If nothing else, the mere circumstance that every event has a *date* and *location* would

¹ James Harvey Robinson, *The New History, Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical Outlook* (New York, 1912), pp. 54-55.

² James Harvey Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

give historical facts an individuality that facts of the abstract science do not possess. Because historical facts always are located and dated, and cannot therefore be repeated, they are not subject to experiment and verification. On the other hand, a fact not subject to verification is not a fact for natural science. History, as distinguished from natural history, deals with individuals, i.e., individual events, persons, institutions. Natural science is concerned, not with individuals, but with classes, types, species. All the assertions that are valid for natural science concern classes. An illustration will make this distinction clear.

Sometime in October, 1838, Charles Darwin happened to pick up and read Malthus' book on *Population*. The facts of "the struggle for existence," so strikingly presented in that now celebrated volume, suggested an explanation of a problem which had long interested and puzzled him, namely the origin of species.

This is a statement of a historical fact, and the point is that it is not subject to empirical verification. It cannot be stated, in other words, in the form of a hypothesis, which further observation of other men of the same type will either verify or discredit.

On the other hand, in his *Descent of Man*, Darwin, discussing the rôle of sexual selection in evolution of the species, makes this observation: "Naturalists are much divided with respect to the object of the singing of birds. Few more careful observers ever lived than Montagu, and he maintained that the 'males of song-birds and of many others do not in general search for the female, but, on the contrary, their business in spring is to perch on some conspicuous spot, breathing out their full and amorous notes, which, by instinct, the female knows and repairs to the spot to choose her mate.' "

This is a typical statement of a fact of natural history. It is not, however, the rather vague generality of the statement that makes it scientific. It is its representative character, the character which makes it possible of verification by further observation which makes it a scientific fact.

It is from facts of this kind, collected, compared, and classified, irrespective of time or place, that the more general conclusions are drawn, upon which Darwin based his theory of the "descent of

man." This theory, as Darwin conceived it, was not an *interpretation* of the facts but an *explanation*.

The relation between history and sociology, as well as the manner in which the more abstract social sciences have risen out of the more concrete, may be illustrated by a comparison between history and geography. Geography as a science is concerned with the visible world, the earth, its location in space, the distribution of the land masses, and of the plants, animals, and peoples upon its surface. The order, at least the fundamental order, which it seeks and finds among the objects it investigates is *spatial*. As soon as the geographer begins to compare and classify the plants, the animals, and the peoples with which he comes in contact, geography passes over into the special sciences, i.e., botany, zoölogy, and anthropology.

History, on the other hand, is concerned with a world of events. Not everything that happened, to be sure, is history, but every event that ever was or ever will be significant is history.

Geography attempts to reproduce for us the visible world as it exists in space; history, on the contrary, seeks to re-create for us in the present the significance of the past. As soon as historians seek to take events out of their historical setting, that is to say, out of their time and space relations, in order to compare them and classify them; as soon as historians begin to emphasize the typical and representative rather than the unique character of events, history ceases to be history and becomes sociology.

The differences here indicated between history and sociology are based upon a more fundamental distinction between the historical and the natural sciences first clearly defined by Windelband, the historian of philosophy, in an address to the faculty of the University of Strassburg in 1894.

The distinction between natural science and history begins at the point where we seek to convert facts into knowledge. Here again we observe that the one (natural science) seeks to formulate laws, the other (history) to portray events. In the one case thought proceeds from the description of particulars to the general relations. In the other case it clings to a genial depiction of the individual object or event. For the natural scientist the object of investigation which cannot be repeated never has, as such, scientific value. It serves his purpose only so far as it may be regarded as a type or as a special instance

of a class from which the type may be deduced. The natural scientist considers the single case only so far as he can see in it the features which serve to throw light upon a general law. For the historian the problem is to revive and call up into the present, in all its particularity, an event in the past. His aim is to do for an actual event precisely what the artist seeks to do for the object of his imagination. It is just here that we discern the kinship between history and art, between the historian and the writer of literature. It is for this reason that natural science emphasized the abstract; the historian, on the other hand, is interested mainly in the concrete.

The fact that natural science emphasizes the abstract and history the concrete will become clearer if we compare the results of the researches of the two sciences. However finespun the conceptions may be which the historical critic uses in working over his materials, the final goal of such study is always to create out of the mass of events a vivid portrait of the past. And what history offers us is pictures of men and of human life, with all the wealth of their individuality, reproduced in all their characteristic vivacity. Thus do the peoples and languages of the past, their forms and beliefs, their struggles for power and freedom, speak to us through the mouth of history.

How different it is with the world which the natural sciences have created for us! However concrete the materials with which they started, the goal of these sciences is theories, eventually mathematical formulations of laws of change. Treating the individual, sensuous, changing objects as mere unsubstantial appearances (phenomena), scientific investigation becomes a search for the universal laws which rule the timeless changes of events. Out of this colorful world of the senses, science creates a system of abstract concepts, in which the true nature of things is conceived to exist—a world of colorless and soundless atoms, despoiled of all their earthly sensuous qualities. Such is the triumph of thought over perception. Indifferent to change, science casts her anchor in the eternal and unchangeable. Not the change as such but the unchanging form of change is what she seeks.

This raises the question: What is the more valuable for the purposes of knowledge in general, a knowledge of law or a knowledge of events? As far as that is concerned, both scientific procedures may be equally justified. The knowledge of the universal laws has everywhere a practical value in so far as they make possible man's purposeful intervention in the natural processes. That is quite as true of the movements of the inner as of the outer world. In the latter case knowledge of nature's laws has made it possible to create those tools through which the control of mankind over external nature is steadily being extended.

Not less for the purposes of the common life are we dependent upon the results of historical knowledge. Man is, to change the ancient form of the expression, the animal who has a history. His cultural life rests on the transmission from generation to generation of a constantly increasing body of historical memories. Whoever proposes to take an active part in this cultural

process must have an understanding of history. Wherever the thread is once broken—as history itself proves—it must be painfully gathered up and knitted again into the historical fabric.

It is, to be sure, true that it is an economy for human understanding to be able to reduce to a formula or a general concept the common characteristics of individuals. But the more man seeks to reduce facts to concepts and laws, the more he is obliged to sacrifice and neglect the individual. Men have, to be sure, sought, in characteristic modern fashion, “to make of history a natural science.” This was the case with the so-called philosophy of history of positivism. What has been the net result of the laws of history which it has given us? A few trivial generalities which justify themselves only by most careful consideration of their numerous exceptions.

On the other hand it is certain that all interest and values of life are concerned with what is unique in men and events. Consider how quickly our appreciation is deadened as some object is multiplied or is regarded as one case in a thousand. “She is not the first” is one of the cruel passages in *Faust*. It is in the individuality and the uniqueness of an object that all our sense of value has its roots. It is upon this fact that Spinoza’s doctrine of the conquest of the passions by knowledge rests, since for him knowledge is the submergence of the individual in the universal, the “once for all” into the eternal.

The fact that all our livelier appreciations rest upon the unique character of the object is illustrated above all in our relations to persons. Is it not an unendurable thought, that a loved object, an adored person, should have existed at some other time in just the form in which it now exists for us? Is it not horrible and unthinkable that one of us, with just this same individuality, should actually have existed in a second edition?

What is true of the individual man is quite as true of the whole historical process: it has value only when it is unique. This is the principle which the Christian doctrine successfully maintained, as over against Hellenism in the Patristic philosophy. The middle point of their conception of the world was the fall and the salvation of mankind as a unique event. That was the first and great perception of the inalienable metaphysical right of the historian to preserve for the memory of mankind, in all their uniqueness and individuality, the actual events of life.¹

Like every other species of animal, man has a natural history. Anthropology is the science of man considered as one of the animal

¹ Wilhelm Windelband, *Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft, Rede zum Antritt des Rectorats der Kaiser-Wilhelms-Universität Strassburg* (Strassburg, 1900). The logical principle outlined by Windelband has been further elaborated by Heinrich Rickert in *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, eine logische Einleitung in die historische Wissenschaft* (Tübingen u. Leipzig, 1902). See also Georg Simmel, *Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, eine erkenntnistheoretische Studie* (2d ed., Leipzig, 1915).

species, *Homo sapiens*. History and sociology, on the other hand, are concerned with man as a person, as a "political animal," participating with his fellows in a common fund of social traditions and cultural ideals. Freeman, the English historian, said that history was "past politics" and politics "present history." Freeman uses the word politics in the large and liberal sense in which it was first used by Aristotle. In that broad sense of the word, the political process, by which men are controlled and states governed, and the cultural process, by which man has been domesticated and human nature formed, are not, as we ordinarily assume, different, but identical, procedures.

All this suggests the intimate relations which exist between history, politics, and sociology. The important thing, however, is not the identities but the distinctions. For, however much the various disciplines may, in practice, overlap, it is necessary for the sake of clear thinking to have their limits defined. As far as sociology and history are concerned the differences may be summed up in a word. Both history and sociology are concerned with the life of man as man. History, however, seeks to reproduce and interpret concrete events as they actually occurred in time and space. Sociology, on the other hand, seeks to arrive at natural laws and generalizations in regard to human nature and society, irrespective of time and of place.

In other words, history seeks to find out what actually happened and how it all came about. Sociology, on the other hand, seeks to explain, on the basis of a study of other instances, the nature of the process involved.

By nature we mean just that aspect and character of things in regard to which it is possible to make general statements and formulate laws. If we say, in explanation of the peculiar behavior of some individual, that it is natural or that it is after all "simply human nature," we are simply saying that this behavior is what we have learned to expect of this individual or of human beings in general. It is, in other words, a law.

Natural law, as the term is used here, is any statement which describes the behavior of a class of objects or the character of a class of acts. For example, the classic illustration of the so-called

"universal proposition" familiar to students of formal logic, "all men are mortal," is an assertion in regard to a class of objects we call men. This is, of course, simply a more formal way of saying that "men die." Such general statements and "laws" get meaning only when they are applied to particular cases, or, to speak again the terms of formal logic, when they find a place in a syllogism, thus: "Men are mortal. This is a man." But such syllogisms may always be stated in the form of a hypothesis. If this is a man, he is mortal. If *a* is *b*, *a* is also *c*. This statement, "Human nature is a product of social contact," is a general assertion familiar to students of sociology. This law or, more correctly, hypothesis, applied to an individual case explains the so-called feral man. Wild men, in the proper sense of the word, are not the so-called savages, but the men who have never been domesticated, of which an individual example is now and then discovered.

To state a law in the form of a hypothesis serves to emphasize the fact that laws—what we have called natural laws at any rate—are subject to verification and restatement. Under these circumstances the exceptional instance, which compels a restatement of the hypothesis, is more important for the purposes of science than other instances which merely confirm it.

Any science which operates with hypotheses and seeks to state facts in such a way that they can be compared and verified by further observation and experiment is, so far as method is concerned, a natural science.

III. HUMAN NATURE AND LAW

One thing that makes the conception of natural history and natural law important to the student of sociology is that in the field of the social sciences the distinction between natural and moral law has from the first been confused. Comte and the social philosophers in France after the Revolution set out with the deliberate purpose of superseding legislative enactments by laws of human nature, laws which were to be positive and "scientific." As a matter of fact, sociology, in becoming positive, so far from effacing, has rather emphasized the distinctions that Comte sought to abolish. Natural law may be distinguished from all other forms

of law by the fact that it aims at nothing more than a description of the behavior of certain types or classes of objects. A description of the way in which a class, i.e., men, plants, animals, or physical objects, may be expected under ordinary circumstances to behave, tells us what we may in a general way expect of any individual member of that class. If natural science seeks to predict, it is able to do so simply because it operates with concepts or class names instead, as is the case with history, with concrete facts and, to use a logical phrase, "existential propositions."

That the chief end of science is descriptive formulation has probably been clear to keen analytic minds since the time of Galileo, especially to the great discoverers in astronomy, mechanics, and dynamics. But as a definitely stated conception, corrective of misunderstandings, the view of science as essentially descriptive began to make itself felt about the beginning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and may be associated with the names of Kirchhoff and Mach. It was in 1876 that Kirchhoff defined the task of mechanics as that of "describing completely and in the simplest manner the motions which take place in nature." Widening this a little, we may say that the aim of science is to describe natural phenomena and occurrences as exactly as possible, as simply as possible, as completely as possible, as consistently as possible, and always in terms which are communicable and verifiable. This is a very different rôle from that of solving the riddles of the universe, and it is well expressed in what Newton said in regard to the law of gravitation: "So far I have accounted for the phenomena presented to us by the heavens and the sea by means of the force of gravity, but I have as yet assigned no cause to this gravity. . . . I have not been able to deduce from phenomena the *raison d'être* of the properties of gravity and I have not set up hypotheses."¹

"We must confess," said Prof. J. H. Poynting (1900, p. 616), "that physical laws have greatly fallen off in dignity. No long time ago they were quite commonly described as the Fixed Laws of Nature, and were supposed sufficient in themselves to govern the universe. Now we can only assign to them the humble rank of mere descriptions, often erroneous, of similarities which we believe we have observed. . . . A law of nature explains nothing, it has no governing power, it is but a descriptive formula which the careless have sometimes personified." It used to be said that "the laws of Nature are the thoughts of God"; now we say that they are the investigator's formulae summing up regularities of recurrence.²

¹ Newton, *Philosophia naturalis principia mathematica*, 1687.

² J. Arthur Thomson, *The System of Animate Nature* (New York, 1920), pp. 8-9. See also Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science* (2d ed.; London, 1900), chap iii, The Scientific Law.

If natural law aims at prediction it tells us what we can do. Moral laws, on the other hand, tell us, not what we can, but what we ought to do. The civil or municipal law, finally, tells us not what we can, nor what we ought, but what we must do. It is very evident that these three types of law may be very intimately related. We do not know what we ought to do until we know what we can do; and we certainly should consider what men can do before we pass laws prescribing what they must do. There is, moreover, no likelihood that these distinctions will ever be completely abolished. As long as the words "can," "ought," and "must" continue to have any meaning for us the distinctions that they represent will persist in science as well as in common sense.

The immense prestige which the methods of the natural sciences have gained, particularly in their application to the phenomena of the physical universe, has undoubtedly led scientific men to overestimate the importance of mere conceptual and abstract knowledge. It has led them to assume that history also must eventually become "scientific" in the sense of the natural sciences. In the meantime the vast collections of historical facts which the industry of historical students has accumulated are regarded, sometimes even by historians themselves, as a sort of raw material, the value of which can only be realized after it has been worked over into some sort of historical generalization which has the general character of scientific and, ultimately, mathematical formula.

"History," says Karl Pearson, "can never become science, can never be anything but a catalogue of facts rehearsed in a more or less pleasing language until these facts are seen to fall into sequences which can be briefly resumed in scientific formulae."¹ And Henry Adams, in a letter to the American Historical Association already referred to, confesses that history has thus far been a fruitless quest for "the secret which would transform these odds and ends of philosophy into one self-evident, harmonious, and complete system."

You may be sure that four out of five serious students of history who are living today have, in the course of their work, felt that they stood on the brink of a great generalization that would reduce all history under a law as

¹ Karl Pearson, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

clear as the laws which govern the material world. As the great writers of our time have touched one by one the separate fragments of admitted law by which society betrays its character as a subject for science, not one of them can have failed to feel an instant's hope that he might find the secret which would transform these odds and ends of philosophy into one self-evident, harmonious, and complete system. He has seemed to have it, as the Spanish say, in his inkstand. Scores of times he must have dropped his pen to think how one short step, one sudden inspiration, would show all human knowledge; how, in these thickset forests of history, one corner turned, one faint trail struck, would bring him on the highroad of science. Every professor who has tried to teach the doubtful facts which we now call history must have felt that sooner or later he or another would put order in the chaos and bring light into darkness. Not so much genius or favor was needed as patience and good luck. The law was certainly there, and as certainly was in places actually visible, to be touched and handled, as though it were a law of chemistry or physics. No teacher with a spark of imagination or with an idea of scientific method can have helped dreaming of the immortality that would be achieved by the man who should successfully apply Darwin's method to the facts of human history.¹

The truth is, however, that the concrete facts, in which history and geography have sought to preserve the visible, tangible, and, generally speaking, the experiential aspects of human life and the visible universe, have a value irrespective of any generalization or ideal constructions which may be inferred from or built up out of them. Just as none of the investigations or generalizations of individual psychology are ever likely to take the place of biography and autobiography, so none of the conceptions of an abstract sociology, no scientific descriptions of the social and cultural processes, and no laws of progress are likely, in the near future at any rate, to supersede the more concrete facts of history in which are preserved those records of those unique and never fully comprehended aspects of life which we call *events*.

It has been the dream of philosophers that theoretical and abstract science could and some day perhaps would succeed in putting into formulae and into general terms all that was significant in the concrete facts of life. It has been the tragic mistake of the so-called intellectuals, who have gained their knowledge from textbooks rather than from observation and research, to assume that

¹ Henry Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

science had already realized its dream. But there is no indication that science has begun to exhaust the sources or significance of concrete experience. The infinite variety of external nature and the inexhaustible wealth of personal experience have thus far defied, and no doubt will continue to defy, the industry of scientific classification, while, on the other hand, the discoveries of science are constantly making accessible to us new and larger areas of experience.

What has been said simply serves to emphasize the instrumental character of the abstract sciences. History and geography, all of the concrete sciences, can and do measurably enlarge our experience of life. Their very purpose is to arouse new interests and create new sympathies; to give mankind, in short, an environment so vast and varied as will call out and activate all his instincts and capacities.

The more abstract sciences, just to the extent which they are abstract and exact, like mathematics and logic, are merely methods and tools for converting experience into knowledge and applying the knowledge so gained to practical uses.

IV. HISTORY, NATURAL HISTORY, AND SOCIOLOGY

Although it is possible to draw clear distinctions in theory between the purpose and methods of history and sociology, in practice the two forms of knowledge pass over into one another by almost imperceptible gradations.

The sociological point of view makes its appearance in historical investigation as soon as the historian turns from the study of "periods" to the study of institutions. The history of institutions, that is to say, the family, the church, economic institutions, political institutions, etc., leads inevitably to comparison, classification, the formation of class names or concepts, and eventually to the formulation of law. In the process, history becomes natural history, and natural history passes over into natural science. In short, history becomes sociology.

Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage* is one of the earliest attempts to write the natural history of a social institution. It is based upon a comparison and classification of marriage customs

of widely scattered peoples, living under varied physical and social conditions. What one gets from a survey of this kind is not so much history as a study of human behavior. The history of marriage, as of any other institution, is, in other words, not so much an account of what certain individuals or groups of individuals did at certain times and certain places, as it is a description of the responses of few fundamental human instincts to a variety of social situations. Westermarck calls this kind of history sociology.¹

It is in the firm conviction that the history of human civilization should be made an object of as scientific a treatment as the history of organic nature that I write this book. Like the phenomena of physical and psychical life those of social life should be classified into certain groups and each group investigated with regard to its origin and development. Only when treated in this way can history lay claim to the rank and honour of a science in the highest sense of the term, as forming an important part of Sociology, the youngest of the principal branches of learning.

Descriptive historiography has no higher object than that of offering materials to this science.²

Westermarck refers to the facts which he has collected in his history of marriage as phenomena. For the explanation of these phenomena, however, he looks to the more abstract sciences.

The causes on which social phenomena are dependent fall within the domain of different sciences—Biology, Psychology, or Sociology. The reader will find that I put particular stress upon the psychological causes, which have often been deplorably overlooked, or only imperfectly touched upon. And more especially do I believe that the mere instincts have played a very important part in the origin of social institutions and rules.³

¹ Prof. Robertson Smith (*Nature*, XLIV, 270), criticizing Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage*, complains that the author has confused history with natural history. "The history of an institution," he writes, "which is controlled by public opinion and regulated by law is not natural history. The true history of marriage begins where the natural history of pairing ends. . . . To treat these topics (polyandry, kinship through the female only, infanticide, exogamy) as essentially a part of the natural history of pairing involves a tacit assumption that the laws of society are at bottom mere formulated instincts, and this assumption really underlies all our author's theories. His fundamental position compels him, if he will be consistent with himself, to hold that every institution connected with marriage that has universal validity, or forms an integral part of the main line of development, is rooted in instinct, and that institutions which are not based on instinct are necessarily exceptional and unimportant for scientific history."

² Edward Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage* (London, 1901), p. 1.

³ E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

Westermarck derived most of his materials for the study of marriage from ethnological materials. Ethnologists, students of folklore (German *Völkerkunde*), and archaeology are less certain than the historians of institutions whether their investigations are historical or sociological.

Jane Harrison, although she disclaims the title of sociologist, bases her conception of the origin of Greek religion on a sociological theory, the theory namely that "among primitive peoples religion reflects collective feeling and collective thinking." Dionysius, the god of the Greek mysteries, is according to her interpretation a product of the group consciousness.

The mystery-god arises out of those instincts, emotions, desires which attend and express life; but these emotions, desires, instincts, in so far as they are religious, are at the outset rather of a group than of individual consciousness. . . . It is a necessary and most important corollary to this doctrine, that the form taken by the divinity reflects the social structure of the group to which the divinity belongs. Dionysius is the Son of his Mother because he issues from a matrilinear group.¹

This whole study is, in fact, merely an application of Durkheim's conception of "collective representations."

Robert H. Lowie, in his recent volume, *Primitive Society*, refers to "ethnologists and other historians," but at the same time asks: "What kind of an historian shall the ethnologist be?"

He answers the question by saying that, "If there are laws of social evolution, he [the ethnologist] must assuredly discover them," but at any rate, and first of all, "his duty is to ascertain the course civilization has *actually* followed. . . . To strive for the ideals of another branch of knowledge may be positively pernicious, for it can easily lead to that factitious simplification which means falsification."

In other words, ethnology, like history, seeks to tell what actually happened. It is bound to avoid abstraction, "oversimplification," and formulae, and these are the ideals of another kind of scientific procedure. As a matter of fact, however, ethnology, even when it has attempted nothing more than a description

¹ Jane Ellen Harrison, *Themis, A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion* (Cambridge, 1912), p. ix.

of the existing cultures of primitive peoples, their present distribution and the order of their succession, has not freed itself wholly from the influence of abstract considerations. Theoretical problems inevitably arise for the solution of which it is necessary to go to psychology and sociology. One of the questions that has arisen in the study, particularly the comparative study, of cultures is: how far any existing cultural trait is borrowed and how far it is to be regarded as of independent origin.

In the historical reconstruction of culture the phenomena of distribution play, indeed, an extraordinary part. If a trait occurs everywhere, it might veritably be the product of some universally operative social law. If it is found in a restricted number of cases, it may still have evolved through some such instrumentality acting under specific conditions that would then remain to be determined by analysis of the cultures in which the feature is embedded. . . . Finally, the sharers of a cultural trait may be of distinct lineage but through contact and borrowing have come to hold in common a portion of their cultures. . . .

Since, as a matter of fact, cultural resemblances abound between peoples of diverse stock, their interpretation commonly narrows to a choice between two alternatives. Either they are due to like causes, whether these can be determined or not; or they are the result of borrowing. A predilection for one or the other explanation has lain at the bottom of much ethnological discussion in the past; and at present influential schools both in England and in continental Europe clamorously insist that all cultural parallels are due to diffusion from a single center. It is inevitable to envisage this moot-problem at the start, since uncompromising championship of either alternative has far-reaching practical consequences. For if every parallel is due to borrowing, then sociological laws, which can be inferred only from independently developing likenesses, are barred. Then the history of religion or social life or technology consists exclusively in a statement of the place of origin of beliefs, customs and implements, and a recital of their travels to different parts of the globe. On the other hand, if borrowing covers only part of the observed parallels, an explanation from like causes becomes at least the ideal goal in an investigation of the remainder.¹

An illustration will exhibit the manner in which problems originally historical become psychological and sociological. Tyler in his *Early History of Mankind* has pointed out that the bellows used by the negro blacksmiths of continental Africa are of a quite different type from those used by natives of Madagascar. The

¹ Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (New York, 1920), pp. 7-8.

bellows used by the Madagascar blacksmiths, on the other hand, are exactly like those in use by the Malays of Sumatra and in other parts of the Malay Archipelago. This indication that the natives of Madagascar are of Malay origin is in accordance with other anthropological and ethnological data in regard to these peoples, which prove the fact, now well established, that they are not of African origin.

Similarly Boas' study of the Raven cycle of American Indian mythology indicated that these stories originated in the northern part of British Columbia and traveled southward along the coast. One of the evidences of the direction of this progress is the gradual diminution of complexity in the stories as they traveled into regions farther removed from the point of origin.

All this, in so far as it seeks to determine the point of origin, direction, speed, and character of changes that take place in cultural materials in the process of diffusion, is clearly history and ethnology.

Other questions, however, force themselves inevitably upon the attention of the inquiring student. Why is it that certain cultural materials are more widely and more rapidly diffused than others? Under what conditions does this diffusion take place and why does it take place at all? Finally, what is the ultimate source of customs, beliefs, languages, religious practices, and all the varied technical devices which compose the cultures of different peoples? What are the circumstances and what are the processes by which cultural traits are independently created? Under what conditions do cultural fusions take place and what is the nature of this process?

These are all fundamentally problems of human nature, and as human nature itself is now regarded as a product of social intercourse, they are problems of sociology.

The cultural processes by which languages, myth, and religion have come into existence among primitive peoples has given rise in Germany to a special science. Folk-psychology (*Völkerpsychologie*) had its origin in an attempt to answer in psychological terms the problems to which a comparative study of cultural materials has given rise.

From two different directions ideas of folk-psychology have found their way into modern science. First of all there was a demand from the different social sciences [*Geisteswissenschaften*] for a psychological explanation of the phenomena of social life and history, so far as they were products of social [*geistiger*] interaction. In the second place, psychology itself required, in order to escape the uncertainties and ambiguities of pure introspection, a body of objective materials.

Among the social sciences the need for psychological interpretation first manifested itself in the studies of language and mythology. Both of these had already found outside the circle of the philological studies independent fields of investigation. As soon as they assumed the character of comparative sciences it was inevitable that they should be driven to recognize that in addition to the historical conditions, which everywhere determines the concrete form of these phenomena, there had been certain fundamental psychical forces at work in the development of language and myth.¹

The aim of folk-psychology has been, on the whole, to explain the genesis and development of certain cultural forms, i.e., language, myth, and religion. The whole matter may, however, be regarded from a quite different point of view. Gabriel Tarde, for example, has sought to explain, not the genesis, but the transmission and diffusion of these same cultural forms. For Tarde, communication (transmission of cultural forms and traits) is the one central and significant fact of social life. "Social" is just what can be transmitted by imitation. Social groups are merely the centers from which new ideas and inventions are transmitted. Imitation is the social process.

There is not a word that you say, which is not the reproduction, now unconscious, but formerly conscious and voluntary, of verbal articulations reaching back to the most distant past, with some special accent due to your immediate surroundings. There is not a religious rite that you fulfil, such as praying, kissing the icon, or making the sign of the cross, which does not reproduce certain traditional gestures and expressions, established through imitation of your ancestors. There is not a military or civil requirement that you obey, nor an act that you perform in your business, which has not been taught you, and which you have not copied from some living model. There is not a stroke of the brush that you make, if you are a painter, nor a verse that you write,

¹ Wilhelm Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie, eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte*. Erster Band, *Die Sprache*, Erster Theil (Leipzig, 1900), p. 13. The name folk-psychology was first used by Lazarus and Steinthal, *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, I, 1860. Wundt's folk-psychology is a continuation of the tradition of these earlier writers.

if you are a poet, which does not conform to the customs or the prosody of your school, and even your very originality itself is made up of accumulated common-places, and aspires to become common-place in its turn.

Thus, the unvarying characteristic of every social fact whatsoever is that it is imitative. And this characteristic belongs exclusively to social facts.¹

Tarde's theory of transmission by imitation may be regarded, in some sense, as complementary, if not supplementary, to Wundt's theory of origins, since he puts the emphasis on the fact of transmission rather than upon genesis. In a paper, "Tendencies in Comparative Philology," read at the Congress of Arts and Sciences at the St. Louis Exposition in 1904, Professor Hanns Oertel, of Yale University, refers to Tarde's theory of imitation as an alternative explanation to that offered by Wundt for "the striking uniformity of sound changes" which students of language have discovered in the course of their investigation of phonetic changes in widely different forms of speech.

It seems hard to maintain that the change in a syntactical construction or in the meaning of a word owes its universality to a simultaneous and independent primary change in all the members of a speech-community. By adopting the theory of imitative spread, all linguistic changes may be viewed as one homogeneous whole. In the second place, the latter view seems to bring linguistic changes into line with the other social changes, such as modifications in institutions, beliefs, and customs. For is it not an essential characteristic of a social group that its members are not co-operative in the sense that each member actively participates in the production of every single element which goes to make up either language, or belief, or customs? Distinguishing thus between *primary* and *secondary* changes and between the *origin* of a change and its *spread*, it behooves us to examine carefully into the causes which make the members of a social unit, either consciously or unconsciously, willing to accept an innovation. What is it that determines acceptance or rejection of a particular change? What limits one change to a small area, while it extends the area of another? Before a final decision can be reached in favor of the second theory of imitative spread it will be necessary to follow out in minute detail the mechanism of this process in a number of concrete instances; in other words to fill out the picture of which Tarde (*Les lois de l'imitation*) sketched the bare outlines. If his assumptions prove true, then we should have here a uniformity resting upon other causes than the physical uniformity that appears in the objects with which the natural sciences deal.

¹ G. Tarde, *Social Laws, An Outline of Sociology*, translated from the French by Howard C. Warren (New York, 1899), pp. 40-41.

It would enable us to establish a second group of uniform phenomena which is psycho-physical in its character and rests upon the basis of social suggestion. The uniformities in speech, belief, and institutions would belong to this second group.¹

What is true of the comparative study of languages is true in every other field in which a comparative study of cultural materials has been made. As soon as these materials are studied from the point of view of their similarities rather than from the point of view of their historical connections, problems arise which can only be explained by the more abstract sciences of psychology or sociology. Freeman begins his lectures on *Comparative Politics* with the statement that

the comparative method of study has been the greatest intellectual achievement of our time. It has carried light and order into whole branches of human knowledge which before were shrouded in darkness and confusion. It has brought a line of argument which reaches moral certainty into a region which before was given over to random guess-work. Into matters which are for the most part incapable of strictly external proof it has brought a form of strictly internal proof which is more convincing, more unerring.

Wherever the historian supplements *external* by *internal* proof, he is in a way to substitute a sociological explanation for historical interpretation. It is the very essence of the sociological method to be comparative. When, therefore, Freeman uses, in speaking of comparative politics, the following language he is speaking in sociological rather than historical terms:

For the purposes then of the study of Comparative Politics, a political constitution is a specimen to be studied, classified, and labelled, as a building or an animal is studied, classified, and labelled by those to whom building or animals are objects of study. We have to note the likenesses, striking and unexpected as those likenesses often are, between the political constitutions of remote times and places; and we have, as far as we can, to classify our specimens according to the probable causes of those likenesses.²

Historically sociology has had its origin in history. It owes its existence as a science to the attempt to apply exact methods to the

¹ Hanns Oertel, "Some Present Problems and Tendencies in Comparative Philology," Congress of Arts and Sciences, Universal Exposition, St. Louis, 1904 (Boston, 1906), III, 59.

² Edward A. Freeman, *Comparative Politics with the Unity of History* (London, 1873), p. 23.

explanation of historical facts. In the attempt to achieve this, however, it has become something quite different from history. It has become like psychology with which it is most intimately related, a natural and relatively abstract science, and auxiliary to the study of history, but not a substitute for it. The whole matter may be summed up in this general statement: history interprets, natural science explains. It is upon the interpretation of the facts of experience that we formulate our creeds and found our faiths. Our explanations of phenomena, on the other hand, are the basis for technique and practical devices for controlling nature and human nature, man and the physical world.

THE COMPARATIVE RÔLE OF THE GROUP CONCEPT IN WARD'S *DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY* AND CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

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III. THE GROUP CONCEPT AS USED BY SOME CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGISTS

This chapter will endeavor to present the uses of the group concept as they are displayed by some scholars who have become distinguished as writers of sociology in America. The sociological field is too wide for any pretense of giving attention to all to whom reference might be made. The selection is purely arbitrary and personal, but the reviews presented are fairly representative of different standpoints. The rule has been adhered to of selecting for extended discussion only those who have become known as sociologists, and who have definitely been aligned with that division of labor.¹ This does violence, in particular, to one group of social scientists which has been particularly prominent in developing the view which is set forth throughout the paper. That group is the social psychologists, such as Baldwin, Mead, and others who have performed an indispensable work in changing the whole bent of thought in social science. In this case also the selection is arbitrary, and has no justification except the limitations of space and the recognition of a division of labor. No effort will be made to review the whole system of sociology that might be found in all the writings of a given author, but only those selections will be made which seem to be appropriate for the purpose in hand. A steady effort will be made to adopt a policy of liberal rather than strict construction in all cases. The order in which the reviews come is partly chronological and partly that of the importance which is given to the use of the group concept.

¹ One exception is mentioned later.

As a point of departure for the consideration of Giddings' use of the group concept, it will be well to give his conception of his task as a sociologist. He believes the purpose of sociology to be that of conceiving society in its unity and attempting to explain it in terms of cosmic cause and law.¹ In order to accomplish its purpose it seeks to work out a subjective explanation in terms of some fact of consciousness or motive, and an objective interpretation in terms of a physical process. This does not mean a philosophical dualism, but two ways of viewing reality.² The central fact of motive or consciousness is, of course, the consciousness of kind. Around this the whole subjective explanation revolves:

Accordingly, the sociologist has three main quests. First, he must try to discover the conditions that determine aggregation and concourse. Secondly, he must try to discover the law that governs social choices, the law that is of the subjective process. Thirdly, he must try to discover also the law that governs the natural selection and the survival of choices, the law that is of the objective process.³

With this brief summary of the general point of view and purpose of sociology we may consider in further detail how far Giddings makes use of the group in gaining the ends he has devined for his subject. In setting out upon the descriptive analysis of society, one must begin with the study of population, since the physical population is the basis for all society. In such a study the first fact to claim attention is the fact of aggregation or grouping. In other words, the group is assumed as the starting point for any study whatever. "Some degree of aggregation is the indispensable condition to the evolution of society." As will be shown later on in the review, this position is carried through the whole sociological discussion which occupies our attention. The importance of the group factor, as the initial condition of the explanation of all origins, will appear more clearly when we come to the study of the origin and evolution of society. In support of his contention the author cites examples of group life among animals and the fact that human

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, p. 16.

² *Ibid.* Giddings expressly disclaims any dualistic conception by his use of these two interpretations, but passages throughout the book seem to indicate that he does not escape a psychological dualism as will be suggested later on.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

beings are always found in groups. "The conception of nature as 'red in tooth and claw' is very dear to moralists and politicians, but, unhappily, moralists and politicians do not know nature intimately. A world of living creatures that fear and hate, shun and attack one another without restraint, is not a fact of observation. It is a pure *a priori* creation of the 'pure' reason."¹

The term aggregation as used has a special meaning which is intended to distinguish it from association. Aggregation is the physical foundation of society. It is the mere physical concourse of propinquity. Association, on the other hand, has reference to the psychic process which begins in simple phases of feeling and perception, and develops into activities that ultimately call forth the highest powers of the mind. Aggregation is always supplemented by association if the assembled individuals are not too unlike.² While one might easily question whether any forms of higher animals or the ancestors of man ever represent mere aggregation as thus defined, yet the fact that is being emphasized by Giddings is sound, namely, that the first assumption from which a sociological study must start is the group, that is forms of life in some sort of "togetherness." Some of the discussion of the process of aggregation seems to lay him open to the charge of having after all to desert his social hypothesis and proceed to aggregate or gather together his individuals, but a careful reading of the whole book with this query in mind must acquit him of the charge. The emphasis is on the fact of being in a group rather than on the active stage of aggregation. The choice of terms is a bad one on account of the active connotation to which the term "aggregation" so easily lends itself. Giddings starts with an association or group, and does not conceive of the individuals as coming together out of nothingness with varying degrees of isolated evolution.

All human beings, from the lowest savages to civilized men, live in family groups.³ These family groups range in size from the simplest family unions up to the larger groups found among polygamous peoples. Human societies are composed of families which are combined to form larger aggregates. These aggregates are of two types, the ethnical and the demotic. Ethnical societies are genetic

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

² *Ibid.*, p. 100.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

aggregations in which the chief bond is blood-kinship. Demotic societies, on the other hand, are those associations which are bound together by habitual intercourse, mutual interests, and co-operation, with little or no regard to origins or genetic relations.¹ The demotic society is the later development, although the family group is found in it as well as in the ethnic type. A more detailed consideration of Giddings' development of the nature and formation of these two types of societies will bring out in a number of ways the part which the group plays in his thinking.

Ethnic societies are divided into three great classes according to the degree of development they have reached. The first class is the horde which is composed of a few families, usually not more than a hundred persons in all. These small groups are not found permanently isolated from other similar groups, consequently there results not only an internal group life, but also an intergroup communication. They do not permanently combine, however, so as to become a single group. The next larger group is the tribe, which is an aggregate of several hordes or a differentiated horde which has become very large. Such groups have one language, occupy one territory, and are pretty thoroughly organized unities. The third class of ethnic societies is the still larger group which is a confederation of tribes into an ethnic nation or a folk. Such groups have not yet developed along commercial, industrial, or intellectual lines to a degree sufficient to make them into the modern states.² Whatever the class of ethnic society, it may be organized on either the metronymic or patronymic basis. It will be seen from the above summary of Giddings' discussion of the primitive forms of human life that some kind of group life is always in evidence. Whatever the size or form of the life may be, there is the constant factor of the group which makes possible a more or less active social life.

As before indicated, the demotic societies are defined as being those which have attained a civil basis; the blood bond has largely disappeared. In this class are found all the more highly developed states, including the present civilized nations. The latter represent a higher type of social evolution. The family, however, remains

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, p. 157.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 157-58.

the unitary group. Families are combined into neighborhoods, hamlets, villages; the latter compose the town and so on up to the highest unit, the state.¹ From the lowest to the highest type of organization in groups, the central subjective factor is the consciousness of kind.

The organization of the different members of society into voluntary groups for specified ends is what is called the constitution of a society. These voluntary organizations are on the basis of the consciousness of kind, that is, those that are in sympathetic agreement as to the purposes of the organization. Those that are not of "kind" are generally refused entrance to the special group. These voluntary organizations are numerous, and increase with the development of society. The most important of all voluntary organizations are the political organizations. In addition to the political are the religious organizations, secret societies, cultural groups, labor organizations, in fact, all voluntary groupings which are found to exist in contemporary society. Giddings does not adequately explain the significance of these groups in the life of the individual nor attempt to explain the processes by which the relation of the individual to the group becomes so important. He does not possess the means to do this, and relies on the principle of the consciousness of kind for whatever explanation is given. In other words, he has no social psychology to interpret the significance of the situation he describes. In spite of these limitations, however, it is of interest to this investigation to note the degree to which emphasis is placed on the presence of numerous groups in the actual life of society. The importance of the groups is implied, but the details of the way in which the groups, particularly the "primary groups," are so important in the creation of the individual, are lacking. It remained for later sociological thought to bring out this point more explicitly. The fact of the group, however, as a central fact in human society is consistently kept in view in the discussion with which we are dealing.

Thus far the discussion has largely concerned existing societies, primitive and civilized. In order to show up more clearly the extent to which the group concept plays a part in Giddings' thought,

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 168 ff.

it will be of value to consider that part of his sociology which has to do with the evolution of society. The development of society is traced through four stages of association: zoögenic, anthropogenic, ethnogenic, and demogenic. We shall observe the same order in seeking to find out to what extent he has used the group as a factor in the evolutionary process which he attempts to follow.

The term "zoögenic association" suggests that the author conceives association, or the group life, to have been a factor among animals and the precursors of man. We shall try to point out the wide use which is made of this conception in the course of a few pages. The principle upon which he proceeds is stated in this manner: "If animal life in the primeval ages was not wholly different from the animal life now, association had been quietly working its transforming results for millions of years before mankind appeared upon the earth."¹ In other words, the group life began long before man appeared, and not only that, it had also been a vital factor in preparing for his advent. How this had been done will appear as we proceed with the review. First of all, the group life or association had certain direct effects on the mental life of the associated forms.²

These effects were, first, an original development of native susceptibilities and powers, such as susceptibilities to suggestion, capability of imitation, antipathies, sympathies, power of discrimination and co-ordination; secondly, a considerable accumulation of knowledge; and thirdly, a further development of all powers and susceptibilities. Association thus reacted on the whole organism. It gave the social animal an advantage in securing a more adequate food supply, afforded a wider range of sexual selection within the group, and gave the group a greater advantage in struggles with hostile or unfavorable surrounding flora or fauna.

Giddings carries the group value still further and maintains that the group has been a factor in the origin of species. The extent to which the social factor is carried may be seen from the following quotations: "Association was one of the great co-operating causes of the origin of species";³ "It is not possible to doubt that

¹ *Principles*, p. 199; *Elements of Sociology*, p. 232.

² *Elements of Sociology*, p. 237.

³ *Principles*, p. 202.

for thousands of years before man existed, natural selection was everywhere supplemented by conscious choice, a direct product of association"; "Association, in short, was a chief cause of variation and of characterization. It created new varieties, and in them it reproduced, in ever-increasing strength, the instinct to associate."¹ In commenting upon the strictly biological approach to the evolutionary problem he demands: "Is there not a fatal lack in the biological philosophy that ignores the social factor and attempts to account for variation through physiological processes only? Was not animal intelligence a selective agency that combined and recombined the factors of evolution? And was not association a factor in the development of intelligence?"² After citing many examples from Kropotkin (*Mutual Aid*), he resumes, "On the whole, we may accept M. Kropotkin's conclusion that society has been a more powerful aid than any other in the struggle for existence. But it has been so, not because of any mysterious power in itself, but because it has acted directly on the characters of the associated individuals, transforming them gradually, and by degrees developing mental power."³ With the defects in the analysis made, we are not concerned. It is immaterial for our purpose whether, from the side of biology, the details of the plan are sound or not. What the passages do show is, that Giddings had in mind the group as a very important factor in the actual life of the animal forms and of the precursors of man, and that the group played a very important part, not only in the development of the subsequent group life, but also was a factor in the development of the individual forms. The whole of Giddings' view on this point is summarized in this way:

Thus throughout the ages before man, association was zoögenic. It was causing variation and was determining survival. It was differentiating animal life into kinds, and was bringing to a high state of perfection the kinds that were best equipped with a social nature, with habits of mutual aid, and with elementary forms of social organization. In achieving all this, association was preparing the way for man and for human society. . . . Thousands of years, perhaps millions of years, before man was born, the foundations of his empire were being laid in the zoögenic associations of the humblest forms of conscious life.⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 206-7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

In other words, human society has its roots in the group life of the distant past, and in order to analyze the evolutionary basis of society and of man, one must have recourse to the fundamental fact of the group.

Under the term anthropogenic association, Giddings discusses the fact of association among prehistoric peoples and its relation to the development of human beings. It is the next stage above animal, or zoögenic, association described above. No existing societies can be found which are in this stage, but there are enough similarities revealed by the study of primitive tribes to suggest some parallels. These are supplemented by the discoveries of archaeologists which have revealed a good deal of the nature of prehistoric life.

In this type of association, as in the former, the group plays a central part. All evidence points to the conclusion that the prehistoric peoples lived in groups, as did their animal ancestors, and as do their descendants. There is no evidence of a hiatus of a non-group life between the social animals and social man.

All the remains of primitive man show that they lived as savage men live, in groups. The ape-like ancestor of man must have been a social animal. Is there any reason to suppose that between the social anthropoid and the social primitive man there was intercalated a pair living out of social relations and so far differing mentally and physically from all the other creatures that any society with them was impossible? If there is, it would be just as well to go back to the hypothesis of special creation; for the mental and physical differences that mark me off from other creatures are those that are created by social intercourse, and without society they could not have had a natural genesis.¹

The group, then, is the *sine qua non* of the evolution of human society and man. It is the group with its interrelations that has produced those qualities which distinguish man from other forms of animal life and has given him his pre-eminence. "If the conclusions hitherto reached in this work are true, it is necessary to believe that association, more extended, more intimate, more varied in its phases, than the association practiced by inferior species, was the chief cause of the mental and moral development, and of the anatomical modifications that transformed a sub-human species into man."²

¹ *Principles*, p. 208.

² *Ibid.*, p. 221.

In his analysis of the nature, origin, and function of language, Giddings displays, in a very clear fashion, the group factor as a part of the social process in evolution. Of the importance of speech in the development of society and of human beings he says: "Speech is the specific attainment that separates man from the brute and is the means to the development of his higher intellectual qualities."¹ As will be shown later, this peculiar achievement is a social product, and therefore is a result of group relations.

Language is defined broadly:

Language, the system of signs by which simple ideas, receipts, and concepts are expressed, may consist of gestures, grimaces and tones, of inarticulate utterances, of articulate sounds, or of articulate sounds, tones and gestures in combination. The language of gesture and tone is the language of receipts; It is well developed among animals and is the natural language of children, mentally deficient adults and savages. Articulation is a secondary language of receipts and the only language of concepts.²

Giddings adopts Romanes' classifications of the signs that constitute language, whether such signs are gestures, tones, or articulate sounds, namely: (1) indicative; (2) denotative; (3) connotative; (4) denominative; (5) predicative. These represent an advancing gradation from the simplest expression of sensations up to the expression of concepts. Animals cannot ascend above the third class of signs, and only rarely as far as the third. The fourth and fifth classes of signs are employed only by man. In other words, animals below man have language, but not speech.³

The "crucial question in the problem of the origin of human faculty" is, How was the transition made from the lower type of language to the higher type? In trying to answer this crucial question, Giddings follows Donovan in looking for the solution in the intimate relation between speech, on the one hand, and ideation,

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

² *Ibid.*, p. 223.

³ Giddings properly includes gesture as the beginning of language of the higher type. His discussion reveals a psychology which is atomistic and individualistic and does not fit in with his group hypothesis. His psychological dualism is open to criticism from several points of view, but we are not concerned so much with this defect as with the problem of finding out to what extent he makes use of the group factor in evolving that most vital factor in human evolution, language. His psychology is inadequate but he does attempt to follow out the social hypothesis. In other words, he makes bad use of the group concept, but he makes the attempt.

with choral music, on the other. Under the stimulus of excitement which occurs at festal occasions and celebrations, with their intense emotion, social interest, and rhythm, "signs were first distinguished in thought from the things signified, and so conventionalized as names, movable types of speech."¹ The inadequacy of this explanation of the problem is quite apparent, but the important point to be noted is not its inadequacy but that it brings in the essential fact of the group, and the emotional tension arising in group life, as the starting-point for all attempts to explain the problem of the origin of language in its higher forms. It was the group which gave the human being a language which enabled him to lift himself above the other forms of life.

The effect of language upon the nature of the developing forms was to develop what Giddings calls human nature.

From the moment that the hominine species began to practice speech, however feebly, however awkwardly, it began to develop a human nature. The term "human nature" has so long been associated with economic motives and with individualism, that it has acquired a perverted meaning. Human nature is not the unsocial egoistic nature. Self-interest is not the distinctively human trait; it is a primordial animal trait, which man, an animal after all, still possesses and must cultivate if he would continue to live. Human nature is the pre-eminent social nature.²

The thought contained here has been developed by other sociologists and is sound.³ Human nature is a group product and is essentially a human characteristic. The instincts have their roots in the distant past of the physical organism, but the mind or self is created by the group and is a social product; it is human nature.

Giddings criticizes the traditional view of the order of evolution as being unsound in that it reverses the true order. He describes the traditional view as follows: "In the conceptions of evolution that became current after the publication of the *Descent of Man*, the development of man was pictured as beginning in a physical transformation, continuing in a mental and moral development, and completing itself in an evolution of social relations."⁴ Such a view, according to Giddings, reverses the true order of cause and

¹ *Principles*, p. 225.

² *Ibid.*

³ Cooley, *Social Organization*; Park, *Principles of Human Behavior*; Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*; et al.

⁴ *Principles*, p. 228.

effect. "Social life enlarged and stimulated the mental life until it created speech and conceptual thought. With the aid of speech and conceptual thought, association continued to develop the mental activity at an ever-accelerating rate until it became the supreme activity and dominant interest of man."¹ By reason of the fact of association in group life there developed language and the resulting power of thought. "To create the human mind was the great work of anthropogenic association."²

Enough has been given to show the central position which in Giddings' view the group occupies in human evolution. As has been suggested, there is an absence of an adequate process to explain the origin of speech and the human mind, but they are properly considered as results of a group mode of life extending back into the dim animal past. Giddings' psychological point of view is that of an intellectualistic dualist, which, from the standpoint of a behaviorist or functionalist, is open to serious criticism, but, for the present, that is outside the purpose of this review. That purpose is to indicate some of the ways in which Giddings used the group as a fact in constructing his sociology. It is hoped that the purpose has been accomplished.

Concerning the relation of the individual to the group in present societies, Giddings says: "The individual, therefore, is not prior to society, or society to the individual. Community is not precedent to competition, or competition to community. From the first, competition and community, society and the individual, have been co-ordinate. Society and the individual have always been acting and reacting upon each other."³ This passage suggests the thesis which Cooley followed,⁴ and which expresses the starting-point for modern social psychology, namely, the individual and the group are but two phases of the larger whole. The final end of the whole social process is not, however, the ultimate exaltation of the group at the expense of the individual, as implied by Plato and actually carried out in the German state, but rather the reverse: "The function of society is to develop conscious life and to create human personality."⁵

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

² *Ibid.*, p. 255.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 399.

⁴ *Human Nature and the Social Order; Social Organization.*

⁵ *Principles*, p. 420.

Professor Ross has made his particular contribution to American sociology in the field of what he has defined as social psychology and its subordinate branch, social control. This investigation will, therefore, endeavor to find in his writings bearing on those subjects to what extent he makes use of the group as a tool of thought in the solution of the problems arising in those fields.¹ In doing so, we shall seek out those phases of his discussion which seem to bear upon certain points that may be of aid, rather than attempting to give a résumé of his whole sociological contribution. In order to derive a perspective for the summary it will be well to present Ross's conception of the whole sociological field and of the particular place of each branch in the whole scheme.

In his *Foundations of Sociology* Ross attempts to define the scope and function of sociology and to give it its place among the social sciences. The first task he sets himself is to define the subject-matter of the science. The "social organism" will not do because, look where we will, we find no "social body complete with head, limbs, periphery, and viscera." The study of the relation between groups, and between the group and the individual, is not broad enough to constitute the subject-matter of the science, because it must embrace the genesis of the groups and there are many relations between individuals that do not involve the groups. If we turn to the modes or forms of association into groups, after Simmel's notion, we have only one of the provinces of sociology, namely social morphology. Human achievement, which was Ward's subject-matter for the science, is again but one volume of a treatise on sociology. Much of the field of human interaction is not embraced within the subject of achievement. Ross's conception of sociology as the science of association is extended by Ross himself. Sociologists are eager to investigate the "springs of human progress," to find the causes of social transformations, to trace the influence of environment on humanity; but these do not belong to the problem of association. "Social psychology, social morphology, social mechanics . . . all of them

¹ This summary is based on his three works, *Social Control* (1901), *Foundations of Sociology* (1905), *Social Psychology* (1908). His subsequent writings do not indicate a material departure from the views elaborated in the books named, and for the purpose of this discussion may be ignored.

are, it seems to me, but convenient segments of a science, the subject-matter of which is social phenomena. I say 'phenomena' in preference to 'activities,' because it embraces beliefs and feelings as well as action."¹ In defining what are "social phenomena," he says: "All phenomena which we cannot explain without bringing in the action of one human being on another."²

The science which has social phenomena for its subject-matter is necessarily the master-science; it aspires to the suzerainty of the special social sciences.³ The justification for such a claim is found in the interrelatedness of society.

Although there are several facets to human nature, although each aspect of social life has some sort of psychic basis of its own, still, the deeper we penetrate into the causes of human affairs, the more impressed are we with the cross relations between social phenomena of different orders.⁴

. . . . The fuller our knowledge, the more impressed we are with the relativity of each class of social phenomena to other classes. Society no longer falls apart into neat segments like a peeled orange. State, law, religion, art, morals, industry, instead of presenting so many parallel streams of development, are studied rather as different aspects of *one social evolution*.⁵

Although one might dissent from the claim for sociology inferred from this statement, still the latter indicates a clear conception of the fact that human life is a social process, a group, and that the group conception must be held in mind in all attempts to study this thing that we call society in any of its multifarious forms.

What is the unit of investigation with which sociology has to deal? Is it the group? Is it the individual? Is it something else? To these questions Ross returns very definite answers. There is no use to look for a single elementary social fact: "When the assay is completed, at the bottom of the crucible will probably be found several ultimates."⁶ The individual must be rejected as the unit because that is the unit of anthropology. Furthermore, only the spiritual part of man is molded by association, and not everyone is drawn in between the social rollers.⁷ The functional group will

¹ *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

² *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

⁷ *Ibid.* This statement is very significant in showing the individualistic pre-conceptions underlying his analysis.

not do for the social unit; since many groups are antagonistic to society, they have no part in the division of labor. Groups are temporary and shifting, and while a study of groups and group relations is of very great value, it is not the unit of social investigation. Nor can the institution be considered the social unit. It leaves out of account those social relations and those groupings which are temporary and do not become institutions. All these things are products; they have arisen out of the actions and interactions of men. To understand them, "we must ascend to that primordial fact known as the social process."¹ This is the basic unit. It is not single, however, but manifold, social processes.

Leaving the larger sociological field, it is of value to place in that field the particular subjects of study, social psychology and social control. It is in these lines that Ross shows his thinking most clearly, and they will, therefore, merit closer examination. Social psychology, as Ross conceives it, "studies the psychic planes and currents that come into existence among men in consequence of their association."² It has to do with psychic uniformities, that is, with uniformities due to social causes. It is distinguished from sociology proper in that the latter deals with groups and structures. It is distinguished from psychological sociology by the fact that it omits the psychology of groups.³ The problem of social control is but one phase of social psychology, namely, conscious social ascendancy.⁴ These differentiations of definition are necessary in order to preserve an honest criticism of Ross's work, and enable us to escape misinterpretation of varying terminologies. With this introduction we pass on to a more concrete study of his use of the group concept in his analysis. In doing so we shall take up several illustrative problems that are especially fitted to display the use to which he puts such a conception, and the failures to use it, if such there be.

In order to see what use is made of the group concept, we may examine the crucial question of the relation of the individual to

¹ *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 91.

² *Social Psychology*, p. 1.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴ *Social Control*, Preface, p. vii.

the group, as Ross sees it. With reference to the problem of order in society, Ross says:

I began the work six years ago with the idea that nearly all the goodness and conscientiousness by which a social group is enabled to hold together can be traced to such influences [social influences]. It seemed to me then that the individual contributed very little to social order, while society contributed almost everything. Further investigation, however, appears to show that the personality freely unfolding under conditions of healthy fellowship may arrive at a goodness all its own, and that order is explained partly by this streak in human nature and partly by the influence of social surroundings.¹

In attempting to state the reciprocal relation between the individual and the group, Ross adopts uncritically the thought of Baldwin: "In other words, the *ego* and the *alter* are only the same thought with different connotations. I use the same notion of personality, now in thinking of *ego*, now in thinking of *alter*. Hence, I must read into the other person the same desires and interests I feel in myself."² Upon this basis Ross builds his conception of the sense of justice as one of the agencies of control. The use made of Baldwin's thought in a few such discrete passages indicates that Ross did not grasp the significance of either the process or the implications of the theory which Baldwin was trying to develop. The conception of the self and the *alter* as being twin phases of a total social situation, which is the basis of all social psychology, was never utilized by Ross. His references in such statements as the above were merely perfunctory. They do show, however, a reaching after the heart of the social process and a consciousness that it is in the group-individual relation that a sound sociological unit must be found. Though lacking in many particulars, the writer of *Social Control* was getting at the heart of the sociological problem; it was an attempt to interpret the process and significance of the relation of the group to the individual, in so far as the social influences mold and shape the individual into its own likeness. Of the essential part of the group in the formation of the various attitudes of the individual, Ross was well conscious. Thus, for example:

The fact is, every group of men exhibits a morality corresponding to its place in the hierarchy of groups. . . . Many nepotists, sectaries, and

¹ *Ibid.*, Preface.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

partisans are simply victims of one of these unscrupulous group moralities. Adherents of sects—anarchists, Jesuits, Jacobins, émigrés—are induced by the sectego to commit crimes they would not commit for themselves.¹

Again, the influence of smaller groups on the individuals in them is powerful:

Every party, labor union, guild, lodge, surveying corps, or athletic team will, in the course of time, develop for its special purposes appropriate types of character or observance, which exert on its members an individual pressure subordinating them to the welfare or aims of the association.²

These quotations indicate the place which Ross gives to the group in the influencing of the actions of the members of those groups. He does not, however, grasp fully the essentially social nature of the origin of moral codes and moral attitudes. His individual is largely given and, once given, the group has a powerful effect upon him. He does not utilize adequately the place of the group in the creation of moral attitudes arising out of group crises. In fact the individual is the source of all ethical improvements.

Ross does not enter into a study of social origins to any length. He takes society as it is and deals with the problems of association as he finds them. Occasional references, however, disclose his hypothesis as to some of the problems of social origins. He inclines to adopt the view of Ward and Comte that the altruistic attitude is relatively a late development in social evolution: "In the light of the facts collected by many workers, it is no longer difficult to trace the slender stem of altruism rising from the lower levels of mammalian life side by side with the thicker and rougher trunk of egoism."³ To bridge the chasm he exploits the rôle of sympathy. In addition to sympathy there are certain gregarious instincts that facilitate harmony in social relations, but

we do not yet know whether our simian ancestor was most akin to the solitary ape, or to the sociable chimpanzee, but it is safe to say that man was never so thoroughly sociable as the horse, the prairie dog, or the grass-eating animals generally. With even the best of strains of man, the gregarious instincts do not seem to have very long roots. His social union comes late and is not easy to maintain. . . . Those enthusiasts, then, who draw charming lessons from the study of gregarious animals and of social insects not only fail to give us

¹ *Social Control*, p. 71.

² *Ibid.*, p. 232.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

the clew to human association, but are very apt to lead us quite astray as to the real causes of social order.¹

Ross recognizes, however, that the studies of anthropologists among the primitive communities that exist show a natural community life with a relatively peaceful nature. This is one of the paradoxes of anthropology.² How this paradox is to be reconciled with his theory of the origin of altruism and social impulses is not adequately explained. Since primitive times, he continues, the present civilized peoples have gone through a process of evolution which destroyed the primitive attitudes of sociability and replaced them with individualistic ones. Still more recently there is a reversion, through the selective process, to the more sociable type, resulting from the disappearance of the frontier and the creation of an industrial stable life. The older primitive association was a natural one, while the latter is a more rational one following upon the perception of the advantages of association.³ Ross also finds racial difference when it comes to the matter of sociability. The superior dolichocephalic blond race of North Europe is "mediocre in power of sympathy and weak in sociability" but it has a pre-eminent sense of justice. It is the protestant race, the race which achieves dominion over others and individual liberty.⁴

In connection with the place of the group or social factor in the explanation of the social process, it is of interest to note that Ross recognizes the fact of the transition from an individualistic type of psychology to a social psychology:

The older psychology was individualistic in its interpretations. The contents of the mind were looked upon as elaborations out of personal experience. It sought to show how from the primary sense-perceptions are built up ideas, at first simple, then more and more complex—ideas of space, time, number, cause, etc. The upper stories of personality, framed on beliefs, standards, valuations and ideals, were comparatively neglected. The psychologists failed to note that for these highly elaborated products we are more indebted to our fellowmen than to our individual experience, that they are wrought out, as it

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 32 ff., 439 ff.; *Social Psychology*, pp. 6 ff. One wonders what the effect of the experiences of the war may be upon this naïve conception. If there is one thing that contemporary social psychology is a unit in, it is that such pseudo-racial deductions are of decreasing value.

were, collectively, and not by each for himself. The newer psychology, in accounting for the contents of the mind, gives great prominence to the social factor. It insists that without interaction with other minds the psychic development of the child would be arrested at a stage not far from idiocy.¹

This criticism of the older psychology is certainly sound. It is also true that there has been going on a swing to the social interpretation of the origin of the mind both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. The shift which Ross mentions here is the most significant shift in the social sciences. It is essentially the shift to the group as the center of thought and investigation.

In attempting to apply the newer psychology, which he expressly adopts, Ross follows in the path of Tarde and Baldwin. To the former particularly is he indebted for his thought. If one were to find in his whole sociological system a central thought, it is the explanation of social life in terms of the planes and currents of uniformity which are achieved by means of suggestion and imitation. The rôle of the individual is that of the inventor. The innovator's products are made the possession of the group by the process of imitation or suggestion. Aside from imitation Ross has no clue to explain the social process. Its inadequacy is not recognized, and the tendency is for it to be used uncritically without any attempt to enter into its psychological limitations.²

In dealing with that most interesting part of contemporary social psychology, the nature and origin of the self, Ross does not go much farther than to refer with approval occasionally to Baldwin, as suggested above. Such references, however, do not penetrate to the center of Ross's thinking, and they are essentially foreign to his general argument. For all practical purposes, he assumes the self as given, the individual as already formed. His problem is then the rather futile one of attempting to mold and shape this complete individual into social conformity, to bend the individual will into some sort of social order. Such is the central thesis one

¹ *Social Psychology*, p. 11.

² Ross shaped his thinking at the time when the imitation theory was at its height. Its place in psychology has materially waned since then and it occupies a relatively small place in genetic psychology now. Trenchant criticisms of the imitation theory are suggested by Mead, *Psychological Bulletin*, December 15, 1909; Dewey, *Monroe's Cyclopaedia of Education*.

finds in the books to which we have referred. Had he mastered the significance of Baldwin's contributions to the problem of social psychology, to say nothing of the advances that have been made upon Baldwin's work, he must have realized that he was neglecting the most fertile field for the utilization of the group concept in the field of social psychology. Underneath the planes and currents of uniformity which we see on the surface of society are vast depths to which he does not apply himself. Professor Mead has put his finger on the weakness just noted, in these words: "Sociality is for Professor Ross no fundamental feature of human consciousness, no determining form of its structure."¹ In other words, he has made only a partial, though stimulating, use of his group concept. His thinking is essentially individualistic. He stands as a transition point in the development of the recognition of the essentially fundamental importance of sociality, of the group, in social interpretations.

Ellwood defines sociology as the science of the origin, development, structure, and function of the reciprocal relations of individuals.² As will be found out in later discussion, he makes special mention of the psychic interaction which, in his opinion, is the essence of the social process. In other words, his definition of the subject implies a group relation to start with. In so far as the social origins are to be treated, they must be treated with the primary assumption of a group of social beings in more or less of psychic interaction. "In a psychological interpretation of society, therefore, we must begin with concerted or co-ordinated activity, with the group acting together in some particular way, for it is this which constitutes the group a functional unity, and which is the first psychic manifestation of group life."³ For Ellwood, this interacting relationship, this psychic stimulus and response, is the central factor in sociological study. In looking for a concrete object which may be adopted as the unit or object of investigation he finds it in the group. "So

¹ Mead, "Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physical Psychology," *Psychological Bulletin*, December 15, 1909.

² *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, p. 15.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 146-47.

far as there is a *concrete* object of the sociologist's attention, it is the group of associated individuals."¹ As soon as the investigator shifts his attention from interactions to the individuals concerned in the associational process or mental interaction, he becomes a psychologist or biologist and loses the end of the sociologist's quest. We thus see that in Ellwood's general introduction to the sociological problem he has the group in the foreground as the *sine qua non* of his search. Whether used adequately or not, it is the basic assumption in all his thinking. How it is used in the various problems he meets will appear in later pages of this review.

To bring out more clearly the central place which the group occupies in Ellwood's thought it will be worth while to refer to his discussion of the nature and origin of society. After reviewing several conceptions of society which have been suggested by different writers, he adopts as a tentative definition of society, "any group of psychically interacting individuals."² "The only criterion by which we may decide whether any group constitutes a society or not is its possession or non-possession of the essential mark of a society, namely, the *functional interdependence of its members on the psychical side*."³ Applying this criterion to various groups such as a family, a nation, a debating club, a civilization, he finds that they are all within the given category. The term society as he uses it is a very broad one, and would come within the meaning of the term group where that term is used to cover social situations in which the actions of one form of life answer to and stimulate activities in another form. The definition given above indicates the bent of Ellwood's thinking along the psychological line of approach to the sociological problem. He does not ignore the biological approach, but feels that the psychological is the more important as the basis for an adequate sociology. Some of the possible criticisms of his stressing of the "psychical" interactions will be mentioned later.

With this view of the nature and definition of society we may proceed to the problem of the origin of society. To begin with, Ellwood points out that the life-process is essentially social. It

¹ *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, p. 22.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

involves interaction from the start. This interaction goes through an evolution from a physical to a psychical basis. He expressly repudiates the individualistic approach to the problem of the origin of society and adopts the group as his starting-point.

Life is not, and cannot be, an affair of individual organisms. The processes of both nutrition and reproduction of all higher forms of life involve a necessary interdependence among organisms of the same species, which, except under unfavorable conditions, gives rise to group life and psychical interaction. Society is no more the result of the coming together of individuals in isolation than the multicellular organism is the result of the coming together of cells so developed. Society, that is, the psychical interaction of individuals, is an expression of the original and continuing unity of the life-process of the associating organisms.¹

We have here then an avowed adoption of what has been called the social hypothesis, or, in other words, the group concept, as the fundamental starting-point in the discussion of the much-discussed problem of the origin of society. The contrast with the position of Ward and much of the earlier sociological thought is abrupt and definite. Ellwood states that the "most serious errors in sociology have been introduced through the assumption of primitive isolation or separateness."²

In carrying out in more detail the development of society, Ellwood shows how social life is a function of the food and reproductive processes. Under ordinary conditions the food process is essentially a social matter or group matter. It is of fundamental importance both to the individual and to the group. The social factor has selective value in the food process.

Now, control over the food process can be more easily established by groups of co-operating individuals than by isolated individuals. Natural selection operates, therefore, from the first in favor of such groups, and toward the elimination of individuals living relatively isolated. It must especially favor those groups in which the interactions between individual units are quick and sure—that is, those groups in which the power of psychic inter-stimulation and response is fully established and in which intelligent co-operation and orderly relations between individuals are highly developed. It is not an accident that the most successful, and, in general, the higher animals live in groups with well-ordered relations and highly developed means of inter-stimulation and co-operation.³

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

² *Ibid.*, p. 126.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

However important the food process may be in the group life, the reproductory process is still more important as a group factor in the evolution of the higher types of association or society. The presence of the young implies a social situation in which there are at least two persons. The most important of the relations growing out of the reproductive process is not the relation of the male to the female, but of the parent to the child, particularly the relation of the mother and the child. This becomes increasingly important as the period of infancy is prolonged:

In the relationship of the mother to the child we have the beginnings of that sympathetic social life of which the family has remained the highest type, and which has become the conscious goal of civilized human society. Society in the sympathetic sense then has had its beginnings in the family, that is, in the relation of the child form to the mother form.¹

Human society is but an evolution of animal societies. In other words, the group life was characteristic of the ancestors of man; "animal society is the precursor of human society," and human society is "but a form of animal society." The "whole difference between the two . . . is in the forms and definiteness of the psychical interaction between individuals."² The chief characteristic distinguishing human from animal society is the possession, by the former, of language and abstract reasoning. All other differences can be reduced to these two.³ Whatever degree of difference may exist between the two types of society, human society is an inheritance from animal society and may be regarded as a form of animal society. The origin of society has been affected and modified by the intellectual factors that have developed, but "human society is not in any sense an intellectual construction due to the perceptions of the utilities of association."⁴ In other words, the intellectual factors are a result of the group life, and their presence assumes the priority of the group as a necessary precedent. This is an exact reversal of the position taken by Ward. The group is thus conceived, in Ellwood's thinking, as the fundamental concept in the explanation of the origin of contemporary social life.

¹ *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, p. 129.

² *Ibid.*, p. 131.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-38.

In order to show further the place of the group concept, it is interesting to discover what answer Ellwood gives to the question as to whether man was primitively a social animal. The foregoing discussion implies the emphatic affirmative answer he gives to the question:

There is not the slightest evidence that man was ever a solitary creature, or even that he lived in solitary family groups. The evidence from the highest animals, from prehistoric archaeology, from the lowest existing savages, from human instincts, from language and other sources, points to the conclusion that primitive man lived in hordes of several related families.¹

This, it will be remembered, is contrary to the argument of Ward. The distinction between the two is that Ellwood maintains the group concept in his theory of origins. With reference to the much-elaborated "anti-social" characteristics, which led Ward and others to predicate a non-social primitive ancestor of man, Ellwood points out that these qualities are a later development, due to the changes in the group life:

The answer is that while man was primitively social, his sociality was narrow, confined largely to the family and to the kindred group, and that consequently he is not as yet well adapted to wider social relations. It is interesting to note, however, that these so-called anti-social traits of man are not found most fully developed among the lowest savages. Rather they characterize peoples that are somewhat advanced in culture, particularly those in the stage of barbarism. . . . The lowest peoples in point of culture even at the present time we find again to be essentially peaceful. War with its ferocities, cannibalism, and slavery are relatively late products, then, in social evolution, and incident to man's adjustment to a wide and more complex social environment. It is, therefore, quite within the truth to say that it is the struggle and conflict that have been developed with the species in its more complex stages of evolution that have called forth, sometimes in exaggerated forms, the predatory and anti-social tendencies which we see more or less in human society at present.²

In so far then as there is a problem of socialization, it is one of making the individual a factor in the larger and more complex life of the community so as to extend his habitual small group attitudes to the larger groups also. Ellwood's use of the group as the tool for the interpretation of the origin of society and for the explanation of the so-called anti-social characteristics, particularly the latter,

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-38.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 138-39.

is a real advance over the position of Ward. It displays an adequate grasp of the place of the group as the fundamental starting-point for sociology and for all social sciences as well. The group concept marks the most significant step in sociological thought since Ward's *Dynamic Sociology*.

Professor Ellwood emphasizes the importance of the "primary groups" as they are conceived by Cooley. These face-to-face groups constitute the most significant agencies by which social unity is created and continued:

Now, these small primary groups, the family, the neighborhood community, and other groups which involve face-to-face association, are manifestly the natural environment for the development of the social traits of the individual. They are, in other words, the natural medium for the development of our social life; they preserve its unity in time, and hence we shall have to consider them at length when we consider the problem of social continuity.¹

These groups are the particular carriers of tradition. It is through them more than through our schools, churches, etc., that the social life, the social inheritance, is transmitted from generation to generation. "So important is tradition in human society that in practically all stages of civilization we find certain institutions whose special work is to be carriers of tradition. In modern civilization these institutions are especially schools, churches, libraries, and the like. However, the real carriers of tradition are not these specialized institutions, but the primary groups of which we have already spoken, especially the family and the neighborhood groups. If human society had to rely upon schools and libraries to conserve its mental life, its continuity on the psychic side would be very imperfectly developed."²

The great importance attached to the family group is characteristic of all of Ellwood's writings.

The family is perhaps the chief institutional vehicle of tradition in human society. It has been such in all stages of civilization, and as long as it continues to be the chief environment of children of tender years, it will doubtless continue to be so. In the family the child learns his language, and in learning it he gets with it the fundamental knowledge, beliefs, and standards contained in the tradition of his civilization, or at least of his class. So much does the

¹ *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, p. 119.

² *Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 135.

child get his essential social traditions from his family life that many educators claim that moral instruction can never be given adequately in our public schools, but that the real foundation of the moral tradition must be gotten while the child is yet of tender age from his family circle.¹

This small family group with its close association is the source of the primary ideals. From this smaller group life these ideals are carried into the larger groups.

It is from the family group that we get, in the main, our notions of love, service and self-sacrifice; and we learn these ideals in the family the more effectively, because the life of the normal family group usually illustrates the practices which these ideals stand for. Taking these primary ideals from the family life, we apply them to the social life generally, and even to humanity at large. The family then, we may say, is the natural medium for the development and transmission of the ideals and standards of the social life. It has been the cradle of civilization in the past, and something like its organization seems to be the normal goal which men set up for society at large to realize. Two traditional ideals which are potent in our civilization, for example the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, are quite sufficient in themselves to illustrate the importance of the family as a maker and conserver of social ideals.²

From the neighborhood groups certain ideals are gathered by the child which are fundamental for its participation in any social group.

In the same way, we have received from our neighborhood group the ideals of freedom, fair play, justice and good citizenship. The very ideal of social solidarity itself comes, as Professor Cooley shows, from the unity experiences in these small primary groups. Inasmuch as these groups have certain traits which are found in all stages of civilization, there is certainly much to be said for Professor Cooley's idea that what we ordinarily call "human nature" is largely acquired there.³

The reason why those groups are so important and powerful in engrafting the fundamental social traditions on the growing generation is that the meanings of these traditions are accompanied, to a large extent, by actual behavior. They are thus a part of the activity of the child rather than being merely precepts.

The meaning of essential traditions is clearer in these groups to the young because they are accompanied, to a large extent, by actual behavior correlated with the tradition. In other words, these groups are also the carriers of custom,

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 136-37.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

in the sense of definite habits of social behavior. The child therefore can get the meaning of a certain tradition regarding government, religion or morality, for example, from the family life, better than he can from the printed page or even the spoken word. He can get the meaning, too, better in the close and intimate relations of the family group than he can in the more partial and uncertain associations of the school or the neighborhood.¹

Professor Ellwood might have carried this suggestion of his functional psychology further. It is a logical explanation coming from one whose express psychological point of view is that the act is the proper unit of thought.

The use of the primary group in tracing so large a part of social evolution thus constitutes one of the most important uses of the group concept possible. In emphasizing these small groups, Ellwood is recognizing in social theory one of the striking developments in contemporary practical life, namely, the growing consciousness of the small local group as the center of so many phases of social activity.²

One of the interesting and fruitful ways in which Ellwood applies his psychology to group situations is shown in his discussion of the problem of the origin and function of social consciousness. Applying the analogy of the rôle of consciousness in individual life, he finds that social consciousness arises when a group crisis arises, that is, when the old and hitherto useful habits have broken down and are no longer able to meet the situation. In such cases social consciousness enters, and like individual consciousness, its rôle is to create a new adjustment in a conflict situation. He describes the process in this manner:

One can say, in a general way, perhaps, and be approximately near the truth, that all social changes start in an unconscious way; that they are then brought to consciousness, and later conscious efforts are made to guide and control them. In other words, social changes start, as a rule, with some change in the environment or in the inner make-up of the group, which makes old social habits and institutions no longer well adjusted, or even altogether unworkable. Thus, changes in the mere numbers of a group may make some social custom, adapted to a smaller group, unworkable. In some cases where the new adjustments to be made are slight, or take place very slowly, they may not come vividly into the consciousness of the members of a group. But when

¹ *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 135-36.

² See introductory chapter.

the changes are great, rapid, or complex, they come into the consciousness of the members of the group, and some attempt to control them usually takes place.¹

Now it is evident that what is called social consciousness in human groups has to do with the adaptation of the group as a whole to some situation, just as individual consciousness has to do with adaptation. It is only by developing such a state that the activities of the members of a group can be accurately co-ordinated in the way required by a complex social life. The more complex groups, therefore, show more social consciousness. The city group shows more than the rural group, and the civilized group more than the uncivilized.²

Some light for our discussion may be gained in considering Ellwood's conception of the nature and function of the mind. This is one of the crucial points in the problems of social origins and is significant for our purposes, since it reveals pretty clearly just what the point of view of a particular writer under discussion may be. In any given case it displays whether the group conception is the fundamental one, or whether the author has recourse to an individualistic explanation for the difficult problem he faces. The significance of this for social control and for social theory will be pointed out later. The mind, according to Ellwood, is a part of the life-process and a part of the general evolutionary stream.³ Its function is that of control over complex adaptive processes.⁴ Consciousness arises where new adjustments or adaptations to a complex situation are made necessary by the failure or inadequacy of pre-existing co-ordinations.⁵ Mind thus comes to be a thing having distinct survival value, and as such giving human beings an enormous advantage.⁶ From the very first, since it is selective, it assumes a teleological or purposeful rôle.⁷ This purposive activity increases in scope and importance until at the present complex stage of the higher civilizations, it may be said to be the dominant type.⁸

This résumé of Ellwood's discussion is sufficient to show that his effort is to follow the general lines of a functional psychology. His footnote acknowledgments express his definite nominal adherence to that point of view. His adherence to a consistent functional psychology is apparent, rather than real. The mind, with

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, pp. 152-53.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-33.

⁶ *Ibid.*

him, is still a thing in itself. Consciousness "comes in" to mediate difficult conflict situations. Both mind and consciousness remain entities which are unexplained, and, except when making an effort to class himself as a functionalist, he is using a structural point of view. His writing exhibits an interesting halfway station between an earlier structural-metaphysical point of view and a later functional point of view, with the former predominating.¹

As a supplementary fact to this criticism one may add the more or less recurring dualism running through that part of Ellwood's discussion dealing with social psychology. This probably is a natural result of his conception of mind or consciousness as an entity. He carefully distinguishes between physical interaction and psychic interaction.² "Each mind is, so far as we know, wholly unconnected with other minds except through the intervention of physical media."³ This unconscious dualism pervades both of Ellwood's major works, and is never unified. Just why the glance of the eye, the movement of the body of one form, and the reciprocal gestures and cries of another form, are not as much a part of the psychical as any other part of the total activity circuit is hard to see.⁴ To take the act and not an isolated segment called psychic as the unit seems the only way out of the dualism. The act is social, and in so far as it has significance for sociology it involves the group. To segment the act is to make an inadequate use of the group concept in approaching the very interesting and difficult problem of the "mind."⁵

¹ Professor Ellwood follows the error of so many functional psychologists in bringing in a "consciousness" to mediate conflict crises, without explaining the new factor. Nothing is gained by substituting a new metaphysical entity for the "soul" or "mind" of earlier psychologists. The functionalist must reduce his consciousness to terms of behavior, to activity, to escape. Weiss distinguishes between functional and behavioristic psychology: "Perhaps the distinguishing difference between the functionalist and the behaviorist lies in the fact that the behaviorist disregards the entity which the functionalist calls consciousness" ("Relation between Functional and Behavior Psychology," *Psychological Review*, XXIV, 367). On such a basis Ellwood would be classed as a functionalist.

² *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 5, 6, 8, 9.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁴ Dewey, *Reflex Arc Concept*.

⁵ Attention should be called to Ellwood's article, "Objectivism in Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXII (1916), 289, in which he attacks the extreme

Before leaving this phase of the discussion it should be noted that Ellwood recognizes and emphasizes the fact that the mind is a social product:

We cannot doubt the social character of the individual mind. While consciousness exists only in the individual, every aspect of consciousness has been socially conditioned. This is true even of the racially inherited aspects of consciousness, the instincts, emotions, and practically all native impulses. The higher human instincts and emotions, especially, show very plainly their reference to the social life, and function quite as much with reference to the life of the group as they do with reference to the life of the individual. The acquired traits of consciousness practically all come to us through our social environment. From it we get not only our knowledge, our beliefs, our ideals, but even our precepts and concepts, in the strict sense of these terms. It is in the "give and take" of the social life that we learn and develop practically all of the phases of the consciousness of adult life. In a word, mind has been developed through interaction of mind with mind in the carrying on and controlling of common life processes. Mental life belongs, therefore, quite as much to the group as to the individual.¹

This point of view, which one might denominate the prevailing one in contemporary sociology in America, is adhered to pretty consistently throughout Ellwood's writings. He does not, however, furnish any sufficient process whereby the result arrived at in the group relation, namely, the development of the mind, the self, or consciousness, is explained. Just what the process is, in terms of functional psychology, whereby language, meaning, and mind have been created by the group is not set forth. Imitation is stressed, but it cannot suffice.² Until this gap is filled, it would seem there can be no complete social psychology. It is the missing link in the application of the group concept to the problems of sociology.

On the whole, Ellwood has made one of the distinguished contributions to sociological thought in America. The group concept is

claims of objectivism, or "physiological sociology." He feels that both the subjective and the objective methods may be of value to the sociologist. In answer to Ellwood's article, see Bernard's, "The Objective Viewpoint in Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXV, 298.

¹ *Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 73.

² The lack of a process is shown clearly in Ellwood's treatment of imitation in both his larger works. It is outside our province to do more than call attention to it here.

one of his fundamental concepts. One is struck by the frequency with which the word recurs on almost every page of his writings. He has gone a long distance in attempting to bring to sociology the results and methods of a newer type of psychology. That he left some gaps and unexplored corners, or that he failed to apply his tools in the proper way at all times, is not surprising. The chief criticism that might be made is that he did not go far enough. What he lacks may be ascribed to the mixture of an older psychology with his functional superstructure, or "the endeavor to adapt the rubrics of introspective psychology to the facts of objective associated life."¹

Cooley's writings have given him rank as one of the real contributors to sociological thought in America. The three books under consideration may all be ranked as studies in social psychology rather than in general sociology or social origins.² The subject which formed the problem of investigation for his first book, society and the individual, may be looked upon as the subject of his writings in general. The situation before him is always one involving a group. This summary will not attempt to present a review of his whole system, but will select out salient parts which seem to display most clearly the use of the group concept in his analysis of the various problems that he attempts to treat. Such problems, for example, as the relation of society to the individual, the nature of the mind in so far as it is both social and individual, the nature and formation of the self, the nature and origin and importance of primary groups, freedom, pecuniary valuation, will give a fairly good insight into the use made of the group concept.

We may begin, as he does in his first book, with the long-debated problem of the relation of the individual to the group, or society and the individual. Of the fundamental nature of his conception

¹ Dewey has thus characterized some of the attempts at a social psychology and attributes to it the main responsibility for the backward state of social psychology. In his opinion the behaviorist approach is an entirely new attack upon the problem and one offering hope of success.—"The Need for Social Psychology," *Psychological Review*, XXIV (1917), 271.

² The books referred to are *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902), *Social Organization* (1909), and *Social Process* (1918).

of this relation he does not leave one long in doubt, although the whole book is but an elaboration of the principles laid down in the first chapter.

A separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience, and so likewise is society when regarded as something apart from individuals. The real thing is Human Life, which may be considered either in an individual aspect or in a social, that is to say, a general, aspect; but is always, as a matter of fact, both individual and general. In other words, "society" and "individuals" do not denote separable phenomena, but are simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing, the relation between them being like that between other expressions, one of which denotes a group as a whole, and the other the members of the group, such as the army and the soldiers, the class and the students, and so on.¹

The point of view suggested is so thoroughly a part of Cooley's general thought that it will be well to cite further statements explaining and elucidating it. Each will serve of itself to show the prominent place which the group occupies in the assumptions from which he starts his discussions. Continuing the thought that the individual and society are one, he says still more emphatically:

And just as there is no society or group that is not a collective view of persons, so there is no individual who may not be regarded as a particular view of social groups. He has no separate existence; through both the hereditary and the social factors in his life a man is bound into the whole of which he is a member; and to consider him apart from it is quite as artificial as to consider society apart from individuals.²

Consequently any view which sets society over against the individual, or vice versa, as its fundamental assumption is false to the facts.

I think, then, that the antithesis, society versus the individual, is false and hollow whenever used as a general or philosophical statement of human relations. Whatever ideas may be in the minds of those who set these words and their derivatives over against each other, the notion conveyed is that of two separable entities or forces; and certainly such a notion is untrue to fact.³

In order to clarify his conception of the indissoluble relationship which he has described, Cooley expressly repudiates four traditional conceptions that have prevailed or do prevail in current thought. The first of these is what he calls "mere individualism," in which the

¹ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 1-2.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

collective aspect is as nearly as possible ignored: "Each person is held to be a separate agent, and all social phenomena are thought of as originating in the action of such agents. The individual is the source, the independent, the only human source, of events."¹ This view enters into the current thought of the day, being congenial to the "ordinary material view of things and corroborated by theological and other traditions." The second view which he repudiates is the "double causation," in which society and the individual are thought of as separate causes with a division of power between them. This is the view "ordinarily met with in social and ethical discussion." It is not advance, philosophically, upon the one first mentioned:

There is the same premise of the individual as a separate unrelated agent; but over against him is set a vaguely conceived general or collective interest and force. It seems that people are so accustomed to thinking of themselves as uncaused causes, special creators on a small scale, that when the existence of general phenomena is forced upon their notice they are likely to regard these as something additional, separate, and more or less antithetical.²

Another view which is inadequate, according to Cooley, is "the social faculty view." This view regards the social as including a part only of the individual. "Human nature is thus divided into individualistic or non-social tendencies or faculties, and those that are social. Thus, certain emotions, such as love, are social; others, as fear, or anger, are unsocial or individualistic."³ In contrast to this particular-faculty view, Cooley presents the thesis that "man's psychical outfit is not divisible into the social and the non-social; but that he is all social in a large sense, is all a part of the common human life."⁴ A fourth view which must be discarded is "primitive individualism":

This expression has been used to describe the view that sociality follows individuality in time, is a later and additional product of development. This view is a variety of the preceding and is, perhaps, formed by a mingling of individualistic preconceptions with a somewhat crude evolutionary philosophy. . . . Man *was* a mere individual, mankind a mere aggregation of such; but he has gradually become socialized, he is progressively merging into a social whole. Morally speaking, the individual is bad, the social the good, and we must push on the work of putting down the former and bringing in the latter.⁵

¹ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 8.

² *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

In contrast to this view of the priority of the individual in point of time, Cooley asserts that

individuality is neither prior in time nor lower in moral rank than sociality; but that the two have always existed side by side as complementary aspects of the same thing, and that the line of progress is from a lower to a higher type of both, not from the one to the other. . . . If we go back to a time when the state of our remote ancestors was such that we are not willing to call it social, then it must have been equally undeserving to be described as individual or personal.¹

If the person is thought of primarily as a separate material form, inhabited by thoughts and feelings conceived by analogy to be equally separate, then the only way of getting a society is by adding on a new principle of socialism, social faculty, altruism, of the life. But if you start with the idea that the social person is primarily a fact in the mind, and observe him there, you find at once that he has no existence apart from a mental whole of which all personal ideas are members, and which is a particular aspect of society.²

The foregoing statements are sufficient to show the nature of Cooley's point of view in his approach to the social problem. The unit which he has in mind is always a group, of which one may take either an individual aspect or a total or collective aspect. The group and the individual are but two phases of the same or total social situation. To attempt to approach the study of society, as Ward did for instance, from the standpoint of the individual, and then attempt to create a social superstructure on the basis of that individual approach is an abstraction that the facts do not warrant. From the beginning, according to Cooley, there must have been a group situation. It is the fundamental hypothesis upon which he constructs his whole subsequent thought. The further points of inquiry which we shall pursue are in reality but amplifications of this fundamental one, but they will serve to illustrate and clarify it and will, to some extent, show the process which is found to exist in them all. We may begin with the closely related discussion of the individual and social aspects of the mind and of the nature of the mind in general.

In defining the term mind in its social and individual aspects, Cooley carries his synthetic view, elaborated above, into every part

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90. Cooley acknowledges his deep indebtedness to both James and Baldwin for the view he holds.

of the discussion. To understand his discussion we must discover his definition of the mind. This he gives in the following words:

Mind is an organic whole made up of co-ordinating individualities, in somewhat the same way that the music of an orchestra is made up of divergent but related sounds. No one would think it necessary or reasonable to divide the music into two kinds, that made by the whole and that of the particular instruments; and no more are there two kinds of mind, the social mind and the individual mind. When we study the social mind we merely fix our attention on larger aspects and relations rather than on the narrower one of ordinary psychology.¹

In other words, the conception of a separate and isolated individual entity, which can be called the mind, is an abstraction which has no real existence. The point will become clearer as we go on to discuss Cooley's treatment of the problem of consciousness and the self. It will be noted that the group relation is kept consistently in view throughout.

Consciousness, whether one is treating of social consciousness or self-consciousness, is invariably a product of a group relation. Neither can arise without the other.

Social consciousness or awareness of society is inseparable from self-consciousness, because we can hardly think of ourselves excepting with reference to a social group of some sort, or of the group except with reference to ourselves. The two things go together, and what we are really aware of is a more or less complex personal or social whole, of which now the particular, now the general, aspect is emphasized. In general then most of our reflective consciousness, of our wide-awake state of mind, is social consciousness, because a sense of our relation to other persons, or of other persons to one another, can hardly fail to be a part of it. Self and society are twin-born, we know one as immediately as we know the other, and the notion of a separate and independent ego is an illusion. This view, which seems to me quite simple and in accord with common-sense, is not the one most commonly held, for psychologists and even sociologists are still much infected with the idea that self-consciousness is in some way primary, and antecedent to social consciousness, which must be derived by some recondite process of combination or elimination.²

The view here enunciated is so vitally a part of all Cooley's thinking that it will bear repetition in different forms. It would be difficult to find a more complete statement of the growing view of social

¹ *Social Organization*, p. 3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

psychology as to the essentially social nature of the individual and of the self.

Cooley criticizes Descartes' well-known maxim, *Cogito, ergo sum*, upon the ground that it is an abstraction of the individual aspect of a social situation and a positing of that as the primary fact, to the neglect of the other pole of the dialectic. It is "one-sided or 'individualistic' in asserting the personal or 'I' aspect to the exclusion of the social or 'we' aspect, which is equally original with it."¹ Descartes' error was a result of a too narrow introspection. A broader introspection reveals the fact "that the 'I'-consciousness does not explicitly appear until the child is, say, about two years old, and that when it does appear it comes in inseparable conjunction with the consciousness of other persons and of those relations which make up a social group."² In other words, Descartes lacked an adequate conception of the group as a fact in mental development. The consciousness of self implies the consciousness of others and vice versa. "Self and society go together, as phases of a common whole. I am aware of the social groups in which I live as immediately and authentically as I am aware of myself."³

Closely connected with the social nature of the self and of consciousness, is the problem of thought as a social process. Thought, according to Cooley's explanation, is essentially an implication of the group process. In other words, thought is a social process. "Our thoughts are always, in some sort, imaginary conversations; and when vividly felt they are likely to become quite distinctly so."⁴ Thought has grown up out of the interrelations of living forms. Whether we view it as it develops in the case of the child, or in the most highly developed type of reflection, thinking always implies the other forms of life. Thought is essentially internal conversation, internal dialogue. That is, it is a group product, and always implies a group both for its inception and for its development. It is true of adults as it is of children that "the mind lives in perpetual conversation." "The fact is that language, developed by the race through personal intercourse and

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

⁴ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 328.

imparted to the individual in the same way, can never be dissociated from personal intercourse in the mind; and since higher thought involves language, it is always a kind of imaginary conversation. The word and the interlocutor are correlative ideas."¹ This implication of the fundamental relation of the group to both language and thought, and the very close relation, one might say identity, between language and thought, is one of the most important implications of the group concept which modern social psychology has developed. Cooley has performed a real service in pointing out some suggestive ways in which the problem may be followed up. The radical contrast that this view presents to that of Ward, in which thought was assumed to antedate group or social life, is quite apparent. It symbolizes one of the most important differences in the rôle of the group concept and its implications. It is true, of course, that Cooley does not discover any process whereby self-consciousness arises and functions, nor does he show the process by which the self is created or by which the social product, language, becomes reflective thought. He does, however, by calling attention to the essentially social nature of self, language, and thought, establish the basis for his sociological approach to the problems which he discusses. Some such presumption, it would seem, is necessary for the founding of a real claim for sociology as a social technique.

Two very significant applications of the group concept remain to be pointed out. They constitute two very significant and important contributions to social theory in general. They are Cooley's elaboration of the nature and importance of "primary groups" and his group or social approach to the problem of pecuniary valuation. The meaning and significance of the term "primary groups" as developed by Cooley are so well recognized that it is hardly necessary to do more than to call attention to the point. The importance of the family, the playground, the neighborhood was not unknown before his treatment of them, but their real importance could be pointed out only on the basis of an adequate social psychology. So long as the self, the individual, was looked upon as a datum rather than as a creation of social or group life, the intimate

¹ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 56.

face-to-face groups, while more or less important as secondary factors, could not assume a primary rôle. Once, however, the newer social psychology has taken upon itself to regard the self, thought, and the individual as products of a group relation, then the intimate associational groups become primary in importance. In other words, the significance of Cooley's contribution in this respect is not in calling attention to certain universal forms of group life, but in reinterpreting that group life in terms of a social psychology. The degree to which the local group life is coming to have a recrudescence of emphasis in various fields of thought is, to some extent at least, influenced by Cooley's able use of the group concept in this part of his thinking.

With reference to the other point mentioned, the discussion of the problem of value, it is not within the province of this paper to attempt to present a résumé of the argument presented. The relevant point for us is that, in taking up the problem of pecuniary valuation, Cooley approaches it from the social point of view rather than from the individual point of view as is common in economic theory. In other words, it is an effort to deal with the problem of pecuniary valuation in particular from the group point of view. In carrying out his purpose, Cooley makes use of the fundamental social psychology which runs through all his work. In doing this he is making a contribution to the, as yet, young attempt to apply the group concept, the social point of view, to the province of valuation in economic theory, which has for so long been the preserve of the individualist. The usual treatment of the problem in economic theory, according to Cooley,

starts with demand as a *datum*, assuming that each individual has made up his mind what he wants and how much he wants it. There is seldom, I believe, any serious attempt to go back of this, it being assumed, apparently, that these wants spring from the inscrutable depths of the private mind. At any rate it has not been customary to recognize that they are the expression of an institutional development.¹

What Cooley attempts to do is to go back of these individual wants, as found in the individual minds of economic theory, and show that the minds themselves, as well as the wants or demands, are

¹ *Social Process*, p. 297.

socially created; that the group has formed and made them as they are. A treatment of value which ignores this fundamental part of the valuation process as at best a half-truth. The market is an institution and as such creates its values and demands, shapes the types of wants and tends, like any institution, to preserve itself and its wants from changes and modifications. The result of the individualistic treatment of valuation which has been current is to saddle the whole institution of the market on human nature:

The accepted economic treatment would seem to be equivalent to a renunciation of any attempt to understand the relation of value to society at large; or, in other words, of any attempt to understand value itself, since to understand a thing is to perceive its more important relations.¹

The truth of the situation is that the problem is a social one, valuation is a social process rather than an individual one. The market itself is the main factor in creating values. This does not mean merely

that pre-existing individual estimates are summed up and equilibrated in accordance with the formulas of economic science; though this is one phase of the matter, but also that the individual estimates themselves are moulded by the market, at first in a general way and then, in the process of price making, drawn toward mechanical uniformity. The individual and the system act and react upon each other until, in most cases, they agree, somewhat as in fashion, in religious belief and the like. The influence of the market is not secondary either in time or importance to that of the person; it is a continuous institution in which the individual lives and which is ever forming his ideas.²

From these quotations one may see that what Cooley is attempting to do is to apply his psychology of the relation of the individual and the group to the particular social problem of valuation. It is merely, by way of summary, an application of the newer social psychology to the province of economic theory in so far as it has to do with valuation. We are not concerned with the further details of the application. It is enough to point out that the overwhelming number of writers in political economic theory are individualistic in their thinking, but that, in his latest book, Cooley is attempting to proceed logically from the prevailing point of view in contemporary social psychology. In a word, it is an effort to approach the heart of economic theory from the group

¹ *Social Process*, p. 298.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 298-99.

standpoint. That this has not been done with any degree of success by economists themselves is but an illustration of the way in which sciences fix the attitudes and values of the workers in their respective fields.¹ The individualistic prepossessions which were woven into economic theory early in the formation of economics as a separate science will tend to survive long after new points of view have become commonplaces in social psychology.

Miss Follett's book, *The New State*, is the most important analysis of the group concept and its significance for social practice that has recently appeared.² Like some of the other books that have been noted in the discussions of this chapter, the group concept forms such a large part of the text that to attempt to show in any adequate way the details of its treatment would involve a repetition of almost the whole of the work. The effort will be confined, therefore, to an attempt to select out those parts of the discussion which show most clearly the prominence of the group in the author's, mind, and the uses to which the concept is put. Such a plan necessarily will do violence to a book which is so thoroughly permeated with the group idea that it merits bodily inclusion in this essay. We shall have occasion to refer to it again in the next chapter.³

In order properly to approach the point of view with which Miss Follett sets about her task, it will be well to inquire into the psychological point of view with which she begins. That is, we must find out what is meant by the "new psychology" as contrasted with the discarded "old psychology." The key to the former is,

¹ Acknowledgment should be made, of course, of the work of Anderson (*Social Value*) which attempts to reconstruct economic theory from within the ranks of the economists. In general, however, the newer view is still in its infancy. Cooley's contribution to this view is the most valuable and significant part of his latest book, *Social Process*.

² Apparently a book in political science, *The New State* is so thoroughly a sociological study that it must be included here, although the steady policy has been followed of confining the discussion to writers who are definitely known to be at work in the division of labor called sociology.

³ The outline for this paper was completed before this book came to hand. The similarity in thought is a coincidence with no causal relationship.

that it refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the separation of the individual from the group:

We have long been trying to understand the relation of the individual to society; we are only just beginning to see that there is no "individual," and that there is no "society." It is not strange, therefore, that our efforts have gone astray, that our thinking yields small returns for politics. The old psychology was based on the isolated individual as the unit, on the assumption that a man thinks, feels, and judges independently. Now that we know that there is no such thing as a separate ego, that individuals are created by reciprocal interplay, our whole study of psychology is being transformed.¹

In other words, the new psychology is a social psychology which recognizes the interacting socii in a total social situation as the unit. Such a psychology must be more than an "application of individual psychology to a number of people."² The new psychology, on the other hand, "must take people with their inheritance, their 'tendencies,' their environment, and then focus its attention on their interrelations."³ Again, we must distinguish a proper social psychology from that so-called social psychology which makes "socially minded" tendencies on the part of individuals the subject of its study. "Such tendencies still belong to the field of individual psychology."⁴ "A social action is not an individual initiative with a social application, neither is social psychology the determination of how far social factors determine individual consciousness. Social psychology must concern itself primarily with the *interaction* of minds."⁵ In other words, it is group psychology.

Still another distinction is to be made between the latter and what has sometimes passed for group psychology, namely, crowd psychology. "Social psychology may include both group psychology and crowd psychology, but of these two group psychology is much the more important."⁶ This distinction between the group and the crowd is conceived to be fundamental. The crowd and the group "represent entirely different modes of association." "Crowd action is the outcome of agreement based on concurrence of emotion rather than of thought, or if on the latter, then on a

¹ *The New State*, p. 19.

⁴ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁵ *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁶ *Ibid.*

concurrence of emotion produced by becoming aware of similarities, not by a slow and gradual creating of unity."¹ The process by which this creation of unity is secured will be explained later. The point to be noted here is that a crowd psychology, while it has received more study, is to be distinguished from a group psychology or social psychology as used by the author. The latter is the more important, not only for present analysis of group life, but for a constructive program in a democracy. In a word, the essence of the theme of the book is that the group process must be substituted for the "crowd fallacy." With these preliminary remarks on the general psychological point of view we may pass to other matters which will serve to illustrate and amplify the suggestions contained in the foregoing quotations.

In order to understand the further references to the group as the fundamental concept with which the book deals, it is necessary to sketch briefly what is meant by the term "the group process" as it is used. The group process is the heart of the group psychology, and is represented as the only solution of the problem of democracy. In its essence it is a stimulus-and-response situation in a group, whereby a real group mind is created out of integration of the attitudes of the co-operating persons. This process is not one of mere addition or subtraction of individual attitudes. The attitudes are not fixed. The result of group discussion and activity is a composite whole which is something new. It is not secured by the acquiescence of the member of the group but by his contribution. It is not compromise or a striking of averages. It is not suppression of one part by the other members. The group process is found only when there is an integration of differences and agreements into a new whole. "It is an acting and reacting, a single and identical process which brings out differences and integrates them into a unity. The complex reciprocal action, the intricate interweavings of the members of the group, is the social process."²

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.* The point of view set forth in this summary of the author's analysis of the group process suggests Cooley's analysis of the formation of public opinion (*Social Organization*, chap. xii), and Aristotle's still earlier statement of the advantages of giving supreme power in the state to the many rather than to the few (*Politics* iii. 11).

In contrast to the group process as thus sketched, two theories of the group process are criticized, namely, "the imitation theory and the like-response-to-like-stimuli theory."¹ Imitation is a part of our social life but it is only a part, and a "part that has been fatally over-emphasized."² It has been made the bridge to span the gap "between the individual and society, but we now see that there is no gap, therefore no bridge is necessary."³ The chief error in making imitation the basis of a social psychology is that it stresses likenesses to the neglect of the other very important factor, difference:

The core of the social process is not likeness, but of harmonizing difference through interpenetration. But to be more accurate, similarity and difference cannot be opposed in this external way—they have a vital connection. Similarities and differences make up the differentiated reactions of the group; that is what constitutes importance, not their likeness or unlikeness as such. I react to a stimulus; that reaction may represent a likeness or an unlikeness. Society is the unity of these differentiated reactions. . . . Unity is brought about by the reciprocal adaptings of the reactions of individuals, and this reciprocal adapting is based on both agreement and difference.⁴

This does not mean that there is not uniformity. The distinction to be made is between uniformity as given, and the unity which we achieve. Uniformity means stagnation. Similarity is a doctrine of degeneration. "Unity, not uniformity, must be our aim. We attain unity only through variety. Differences must be integrated, not annihilated, nor absorbed."⁵ "The unifying of difference is the eternal process of life—the creative synthesis, the highest act of creation, the at-onement."⁶

Closely connected with the unification of thought through what has been described as the group process of integration is the unification of feeling, or "collective" feeling as it is called. It is recognized by Miss Follett that the unification of thought which she has described is only part of the group process. Here again, it is pointed out, the older individualistic psychology is inadequate to give a true explanation of the origin and nature of sympathy:

Particularistic psychology, which gave us *ego* and *alter*, gave us sympathy going across from one isolate being to another. Now we begin with the group.

¹ *The New State*, p. 21.

³ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

We see in the self-unifying of the group process, and all the myriad unfoldings involved the central and all-germinating activity of life. The group creates. In the group, we have seen, is formed the collective idea, "similarity" is there achieved, sympathy also is born within the group—it springs forever from inter-relation. The emotions I feel when apart belong to the phantom ego; only from the group comes the genuine feeling *with*—the true sympathy, the vital sympathy, the just and balanced sympathy.¹

We have here an excellent statement of the relation of the group to the feeling of sympathy, as well as a clear conception of the central position of the group as opposed to the older separation of one independent individual from another, with the consequent necessity of getting them together through the invention of a bond of feeling. The necessity of the assumption of the priority of the group as the basis for the appearance of sympathy is clearly set forth in the following passage:

It has been thought until recently by many writers that sympathy came before the social process. Evidences were collected among animals of the "desire to help" other members of the same species and the conclusion drawn that sympathy exists and that the result is "mutual aid." But sympathy cannot antedate activity. We do not, however, now say that there is an "instinct" to help and then sympathy is the result of the helping; the feeling and the activity are involved one in the other.²

The reason why we have had difficulties in trying to find out whether self-interest or love for one's fellows is the chief motor force in society has been because "we have thought of egoistic or altruistic feelings as pre-existing; we have studied action to see what precedent characteristics it indicated. But when we begin to see that men possess no characteristics apart from the unifying process, then it is the process we shall study."³ The recognition of the group life as the center and starting-point for social analysis is quite apparent from the older views criticized. This emphasis which Miss Follett places upon activity as the key to the interpretation of the group process, is one of the cardinal characteristics of functional psychology. One of the significant suggestions, in a practical application of the point of view that has been presented, is contained in the following words:

This means that we must live the group life. This is the solution of our problems, national and international. Employers and employed cannot be

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

³ *Ibid.*

exhorted to feel sympathy for one another; true sympathy will come only by creating a community or group of employers and employed. Through the group you find the details, the filling out of Kant's universal law. Kant's categorical imperative is general, it is empty; it is only a blank check. But through the life of the group we learn the content of universal law.¹

This recognition of the importance of the implications of the relation of group activity to the formation of the feeling of sympathy and all other moral qualities can hardly be exaggerated. The empty attempts to form moral character by the repetition of moral precepts, which has been the common theory of educational and religious leaders and institutions, find in the above statement a much-needed corrective. The educational application of the theory that the group activity is the center from which education must proceed will be pointed out later. Attention is called to it here to show the significance of the group concept as a basis for the analysis of the feelings of sympathy as suggested by the passage last quoted above.

Although the author's point of view has been suggested, it will be well to take up in some specific details her conception of the relation of the individual to society. We shall have occasion to point out that a distinction is made between the old individualism and the new individualism; we shall take up the former first and deal with it and the category "society" at the same time. The key to Miss Follett's position is given in these words: "A man is a point in the social process rather than a unit in that process, a point where forming forces meet straightway to disentangle themselves and stream forth again. In the language of the day, 'man is at the same time a social factor and a social product.'"² The sundering of the individual from the larger whole is as "artificial and late an act as the sundering of consciousness into subject and object." The same view of the group as the reality is set forth more fully in the following statement of it:

The individual is the unification of a multiplied variety of reactions. But the individual does not react to society. The interplay constitutes both society on the one hand and individuality on the other; individuality and society are evolving together from this constant and complex action and reaction. Or, more accurately, the relation of the individual to society is not action and reaction, but infinite interactions by which both individual and society are

¹ *The New State*, p. 60.

² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

forever a-making; we cannot say, if we would be exact, that the individual acts upon and is acted upon, because that way of expressing it implies that he is a definite, given, finished entity, and would keep him apart merely as an agent of the acting and being acted on. We cannot put the individual on one side and society on the other, we must understand the complete interrelation of the two. Each has no value, no existence without the other.¹

The above summary of the view of the relation of the individual to the group and its condemnation of the older individualistic viewpoint suggests the author's conception of the "new individualism," or the proper and sound individualism. Individualism, in this latter sense, is a late social product. It consists in the development of the individual to the highest power in a collective or intense group life. The development of a true social life is not antagonistic to the development of an individual, but is a part of the same process. In other words, the two develop together. The new view of individualism does not destroy the individual, as has been charged. Those who advocate the newer view are giving "the fullest value to the individual that has ever been given, are preaching individual value as the basis of democracy, individual affirmation as its process, and individual responsibility as its motor force."² This conception of individualism suggests a criticism of the older conception of freedom or liberty. That conception was that the "solitary man was the free man, that the man outside society possessed freedom but that in society he had to sacrifice as much of his liberty as interfered with the liberty of others."³ Such a conception of freedom involves the fallacies of the older psychology with its assumption of the priority of the individual. The true idea of freedom, the argument runs, is found only in that view which conceives of the individual and the group developing together; a man "gains his freedom through perfectly complete relationship because thereby he achieves his whole nature."⁴ Freedom is found in what has been described as the group process, in the integration process whereby a social unity is created out of differences and agreements. One becomes free as one enters into the intense social life and becomes an actual part of it:

That we are free only through the social order, only as fast as we identify ourselves with the whole, implies practically that to gain our freedom we must

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

² *Ibid.*, p. 74.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁴ *Ibid.*

take part in all the social life around us; join groups, enter into many social relations, and begin to win freedom for ourselves. When we are the group in feeling, thought and will we are free.¹

We see, then, that the group is the central concept in the working out of the ideas of freedom and of individualism. Freedom and individualism, in the proper sense of the term, are not opposed to the group, but are implied in the group conception of life. It is only in a group that individuality and freedom are possible. They are corollaries of a group conception of the human process. Both are achievements.

Before leaving the discussion of the relation of the individual to the group or to society, it may be well to notice briefly Miss Follett's view of the concept "society," and her criticism of the social-organism theory. With reference to the first, she very properly observes that there is no such thing as society *en masse*. In that sense the term is a misnomer. The reality is a number of groups to which one is more or less intimately attached:

I am always in relation not to "society," but to some concrete group. . . . Practically, "society" is for every one of us a number of groups. The recognition of this constitutes a new step in sociology, analogous to the contribution William James made in regard to the individual. . . . The vital relation of the individual to the world is through his groups; they are the potent factors in shaping our lives.²

In other words, the study of society becomes the study of groups.

With reference to the organic conception of society, Miss Follett takes the position that it is inadequate, although containing one essential truth. That truth is that it attempts to stress the fundamental unity of the thing it is describing. The term is valuable as a metaphor but is lacking in psychological accuracy.³ The criticisms made of the analogy set forth nothing that has not been brought forth by other writers in attacking the theory. Most of the defects have been acknowledged even by the sponsors for the theory in American sociology. They need not be repeated here.

In order to bring out more clearly the position of the writer we are now reviewing, it will be helpful to summarize the application of her view to the theory of human progress. Two of the older

¹ *The New State*, p. 70.

² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

theories of progress are examined; first, that progress depends on individual invention and crowd imitation; and second, that progress is the result of struggle and survival of the fittest. Taking up the first of these theories, it is pointed out that the second half of it has been disposed of above in connection with the criticism of the theory of imitation as the process of social psychology. The first half of the theory, individual invention, is briefly treated. The individual does not invent or originate in the older sense of the terms. The older view committed the error of ignoring the fact that the individual is himself a group product. Conceding all that may be true of inborn ability, still, according to Miss Follett, the "individual" idea one brings to a given group "is not really an 'individual' idea; it is the result of the process of interpenetration, but by bringing it to a new group and soaking it in that the interpenetration becomes more complex."¹ "There wells up in the individual a fountain of power, but this fountain has risen underground, and is richly fed by all the streams of the common life."² The place of the group in invention, though not generally a part of the common thought, has been so fully elaborated by other writers that it is hardly necessary to suggest the soundness of Miss Follett's application of the group view to the invention theory.

The second theory of progress, struggle and survival, is subjected to several criticisms. In the first place, it has been placed upon an individualistic basis, pictured as a struggle between individuals. The equally important fact of co-operation and group life was ignored. Not only among men, but in the animal world as well, "biologists tell us that 'mutual aid' has from the first been a strong factor in evolution,"³ giving to those animals which exhibit it an advantage over the solitary type. Assuming correction of the individualistic conception of struggle, does the conception of group struggle suffice as an adequate process of progress? To this question a negative answer is given because group struggle implies a subjection of one group by the other; it violates the principle that progress is achieved by the integration of differences, by the extension of membership in ever higher groups. Even if the struggle idea is extended no further than the intellectual world it is invalid, because

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

² *Ibid.*, p. 95.

³ *Ibid.*

the true way to progress is not through argument or struggle but through the process of group integration of differences, that is, through what has been called the "group process." True discussion is not struggle, but "an experiment in co-operation."¹ "We must learn co-operative thinking, intellectual team-work. There is a secret here which is going to revolutionize the world."²

The failure to take into account the group process is the error in both the older notions of progress which have just been criticized. The true approach, according to Miss Follett, to an adequate theory of progress is to be found in the group process: "Progress then must be through the group process. Progress implies respect for the creative process, not the created thing; the created thing is forever and forever being left behind us."³ Out of the group life alone comes the creative power. "No *individual* can change the disorder or the iniquity of this world. No chaotic *mass* of men and women can do it. Conscious *group* creation is to be the social and political force of the future. Our aim is to live consciously in more and more group relations and to make each group a means of creating. It is the group which will teach us that we are not puppets of fate."⁴ Progress, in other words, is to be secured by the application of the group conception to our whole life. Thus will it "revolutionize the world."

Thus far in the summary, attention has been directed to the problem of setting forth the fundamental notions of the writer under discussion, of clarifying the meaning of the concept "group," and showing some of its implications. From now on it will be well to point out some of the ways in which the group concept that has been developed may be used in practical problems. Lack of space necessitates doing violence to the constructive side of Miss Follett's discussion. It may be summarized in the following words: "We have said, 'The people must rule.' We now ask, 'How are they to rule?' It is the technique of democracy which we are seeking. We shall find it in group organization."⁵ That is, the "new state"

¹ *The New State*, p. 95.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 101. This statement gives the thesis of the book. The new state is to arise out of the recognition of the group principle and its application, in place of the older political theories based on the older psychologies.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

is to be secured by discarding the older conceptions and perfecting the organization of groups as the only workable democratic method. At the bottom of a sound democratic group method is placed the neighborhood group. This small "primary" group, as Cooley calls it, is the foundation stone upon which Miss Follett erects her edifice. It is here that, for political purposes, the group process works out. It is here that public opinion is formed and made effective. It is here that the individual is discovered and conserved and enlarged. Neighborhood organization is the destroyer of the boss and the crowd, supplanting them with real leadership and a real group:

Neighborhood organization must then take the place of party organization. . . . The rigid formality of the party means stultification, annihilation. But group politics, made of the very stuff of life, of the people of the groups, will express the inner, intimate ardent desires of spontaneous human beings, and will contain within its circumference the possibility of the fullest satisfaction of those desires. Group organization gives a living, pulsing unity made up of the minds and hearts and seasoned judgments of vital men and women.¹

With the neighborhood organized, Miss Follett extends the principle of group organization on up to the highest groupings known. To carry the principle of group organization from "neighborhood to nation" there must be

two changes in our state first, the state must be the actual integration of living, local groups, thereby finding ways of dealing directly with its individual members. Secondly, other groups than the neighborhood groups must be represented in the state; the ever-increasing multiple group life of today must be recognized and given a responsible place in politics.²

As suggested by this statement, Miss Follett accepts the theory of the unified state as opposed to political pluralism which discredits the state. Her discussion of the principles and inferences involved in the different point of view is a very interesting elaboration of the group-process theory, but we cannot go into it further than to point out that she holds consistently to the view, which seems to be sound, that the organization of larger and more inclusive groups does not destroy the smaller groups, but, on the contrary, demands them as essential to the larger group organization. Through the process of integration, it is pointed out, it is possible to build

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 242-43.

² *Ibid.*, p. 245.

up a group organization from neighborhood to nation, and even to internation or world-organization. Through it all, however, the group method is the only sound basis of modern political organization. In reply to the contention of those who favor occupational representation as the proper method of representation, it is pointed out that no one group can be chosen to the exclusion of all other groups. Important as the occupational group is, it does not take in the whole of one's interests. One is a member of many and various groups which must be integrated into the true neighborhood group as the fundamental group in political activity. "To sum up: no one group can enfold me, because of my multiple nature. This is the blow to the theory of occupational representation."¹

The foregoing brief summary has not attempted to do more than to present the point of view of the author with respect to the group conception of society, and to suggest the application which is made of the concept once it has been developed. The book contains one of the most suggestive applications of the group concept as a tool of analysis that has appeared. It represents a point of view which sociology has had a large share in developing; a view which is characteristic of contemporary sociological thought in this country.

[To be continued]

¹ *The New State*, p. 295. Part III and Part IV are devoted to an elaboration of group organization as the true democratic method. We are not interested so much in the details as in the attempt to apply the *group concept* to such an important field.

EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL WORK

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I. THE NATURE OF SOCIAL WORK

The term social work which has come to be the accepted designation for a large group of specialized activities in the field of social betterment was not in general use at the opening of the present century. Two or three decades ago such terms as philanthropy, charity, correction, outdoor relief, care of dependents, defectives, and delinquents, were commonly employed by those at work in these fields. This is at once evident in the names of leading organizations established during those early years—the Charity Organization Society, Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, National Conference of Charities and Correction. When Miss Mary E. Richmond, in 1897, made her plea for professional training she urged the establishment of a “Training School in Applied Philanthropy.” The training class which was organized in New York the following year developed later into the New York School of Philanthropy, and this name persisted until very recently when it was changed to the New York School of Social Work.

This early terminology is significant, for it indicates clearly the nature of the field from which modern social work has developed. The social workers of a generation ago were frankly engaged in the work of charity or philanthropy. Their efforts were concentrated upon the disadvantaged and handicapped and represented a growing attempt to understand their problems and solve them through the application of scientific methods. Just because their work was permeated with the scientific spirit it was inevitable that their attention should be increasingly directed to the forces that were dragging men down and making the work of relief such a difficult task.

Thus there developed very naturally a keen interest in what is frequently called the preventive side of social work. Those whose

work was commonly thought of as being in the field of relief began to interest themselves in social legislation and in the improvement of social and industrial conditions. From the ranks of philanthropic workers there arose those who took up the fight against the adverse conditions of life instead of in behalf of the unfortunate who were disabled by those conditions. Investigations of the standards of living and housing conditions, social surveys of various kinds, promotion of recreational activities, organization of communities for the purposes of social betterment, arousing public sentiment against the evils of child labor, and organized efforts to give the general public a social point of view—all these and many other activities of a similar nature became a recognized part of the field of social work.

This change of emphasis in social work from remedial measures to those that strike at the root of social problems caused the whole field under consideration to lose its early definiteness of boundary lines. As long as social work was regarded as the adjustment of the dependent and handicapped to their environment, its activities could be grouped together in a field that was peculiar to itself. Just as soon, however, as it attempted to accomplish its purpose by bringing about modifications of the environment, it allied itself with forward looking movements in many lines of work. In this sense, social work may be regarded as almost identical with the promotion of common welfare and the social worker is the individual of any occupation or profession whose life is actuated by a definite social purpose. Devine's *Spirit of Social Work* is dedicated

to social workers, that is to say, to every man and woman, who, in any relation of life, professional, industrial, political, educational or domestic; whether on salary or as a volunteer; whether on his own individual account or as part of an organized movement, is working consciously, according to his light intelligently, and according to his strength persistently, for the promotion of the common welfare—the common welfare as distinct from that of a party or a class or a sect or a business interest or a particular institution or a family or an individual.

It is at once evident that while such a broad conception of social work may be logical, it leads us far beyond its distinctively technical aspects. An analogy may be found in education which has

both its popular and its professional sides. In one sense a large part of our activities may be looked upon as educational, but nevertheless it is well understood that there is a very clearly defined field for those who have to do with formal education. Social work, because it touches life in so many intimate ways and includes activities that are commonplace and informal in nature, must have its popular side that can be participated in by people of every vocation. This is in fact the purpose of that part of social work which lays emphasis upon the spread of socialized intelligence. The more intelligent people become about social duties and problems, the more active will they be in the promotion of the common welfare. One of the most hopeful signs of the times is the active interest of such agencies and institutions as the school, the church, chambers of commerce, farmers' organizations, etc., in social programs designed to bring about a solution of social problems.

But, however legitimate it may be to speak of social work in this broad sense as merging into many different fields, there is without doubt a point beyond which popular effort cannot go and maintain a high efficiency. It is evident, for instance, that social investigation involves processes for which is required a technique of its own. It is even more clear that technical equipment is needed to deal with the situations that arise in connection with the care of the dependent and handicapped. No one can doubt that the adjustment of the social forces of communities requires the sure touch of a hand trained for its task. These and other similar activities in the general field of social welfare stand out in a well-defined group, not primarily because of what they attempt to do, but because they can be carried on successfully only by those who possess the proper technical training and experience. The social worker may be working hand in hand with many people interested in the same general problems but he is distinguished from them because he is qualified through special training to accomplish well certain tasks that only incidentally come to the attention of those in other fields. Social work defined in this way loses something of the indefiniteness that comes from its close relation to efforts to improve the common welfare. While its results are accomplished through the aid of many allies, it has its distinctively technical aspects which, taken

together, form a group of highly specialized activities that may very well be regarded as the beginning of a new profession.

But the confusion in regard to the proper limits of the field of social work has not resulted entirely from its far-reaching tendencies. Complications also arise from the domination of certain types of social work which more or less consciously regard themselves as occupying a fundamental position in the field of social welfare. This is especially true of the Charity Organization Society movement which must be recognized as the beginning of scientific social work in this country and which has maintained its place of leadership ever since its establishment more than a generation ago. Within this movement has been developed the technique of family case-work which was one of the first examples of the application of scientific methods to social work. The family welfare group have long been prominent in state and national conferences of social workers, and have made very significant contributions to the literature dealing with social problems. It is not surprising, therefore, that family case-work should sometimes be used as synonymous with social work, and that there should be a tendency in some quarters to judge the standing of social workers by training and skill in this particular field.

The natural confusion that results from this point of view can be easily seen. Social work is frequently identified with social pathology in spite of the efforts, led in many instances by family case-workers themselves, in the wider fields of social investigation and community work. There is no clear recognition that social work has progressed to the point where remedial work represents only a part of its field. Instead of placing family case-work in its legitimate position as one of the most important of the special activities of social work, there is a tendency to continue to regard it as the center from which all phases of social work naturally develop.

A scientific interpretation of social work, upon which can be based an adequate plan for professional education, must place in the right perspective the activities that make up its technical field. Unquestionably its remedial and ameliorative activities come first in importance. The problem of dealing with the subnormal and

handicapped presses upon us from all sides. Many generations of social neglect, of toleration of indecent conditions of life, of wilful choice of the things that degrade, have produced their evil results. The proper care of dependent families, of orphaned and neglected children, of anti-social and subnormal individuals, requires skill, and no social worker, whatever his specialized form of work, dare be ignorant of the technique needed in this field.

On the other hand due importance must be given to methods of social investigation, analysis of community life, construction of community programs, the technique of organized recreation, and problems of social work administration. These are aspects of social work that are now demanding many skilled leaders and unfortunately there is no general agreement as to the technique involved or as to the way workers in these fields should be prepared. No system of education for social work can be regarded as adequate until the methods of training in social investigation and social organization are as carefully worked out as is the technique of instruction for the remedial side of social work.

II. HOW PREPARATION FOR SOCIAL WORK HAS BEEN SECURED

It is a matter of common knowledge that the professional schools of law, medicine, teaching, and engineering began as a supplement to the apprenticeship system which was the original method of preparation for technical tasks. The difficulties these schools experienced in establishing themselves in competition with what were regarded as more practical methods of training can be understood without detailed reference to the past, for in some of these fields, at least, the apprenticeship system is still an active competitor and exerts a restraining influence upon efforts to raise standards of professional education.

A study of the methods of preparation for social work shows no exception to this experience of the well-established professions. The only difference worthy of mention is that social work is a more recent development, and therefore the apprenticeship system is still in vogue to an extent that would hardly be permitted today in other professions.

The apprentice method as it has been developed in the social-work field has been simply a means employed by organizations to train their new workers. The employee in training sometimes receives formal instruction from his superior through assigned readings and conferences, but the training consists chiefly of practical work carried on under supervision. Such an apprenticeship therefore cannot be called training for social work for it gives the worker no well-rounded view of the whole field but prepares him merely for specific tasks within a single organization.

The organization that conducts the training often safeguards its own interests by requiring the new worker to remain in its employ for a stated period of time. In 1898 the Boston Associated Charities requested its agents in training to agree in advance to remain for three years in the service of that Society. The United Charities of Chicago in 1915 demanded a two-year period of service of those whom it undertook to train. This rule, which was quite generally followed, makes it clear that the well-established social work organizations in the larger cities have not desired to accept responsibility for the training of workers not in their employ. In a report read at the National Conference of Charities and Correction at Topeka, Kansas, in 1900, it was stated that

there is but one Society which is making a special effort to train agents and secretaries for positions in newly organized societies and so spreading the gospel of organized charities in other cities. This has no reference to the New York Society which is conducting an excellent six weeks' mid-summer course for those who wish to take advanced work.

Eight years later Mrs. John M. Glenn discussed this same subject in a paper read at the National Conference of Charities and Correction in Richmond, and quoted a field secretary as follows:

I do not know whether large societies feel a responsibility toward small societies or not. The engagement of a field secretary for Charities and the Commons would seem to be an indirect evidence that they do. I don't think we are ready to train workers sent us from other cities, expecting them to go back to work in other cities.

An apprenticeship system that was limited to the large organizations of a few cities, and admitted to training only a number sufficient to take care of their labor turnover, could never meet the

demand for trained workers in a line of work that was constantly expanding. The first public evidence of recognition of this fact in this country was a paper read by Miss Anna Dawes, in 1893, at the International Congress of Charities in Chicago. In this paper, which had as its subject "The Need of Training Schools for a New Profession," Miss Dawes pointed out the desperate situation in which the Charity Organization Society found itself because new societies were springing up more rapidly than trained workers could be supplied. As a result of this lack of skilled leadership an undue proportion of these organizations were either failing utterly or were carrying on their work in a feeble and inefficient manner. In commenting on this situation, Miss Dawes said:

I am convinced that it is not so much lack of willing individuals as entire lack of opportunity for training that is the real trouble. For no matter how much a man may wish to go into this work there is no place where he can learn its duties. . . . What is needed, it seems to me, is some course of study where an intelligent young person can add to an ordinary education such branches as may be necessary for this purpose, with a general view of those special studies in political and social science which are most closely connected with the problem of poverty, and where both he and his associate already learned in the study of books can be taught what is now the alphabet of charitable science—some knowledge of its underlying ideas, its tried and trusted methods, and some acquaintance with the various devices employed for the upbuilding of the needy, so that no philanthropic undertaking, from a model tenement house to a kindergarten or a sand heap, will be altogether strange to his mind. . . . It seems to me that the time has come when either through a course in some established institution or in an institution by itself, or by the old-fashioned method never yet improved upon for actual development—the method of experimental training as the personal assistant of some skilled worker—it ought to be possible for those who would take up this work to find some place for studying it as a profession. . . .¹

This appeal for a training school did not lead to immediate action. However clearly a few leaders might see the need of trained workers, there was very little recognition of this need on the part of the public. The ninety-two charity organization societies in existence at that time represented an important and growing movement, but they were supported by a limited clientèle, and their methods were not fully understood or approved. Even when we

¹ *Charities Review*, III, 49-51.

add to this list of charity organization societies the organizations that were springing up in related kinds of social work, the field was still too limited in scope to offer many inducements to trained workers. It must not be forgotten also that the public did not regard philanthropic work as a technical activity that required special skill and so quite readily employed as workers in this field those who lacked proper training and experience. This was brought out very strikingly by Miss Mary E. Richmond in an address made at Philadelphia, in 1897, in the course of which she cited the following incidents:

"You ask me," wrote a clergyman, "what qualifications Miss — has for the position of agent in the Charity Organization Society. She is a most estimable lady and the sole support of a widowed mother. It would be a real charity to give her the place." Another applicant for the same position when asked whether she had any experience in charity work, replied that she had had a good deal—she had sold tickets for church fairs. Though those particular ladies were not employed, is it not still a very common thing to find charity agents who have been engaged for no better reason?—like the one who was employed to distribute relief because he had failed in the grocery business.¹

The National Conference of Charities and Correction, which had been bringing together the leading social workers of the country in annual conference since 1873, gave its first extended consideration to the problem of professional training at its session in Toronto in 1897. At that meeting Miss Richmond read a paper on the subject "The Need of a Training School in Applied Philanthropy," in which she stated her belief that professional standards could not be attained until a training school had been provided. With admirable clearness she pointed out the confusion that existed because the different types of philanthropic workers were not familiar with the common ground of knowledge that underlies all charitable work. She says,

If an agent of a relief society has occasion to confer with the head of a founding asylum, is it not likely that the ends they have in view, that the principles underlying their work, that the very meanings which they attach to our technical terms, will prove to be quite at variance? What an incalculable gain to humanity when those who are doctoring social diseases in many departments of charitable work shall have found a common ground of agreement and

¹ *Charities Review* (June, 1897), p. 308.

be forced to recognize certain established principles as underlying all effective service! Not immediately, of course, but strongly and steadily such a common ground could be established, I believe, by a training school for our professional workers.

Miss Richmond's plan for the school did not go into details, but included recommendations that it be located in a large city where students could have direct access to the work of public and private charitable agencies, that its affiliation with an educational institution should not prevent the placing of emphasis upon practical work rather than upon academic requirements, and that a considerable part of the instruction be given by specialists in the different fields who could be engaged to give their lectures during the less busy months of the year.

At the same meeting another plan was brought forward by Miss Frances R. Morse, which contemplated the development of co-operative normal-training by the larger charity organization centers. In the opinion of Miss Morse, satisfactory training could be provided by setting up a responsible group of advisers who would assign students in training to different organizations for definite periods and exercise general supervision over the students' instruction so as to make sure that it would cover a wider field than that of a single agency. It was in fact a sort of centrally directed apprenticeship system whereby a new worker would be assigned at successive periods to different agencies, thus making it possible to secure a well-rounded experience.

Miss Morse's plan did not meet with general favor and the time did not seem ripe for the establishment of a training school. The following year, however, in the summer of 1898, the New York Charity Organization Society took the first steps in the direction of a professional school by holding a six weeks' training course. In a lengthy editorial on the subject, "A Training School in Charities and Correction," the *Charities Review* of May, 1898, gave the following description of the course to be held that summer:

The main feature of this course is that no tuition is charged, but members of the course are expected to enter the service of the society for six weeks. District work, care of one or more families, investigation of special subjects with one major and one minor report of the results of such investigation are

to be required. There will be daily sessions for lectures and discussions. An attractive program has been arranged under the following general plan.

During the first week the subject of charity organization and general philanthropic work will be considered with visits to the offices in the charities building, industrial agencies of New York and Brooklyn, and other private charitable institutions. The second week will be devoted to the care of dependent and delinquent children and the philanthropic side of mission enterprise. In the third week, study will be made of the public charitable institutions with addresses from the several superintendents and from the President of the Board of Charities Commissioners. Attention will be given to the work of the state Charities Aid Association and the state Board of Charities. The fourth week will be devoted to the study of the care of the dependent sick. Visits will be made to various hospitals, dispensaries, etc. Consideration will be given to the care for the aged, and fresh air work. The fifth week will include some study of general sanitary improvements, the divisions of the health departments and visits to the improved tenements in New York and Brooklyn. The first part of the sixth week will be given to the care of delinquents with visits to the workhouse and penitentiary; the second half to a review of the work of the class, with further study into the functions of charity organization societies in developing the several branches of philanthropic and reform work into unity and precision.

It is not expected that a thorough training will be imparted in this period. No diploma or degrees are to be conferred and no promises made concerning future employment of those who avail themselves of the opportunity offered. As an experimental contribution toward the end in view, the results of the present training class will be watched with interest.

Dr. Philip W. Ayres was placed in charge of the training class which was attended by twenty-seven students representing fourteen colleges and universities and eleven states. According to the report of the New York Charity Organization Society for 1897-98, this course was carried on along the lines indicated in a highly satisfactory manner. The report says,

The immediate results of this experimental course are all that was anticipated. Permanent positions have been secured by some, others have gained valuable material for the university class room, while still others have entered upon special lines of inquiry which will be prosecuted in the future. It is hoped that from this beginning a plan of professional training in applied philanthropy may be developed which will raise the standards of qualifications and of usefulness throughout the entire field of charitable work.

This Summer School in Philanthropic Work, as it was called, filled such a real need that it became for a period of seven years a

regular feature of the work of the New York Charity Organization Society. Until the year 1903, this summer course represented practically the only organized effort to provide systematic training in the philanthropic field. As its purpose was primarily to increase the efficiency of active workers, its attendance was largely limited to those who had at least one year's experience in social work. New workers were supposed to serve a period of apprenticeship with a social agency before becoming eligible to register for the course. The desire for training was so great that it was not difficult to secure students of high grade. Two hundred and fifteen students were enrolled during the period 1898-1904, an average of thirty for each session, which was as large a class as their limited facilities at that time made practicable. Among those who took this six weeks' course are many well-known teachers and specialists in the social-work field. The list of graduates includes: Dr. U. G. Weatherly, professor of sociology, University of Indiana; C. C. Carstens, general secretary, Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children; Kate H. Claghorn, instructor in social research, New York School of Social Work; Dr. Carl Kelsey, professor of sociology, University of Pennsylvania; Dr. E. W. Capen, professor of sociology, Hartford Theological Seminary; Eugene T. Lies, formerly general superintendent, United Charities of Chicago; W. Frank Persons, formerly director general, Civilian Relief, American Red Cross; Alexander M. Wilson, formerly director, Civilian Relief, Atlantic Division, American Red Cross; Lillian Brandt, formerly statistician, New York Charity Organization Society; Mrs. Alice Higgins Lothrop, formerly director, Civilian Relief, New England Division, American Red Cross; Paul U. Kellogg, editor of *Survey*; Frances A. Keller, well-known writer and authority on unemployment; Porter R. Lee, director, New York School of Social Work; and Howard S. Braucher, general secretary of Community Service, Incorporated.

In 1903 the training program of the New York Charity Organization Society was extended to include a six months' winter session which provided weekly lectures at a late afternoon hour so that the course would be available for social workers employed in the city. One hundred and forty-seven registered for this course, but the

attendance was irregular on account of the heavy work of the charitable societies caused by an unusually severe winter.

The following year these experimental training classes developed into the New York School of Philanthropy under the direction of the Committee on Philanthropic Education of the New York Charity Organization Society. The first director of the school was Dr. Edward T. Devine, who served in this capacity in connection with his duties as general secretary of the New York Charity Organization Society. A full year's course of training was established which was planned primarily for students without experience in social work. The first year fifty-seven students registered, twelve of whom completed the year's work and received the certificate of the school.

In the fall of the same year, 1904, a similar school was established in Boston under the title "School for Social Workers, Maintained by Simmons College and Harvard University." Its first published announcement stated that it was

a school for the study of charity, correction, neighborhood uplift, and kindred forms of social service, whether under private management or public administration. Its purpose is to give opportunities to men and women to study social problems by practical methods, particularly to those who would become officials of institutions and agencies or would prepare themselves for service as volunteers in this field of work.

The school opened with one classroom and a small office in Hamilton Place, Boston, with an enrolment of twenty-six students. Dr. Jeffrey R. Brackett, the President of the Department of Charities and Correction of Baltimore, was appointed director and remained in active charge of the school for a period of sixteen years.

This demand for trained social workers which resulted in the establishment of these schools in New York and Boston was felt also in other cities of the country where social work was being carried on aggressively. In Chicago the movement to secure trained workers was led by Graham Taylor of Chicago Commons, who took a prominent part in the development of the Chicago Institute of Social Science which was established in 1903 as a part of the Extension Division of the University of Chicago. In the

January, 1904, issue of *The Commons* Graham Taylor wrote as follows concerning this new training course:

At the initiative of a settlement worker, heartily supported by the representatives of practically all the private and public charity and correctional institutions of the city, the University of Chicago will furnish the great facilities of its Extension Department for the establishment of training centers and correspondence courses.

Dr. Taylor was appointed director of the Institute which held its first sessions in the rooms of the University College in the Fine Arts Building on Michigan Avenue. The students were enrolled chiefly from the ranks of those employed by the Chicago social agencies and institutions. The new training course proved so successful that the Russell Sage Foundation, which was one of the most active supporters of the movement to develop professional training for social work, enlarged the Institute by establishing in 1907 a department of Research, with Julia C. Lathrop and Sophonisba P. Breckinridge in charge. The following year the Trustees of Chicago Commons Association, which had, since 1906, assumed responsibility for the administrative expenses of the Institute, transferred the management of the school to a new board organized for that purpose. Steps were immediately taken to establish the school on an independent basis and it was incorporated in 1908 under the name of the Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy. The object of the school as stated at that time was "to promote through instruction, training, investigation, and publication, the efficiency of civic, philanthropic and social work and the improvement of living and working conditions." Graham Taylor still continued to hold his place of leadership in the school and had among his co-workers, Sophonisba P. Breckenridge, Edith Abbott and Allen T. Burns.

Still farther west, in the city of St. Louis, this movement to provide formal instruction in social work appeared almost contemporaneously with its rise in the eastern cities. The interest in social work training in St. Louis first found expression, in the winter of 1901-2, in a series of round-table meetings of the workers in the St. Louis Provident Association under the direction of the General Manager, W. H. McClain. From this beginning there

developed a series of fortnightly conferences of the social workers in the city, followed a little later by fortnightly public lectures given by persons prominent in different fields of social work. Regular classroom work was not begun until 1907, when a course was held in the Y.M.C.A. building, for a period of fifteen weeks, at which twenty-three regular students were enrolled. The first full year's course was begun in the autumn of 1908. While the school was started by the social workers in the city in order to provide training facilities for themselves, it was not developed on an independent basis. Through the efforts of Professor C. A. Ellwood, of the department of sociology of the University of Missouri, and Mr. W. H. McClain, manager of the St. Louis Provident Association, the school was in 1906 closely affiliated with the University of Missouri. In accordance with the plan agreed upon Dr. Thomas J. Riley of the department of sociology in the university became the first director of the school, thus insuring a vital relationship with the university in spite of the latter's location at a considerable distance from St. Louis. As first organized the school was known as the St. Louis School of Philanthropy. In 1909 its name was changed to the St. Louis School of Social Economy, which remained its title until 1916 when it was rechristened the Missouri School of Social Economy.

The success of the schools of social work in New York and Boston stimulated the social agencies in Philadelphia to provide a training course in that city for the training of their own workers. In 1908 a special training class was held, which was organized the following year as the Philadelphia Training School for Social Work. In the 1910 report of the Philadelphia Society for Organizing Charity, its general secretary, Porter R. Lee, made the following statement in regard to the origin of this school:

In many ways the most important step to which the Society has lent its influence has been the establishment of the Philadelphia Training School for Social Work. Believing that it would be a distinct service to the community to offer training in social work in Philadelphia to Philadelphia people who might thereby be encouraged to remain in the city for their permanent work, the Children's Bureau two years ago established a course of lectures on the practical problems and methods of social work, a large number of which were given by experts from outside the city. The lack of opportunities for field

work in connection with the lectures and the difficulty of holding the students to definite requirements were obstacles to the success of the plan as a training school.

This course has now been expanded into a definitely organized school with a curriculum providing for both class work and field work and for definite tests for graduations. This has been made possible through the co-operation of a large number of the city's agencies for social work of which this Society is one.

The enrolment of the school for the first year was fifty-two. Mr. W. O. Easton, director of instruction of the Philadelphia Y.M.C.A., had personal charge of the administration of the school in the capacity of executive secretary, during the first few years of its existence. The teaching staff was composed of leading specialists in social work in that city. In 1916 the school was incorporated as the Pennsylvania School for Social Service, and under the direction of Dr. Bernard J. Newman, and later of Dr. Frank D. Watson, developed an extensive course of study designed to prepare students for all the more important types of social work.

This movement to develop training centers for social work made its first ventures in the South in 1916 with the establishment of the Richmond School of Social Economy at Richmond, Virginia, and the Texas School of Civics and Philanthropy at Houston, Texas. The former is now known as the Richmond School of Social Work and Public Health and has as its director, Dr. H. H. Hibbs, Jr., under whose leadership the school was organized. The Texas School of Civics and Philanthropy, which was organized by the social agencies of Houston as an independent school, was taken over by Rice Institute in 1918, when its director, Dr. Stuart A. Queen, resigned to enter the military service.

These seven schools fall very conveniently into one group, not merely because they represent similar methods of instruction, but because they are to a large extent the outcome of the efforts of social workers to provide training facilities and have been built up in accordance with the ideals of practical workers rather than with those of university teachers. The schools in this group are usually spoken of as the independent schools, to distinguish them from the departments and schools of social work that have been established within recent years by colleges and universities. As a matter of

fact, only one of these seven schools enjoys the distinction of having been entirely free from academic connections during its entire history.

The New York School of Social Work has from its earliest beginnings been under the direction of the Charity Organization Society of New York and affiliated with Columbia University. In a communication of John S. Kennedy to the president of the New York Charity Organization Society in October, 1904, notifying them of his gift to that organization of securities yielding an annual income of \$10,000 for this new school, he said:

I have also considered the possible desirability of establishing the School as a department of some university, but have decided it should preferably be connected directly with the practical charity work of the city in analogy rather to training schools for nurses which are connected with hospitals, than to any separate university department.

He desired, however, the school to be affiliated with Columbia University and arranged for the president of the university to be a member of the committee in charge of the school. What this affiliation with Columbia involved is stated in the Handbook of the New York School of Philanthropy for the year 1905-6 as follows:

The students of the School of Philanthropy are admitted to any course in Columbia for which they may be qualified without charge of tuition fees, the selection of courses being subject in each instance to the approval of the Director of the School and of the instructor in the University whose course is chosen. Students of Columbia University are given reciprocal privileges in the School of Philanthropy and the work of the School is accepted by the University as the equivalent of one minor subject for an advanced degree.

During the early years of the school's existence this affiliation was strengthened by the fact that Dr. Edward T. Devine and Dr. Samuel M. Lindsay, the first directors of the school, were also members of the faculty of Columbia University. Within the past two years the relation of the school to the university has been modified by a discontinuance of the plan of reciprocal fee privileges.

The School for Social Workers in Boston was organized in response to the requests of the social workers in that city, but was from the first maintained by Simmons College and Harvard University. Later the connection with Harvard was discontinued

and at present this school is conducted as a regular department of Simmons College.

The Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy grew out of the Chicago Institute of Social Science which was conducted under the auspices of the Extension Department of the University of Chicago. In 1908 the school became an independent corporation and maintained that status until 1920, when its work was taken over by the University of Chicago.

The Missouri School of Social Economy was affiliated with the University of Missouri at the time of its first organization. In 1909 this affiliation was transferred to Washington University at St. Louis and the school was conducted as one of the University departments until 1915, when the University severed its relationship with the school because of the withdrawal of the financial support of the Russell Sage Foundation. For one year the school was conducted as an independent enterprise and then was taken over by the University of Missouri which still conducts it under the direction of its Extension Department.

The Pennsylvania School for Social Service has maintained its independent status from its first organization until the present time. The Richmond School of Social Work and Public Health was established independently, but in 1920 was affiliated with William and Mary College.

While all but one of these schools have had at some time in their history, college or university connections, none of their affiliations, prior to the transfer of the Chicago School to the University of Chicago, has been of such a nature that the university has had an active part in determining the policies and standards of the professional school. These schools, whatever their academic affiliations, have been largely under the control of social workers and throughout their whole development have laid their emphasis upon practical training for specific kinds of social work.

Another characteristic of this group of professional schools is the striking similarity in their curricula and methods of instruction. The terminology used in the announcement of courses may vary in different schools but there is little variation in the field they attempt to cover. During the first years of the New York School of

Philanthropy, its courses of instruction were arranged under the following groups: (1) survey of the field, principles, theories and methods of general application; (2) the state in relation to charity; (3) racial traits in the population; (4) constructive social work; (5) the care of needy families in their homes; (6) child-helping agencies; (7) treatment of the criminal. In the announcement of the Boston School in 1905, the topics included in the course of studies were (1) aim of social service; (2) improvement of general conditions of living; (3) neighborhood improvement in city and country; (4) scope of charity; (5) the needy family; (6) persons out of their own families; (7) the criminal. At about the same time the Chicago school announced courses in (1) introduction to the study of philanthropic and social work; (2) personal, institutional, and public effort for dependents; (3) preoccupying and preventive policy, agencies, and methods.

The course of study during those early years was centered around the problem of poverty and methods of work with the handicapped and dependent. This was still further emphasized by the requirement of field work which was carried on largely under the direction of agencies doing case-work with families. This emphasis, which may now seem somewhat one-sided, was then entirely natural and proper because the students' best opportunities for employment were in the case-work field, and few other agencies were prepared to give field work training of any value. This situation, which influenced the early development of these schools, still persists, although to a lesser degree. We are not surprised therefore to find that while the courses of study have been widened to include social investigation, community organization, industrial welfare, mental hygiene, etc., the plan of field-work training has experienced great difficulty in keeping pace with all the newer developments in the field of social work. However much this group of professional schools may differ as to particular courses they offer, they find a common bond of agreement in their emphasis upon their case-work departments and in their insistence that case-work must form a very considerable part of the training of all their students, no matter in which field they intend to specialize.

It thus appears that professional training for social work owes its origin and early development to the initiative of groups of social workers rather than to any leadership given to it by the universities. Even in those instances where university affiliations were made, the movement was led by the social workers and the curriculum was shaped to meet the needs of social agencies rather than made to conform to the usual requirements of a graduate school. It is difficult to conceive how this could have been otherwise when we recall that at the time of the establishment of the first summer course in New York for philanthropic workers, sociology had made a very small beginning as a university study, and that for the next ten or fifteen years sociologists were occupied so largely with debates about method, that their work seemed very remote from the problems in which social workers were interested.

Nevertheless the sociologists were not altogether indifferent to their opportunities in the practical field and in some instances took active steps to correlate their work with that of social agencies. One of the earliest efforts of this kind was a co-operative plan of study worked out in 1894 between the University of Wisconsin and the Associated Charities of Cincinnati. As a result of a series of lectures given the preceding year at the University of Wisconsin by Dr. P. W. Ayers, secretary of the Cincinnati Associated Charities, and another series given at Cincinnati by Dr. Richard T. Ely, of the University of Wisconsin, on "Socialism and Social Reform," two scholarships in the University of Wisconsin in practical sociology were established which entitled the holders to spend the summer vacation in Cincinnati in practical social work under the direction of Dr. Ayers. These two scholarship holders were joined the first summer by eight other college students interested in social science and formed probably the first group of college students supplementing their university studies by supervised field work with social agencies. Mr. C. M. Hubbard, writing in the *Charities Review* of December, 1894, called attention to the fact that this experiment demonstrated the value to universities of this type of laboratory work. The arrangement, however, proved to be only a temporary one, and did not lead at that time to the establishment

of regular courses of instruction in applied sociology at the University of Wisconsin.

Another effort to bring about a vital relation between the study of sociology and the work of social agencies was made during that same year (1894) by the new School of Sociology established in connection with the Hartford Theological Seminary. This school planned a three-year course leading to the degree of Bachelor of Sociology. Specialists from the field of social work were brought in as lecturers and the course included practical field work with social agencies.

As early as 1893, the University of Chicago announced courses in practical sociology to be given by Professor C. R. Henderson, which, if properly correlated with field work, would have afforded perhaps the best opportunity for social work training to be found at that time.

One of the first significant efforts in the university field to give the courses in practical sociology a vocational trend was made in 1910 by Dr. J. E. Hagerty, Professor of Economics and Sociology at Ohio State University. In a bulletin issued that year by the university announcing courses for the training of students in business administration and social science, the following statement was made:

The Social Science group of courses has been arranged for the training of professional and volunteer social workers. The state of Ohio has thousands of paid and volunteer social workers, most of whom are untrained for their work. If it is the duty of the state university to train its students for efficient citizenship, it should offer facilities for the training of professional and volunteer social workers. The new ideas of philanthropy, if put in practice, would reduce the number of dependents and criminals, and make more efficient the state and county institutions and the private charities.

The curriculum, which was primarily designed for the last two years of the undergraduate course, included such subjects as charities, criminology, accounting, psychology, labor organization, labor legislation, races, poverty and preventive philanthropy, animal psychology, abnormal psychology, folk psychology, a seminar in social research, and field work under supervision running throughout the last year. The university had already been conducting courses in applied sociology for a period of five years

and was well equipped to give the required instruction in this field.

This training course differed from the usual courses offered by the independent schools of social work in that it was planned to fit into the undergraduate curriculum, laid a great deal of emphasis upon knowledge of fundamental subjects, and did not give the customary amount of time to field work experience. The demand for training of this kind was sufficient to justify its continuance, and in 1916 social service training became a regular activity of the newly organized College of Commerce and Journalism. This movement at Ohio State University was in a measure typical of what was undertaken in a few other colleges and universities, but in general the technical courses in applied sociology offered by universities prior to the world-war could not be regarded as constituting much more than an excellent background for professional study.

The need of active university participation in education for social work was set forth in a striking manner by Professor Felix Frankfurter of the Harvard Law School at the National Conference of Charities and Correction at Baltimore in 1915. After pointing out the successive steps in the development of medical and legal education in this country, Dr. Frankfurter said:

I submit that what has been found necessary for adequate training for those social activities which we call the profession of law and medicine, is needed for the very definite, if undefined, profession we call social work. I can not believe that the preliminary training of a lawyer, most of his life spent in the adjustment of controversies between individuals, requires less of a background, less of an understanding of what has gone before in life, less of a rigorous critical discipline, than is needed by those of you who go out to pass judgment on the social conditions of whole communities; by those of you who administer laws like the minimum-wage laws, and the other social legislation now administered in great numbers by social workers. Secondly, I can not believe that a training fit to discipline people who shall guide and deal with the social forces of the day, can be done in less time than the time found necessary for the training of lawyers. Thirdly, I can not believe that the experience of medicine and law as to the quality of teachers to train men in those professions, applies less in regard to teachers of social work. I believe social workers, to reach the professional level, must be guided by teachers who give their whole time and thought to it. The time has gone by when the

teaching of any profession can be entrusted to persons who from their exacting outside work of practice or administration, give to teaching their tired leavings.

Finally, and at the center of it all, is complete association with a university. The schools for social work have sprung up, of course, in our large industrial cities. Is not their evolution destined to become an integral part of the universities in those cities to which they are now, in most cases, somewhat platonically attached? For the university is the workshop of our democracy. If it is not that, it has no excuse for being. The university should be the laboratory of this great new mass of scientific and social facts, and the co-ordinator of these facts for legislation, for administration, for courts, for public opinion. The nineteenth century necessarily was a period of specialization, even overspecialization. Our task is to unify and correct the partial facts of the all too scattered social sciences. Mr. Flexner truly pictured the character of social work in showing its close interrelation with medicine and law, and sanitation, and the other applied social sciences. In a scattered way these professional studies are now pursued by the university. The function of the university, however, is to accommodate these various social sciences, to unite in a whole all these facts of life. The schools for social work must be intimate parts of the university, because they must have contact with the other branches of the university's work. I suspect that by a careful scheme of co-ordination our great universities could establish schools of applied social science with very little addition to their existing plant or personnel. These schools need the university. But the university needs the school for social work. Just as the medical school can not do its job well without a connected hospital, so the medical school, and the law school, and other branches of the university, need the experience and the experimentation which a school for social work should produce. These various aspects, necessarily specializations of one common endeavor, should be parts of a single intellectual community.

At the time when this statement was made, only a few of the universities were at all conscious of the important service they could render in this field of professional education. The social workers on their part were not inclined to urge universities to develop their curricula in this direction. As a matter of fact, the belief was quite generally held among social workers that training could be given much more advantageously in an independent school unhampered by academic traditions. The university courses, it was felt, would give an inadequate place to field work and would turn out theorists instead of persons equipped along practical lines.

Without doubt, the prevailing type of instruction in university departments of sociology gave considerable ground for the attitude

of the social workers. Graduate students in sociology preparing for teaching positions were seldom required to supplement their university instruction with clinical experience in the social work field. Their acquaintance with social agencies was usually limited to what could be gained through observational visits or assignment for research based on the data available in their files. It was not uncommon for sociologists equipped in this way to underestimate what is involved in learning the technique of social work. Their attitude toward the social agency was not similar to that of the medical instructor toward the hospital clinic. They were not accustomed to regard participation in the work of a social agency as a valuable means of acquiring scientific knowledge of social problems.

To the extent that the foregoing justly characterized the usual attitude of sociological instructors, it is clear that they were not fitted for leadership in training for social work. But what must not be overlooked was the growing tendency in all the social sciences toward active participation in practical affairs. The psychologists and economists as well as the sociologists were rapidly making a place for themselves outside their customary academic rôles.

Undoubtedly this movement which had been gaining momentum for a considerable time was greatly accelerated during the world-war. Men in academic positions suddenly found themselves called upon to aid in organizing and conducting the network of industrial and social agencies that sprang into activity because of the military situation. The experience gained in this way could not fail to have a profound effect upon their attitude toward practical work.

Moreover, the experience of the universities in modifying their courses of study so as to provide practical training along lines of war work must not be forgotten. Of special significance for departments of sociology were the emergency training courses in home service, which these departments were asked to give in co-operation with the American Red Cross. These training courses were held during and immediately following the war in fifteen universities where, previously, practical training for social work had not been

undertaken. In order that these courses might be as nearly as possible uniform in quality and content, the Red Cross outlined the subject-matter, prescribed the standards of the course, supplemented the teaching personnel of the university and usually assumed responsibility for the field work of the students. Through these home service institutes there was demonstrated the need of training facilities for social work in wide sections of the country where schools of that kind had not existed. By actual experience the university men who participated in these courses came to a proper appreciation of the requirements in this field of professional education. Without doubt the efforts of the Red Cross to establish these training courses were an important factor in stimulating the interest of universities in education for social work.

At the time of the organization of the Association of Training Schools for Professional Social Work in 1919, it was found that nine colleges and universities were doing work of a sufficiently high grade in this field to warrant their enrolment as members of this Association. This list comprised Bryn Mawr College, Carnegie Institute of Technology, Smith College, University of Chicago, University of Minnesota, Ohio State University, University of Pittsburgh, University of Toronto, and Western Reserve University. This group by no means includes all the colleges and universities now actively at work in this field. Other institutions that are offering this year professional courses in social work are the following: Berea College, Kentucky, University of California, Harvard University, Johns Hopkins University, University of Indiana, University of North Carolina, University of Oklahoma, University of Oregon, University of Washington, McGill University, Tulane University, and University of Wisconsin. In addition to these, brief training courses were given during the past year in Cornell University, New Jersey State College of Agriculture, University of West Virginia, University of Virginia, Converse College, University of Kentucky, University of Iowa, University of Texas, University of Colorado, Syracuse University, University of Nebraska, University of Missouri, and Iowa State College of Agriculture.

While the experience of these institutions in this field of professional education has covered a very brief period, there are

already evident certain outstanding tendencies that are exercising a profound influence upon methods of education for social work.

In the first place their curriculum is built up to meet the needs of college students and graduates. The usual university standards of admission discourage the attendance of those whose qualifications are based on practical experience rather than upon attainments along academic lines. Students with inadequate academic preparation may gain admission as special students but their inability to get university credit tends to restrict attendance to people of college grade. It is reasonable to expect that the university schools of social work will follow the example of the older professional schools in the universities and gradually raise the entrance requirements until students ineligible to work for a degree will be denied admission.

A second characteristic of their work is their insistence on prerequisite studies in the social sciences as a basis for professional instruction. This of course does not represent so much a new departure as a change of emphasis. The older schools of social work have always recognized the value of knowledge of the social sciences, but with few exceptions they have not insisted upon a thorough-going study in this field as preliminary to a professional course. The attitude of the universities, on the other hand, is seen in their attempt to build up a four or five-year course in which students would, from the beginning of their undergraduate work, specialize in the social sciences.

Again a majority of the university schools of social work have given chief emphasis to courses in small town and rural community problems. The universities have been stimulated to enter this field of community organization largely because of the recent widespread demand on the part of the Red Cross for community workers. The location also of many of these university schools in comparatively small towns has made it natural for them to study the social problems nearest at hand. At present courses in community studies, community organization, recreation, and similar courses dealing with preventive and constructive rather than remedial social work, are receiving increasing attention in most of the universities' schools of social work.

In order to provide suitable field work for these courses dealing with small town and open country problems, it has been necessary to depart widely from the usual methods. Instead of turning students over to a well-equipped agency for practical training, it has been necessary to give them much of their experience in communities where social work had not been well organized. Family case-work has not been neglected but in adapting its methods to small towns and rural situations, the university schools of social work have faced a difficult problem. Of equal importance with this family work is field work with communities and with groups within these communities. This involves experience in community studies, development of community programs, community recreation, and the building up of a public interest in social problems. The university schools of social work located in small towns have had to concentrate their efforts on the development of training facilities in unorganized communities, instead of relying upon social agencies to provide practical training for their students.

The colleges and universities therefore have not only entered the field of education for social work but are already beginning to place their stamp upon standards and methods of instruction. At least twenty-one colleges and universities in this country and in Canada have definitely undertaken to develop schools of social work as a regular part of their activities. The effect of this in taking the control of instruction in social work away from the practical workers and placing it in the hands of educational specialists is already being seen.

III. THE PROPER BASIS OF EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL WORK

The history of professional education reveals a long struggle to determine the proper basis upon which technical instruction should build. As long as professional standards were low and of little influence, not much importance was attached to the problem of the proper relationship of general to professional education. During the early stages of the development of professional schools of law, education, and medicine, the student entered upon his professional studies without very serious consideration of his previous preparation for that particular field.

Within recent years marked changes have occurred in the standards of admission to professional schools. In 1904 there were only four medical schools in this country that required any college work for admission; in 1917 the number that required one or two years of such work had increased to eighty-three, which was 92 per cent of the total number of medical schools. This same tendency to lay greater stress upon a high standard of general education characterizes also the schools of law, education, and engineering. The inadvisability of specialization without a broad foundation is now generally recognized. In all the well-established professions it is taken for granted that general culture, breadth of view, and a common knowledge of fundamental subjects must go along with technical skill and knowledge, if high professional standing is to be attained.

But even more significant is the growing insistence upon pre-professional studies as a prerequisite to vocational courses. A general education as represented by a high-school or college course has a varying content and therefore cannot be regarded as possessing uniform value as a preparation for the professional schools. Each profession has its fundamental sciences upon which its technical instruction must be based. The student of medicine is soon out of his depth unless he is well grounded in biology and chemistry and is familiar with the laboratory technique of the natural sciences. The engineering student's task is hopeless without an adequate knowledge of mathematics and physics. The legal student should bring to his professional studies a mind well-informed along lines of political and economic science. The instructor in a school of education ought to be able to take for granted that his students are familiar with the principles of psychology and sociology.

As a matter of fact there is as yet no uniform agreement on the part of these professions as to the amount and quality of the strictly preprofessional studies that should be made a requirement of admission to their professional schools. The schools of medicine and engineering which must look to the natural sciences as a basis for their work, have, as might be expected, taken the greatest strides forward in their insistence upon prerequisite studies. On the other hand the professions that find their basis in the broad field of the

social sciences find difficulty in setting up similar standards for prerequisites in that field. Social science from its very nature cannot be as exact as natural science and seems less indispensable perhaps because it is so intimately connected with facts and principles that are more or less matters of common knowledge.

But in spite of the lack of uniform insistence by all the professions on prerequisite studies the tendency in that direction is clear and its correctness unquestioned. Professional schools cannot attain a high standard unless they can assume that their students are properly equipped for technical instruction. The best medical schools recognize this by their encouragement of pre-medical courses designed for the college student who desires a college degree, and at the same time is endeavoring to prepare himself for the study of medicine. While it may be a long time before professional schools are placed on a thoroughgoing graduate basis, the nature of their task and the increasing demands that are made upon them are steadily raising their standards of admission.

In the newer field of professional education for social work efforts to approximate the standards set up by the best professional schools have been hampered by the undeveloped state of social work itself and by the failure of the public to appreciate the value of thoroughly trained workers. Much more than in other professions the apprenticeship system of training for social work is an active competitor with the professional school. Such a large number of people still find employment in social work without the technical equipment that a professional school is expected to furnish that insistence upon high standards of professional education does not yet seem very practicable. For this reason professional schools of social work have usually followed the custom of admitting students to their courses without rigid insistence upon academic requirements. Even though high standards of admission may seemingly be set up, these are likely to be offset by qualifying phrases or alternatives which result in the admission of any student who would be passed upon favorably by a social agency seeking an apprentice worker.

That this is not an overstatement seems evident from the published statements of the entrance requirements of the professional

schools of social work. The New York School of Social Work, which stands among the first in its teaching equipment and high standards of work, states that

the standard of instruction is that of a graduate school. A college education, therefore, or equivalent preparation is essential in order to do the work of the school satisfactorily and profitably. Familiarity with the following subjects is recommended as a foundation for the course: Economics, Biology, History (Industrial and Social), Psychology and Political Science.

The School for Social Workers in Boston requires its applicants to have had either a college education or a high-school education supplemented by sufficient subsequent experience. Their *Bulletin* states:

As a desirable preparation for the school and social work, students in colleges are advised to study the following subjects: physiology bearing on hygiene, psychology, economics, the structure of society, the family, state and local government, one laboratory course in science.

The Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy gave in its last *Bulletin* the following as its entrance requirements:

All candidates for admission must have a general education equivalent to that of a good secondary school and in addition, either, (a) must have taken a considerable part of a college or university course, or (b) must have shown ability in practical work. Satisfactory evidence of good health, good character, capacity for practical work and earnestness of endeavor must be presented.

Students who are graduates of colleges and universities of recognized standing will be admitted to the regular second year courses of the School as candidates for the diploma of the School. Such students must, however, show during the first quarter of the School, ability to do work of a high grade. Otherwise they will be required with the opening of the second quarter to register in the first year courses.

The first year course is offered to meet the need of a large group of persons who wish training for social work, but who have not had the advantage of the pre-professional courses now offered in colleges and universities. It is assumed that those who complete satisfactorily this introductory course will remain a second year. To those who remain and complete a curriculum composed of second year courses arranged by the Registrar and approved by the Dean, a certificate of the School will be granted.

Mature persons who have had practical experience testing in some measure their fitness for social work, trained nurses, teachers, church workers, and others who feel that it is too late for them now to undertake college or university work, will be admitted to this introductory course. Younger persons

applying for admission are advised to prepare themselves for the second year at a good college or university.

In the *Bulletin* of the Pennsylvania School for Social Service it is stated that

candidates for admission to the School must have sufficient intelligence and maturity to deal with social problems. They must be able to express themselves in oral and written English. They must also have studied systematically some of those branches on which a knowledge of society is based, such as history, economics, biology, psychology and sociology. Some laboratory training is deemed essential to insure a scientific approach to social problems.

The Missouri School of Social Economy states that its candidates for admission must fulfill one of the following requirements:

(1) The completion of a college course. (2) Graduation from a recognized secondary school. (3) Definite social service experience in which they have shown special aptitude. Among the general subjects in which proficiency is desirable are economics, sociology, psychology and English.

The Richmond School of Social Work and Public Health requires a high-school education or its equivalent for admission to its courses.

The standards of admission as quoted above indicate the unwillingness of these schools to place themselves on a thoroughgoing graduate basis. Even if it is granted, as they maintain, that their standard of instruction is that of a graduate school, students are admitted to their courses who according to the usual tests would not be eligible for graduate work. The Pennsylvania school makes no academic requirements that can be definitely measured in terms of secondary school or college work. The Missouri school gives three alternatives arranged in descending scale from the point of view of academic standards.

The Chicago school opened its first-year course to those who have a general education equivalent to that of a secondary school, while college graduates were admitted at once to their second-year courses. The Richmond school sets up a similar standard with the exception that the way is left open for mature persons of practical experience to enter the second-year course along with college graduates. The New York school modifies its requirements of a college

education with the statement that it will accept "equivalent preparation" the nature of which is not defined. The Boston school sets up practically the same alternative but defines its "equivalent" to mean secondary school education supplemented by practical experience.

When these entrance requirements are subjected to another test of a graduate school, namely, insistence upon preprofessional studies that would give the students a knowledge of the sciences related to their field of work, an equally unsatisfactory showing is made. In general the value of preliminary instruction in the social sciences is recognized but such instruction is not made an absolute requirement. In their references to these subjects the *Bulletins* usually adopt such phrases as "familiarity is recommended" or a "desirable preparation," instead of a recognizing that technical instruction in social work must be based on a knowledge of the social sciences. Even the Pennsylvania school, which requires candidates to have "studied systematically some of these branches on which a knowledge of society is based," does not enforce this rigidly, for it offers a course called "Scientific Bases of Social Work" which is intended "to provide a background of certain fundamental concepts in biology, psychology, economics, and sociology for those who have not had these subjects in college."

The Richmond school makes no reference at all to the desirability of knowledge of the social sciences. It is worthy of mention that the New York, Boston, and Chicago schools do not include sociology in the list of studies mentioned as desirable preparation for their training courses.

Lack of uniform agreement in standards of admission is found also in the departments of social work maintained by the nine colleges and universities that have membership in the Association of Training Schools for Professional Social Work, but in the case of these institutions, the differences are of another nature. These colleges and universities may be conveniently divided into two groups, each representing a distinct point of view in its methods of providing professional training. The first group includes the institutions that place their departments of social work on a graduate basis and limit attendance to those who hold a bachelor's degree. Strong

emphasis is placed on the satisfactory completion of undergraduate courses in the social sciences and in most cases such courses are an absolute requirement for admission to the technical courses of instruction. This group includes Bryn Mawr College, Smith College, Western Reserve University, and University of Toronto.

In the second group are those institutions that place their chief emphasis upon a four-year undergraduate course of instruction in social work leading to a Bachelor's degree. A year or more of graduate work is also provided but even this, it is urged, should follow the specialized undergraduate course instead of being regarded as giving adequate professional training to any college graduate. It is obvious that the requirements of a secondary-school education for admission to a four-year undergraduate course specializing in preparation for social work cannot be compared with a similar requirement for admission to a so-called graduate school of social work. The institutions that make up this group are the University of Chicago, University of Minnesota, Ohio State University, University of Pittsburgh, and the Carnegie Institute of Technology.

The foregoing analysis of the present actual basis of education for social work as is shown by the standards of admission of professional schools indicates the wide divergence of opinion among those at work in this field. It reveals on the one hand the tendency of the independent schools to distrust the value of college courses in the social sciences and to make concessions to candidates for admission who have had approved kinds of practical experience. On the other hand the movement in the universities to set up a course of instruction that would begin early in the undergraduate school and cover a period of four to five years, has grown out of their feeling that the social-work student needs a more thorough foundation in the social sciences than is usually obtained in the college course.

In the field of education for social work we find therefore not merely varying standards of admission to the professional schools but important differences in regard to what should constitute the basis of their technical instruction. Should a college education be made a requirement of admission to a school of social work regard-

less of the subjects included in the college course? In view of the varying content of the subject-matter of the courses in the social sciences in different institutions, as well as the differences in the quality of instruction, is it practicable at the present time to set up a high standard of attainment in these sciences as a prerequisite to a professional school? Since social work from its very nature makes such heavy demands upon soundness of judgment, strong personality, and practical experience, should not factors of this kind rather than academic requirements be given chief consideration? Is it wise at this stage of development of social work to set up academic standards of admission to professional schools that cannot be attained by many who otherwise seem admirably fitted to become useful social workers?

It is of help in trying to answer these questions to remind ourselves that the heart of the difficulty lies, in the last analysis, in the chaotic state of social work itself. As long as there is in the wide field of social work no professional organization that concerns itself with standards and gives real unity to the profession it is to be expected that each type of social work will set up its own standards based upon its own experience and point of view. In such a stage of development of social work, science has no assured place. Scientific studies seem far removed from practical work and therefore any alliance with them that places restrictions upon the entrance to social work is regarded as inconsistent with its proper development. It is nothing more or less than the age-long misunderstanding between the practical worker and the man of science. The former was first in the field and is inclined to regard the scientist as an intruder until science has outstripped practice and gained the right of leadership.

In the medical profession the confusion between medical practice and medical science existed until the latter was able in comparatively recent years to demonstrate its proper place in the determination of professional standards. While the social sciences have not advanced as far as the natural sciences they are sufficiently well developed to justify their claim that they must be taken into account in efforts to solve social problems. Any difference of opinion about this must be regarded as due to ignorance of the present

status of the social sciences or failure to appreciate the place of science in modern progress.

If technical instruction in social work is to be based on the social sciences, what is the extent of the foundation that should be required? Certainly the minimum requirement would seem to be the usual undergraduate courses in sociology, economics, history, political science, psychology, and biology. It is difficult to see how anything less could give the student a scientific equipment comparable to that which is expected of the medical student. In the four-year undergraduate course in social work offered by several of the universities this equipment in social sciences comes as a matter of course. The graduate schools of social work, however, will not find it easy to require their candidates for admission to be thoroughly familiar with the social sciences. Taking the country as a whole the majority of those seeking training in social work are deficient in these subjects. Maybe the graduate schools could meet the situation by establishing a preliminary year for the benefit of students who need a better foundation for their technical studies. A better solution perhaps would be to increase the number of universities that give an undergraduate course in social work. The graduate schools then could maintain a real graduate status and would no longer need to give their attention to elementary courses of instruction.

During a period of adjustment it might be necessary to make provision for special courses to meet the extraordinary demand for social workers. This would be especially true in those sections of the country where few colleges and universities give adequate attention to the social sciences. But in a reasonably brief time a sufficient number of students could be found properly prepared for their professional studies. The number that would be lost by the setting of higher standards would be at least partially offset by those who would not have been attracted to the professional school under its present system of instruction.

This emphasis upon academic attainments as a basis of education for social work must not force unduly into the background the personal qualifications that should be possessed by those seeking training in this particular field. While in all the professions the

highest success cannot be won unless technical equipment is supplemented by a high grade of personal qualities, in social work this is pre-eminently true. The social worker's stock in trade seems much less tangible than that of the engineer, physician, lawyer, or teacher. His services to individuals and communities may be vital and based on expert knowledge, but they do not always stand out in such a clear-cut and definite manner that they are easily understood and readily acceptable. For this reason technical knowledge alone is not sufficient. The social worker must be a salesman, a promoter, an organizer. His personality should be such as would command respect and win confidence. He must be a community leader and at the same time possess those qualities of tact, and sympathy, and common sense, and power of will that give him personal influence over those whom he is trying to help.

Personal qualifications, therefore, must also be regarded as necessary prerequisites for technical training in social work. Accurate means of measuring these qualities in applicants for admission to a professional school do not exist. A careful study of a candidate's references often proves insufficient. In order to arrive at a correct judgment, this should be supplemented by personal observation of the student during his period of training. In the undergraduate school of social work a decision about the student's qualifications can be made after the first two years' work before the specialization has gone far enough to make it difficult for the student to change his line of study. In the graduate school, an accurate decision ought to be made about the student's personal qualifications before he enters upon the course. Efforts to raise the standards of education for social work must include due attention to an accurate measurement of personal qualities as well as of academic attainments.

IV. TECHNICAL COURSES OF INSTRUCTION

In the discussion of the historical development of schools of social work it has already been pointed out that their courses of instruction were from the beginning of a most practical nature. The instructors in almost all instances were persons engaged in social work who were more interested in imparting to their students

their technique than in following the usual academic type of instruction. Just because the schools of social work were organized in this way they escaped some of the shortcomings that have hampered the progress of other fields of professional education. The first engineering schools were manned by university instructors who carried their university teaching methods into the professional school and as a consequence failed for a long time to adjust themselves to the real needs of engineering students. Medical education also passed through its didactic method of instruction and only gradually built up courses growing out of a scientific handling of experience.

The schools of social work on the other hand began with training classes held by social work organizations for the benefit of their own employees. They were interested in technique rather than in research and sought their teaching material in daily experience instead of in textbooks. The graduates of these schools therefore were usually acceptable to the social agencies, and fitted into available positions without the necessity of making radical adjustments. But while these results were fortunate it must not be overlooked that schools of this kind have a tendency to place emphasis upon immediate needs rather than upon the thorough-going scientific foundation demanded by the best professional standards. It thus happened that the schools of social work, in avoiding the mistakes of academic instruction, went to the opposite extreme of depreciating the value of the scientific studies carried on by the universities. As a natural result the professional schools lost in academic standing and were generally given the same rating as normal schools of the older type. The universities on their part failed for many years to receive the impetus to the development of their work in the social sciences which would have resulted from a frank recognition of the value of laboratory and clinical work in this field.

Within the past few years this traditional gulf between the social scientist in the university and the social worker seems in a fair way of being bridged. Both are finding that they have much to learn from each other and that through a union of effort their common goal can more easily be attained. The social worker is not merely

a practitioner but is also a social scientist. He must therefore be equipped in the use of scientific methods as well as in the practical technique of his daily work.

This new attitude cannot fail to have a marked effect upon the curriculum of the schools of social work. It at once makes it evident as has already been pointed out that this curriculum must be built upon the foundation of scientific studies rather than upon the foundation of general education and practical experience. It is difficult to see how instruction in schools of social work can be of graduate quality if their curriculum is adapted equally well to the needs of college graduates who have specialized in the social sciences and of other students with either less or a different type of preliminary education. As long as students are permitted to plunge into technical courses of social work, as is now frequently the case, without careful study of those sciences that deal with the social order, it is useless to attempt to standardize these courses and maintain them at the high level required in other professions. But while this insistence upon a proper scientific foundation represents a real step forward, it would be unfortunate if the social scientists in the universities attempted to make radical changes in the courses of instruction in social work without an appreciation of the value of the methods that have been followed.

In working out the curricula of schools of social work the custom has generally been to have the courses follow very closely the different types of work carried on by the various agencies. For example the courses given by the New York School of Social Work are grouped under eight departments: case-work, child welfare, industry, social research, community work, mental hygiene, criminology, and medical social service. In some of the courses certain processes characteristic of the different kinds of social work are singled out and the technique of carrying on these processes is made the subject of instruction. Examples of such courses are those dealing with the technique of case-work, the technique of social research, the technique of community organization, and the technique of record keeping. Other courses deal directly with types of social work carried on by the more important social agencies. In this group we find such courses as family welfare, child welfare,

recreation, juvenile delinquency, housing investigation, psychiatric social work, and medical social service.

While some of these courses are similar in title to those offered by a well-equipped university department of applied sociology, their distinguishing characteristic is their emphasis upon technique. The point of view is action, not contemplation and reflection. The students do not stand off and study the problem in a detached manner but are made to feel that they are actively participating in all the processes connected with its solution. They find themselves surrounded by the atmosphere of social work rather than that of social research. As a result they do not learn merely about social problems; they learn how to deal with them. A typical university course in the administration of charities may make quite clear the problems in this field. A student in such a course may with great profit to himself make a study of different types of administration and secure results of value as social research. It is an entirely different matter to present this course in such a way that the student assumes the attitude of the participator rather than that of the observer and thus is made to feel as living realities the different methods and points of view of those at work in this field.

This type of technical instruction represents one of the great contributions of the schools of social work to the field of applied sociology. Without courses of this nature a high type of professional instruction cannot be given. A great mistake will be made by the universities that have recently become interested in education for social work if they believe that the addition of a field-work course to their traditional courses in social science will equip them for professional instruction. Nothing will more quickly discredit the recent efforts of universities to enter this field. It would represent a backward step in professional education in which the social scientist will have failed to take advantage of the painful experiences through which the technical schools of other professions have passed.

If the universities are to succeed in this field of instruction it is essential that they clearly recognize the difference between the course that lays emphasis upon knowledge through research and the

course that is interested in technique. At present the tendency in a few universities is to combine these two types of courses under the direction of an instructor who may know something about technique, but has himself never mastered it. Such a situation would not be tolerated in a medical school for there it is taken for granted that an instructor in therapeutics must himself at some time have acquired experience in that field through successful practice. Just here is the great difficulty the universities face in developing professional instruction in social work. Men of academic standing with experience in practical work are not easily available for teaching purposes. The bearing of this fact upon the problem under discussion should be recognized. Nothing can be more fatal to the influence of the university in this field of professional education than to assume that courses can be made vocational by a change in name and a slight modification of content. Vocational courses worthy of consideration in professional circles must be conducted by instructors whose minimum participation in practical work is sufficient to enable them to create the atmosphere of the social agency under discussion and to impart to the students its point of view.

The influence therefore of the university on the curriculum of schools of social work may not necessarily be in the line of progress. Their methods of instruction and attitude toward practical work will in many instances need considerable modification before they are equipped for effective leadership in this field. If, however, the necessary adjustments are successfully made, there is reason to believe that the universities' entrance into professional education for social work will exert an influence upon its standards similar to that brought about by their participation in other fields of professional education.

Where their influence is particularly needed is in giving greater emphasis to intellectual standards. The curriculum of schools of social work has been built up almost entirely by practical workers whose emphasis has chiefly been laid on the side of experience. The courses of study have been designed to teach how particular processes should be carried on and definite situations met. Along with this emphasis upon the value of training by doing there has

grown up, if not a distrust of intellectual studies, at least a failure to appreciate their proper place in a scheme of professional education. This tendency is by no means new for it has characterized the early stages of legal, engineering, and medical education. It is an inheritance from the apprenticeship system of training and must be outgrown as standards of education are raised.

It would be unfair to leave the impression that present courses of instruction in schools of social work pay no attention to academic standards. Much progress has been made during the past two decades since the organization of the first training classes. Courses of instruction usually incorporate the best results of social research and carry with them the customary quota of assigned readings. The chief difficulty is that the requirements in practical work are placed first throughout the whole course and are in some cases so heavy that time for study is reduced to a minimum. In one instance, the students in a school of social work spent their mornings in practical work with a social agency, their afternoons in classes at the school, and their evenings in participating in the varied activities of social settlements. The usual amount of readings supplementary to the courses were assigned to the students but it was manifestly impossible to insist upon the outside study necessary to make these courses comparable to a graduate school. While this may be an unusual instance it is fairly typical of the prevailing tendency. What is needed is not merely a recognition of the value of study but an arrangement of the curriculum that would make a proper amount of study possible. It is to be expected that the influence of the universities will be in the direction of increased time for study. Indeed, unless they modify to a certain extent their traditional point of view, they may go too far in their intellectual requirements and fail to build up a well-balanced curriculum.

Another serious problem of the curriculum has to do with the organization of the courses of instruction. What principles shall determine the arrangement of the subject-matter? Can these courses be made to give a better historical perspective and a wider knowledge of general principles without detracting from the interest that is always aroused by the immediately practical? Here is a problem

that is vital to the success of the professional school. If the independent schools of social work have erred in concentrating too great attention upon practical problems and immediate situations, the university courses in this field have usually gone to the opposite extreme. Will it be possible to build up courses that will avoid the shortcomings of both?

It would seem that the solution of this problem does not demand a radical change in the general type of professional course that has become most common. In so far as these courses are built up around a study of the problems with which social work has to deal they are essentially right in principle. Courses dealing with problems of the family, the community, child welfare, juvenile delinquency, immigration, housing, recreation, and similar problems, not only cover subjects with which social workers must be familiar but represent the best pedagogical method of approach.

Where they frequently need strengthening is in an increased emphasis upon the more general facts and principles that give a comprehensive understanding of the whole situation rather than a definite solution of the immediate problem. The problem itself should continue to be the point of departure and should lead in a natural way to a study of the historical facts bearing upon it. By beginning with the problem instead of the historical introduction so common in university courses, the interest necessary for concentrated effort is aroused and the interpretative value of the historical elements stand out more clearly. But the point where the usual professional course lays itself open to criticism is in its tendency to lead directly toward a consideration of methods and technique. The failure to give sufficient emphasis to the complex factors that enter into the problem under discussion and the causes that underlie it bring about a concentration upon mechanical processes and an overrefinement of technique, that may be useful to specialists who are to deal with particular situations but does not make them professionally educated in the broadest sense. The ideal in technical courses of instruction is to make everything contribute to a thorough knowledge of the whole problem which will as a matter of course include attention to the most approved technique.

If the technical courses of instruction deal in this way with specific problems there would seem to be less necessity for courses in which the entire emphasis is upon technique. The technique of family case-work would not need to be taught as a distinct process because it would be a natural part of the courses dealing with problems of the family, child welfare, juvenile delinquency, etc. In the same way the technique of community organization would be taught in connection with courses in community problems. Such subjects, also, as methods of publicity, financing of social agencies, office management and routine, and other aspects of social-work administration, might be considered more effectively in their immediate application to specific problems than in courses dealing exclusively with the technique of executive management and administration.

In this connection it ought to be stated that methods of social-work administration have never been given adequate attention by the professional schools. Courses in social work have usually been designed to prepare technicians rather than executives. Since the graduates of schools of social work have found their most available opportunities of employment with social agencies in large cities where they must serve for a considerable time in a subordinate capacity before being given executive responsibility, there has not been much demand for instruction in administrative methods. But with the recent development of social work in small towns and communities the graduates of a professional school will frequently be called upon to take a position where both executive ability and social-work technique are needed. Even if the executive positions in social agencies in the large cities can be successfully filled by persons who have come up through the ranks, this plan will not always be found practicable in the smaller communities. The new situation can only be met by an adjustment of the curriculum of the training schools which will provide the needed instruction along administrative lines. A recent effort to meet this need was the special course the past summer at Ohio State University for organizers and executives in social work. This course which was given by the university in co-operation with the Association for Community Organization and the American Red Cross was designed primarily for persons of social-work experience who gave promise of

capacity for executive leadership. During the eight weeks' summer session the attention of the students was concentrated upon the principles and methods of community organization and the problems connected with the administration of social agencies. This work was carried on through classroom lectures and discussions, assigned readings, and a limited amount of observation of the methods of local and state organizations. The remainder of the course, which covered a period of eight months, is being spent by the students as employees of organizations doing community work where under the supervision of skilled workers they are gaining experience in dealing with actual administrative problems. A course of this kind has real value for a picked group preparing for executive positions of considerable responsibility. Its chief present significance, however, is in calling attention to the value of specific instruction in administrative methods and in demonstrating one way in which this may be given with a fair degree of success. The course will have met more than an immediate need if it results in a greater emphasis by the professional schools upon instruction along administrative lines. Such a strengthening of the curricula of schools of social work will represent an important step forward in building up a well-balanced professional course of study.

This addition to the courses of study, together with the increasing number of courses that must be added to the curriculum to keep pace with the rapid development of the many different types of social work, has brought professional schools to the point where they must group their courses under separate departments and direct their students to specialize in certain lines of work. The time is past when students can take a general course of training in social work and then be equipped for a position with any agency they may select. The New York School of Social Work is attempting to meet the situation by devoting the first year to fundamental courses that may be regarded as common to all forms of social work, while vocational training in one department makes up the work of the second year. This selection of fundamental courses that should serve as a general introduction to the more highly specialized vocational work is a step in the right direction. Too early specialization has been one of the tendencies of the schools of social work which

has had the unfortunate result of turning out graduates incapable of seeing beyond their own particular field.

Just what should constitute the fundamental courses that should precede the highly specialized vocational studies is doubtless a matter about which general agreement cannot now be reached. It depends to a certain extent upon what is included in the preprofessional studies that have been completed before entering the professional school. Among the first-year courses listed by the New York School of Social Work are courses in immigration, labor problems, crime and punishment, methods of social research, American government and administration—topics which are ordinarily covered in a university curriculum. The difficulty is that with the present lack of uniform standards in college requirements in the social sciences it is practically impossible to know where to begin in a course of professional education for social work. Certainly no one would be so bold as to claim that the average college graduate has made such a study of the social sciences as would definitely prepare him for the technical studies in this field. The fact that he has taken certain courses may not be of any real significance. The content of the courses and the way they are presented must determine whether they are of preprofessional value.

The undergraduate course in social work given by a few universities would seem to be better adapted to meet this situation. In a training school of this kind it is not only possible to provide the proper number of preprofessional courses but also to see that they are properly correlated and conducted in such a way as to fit into the whole scheme of social-work education. Under this plan the preprofessional courses of the first three years would be followed in the Senior year by the more fundamental technical courses that would give a general knowledge of the field of social work. If then this is followed by one graduate year of specialized vocational training a standard of professional education would have been attained which under present conditions cannot generally be realized by the usual two-year graduate course.

[To be continued]

NEWS AND NOTES

Notes of interest to the readers of the *Journal* should be in the hands of the editor of "News and Notes" not later than the tenth of the month preceding publication.

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

The fifteenth annual meeting of the American Sociological Society was held December 27-29 in Washington, D.C., at the Washington Hotel. The main topic for discussion was "Some Newer Problems, National and Social." At the first meeting on Monday night Professor James Q. Dealey gave the presidential address on the subject "Eudemics, a Science of National Welfare." Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School also gave an address entitled "A Theory of Social Interests."

President Dealey declined re-election for a second term. Professor Scott E. W. Bedford, secretary-treasurer since 1912, also declined renomination. Professor Edward C. Hayes, of the University of Illinois, was elected president. The other officers for the year 1921 are: first vice-president, John P. Lichtenberger, University of Pennsylvania; second vice-president, U. G. Weatherly, Indiana University; secretary-treasurer, Ernest W. Burgess, University of Chicago; members of the executive committee, E. L. Earp, Grace Abbott, A. B. Wolfe, Susan M. Kingsbury, Emory S. Bogardus, and John O'Grady.

The report of the Committee on Standardization of Research was given by the chairman, Professor J. L. Gillin. Professor F. Stuart Chapin, chairman, presented a report for the Committee on Social Abstracts. These reports were accepted and the committees continued. Professor E. C. Hayes, chairman of a committee to consider the advisability of a new publication for the Society made an adverse report, which was accepted and the committee was discontinued.

A motion by the Rev. S. Z. Batten for the dissemination of sociological knowledge was referred to the executive committee for action. A motion was adopted that in the preparation of the program for next year, subjects suggested by the members of the Society should receive consideration.

GROUP ON SOCIAL RESEARCH

Two informal meetings on social research were held in connection with the meeting of the American Sociological Society in Washington.

Reports of research in progress were made by Shelby Harrison, Russell Sage Foundation; C. J. Galpin, U.S. Department of Agriculture; Robert E. Park, University of Chicago; Lucile Eaves, Women's Educational and Industrial Union and Simmons College; J. J. Gillin, University of Wisconsin; J. E. Cutler, Western Reserve University; J. P. Lichtenberger, University of Pennsylvania; F. Stuart Chapin, Smith College; John O'Grady, Catholic War Council; Franklin Johnson, Grinnell College; U. G. Weatherly, Indiana University; Agnes M. H. Byrnes, Carnegie Institute of Technology; Bessie B. Wessel, Connecticut College; Harry Viteles, Kirkwood, N.J.; Milton Fairchild, National Institution for Moral Instruction; G. S. Dow, Baylor University; and R. H. Leavell, Washington. Plans are being made to have meetings in connection with the National Conference of Social Work in Milwaukee in June. Communications should be addressed to Professor J. J. Gillin, University of Wisconsin.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF LONDON

The formal opening of Leplay House took place on June 29, when two meetings were held. Mr. Branford gave an address on "The Main Traditions of Sociology." A symposium on "The War-Mind" was held during the meeting of the summer term.

Mr. W. Mann was Organizing Secretary of the Society for six months, resigning on his appointment to the International Reparations Commission in Berlin as assistant to Dr. Marcel Hardy, who was selected to organize the Agricultural Section of the Commission.

The Society announces that although only two numbers of the *Review* could be published during 1919 and 1920, owing to the high cost of production, that the quarterly issue will be resumed in 1921, a separate fund having been raised for this purpose. The Society secured the services of Mr. Lewis Mumford, formerly associate editor of the *Dial*, New York, as acting editor of the *Review* during the summer term.

BUREAU OF SOCIAL HYGIENE

The Bureau has announced the publication of *American Police Systems* by Raymond B. Fosdick.

The book is based upon personal study of the police in practically every city in the United States with a population exceeding 100,000, and in many of lesser size. In all, seventy-two cities were visited, and the investigation covered a period of more than three years. The book

will appear as a companion study to Mr. Fosdick's previous volume entitled *European Police Systems*, published in 1915.

Mr. Fosdick was once Commissioner of Accounts of New York City, and during the war was chairman of the Commission on Training Camp Activities. Later he served as undersecretary-general of the League of Nations.

"THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY"

The first two numbers of the *Indian Journal of Sociology* have been received. They contain, among other contributions, an article by the editor, Alban G. Widgery, on "Sociology, Its Nature and Scope, Aims and Methods," and two papers on "Indian Womanhood" by Maganlal A. Buch. The *Journal* announces that it is a quarterly for the scientific consideration of the facts and ideals of social life and organization, especially Indian, and of the principles and methods of social advance. The *Journal* is published with the sanction and support of the government of his highness the Maharaja Gaekwas of Baroda. Communications, contributions, and book reviews should be sent to the Editor, *The Indian Journal of Sociology*, Baroda, India.

THE UNIVERSITY OF BOMBAY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND CIVICS

The University of Bombay is to be congratulated on obtaining Professor Patrick Geddes as its first professor of sociology. Professor Geddes is a scientist of considerable reputation, as his several works with Professor J. A. Thomson show. For many years he has been actively engaged in the planning and direction of city and other improvements. We trust that his association with Bombay will not only lead, in the university and beyond, to a spread of his civic conceptions, but also of his enthusiasm and to practical effects on the civic life of Bombay.

Temporary accommodation for the new department has been obtained in the Royal Institute of Science, not far from the university and the beginnings of the library, and facilities for students' work at all times of the day, are thus arranged, over and above the daily lectures, which largely take conversational and "seminar" form. A public course on the "Elements of Sociology" is also given three afternoons weekly, and is followed by discussion. A traveling scholarship to Europe will be awarded.

An assistant professor of sociology has also been appointed. Mr. S. N. Pherwani, B.A., late university librarian, who will conduct

the course during Professor Geddes' absence in the Summer term.—
The Indian Journal of Sociology.

NEW YORK COMMITTEE ON AFTER-CARE OF INFANTILE
PARALYSIS CASES

This committee has published a report of "The Survey of Cripples in New York City." The committee desires to send the report to those in a position of responsibility in agencies for cripples and to all those who might have a general interest in cripples and in plans for their aid. Requests for copies of the report and suggestions for further possible distribution of the report should be sent to Robert Stuart, director of the New York Committee on After-Care of Infantile Paralysis Cases, 69 Schermerhorn Street, Brooklyn, N.Y.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

Miss Gladys Boone has been elected instructor on the Grace H. Dodge Foundation in the Carola Woerishoffer Graduate Department of Social Economy and Social Research, Bryn Mawr College. Miss Boone held the Rose Sidgwick Fellowship at Columbia University last year, where she devoted her time to the study of labor movements with special attention to the most recent American methods in personnel administration throughout the country.

Miss Boone received the degrees of Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts from Birmingham University, England, and was for some time associated with the Cadbury Chocolate Works in its instruction of employees. She has also been associated with the Birmingham Labor Exchanges and investigation work under the trade unions in England and with the Workers Educational Association movement.

Last spring Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., contributed to Bryn Mawr College the sum of \$100,000 toward the instruction in Industrial Relations under the Carola Woerishoffer Graduate Department of Social Economy and Social Research. This contribution, together with an additional endowment which is being raised, will establish the Grace H. Dodge Foundation, affording training in Industrial Relations and offering ten scholarships and fellowships of the value of \$300 and \$500 each, and will also maintain the expenses of field work and supervision for this training. In this way, the work which was undertaken by the college in co-operation with the War Council of the National Board of the Young Women's Christian Association, has been made permanent. Already forty-two women have been given training for positions as employment managers and work with personnel in industry or with

industrial groups, and are holding important positions in industry in various sections of the United States from California to Massachusetts. Ten students are now registered for seminars and courses preparing directly for personnel administration. These courses, as do others in the Carola Woerishoffer department, lead to the degrees of A.M. and of Ph.D. In the five years during which the department has existed at Bryn Mawr College, two women have received the degree of doctor of philosophy, four have completed the work in residence for the degree, and three are now pursuing courses leading to the degree.

UNIVERSITY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

A course of twenty lectures on sociology and modern social problems is being given by Professor John E. Oster at the Mount Morris Baptist Church.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

Dr. Frances Sage Bradley has been assigned by the Children's Bureau to work out some special projects and plans for the study and care of children in rural communities in connection with the School of Public Welfare of the University of North Carolina. She will begin these plans on January 3, and will work in conjunction with the faculty of the university and with the students who are doing field work.

Miss Evelyn Buchan has accepted a position in the School of Public Welfare of the University of North Carolina as Supervisor of Field Work, and will go from the University of Chicago after January 1 to her work in Carolina. The new work to which she goes will offer unusual opportunity for making definite contributions to practical laboratory and field work in field districts.

The University of North Carolina, through its School of Public Welfare, has been holding a series of district conferences on public welfare. Each conference is planned to include approximately ten counties. The state commissioner, Mr. R. F. Beasley, members of the American Red Cross, and other volunteer agencies have joined in these conferences, the purpose of which is to co-ordinate all social work being done in the counties. Conferences have been held so far at Salisbury, Fayetteville, and New Bern.

SMITH COLLEGE

The Century Company announces the publication of a book *Field Work and Social Research* by Dr. F. Stuart Chapin. With the increasing interest in social research among sociologists and social workers, this volume is certain to secure immediate attention and use.

REVIEWS

Labor's Challenge to the Social Order. By JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS.

New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920. Pp. 441. \$2.75

Once more we are indebted to this pioneer sociologist for a sane and wonderfully clear-eyed analysis of our present perplexing industrial confusion. It is a rich and ripe product, somewhat autobiographical, which might be entitled (to borrow from the great dean of American sociologists), "Glimpses of the Industrial Cosmos." Its chief object is "if possible to throw some light on democracy as its own educator with the promise this holds out to us." The author, although recognizing the general world-wide drift toward some form of socialism, at the same time preserves a balanced attitude of justice to both sides and both principles involved. "As a principle, individualism is as persisting a reality as socialism. As the former tends to anarchy, the latter tends to communism, and we shall stand out against the excesses of both." A further hint of his judicial-mindedness is his frank confession of facts that he does not like, but to which he gives proper publicity in order, as he says, "to avoid all pleasant lying." For example, in the chapters on "Government Ownership," "the Employer's Case Against the Union," and "Syndicalism," both sides of the case are stated with admirable fairness and real critical judgment. He recognizes frankly that both employers and employees have used tactics of violence, that both have sometimes played crooked games, that both are avid of power. However, he believes that labor learned tactics of violence from its masters and also that the legislative corruption and the use of spies by employers are grosser evils than anything labor has yet perpetrated. He is strongly against the use of force, for example in the settlement of strikes, whether by government or by private employers; and he is very positive on the analogy between international war and the civil war of industrial armed conflict. On the other hand, he recognizes the dangers of weak concessions made by employers out of ignorance or sentimentality. Incidentally he does not include welfare-work in this category but pays it a respectful tribute as "capital on its good behavior."

Out of all the turmoil two facts emerge. First, the union-smashing attitude of the employers as a class. Second, labor's challenge to industrial domination. On the analogy of war and peace between nations

and the apparent inevitability of some form of international organization for peace, the author argues that the only way to eliminate militancy in the industrial situation is through co-operation and education. We have recognized in him an able student of the co-operative movement, but never before has he come out so strongly on this point. He now looks upon industrial co-operation as industrial democracy at its best, largely because it tends to spread "the ache of responsibility," and because responsibility always tends toward stability and real conservatism. On the other hand, he recognizes in the trades-union constitution-building and administration a much misunderstood but very real and vital education in industrial citizenship. While the employer's case against the union is stated with the utmost frankness and without condonation, and while it is admitted that labor wears no saint's halo and needs housecleaning just like medicine, law, and capitalism, and while the attitude of employers does not excuse but simply explains labor's sins, yet the way out is not through suppression, deportation, or bludgeoning, but through encouragement to any labor organization willing and able to discipline itself.

While the author holds that war has created the communistic revolution and while he appreciates the moral idealism of the communist movement, yet he holds that "in every progressive stage man has eventually got the better of it as he will in the present instance if labor be given a fair chance." As to socialism he concludes, "I have never seen good ground to doubt that though the socialistic function is certain to extend, the individualistic and voluntary forms will also extend." Of government ownership he is frankly critical and insists that both sides present their proofs and cease indulging themselves in a mere battle of feelings. To guild socialism he directs very serious attention, not because it is an attractive name, but because the rapid growth of shop committees, the Plumb Plan, and union concern over scientific production all evidence the trend toward it. As a remedy to all the welter of feelings, uninformed idealism, baseless dreams, self-seeking violence, bad faith, and ineptitudes on both sides of industrial conflict, the author demands that our legal house shall be cleaned of its present discriminations; that the safety valve of free speech and criticism be kept open; that we get away from the witch-baiting attitude which now marks much of the press and many employers; that employers particularly dare to stand up to new ideas, to face them squarely like one of the greatest modern English employers, Charles Booth; that we all learn to forsake force and to encourage self-discipline and self-education;

that we encourage experiment; that we avoid the one-track solution, and that we approach every problem in a large and liberal spirit.

In a brief review, it is impossible to hint even at the wealth of wide reading and rich personal experience which this book reveals. At the risk of appearing captious the reviewer offers the suggestion that in future editions some mention be made of the development of trade-union colleges and of the achievement of the Workers' Educational Associations as factors in workmen's education.

The book is marked by humor aplenty, but at least in one place some unconscious humor has crept in, as, for example, page 388, where as a reference *The Survey*, "Act 4," is cited.

A note of solemn appeal weighted with fact closes the study. "War has left the dwelling places of men foul with vindictive passions, but it has also left there such hungers, as were never felt, for the ways of peace, and good will among men." The best augury we have for the appeasing of those hungers is such men as John Graham Brooks and his writings.

ARTHUR J. TODD

Der Nationalismus Westeuropas. By WALDEMAR MITSCHERLICH [Professor in the University of Breslau]. Leipzig: Hirschfeld, 1920. Pp. 373. \$8.50.

This book commands attention in a double way. It is the widest and most comprehensive attempt made hitherto at investigating nationalism, i. e., a phenomenon which, besides socialism and capitalism, most deeply stimulates and most enduringly dominates our social life. The book intends to trace nationalism back to its remotest connections and is based on a synthetic spirit. And the author has not only first conceived the problem but also the method of his research.

In his opinion, social life is not in a state of evolution: the present may not be called an "organic" development from the past. The author abandons the theory of *evolution* and puts in its place that of *plurality*. His theory regards every social phenomenon as something that is at rest and secluded in itself, something peculiar, living a life of its own on its special conditions. This theory of plurality is, perhaps, a most valuable gift to the whole domain of science, for it gives a chance to regard and investigate all human existence from an altogether new point of view, and it will thus afford quite new insights and prospects.

The book shows that the nationalistic idea had no chance of life in the Middle Ages, that it was then utterly foreign to the structure

and essence of society and state. In the stage of early nationalism the structure of society and state had undergone a fundamental change. The modern state, based on unity and on law, lays the foundation to nationalism; besides this, several causes in social life and culture help to bring it forth; a great influence may here also be conceded to individualism. They all create nationalism, which, however, does not gain importance as a creative idea until toward the end of the eighteenth century. In the nationalistic period the expansion, the essence, and the intensity of nationalism become visible, with their relations to state and economic life.

Of especial importance at the present hour may be considered the last section of the book, which deals with the currents of thought opposed to nationalism. Rival ideas are rising at its side, ideas which strive to go beyond its aims and to lay stronger claims on states and nations. *Imperialism* and *state unionism* may be mentioned here—the latter being a voluntary coalescence of sovereign states into one political structure, without, however, giving up their individuality and full independence.

These few words do not suffice to give an idea of the wealth of Professor Mitscherlich's book. Especially his theory of plurality lifts it above the level of a scientific publication of the day and gives it a personal note. The whole work abounds with valuable sociological insights. The calm, purely scientific tenor of it, standing above all party dispute, will be enjoyed by all those who desire an objective, clear view of this important and exciting subject.

E. SCHWIEDLAND

UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA

The Casual Laborer and Other Essays. By CARLETON H. PARKER. With Introduction (26 pages) by Cornelia Stratton Parker. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 1920. Pp. 199. (Published posthumously.) \$1.75.

Carleton H. Parker plunged into first-hand studies of laboring conditions, especially at their worst. Unshackled by traditional economic theories and fired by dynamic humanitarian purposes, Parker in his relatively few years penetrated close to the heart of the conditions which produce the casual laborer, the I.W.W., the economically defeated.

Parker's approach to industrial problems was through the avenues of behavioristic psychology and is subject to the criticisms which are befalling that type of psychological theory. The chief criticism of

Parker's point of view is that individual responsibility and individual selfishness are both seriously underrated. Further, Parker professed a so-called scientific unwillingness to give full recognition to the intangible but nevertheless highly influential forces of moral motivation.

In the essay on "Understanding Labor Unrest," Parker makes plain how unjust laboring conditions supported by abstract and harsh economic theories have suppressed the normal and healthy instincts of many laborers and created the spirit of radicalism. The essay on "The I.W.W." is the best available analysis of the type of mental attitude which is common among the defeated strata of American labor. In "Motives in Economic Life," Parker observes that "the domination of society by one economic class has for its chief evil the thwarting of the instinct life of the subordinate class and the perversion of the upper class." While this conclusion is correct as far as it goes, it overrates the importance of the instinct life. It fails to provide for the defeat of that virulent selfishness which is now so outspoken in both parties of the class struggle. It does not bespeak a socialization of the purposes of all classes.

E. S. BOGARDUS

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Broken Homes. By JOANNA C. COLCORD. New York: The Russel Sage Foundation, 1919. Pp. 208. \$1.00.

Statistics indicate that 10 per cent of the demands made upon organized charity come from family desertion. The proportion of time and money spent in dealing with such cases is in excess of that figure. For years it has been one of the most expensive and baffling of the problems faced by relief societies, and one productive of extensive harmful effects upon society at large. To professional charity workers, especially, this little volume of Miss Colcord's should prove of real value and serviceability, for it contains the most thoroughgoing and practical plan of dealing with desertion which has yet appeared. The writer is herself a specialist within this field, and she is able to supplement her own extensive experience and observation with first-hand knowledge of the methods and judgments of many of the ablest workers in the country. The book must be regarded as *the* authority to date on the important question of how to deal with cases of this type. Details of immediate treatment are supplemented by practical suggestions as to "next steps in corrective treatment." The closing chapter is devoted

to "next steps in preventive treatment," a topic of still greater concern; but with the exception of a suggested domestic consultation bureau to be established in connection with organized family agencies, it fails to afford as much practical assistance as the preceding chapters. Since the volume deals entirely with desertion and non-support, which constitute only one type of broken homes, the title is too broad, and somewhat misleading.

EARLE E. EUBANK

Y.M.C.A. COLLEGE, CHICAGO

The Social Interpretation of History. A Refutation of the Marxian Economic Interpretation of History. By MAURICE WILLIAM. Brooklyn, 1920. Pp. 222.

Aroused by the disorganization and disintegration resultant from the Great War, Mr. William, a disciple of Marxian Socialism for more than a quarter of a century, investigated for himself and came to the conclusion that Marx was mistaken in his claim to have discovered the laws of social evolution. Mr. William repudiates the class struggle as anti-social and says that co-operation and harmonizing the interests of mankind is the true method of progress, hence the title of his book.

If this is an indication of what is going on in the minds of enough socialists to leaven the mass, if they begin to doubt the absolute reliability of the Marxian formulations and are willing to search for fresh guidance, it augurs well for a broadening and deepening of the socialist movement. Undoubtedly the greatest obstacle to that development has been and is the absolutely unquestioning faith in Marxian principles and failure to accept the scientific method that is emerging in the social sciences.

VICTOR E. HELLEBERG

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

The Modern Household. By MARION TALBOT and SOPHONISBA PRESTON BRECKINRIDGE. Boston: Whitcomb and Barrows, 1919. Pp. 1-93. \$1.00.

This volume is a revision of the 1912 edition. There is little change in the text except the inclusion of a page or two setting forth concisely the effect of the war upon fashions in dress. The suggestive questions at the end of each chapter have been carefully revised and the bibliographies accompanying the several chapters have been enriched by the addition of new titles, especially those dealing with food, clothing, and household management.

More revision of the text might have been desirable. The effects of the very general instruction of housewives during the war in dietetics and in modern canning methods might have been noted. It seems hardly true at present that "only here and there traces remain" of household processes of food preservation. Then, too, various community and co-operative movements affecting the household would seem to be of sufficient significance to deserve notice in so suggestive a volume.

MARY LOUISE MARK

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

Defective Housing and the Growth of Children. By J. LAWSEN DICK, M.D., F.R.C.S. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1919. Pp. 94.

This is a most disappointing book. It is neither about defective housing nor about growth of children. It is merely a study of the prevalence and the effects of rickets upon child health, but at no time does the author indicate the actual relation between the physical and mental growth of the child and specific conditions of health, stature, scholarship, physical strength, or any other condition of growth. The only instances of evidence regarding the actual housing conditions in their relation to health were obtained from sources other than Dr. Dick's investigations.

As a study of rickets in schools the work is no doubt valuable, but it lacks adequate consideration of those factors in housing upon which a classification of child growth could be based without danger of attributing to housing results which might as easily be attributed to other causes, such as nutrition, methods of living rather than housing conditions, and such habits and traditions of child care as may be due to racial characters or the industrial life of the mother.

CAROL ARONOVICI

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

La Raison et le Progrès Moral.—The fact of a practical judgment seems to constitute the initial impulse to conduct; we acquire the sentiment of rationality which reinforces this impulse; the principal function and the *raison d'être* of reason is to discover occasions of action for the other tendencies and the methods of assuring their success. Intelligence can be the instrument of the satisfaction of any desire, good or bad, but the intellectual desire itself is clearly on the side of virtue, because it searches for the significance of our acts as they actually are. Though individuals may blind themselves, in the long run society conspires with intelligence and will not let us escape the facts. The mind predicts the future consequences of our acts, and if the ordinary man refuses to recognize the facts, his mind cannot always be debauched to the point of not seeing them, because they will be pointed out to him by others who share neither his prejudices nor his particular interests which warped his vision. Pride and the social motives can be transported to the side of virtue, but the need to know the truth is always on that side. Virtue is nothing but the adaptation of life to the facts which intelligence discovers. Thus reason, which alone permits social control to define its exigencies and to elaborate its own methods for satisfying them, in a way that creates a situation in which it is ordinarily recognized as disadvantageous if not stubborn to do wrong, becomes also the principal factor in the development of codes of conscience and an effective stimulant for individual virtue.—Edward Cary Hayes, *Revue de L'Institute de Sociologie*, July, 1920. V. M. A.

Psycho-Pathologie Individuelle et Sociale.—Not only has a comparison between individual morbid states and collective morbid states been established, but as far as possible it has been attempted to give positive explanations, that is, to attach the observed facts to laws. The same laws have been invoked for collectivity as for the individual, after being assured that there is nothing more in the "collective consciousness" than the psychic states modified by the solidarity of beings, by intellectual interdependence, affective and practical. It has been shown that the reciprocal actions between the individual and the collective consciousness, bind up the fate of each, from the psychical point of view, with that of all, and that of all with the influence of each. It was thus legitimate to study how the great social troubles are causes of individual psychic pathology: statistics have indicated the quantitative relationships; but it has taken extended development to establish that great social upheavals have an *accelerative* influence upon the psychoses, which demand a bio-psychic predisposition, and which are not really causes but less serious troubles, more or less lasting, attaining above all fitness for personal control, for the domination of self, for deliberate and voluntary action, for strength of character, for regular development of personality. It was not less legitimate to study how individual psychopathies are causes of social troubles, or at least of the aggravation of many of the pathological processes. Social psycho-pathology thus affirms its rights to take its place among the studies destined to enable us to more fully know human nature. It does not forget that man lives necessarily in a social milieu which is also natural, that is to say is subject to laws as the physical milieu; the social conditions of health and of psychic malady have their importance in the same rank as biological conditions; the concrete being is bio-psycho-sociological, and whoever neglects to study in the light of factor and product, cause and effect, the collective psychical life, puts himself beyond understanding or explaining many of the aspects of normal or morbid life.—G. L. Duprat, *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, July-August, 1920. V. M. A.

Mysticism and Art.—Western civilization is many-sided and its problems are difficult to handle. Each aspect of life makes a demand often compatible only with the oblivion of all the rest. Science often gives the sense of mastery without

recognition of the alienation which is its price. One of the most interesting modes of the reaction of the mind against itself is that from thinking to the enjoyment of beauty in art. It is perhaps so interesting because of the conviction that things of beauty differ *toto coelo* from the process and results of thinking. Thus to many severely scientific thinkers music seems to offer refuge from the dispeace of thought. Thought is forever inadequate to achieve the perfect comprehension that it desires of the world which it sets out to know. Yet there is actually an experience by which in some sense this wish is achieved. The point is reached when thought can no longer take refuge from its own dissatisfaction with itself by passing outside of itself, as, for example, into art. It is now compelled to transform itself while yet maintaining itself. This is the experience of mysticism. As opposed to the movement by which thought abandons itself and seeks refuge in the emotional and sensuous, mysticism is the demand which thought makes upon itself to reconcile its aim with its method.—M. Thorburn, *The Monist*, October, 1920. O. B. Y.

La Guerre et la Paix d'après les Prévisions des Sociologues.—What verifications or what challenges has the European catastrophe brought to bear upon sociology as regards the presumed certitude of its assumptions? Sociology has for its object the unraveling of the immense chaos of events, of discovering the necessary laws of the constitution of human societies, in order to deduce therefrom the science of government. The first law which it has formulated is that of progress, but one sociological school sees the causes of progress in the development of right, founded upon justice and reason, and considers peace to be the principal factor of social amelioration; the other regards war as the most precious form of national solidarity and discipline, recognizing no other right than the right of force. The essential traits of the latter school, propagated in Germany for half a century, have been admirably exposed during the recent hostilities, while the pacifist sociology, widespread in France, England, Italy and Russia, has not been studied, either in its detail or entirety. Saint-Simon and Comte felt that war no longer had a place in Europe, probably reflecting the ambient opinion in favor of disarmament at the time. The revolution of 1848 exalted to a paroxysm the sentiments of international fraternity, and at the Congress of Paris in 1849 Victor Hugo announced the creation of the United States of Europe. England, in insular isolation, provided with flourishing colonies, and enriched by her commerce and industry, offered fertile soil for pacifist ideas. Spencer, inspired by Darwin, felt that the industrial type tends to supplant the military type and to gradually replace the forced collaboration of earlier ages by voluntary co-operation in the exploitation of nature. The war of 1870 awoke France to rude reality, but thirty years later a new generation arose, forgetful of the past, and the proselytism of pacifism in France, Italy, England, and Russia became more intense as the war clouds gathered. Ferrero believed that the industrial civilization had created new conditions of peace, that the predominance of nations loving justice and right was assured, and was struck with astonishment by the European war. The science of economics has erred in thinking that sentiments and ideas follow economic facts like their shadows. The national sentiment, overlooked by pacifists in sociology and economics, has rebelled against foreign domination all over the world, and being satisfied seemingly in the unification of Germany, it was changed under the domination of Prussia into invading militarism. The war registered the fallacy of pacifist sociology which had concluded that war was impossible among the great European states. Such a profound error in the assumptions of sociologists puts us on guard against those that we may make in the future. The crowds of laborers striving for social democracy do not signal the triumph of reason in the conduct of society. The irrational is still dominant in history. Science lays aside the search for final causes which relate to metaphysics, but sociology, whether inclined toward materialism or idealism, has always been *finalistic*. Its assumptions have been dictated by feeling, long before the field of the social sciences was classified and delimited. To pretend to the character of science, remarks Durkheim, sociology must enter the era of specialism. Even then prediction far into the future will be denied it. The course of history reveals itself to us as an evolution at once destructive and creative, which means that it is not predictable. We must limit ourselves, for the present, to an attempt to sense tendencies.—Jean Bourdeau, *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, July, 1920. V. M. A.

The Motives of the Soldier.—This article is an attempt based upon the author's experience in the British army to estimate the part played by each factor in the complex of motives which actuated the soldier. Specifically, the questions are: What made men join up? What sustained them during the long war? What is the effect of the war upon the soldier? The motives for enlisting were (1) *submoral impulses*—the love of fighting, the element of romance, the hatred of the enemy and mass excitement; (2) *moral motives*, the cases in which action depended upon some "ought" or other. This class includes both those who believed in the rightness of the war and many who did not; (3) *compulsion by some external agency*. Social compulsion was just as much a force as was conscription and during the second year of the war reached an extraordinary intensity. At close quarters war imposes such a strain upon human nature that the motives that animate the recruit are not always sufficient to sustain him throughout the course of the war. The army cares very little for the motives which make men join up. It relies upon its power to make men over again by its own process-discipline. The personality of the army soon becomes more real to the soldier than his own soul. The whole army discipline is for the purpose of merging the individual into the mass. Discipline is a very different thing from leadership. Leadership acknowledges the individual's will and seeks to enlist its co-operation. Discipline makes no such acknowledgment. The negative side of discipline is fear. The positive element is *esprit de corps*. In a long-drawn-out war, belief in the cause will sustain a soldier when other motives fail. The business of war is to kill and for this reason hatred of the enemy is deliberately inculcated. Warfare is brutalizing, it reduces the soldier to the primitive. The benefits of army life, if any, are only incidental.—J. H. Procter, *The International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1920. O. B. Y.

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SOME AMBIGUITIES IN "DEMOCRACY"

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Sir John Seeley once remarked about the word "liberty" that a political speaker must use it at least once in each address, because otherwise the audience would not know when to applaud. A different stimulant for the lethargic listener is now employed. A different talisman serves the purpose of platform conjuring. "Democracy" bids fair to succeed to the almost vacant place of "liberty" as the most hackneyed, the most ill-defined, and hence the most meaningless term of public debate. The less familiar watchwords at least commit one to something. But an election candidate in search of an elastic label beneath which any attitude under the sun may find shelter had best ring the changes upon "democratic."

One reason why this epithet has come to mean so little is that we have struggled to make it mean so much. The Greeks, who invented it, were not bothered with its present ambiguities, for they knew what they had chosen it to stand for, and they adhered to this. But we of the modern age, in our zeal to have a single word as the most convenient weapon to brandish, have forced into this word *every* aim which our own side has promoted and the other side has opposed in the great conflict of ideals. To prove a thing evil we assume as sufficient that we should prove it undemocratic. In defending what has been so stigmatized we feel that the case is

hopeless if we cannot remove this initial objection, so that by hook or by crook, though we should burst the English language in our effort, we must prove the damnatory adjective to have been misapplied. If we want to reform anything, we place our chief reliance on the argument that our plan will still further democratize what we have set out to mend. Thus we have become almost afraid even to raise the question whether this purpose in statecraft is not, like all other purposes, a thing of limited scope, whose special advantage may be missed by our having too much of it not less surely than by our having too little. Our experience of the Bolsheviki has indeed opened the eyes of a few. But even this is being explained away. Enthusiasts are emphasizing the difference between "true" and "false" democracy, just as they used to split hairs about "liberty" and "license," for they are pledged to exhibit the system they idealize as free from all imperfections whatever. They therefore contend that, while its plausible counterfeit may be bad, the real brand will bring unmixed blessings. It is thus spoken of as if it were not merely good government, not merely the best government, but the just government made perfect, and the implication is that if we seek democracy all other things will be added unto us. Yet it is surely plain that such unqualified panegyric can be deserved by no human arrangement. As Dr. P. T. Forsyth would say, the purpose of the universe is not definable in a formula which undergraduates can easily remember.

How many senses of this term can we distinguish in current usage? At least three. They are not, indeed, independent senses, and we may find that they rest on a common basis of principle. But they are sufficiently different to make it worth while for us to distinguish them.

a) The first is the sense of *equality*. When Martin Chuzzlewit landed in New York one of the earliest things impressed upon him was that no such relation as "master and servant" was there recognized. A mere matter of names is, of course, of little importance. What is important is the determination in the New World, both in the United States and in Canada, to allow nothing that has the shape of birth privilege, and to insist as far as possible that all men shall have the same civic opportunity. One saw an example

of this lately in Canada when the rumor of a large consignment of decorative titles, some of them transmissible from father to son, called forth in the House of Commons a very fierce and probably a very decisive protest. Whatever else the man in the street means when he calls himself democratic, he at least means to avow a mood of permanent irritability toward all social or caste arrogance. But this meaning is negative rather than positive. It states a position in terms not of what one approves but of what one condemns.

b) Again, a democratic order is thought of as one in which individual preferences must yield to the collective will. What the nation has clearly purposed each citizen is called upon to promote. Majority rule means minority submissiveness. Thus a bill may be opposed at every stage in the American Congress by every constitutional weapon, but once it has become the law of the land it is undemocratic to obstruct the enforcement. Words and acts that were permissible before the entry of the United States into the war became treason to the American democracy the moment that step had been taken. The draft law ceased to be a legitimate subject for debate as soon as it had been signed by the President, for to question its propriety was to imperil its effectiveness. It is but the extreme statement of this principle when one hears the jest that all sides in a presidential election are expected when the result is known to agree that the best man has been chosen. Imbued with this spirit we hear with amazement of a Home-Rule Act for Ireland, duly passed after ample discussion in the Imperial Parliament, yet allowed to remain a dead letter because three or four counties have sworn to resist it unto blood. For the insurgent few declare in the same breath that they look upon the wisdom of king, lords, and commons as the one authority which should claim their allegiance! Many of us feel that the deplorable resolve of other Irish counties to resist unto blood this effort at defrauding them of their hard-won constitutional gain was to be expected under the circumstances. For we see "Ulster" and Sinn Fein as alike rebels against democracy.

c) But when we speak of the war as a democratic crusade, and as an effort to "make the world safe for democracy," it is clear that neither of the foregoing senses can be intended. What, for

example, is meant by the view that Germany must be "democratized"? None of us cared with what degree of servility the Germans might choose to prostrate themselves before their All Highest, or in how complex a system of hyphenated prefixes they might struggle to express the fine shades of their noble rank. Still less can we desire to intensify that subordination of the individual to the civic whole of which Germany beyond doubt has had too much rather than too little. It is their cast-iron "patriotism" which, more than any other cause which could be named, made possible their outrage upon the world. We would rather instil, if we could, that wholesome individual rebelliousness by which alone a collective purpose of brigandage may be effectively balked.

What we do mean, then, by a democratized Germany is a Germany in which public affairs shall no longer be made the tool of dynastic intrigue or military ambition. For this purpose we would see the great body of the people taking government into their own hands. For we trust, despite much appearance to the contrary, that they will prove far better than the oligarchs who have misled them. No mere depreciation of hereditary rank will be of the slightest use until there is an active and intelligent participation in *politics*, especially in the control of foreign policy, by the great mass of the citizens.

The three sorts of civic quality which have been distinguished above, and to which the same name has somehow been applied, are so far from mutually implying one another that each of them has often been found, and is still often found, in the absence of one or both of the others. A man may be vociferously resentful about caste but have little public spirit and less desire to take a hand in public business. The new countries have known many such men, hot in pursuit of a private fortune, and disdainfully avowing their disregard of "mere politics." A few generations ago the patriotism of merry England was warm in the breast of multitudes who were at the same time thoroughly obsequious to the duke and the baron, quite content to leave every public matter to such wise or unwise guidance. And today the militant British "Liberal" is often acquiescent in what he looks upon as the empty form of rank and very determined to maintain his individual

freedom against majorities not less than against kings, yet eager to interfere by every privilege which the constitution gives him for shaping national policy.

Moreover, the word "democratic" is so far from covering *all* that we seek in a sound social order that to each of the foregoing senses a special danger corresponds. The passion for equality is a constant menace to legitimate leadership and to wholesome direction by the expert. The Pilgrim in *The Ordeal of Richard Feverel* spoke of that horrible future when science should have produced an intellectual aristocracy; "for what despotism is so black as one which the mind cannot challenge?" And yet, if we were not just so enthusiastic in our belief that one man's opinion is as good as another's, the poor dupe of the patent medicine advertisement might not be so cruelly robbed and tortured in defiance of published advice against quackery by our medical associations. It has been well said that a plebiscite a hundred years ago would have forbidden the threshing-machine, the power loom, the spinning-jenny, perhaps even the steam engine, and that in England at an earlier date a wide franchise would have prevented the reform of the calendar, preserved the penal laws against dissenters, and restored the House of Stuart. We may, indeed, plume ourselves on the thought that since then the schoolmaster has been abroad. But there must always be a great gulf between the best thought and the average thought of any age. Nor can the activity of all the schoolmasters abolish it, any more than the hind legs of a stag can be trained to overtake the front ones. "We may say generally," wrote the pessimistic Sir Henry Maine, "that the gradual establishment of the masses in power is of the blackest omen for all legislation founded on scientific opinion, which requires tension of mind to understand it and self-denial to submit to it." The masses, thank God, have done much better than Maine expected. But we know what he meant. The present writer has seen, for example, many a passionate effort to diffuse belief in vaccination among those who still cling to their own ignorant judgment against it. Perhaps they prefer a democratic subjection to smallpox rather than immunity through a servile submissiveness to oligarchic science.

The danger of becoming over-democratic in the sense of coercing the individual will under a tyrant majority has been displayed to us on an appalling scale by the case of the German professors. That class above any other should have been pledged to truth, and not merely to truth when popular and victorious, but to truth when overborne by clamor and threatened by authority. But these men were brought up in an atmosphere where truth had to play into the hands of power. They lived where an academic teacher must at his peril say, on matters of state, no more and no less than was prescribed to him, where he must pretend an enthusiasm for national purposes that he might personally hate, where, in short, he was a mere literary propagandist for court and public on every subject which touched "patriotism." His academic future depended on his complaisance. This hiring and intimidating of the learned class, this poisoning of the stream at its very source, is a chief count in our indictment against the enemies of civilization. There they stood, those wretched German *Gelehrter*, issuing pamphlet after pamphlet to suit the mood of the Wilhelmstrasse, reinforcing the infamous unanimity of an uninstructed public with the still more infamous, because so dishonest, unanimity of the erudite and the able. Their best excuse is perhaps that of the trembling senators of Tiberius, that they were forced to "balance terror against mutual shame." The thoughtless folk among ourselves, who mock at "academic freedom," little know whose language they have borrowed, whence comes the seed they are trying to scatter, and what sort of fruit it has been proved likely to bear.

It is less needful to point out the risks of democracy in the third sense that we have distinguished, for they have been insisted on with tiresome iteration by every critic from Plato down to Lecky and Carlyle. How can the masses legislate for themselves when they understand their own good so poorly, when so few have the leisure that is needed for so complex a study as government, when the crowd is such a helpless prey to the demagogue and the "machine," when class passions are so readily exasperated, short views are so much easier than long ones, and sacrifice of immediate personal interest for remote social benefit is so difficult a demand upon the average man? To some of these objections democracy

has given such an answer in the ordeal of the war that we need not expect them to present themselves again with quite the old arrogance. We have proved how deep was the truth of John Stuart Mill's judgment fifty years ago: "There is a capacity of exertion and self-denial in the masses of mankind, which is never known but on the rare occasions on which it is appealed to in the name of some great idea or elevated sentiment." One thing, however, we are certain to hear again, that the vast and intricate field of foreign affairs cannot be "democratized" but that decisions there must be left to "those who know." Some men to whom this last phrase can, in the light of the world-war, be applied only with ironic facetiousness do not hesitate still to put forward the claims of that secret diplomacy which conducted the world to disaster. And, although they belong to an order that is vanishing, they will be made to vanish all the sooner if the real democrat will acknowledge the grain of truth in what they say, and will prepare himself with a democratic scheme that can turn the edge of their criticisms.

The prevailing definition of democracy is "government by the will of the people." It has the advantage of making the idea of *government* central, so that social equality, individual submissiveness, and a common interest in common affairs follow by way of inference. But it has the defect of including politics which can be called democratic only by a non-natural use of the word. Every government which holds its place, if we exclude mere military tyrannies, may be said to rest upon the will of the people. For any nation that chooses to act as a whole can at its pleasure remove rulers from their post. If it refrains from doing so, this must be because either from deliberate preference or from mere dislike of change it acquiesces in the wielding of authority by those in power. When Louis Napoleon made himself emperor it is very probable, indeed, that a plebiscite among the French would have approved the step. Would such a plebiscite have made Napoleon's government "democratic"? It was one of the quaint statements of Bismarck that the throne of the king of Prussia was broad based on a people's will. And it is by no means certain that a numerical majority would not have borne Bismarck out. Mr. Bertrand Russell has

told us that it would be undemocratic to depose the Hohenzollerns at the end of the war unless the German people expressed a wish for the change! The use of words in this way is enough to make one's head go round. Yet it is certainly true that whether we think of rule by king and parliament, or of rule by president and congress, or of rule by sultan and grand vizier, or of rule by a Manchu dynasty, it is the public which by its overt action or by its tacit approval is responsible for the *status quo*. Every people, as the old proverb says, has just that sort of government which it deserves. But surely not every people may be said to govern itself democratically.

Granted that the public is the ultimate king-maker, a sharp difference will still exist between that state in which the decisive voice of the public is provided with an acknowledged organ of expression and a state where no such organ is available. For in the one case popular action must needs be revolutionary; in the other it is constitutional. Having raised to power a certain group of rulers, you may either submit without criticism to whatever they choose to do, or you may watch them at every important turn to make sure that they continue to execute your will. And as a country cannot be governed by continual convulsions, the only method, if you mean to be masters in your own house, is to establish a convenient channel through which public opinion may be constantly brought to bear.

Let us put this negatively. There are two ways in which, with equal deadliness, the principle of democracy may be denied. It may be repudiated in form, or it may be nullified in practice. Formal repudiation has been exemplified by the Germans. They have had no genuine right of free speech and free assembly, no unfettered press, no power of removing the executive from office at the public will. Thus, however true it may be that the people are in the end the source of authority, they remain at crucial moments without real influence. But one can also suppose a state in which the channels of popular action are provided but are left unused in practice. Each man may be so absorbed in his individual fortunes that he neglects his share in guiding the common affairs. Everybody's business has become nobody's business. A handful of bureaucrats is allowed to work its will. That state

has the form of democracy but lacks its power, and he who is content with it is no democrat except in name.

Thus we must apply a twofold test. Mr. Asquith once said of the British House of Commons: "There is not a wave, there is scarcely even a ripple of public opinion which is not reflected in our debates." This means that the formal test is there answered in a high degree, and no doubt a similar statement could be made of Congress. But in each case there must *be* a genuine public opinion, not the opinion of a few newspapers or a few noisy agitators, but that of the people as a whole, informing itself on matters of state, and exerting itself this way or that as the social conscience may direct. No Englishman and no American will argue that either country has risen in this respect to the level at which we should aim. Judged so, there have been formal democracies which we should call morally autocratic and formal autocracies that were morally democratic. We need, then, a national self-consciousness, not in the sense of a Kiplingesque jingoism, but in the sense of a widespread resolve on the part of the common man to know what his rulers are doing in foreign policy, and *to know it before it has been unalterably done*. Our advance in this direction has been notable, as anyone can see who compares the thrashing out of the terms of peace today in the public forum with the method of the Holy Alliance or of the Congress of Berlin. But if secret diplomacy is discredited, and if the public is to play an altogether new part in world-statesmanship, how much is needed to make the change effectual and to secure that it shall be a benefit?

It is safe to say that the new régime will demand a tremendous reform of public education. Citizenship must no longer be a side aspect of our school teaching, a thing "referred to" on Fourth of July and Empire Days to the accompaniment of a flag, the recitation of war poetry by the senior class, and the performance of action songs by the primary division before a crowd of admiring parents. Nor must the teaching of citizenship be a mere systematic drilling in submissiveness to the powers that be. What we want is to make our children more fit than we have been, not simply to execute public policies but to determine them. How lamentable it is that such prolonged propaganda should have been needed in the United States, in Canada, in Great Britain, to make our people

know what militarism is, what German imperialism is, what rights are safeguarded in the public law of nations, why peace at any price is an ignoble ideal, where the limits must be set which mark off legitimate national spirit from inhuman national aggressiveness! We ought not to have required so many tons of pamphlets and so many months of popular lecturing before these elements of citizenship were adequately realized. If democracy is to be effective in ruling the world such delay must never be imposed upon our action again. It may be said that the school cannot impart such complicated ideas to an immature mind. It would be nearer the truth to say that the mind of an intelligent boy or girl has just the elasticity and the receptiveness that are absent in the average adult. Try to explain the heinousness of selling votes before the senior class in a public school, and you will meet with less dishonest casuistry than would be put forward by these children's parents. It is not less absurd to say that international morals cannot be taught to the young because of the complex thinking it involves than to suggest that Sunday schools must be a failure because the Athanasian Creed is so very metaphysical. We should of course have to change many things: qualification of teachers, type of curriculum, character of textbooks, and much more. But this is part of the burden and the challenge of a new time.

Again, the democratic citizen of the future must be educated not only for civic self-expression but for civic self-control. It is not more important that he should learn to fulfil the functions which belong to him than that he should learn to recognize what functions do *not* belong to him. The war has brought home to us in its own brutal fashion a new regard for science. Not very long ago the scientific expert was having an uphill fight for his due place in our British and American communities. And until his due place is conceded we must expect that the expert will be much rarer than he might be and should be. Take, for example, an election campaign which involves some serious issue regarding public health. Does the party agent on one side feel very greatly strengthened, or the party agent on the other very much discouraged, by an "overwhelming" manifesto of the medical profession? Such a document can, as a rule, be tremendously counteracted by artful propaganda, by appeals to

prejudice, by insinuation of personal designs on the part of the doctors, by a skilful use of such terms of reproach as "theorist" and "faddist." So far the very mildest eugenic proposals have made little headway. Most of us know cities in which a suggested law of compulsory vaccination would meet with a perfect tornado of resentment at the polls. We have allowed a sort of myth to grow up that the "practical" man must keep a watch upon the "dreamer," and that business experience, native common sense, are the great sources of wise legislation. But the myth has been pricked by the war. We have learned how unmanageable by mere common sense are the explosives that are made in a laboratory, the new mechanical designs of the aerial and marine engineer, nay even the expansive ideas conceived by men of literature and set afloat upon the world through the press. The power of dollars, of business aptitude, of "great executive ability," has been thrust into the background by the power of thought. If this has been the case even amid that clash of arms by which the voice of reason is supposed to be overborne, how much more should it be so when the world has to be reorganized not for war but for peace?

What we must set before ourselves then is the task of making our elective system far more productive than it has ever yet been of rulers who shall deserve our trust not merely by their uprightness but by their insight. The Herculean work before us must not be laid upon the very un-Herculean shoulders of such men as we have had. Thinking on a vast and world-transforming scale has to be done, and we have to choose those who will do a great deal of it *for us*. For, however much we may speak of mandates and plebiscites and referendums, we know that the more complex our affairs become the greater must be the responsibility for decisions that we cast upon our parliamentary representatives. The verdict at the polls is on an issue of principle; the details, often of immense difficulty and importance, must be settled by our delegates, and it is the quite sufficiently arduous task of the common voter to determine who those delegates shall be.

It is not by making democracy prevail in the sense of enthroning average opinion; it is rather by securing for average opinion the best possible enlightenment from the brain and will of the most competent, that the next great step forward shall have been taken.

Surely, then, one of the measures most clearly indicated for the improvement of our education is an organized advance in the subject of "political science" at our universities and colleges. This very term still sounds a little odd to the man in the street, who has been accustomed to think of politics and science in quite different moods of mind. But if our universities are to be a real center from which the light of knowledge will shine abroad, can we afford to neglect as we have done so immensely important a field as the problems of government? Will anyone contend that our seats of learning have contributed even a fraction of the help that might have been expected of them to make the common voter more intelligent in the use of the franchise? And can we conceive any other province which calls for "university extension" work more urgently? Yet a word must here be said about the danger which seems to dog such academic teaching in "politics." No malediction can be adequate upon those who seem to advise that we should herein take our model from Germany. What we seek to promote is political *science*. The first requisite of science is freedom, and the first essential in its professors is fearless independence of popular prejudice. To say this is by no means to question the need at the most extraordinary crisis of the Great War for exceptional restraint by the state on the expression of opinions dangerous to public safety. But the need and legitimacy of restraint at all times upon social teaching that is uncongenial to the teacher's milieu are being shamelessly proclaimed. In one college after another social science has thus been burlesqued. No scientific man can too strongly insist that the principle of unfettered investigation and uncensored publication shall at the earliest safe moment be restored. It touches the very life of a progressive democracy.

Those who would limit the teaching in government or in economics by the tone of prevalent opinion are the lineal descendants of those who interdicted Galileo from saying what he thought about the stars. Those who think that a heretical sociologist should "seek the endowment of his chair from those who agree with him" would have bidden Copernicus expect no further countenance until he loyally and democratically adhered to the view that the sun goes round the earth. It is just at this point that the strain upon

popular institutions has become most intense, and that those who understand the vital need for protecting unpopular sincerity are separating themselves from the charlatans who flatter the uninstructed and toot for profit among the vulgar. President Wilson's ringing denunciation of the mob violence that masquerades as patriotism should be taken to heart by every college trustee who is in danger of mistaking loyalty to his own ignorances for loyalty to the state, and by every college head who cannot distinguish between enthusiasm for the American flag and enthusiasm for increased salary from a board of regents. The manifold questions about property, about labor, about trusts, about trade, about national equipment, about eugenics, which must be settled in the coming time of peace, cannot be dealt with in that poisoned atmosphere of restraint with which not a few who should know better would seek to surround us. They fear, forsooth, that the simple may be misled, and the national will may be impeded! Theories that are false and tendencies that are retrograde will be exposed in due time in the only way in which they can ever be exposed with effect, not by persecution, but by frank and tolerant criticism. To bear such criticism when it is distasteful is just what democracy must learn. And to those who would dole out "truth" under precautions we must reply that truth has so far proved capable of looking after itself with little help or profit from their trembling solitudes.

If any ingenious devotee of words can prove that the educational requirements I have tried to indicate for the democracy of the future are all deducible from the meaning of that very elusive word itself, by all means let him do so. Others will think it preferable to attempt no such linguistic manipulations, but to speak rather of those checks and balances by which democracy is made safe. One thing in any case is clear, that he is no friend but rather an enemy of the democratic system who would see it established without those conditions under which alone it can yield its best. Nothing is easier than to demand it in those shrill tones of compliment to "the people" which the people love to hear. But the democrat who, as Lord Morley has well said, prefers using his mind to merely exercising his tongue on the people's behalf is their true servant for the future.

PUBLIC SERVICE THROUGH CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE

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There are nearly a thousand American cities with a population of over eight thousand. Each of these cities has a problem or a group of problems sufficient to warrant the present existence of at least one community organization. Many cities have been growing so rapidly that their range of problems covers everything from city planning and housing to a new form of city government, a new railroad freight and passenger terminal, a new franchise for a street railway or the financing of a new hotel. Occasionally—but rarely—one finds a city that is so dead that it has no housing problem or any other problem except deadness.

This means that there are at least one thousand cities in which there is a chamber of commerce or other civic organization which someone of ample training and high purpose may serve as community leader.¹

THE CHALLENGE OF A PROGRAM OF WORK

Being fully aware that many socially minded civic and social workers are inclined to look with disdain on the chamber of commerce and to doubt the possibility of constructive community service through the chamber of commerce, I venture to present the program of work of the Bridgeton, New Jersey, chamber of commerce as a sample. The statement of this program of work, as it appears in a report of one of the field secretaries of the American City Bureau, is printed herewith in full as follows:

PROGRAM OF WORK

INTRODUCTION

The following is the result of a thorough survey of the membership of the Bridgeton Chamber of Commerce, as obtained through a series of group

¹For an extended discussion of chamber of commerce ideals and methods see *Community Leadership—The New Profession*, by Lucius E. Wilson, vice-president of American City Bureau, Civic Press, New York, 1919.

meetings. They are an expression of the most urgent and obvious needs of the community at the present time. In the natural course of events, other projects will demand the consideration and decisive action of the Chamber.

Accomplishment of the projects included in these programs is dependent upon intelligent leadership on the part of officers and directors and enthusiastic co-operation on the part of the membership. The programs present a broad and comprehensive field for organized community endeavor, giving promise of actual accomplishment because derived from the united thought of the membership.

MAJOR PROGRAM OF WORK

A general demand already exists for the accomplishment of subjects placed under this heading. The Chamber of Commerce is, therefore, in a position to find immediate and wide support in its activities directed along these lines.

1. *Streets*.—Co-operate with City Council to secure improvement of streets and extension of the present pavement system.

2. *Education*.—Work for an improved public-school system, advocating the erection of a new high school and endeavoring to raise local educational standards.

3. *Good roads*.—Inaugurate movement to improve all highways leading into Bridgeton and endeavor to obtain hard surface road for trucking produce to big marketing centers.

4. *Health*.—Advocate the establishment of a garbage collection and disposal system, extension of the sewerage system and adequate enforcement of the sanitation laws.

5. *Transportation*.—Take steps to secure improvement of local train and trolley service.

6. *Housing*.—Encourage the building of homes as a solution of the housing situation.

7. *Comfort station*.—Provide public restroom and comfort station for the convenience of out-of-town people who make Bridgeton their trading center.

8. *Industrial development*.—Develop Bridgeton industrially by fostering the industries already located here and endeavoring to secure new ones.

9. *Publicity*.—Advertise the advantages of Bridgeton as a good place in which to live and work.

10. *Civic co-operation*.—Bring the general public to an understanding and appreciation of the aims and purposes of the Chamber of Commerce in an effort to unite the entire citizenship into an effective force for promoting the best interests of Bridgeton.

11. *Street lighting*.—Urge City Council to improve the present street lighting system.

12. *Community building*.—Undertake campaign to secure erection of a community building as a memorial to Bridgeton's ex-service men.

FORUM AND DISCUSSIONAL PROGRAM

Certain projects will require discussion and the winnings of a larger interest and support before they are undertaken, if efforts are to be successful.

A single meeting of the Membership Forum may indicate a degree of interest in a topic that will justify its immediate transference to the Major Program by the Board of Directors, and the appointment of a committee to begin work.

1. *Traffic regulations*.—Consider ways and means for the parking of automobiles and the elimination of traffic congestion.

2. *Agricultural development*.—Study the need of and develop plans for the assistance of farmers in the marketing of their products.

3. *Recreation*.—Focus public attention upon the necessity for adequately equipped and properly supervised parks, playgrounds, dance halls, theaters, and recreational centers where Bridgeton's young people can enjoy themselves under wholesome social surroundings.

4. *Fire prevention*.—Stimulate public interest in the care of property so as to eliminate the dangers of fire.

5. *City beautification*.—Promote a sense of pride in the appearance of the city, encouraging general participation in all "clean-up movements," and urging rigid enforcement of existing ordinances.

6. *Taxation*.—Arrange for the presentation of arguments favorable to a readjustment of taxable valuation and rate with a view to an increase in city and county income which will take care of needed improvements.

7. *City planning*.—Advance as a subject for early discussion a feasible plan which will provide for the future growth and development of the city.

8. *Retail trade*.—Awaken interest among merchants in a plan to improve store service, thereby strengthening the position of the city as a mercantile trading center.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES

The following subjects were presented, but do not appear to have sufficient support to warrant their being placed in the Major or Forum Programs. They may be introduced into the activities of the organization as public attention is attracted to them and as there is opportunity to carry them out.

Bring before the public the necessity for more adequate accommodations for visitors.

Unite with the other Chambers of Commerce in this district to secure a satisfactory proportion of state expenditures in South Jersey.

3. Urge City Council to enact an ordinance providing for milk inspection.

4. Co-operate with local ministers to increase interest in church activities.

5. Suggest to the banks the advisability of remaining open one evening a week instead of Saturday afternoon.

6. Establish a public forum for the discussion of important municipal questions.

7. Educate the people of the city to appreciate and support the Bridgeton Hospital.

8. Develop a sentiment favorable to the proper marking of streets and renumbering of houses.

9. Advocate erection of a municipal abattoir.

10. Discuss the possibilities of an improved form of city government.

11. Consider advisability of conducting a campaign to secure a Y.M.C.A.

INTERRELATION OF CIVICS AND COMMERCE

It has been a common sport for socially trained "civic" workers to assume a superior and self-righteous attitude toward the chamber of commerce and the chamber of commerce secretary. This pose is bred of a false philosophy of life which assumes that social and economic points of view are separate and distinct, and that, therefore, civics and commerce should be kept in thought-tight compartments.

Actual experience of the chamber of commerce secretary has served to demonstrate the oneness of the community problem. In secretarial literature it finds its expression in more than one paper on "The Interrelation of Civics and Commerce." Thus one finds that health and education, city planning and zoning, municipal administration, language and religion, politics and race, are intertwined with the business of making a living. A few illustrations quoted from a *Manual on City Planning Procedure*¹ will serve to illustrate more in detail:

Street traffic.—Is retail trade handicapped by the inadequacy of parking areas for automobiles, and by the consequent parking in front of store windows furnished for display? Does the trade avoid congested streets, and can shoppers approach store fronts by automobiles? Is the time of business men and workmen wasted by traffic delays caused by a congestion of street cars, horse-drawn vehicles, motor busses, and automobiles? Must trucks take "the long way around" in delivering industrial products or merchandise to railroad terminals? One could elaborate on the economic significance of the street traffic problem at length.

Zoning.—Real estate men everywhere are anxious for zoning, in the interests of their property or the property of their clients. Does it mean

¹ *Manual on City Planning Procedure*, by W. J. Donald, American City Bureau, 1920.

anything to mortgage companies that homes are protected from the encroachment of stores, from the shadows of apartments, and smoke and fumes of industry? Does the dry goods merchant want proximity to a garage or does the manufacturer of silks seek a chemical plant as his neighbor? Retail business men succeed best where business men "most do congregate." The retail "corner grocery" was ever a precarious financial adventure.

Grade crossings.—Consider the time lost to business by delays caused by grade crossings. Street cars, automobiles, pedestrians, trucks and delivery wagons are kept standing, and workmen and clerks are late for work. Life that can be valued only inadequately in money terms is destroyed by grade crossing accidents. Retail business districts are damaged and residential sections are blighted, until the obstruction is removed.

The principle suggested by these illustrations is one which the business man understands more or less in its concrete applications. It is a principle so well understood by a large percentage of chamber of commerce secretaries that their years are being devoted to teaching it to business men and to applying it in the solution of practical problems. Indeed the chamber of commerce secretary who thinks only in terms of one of the special social sciences will fail to solve the problems of the community, and sooner or later will destroy the chamber of commerce by undermining the only philosophy on which it can live. This statement is not only theory—it is also tried and proven practice.

THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE SECRETARY

To understand the nature and scope of the program of work of a chamber of commerce is a challenge to the man who would serve the public. The opportunity of the chamber of commerce secretary invites men of the very best of training in the social sciences together with executive ability. One's knowledge of the sources of information is likely to be taxed to the utmost in the course of a week's work.

What level the profession has reached is indicated by a "Code of Ethics" prepared by a committee of experienced secretaries and adopted by the Students Association at the American City Bureau School for Chamber of Commerce Secretaries held at Madison, Wisconsin, in August of 1920. The "code," which might well be emulated by other professions, is as follows:

COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP IS A PROFESSION

I BELIEVE

That it offers an exceptional opportunity for constructive and substantial community service.

That as a member of this profession I should strive to improve my knowledge, widen my mental and spiritual horizon, and arrive at an understanding of the forces which move men to united action for the public weal.

That I should be at all times sincere, considerate, unprejudiced and fearless.

That my morals should be above reproach.

That I should apply myself to my work with a diligence and industry consistent with my physical and social efficiency.

That I should scrupulously administer the finances and affairs of my office in accordance with the best business practice.

That I should be honest and accurate in the dissemination of information regarding the community which I represent.

That I should hold in strictest confidence all information given in the same spirit.

That I should take no advantage for personal gain of private information received through the activities of the organization which I serve.

That a greater field for service rather than a higher salary should be the actuating motive in any future advancement in my profession.

That I should make no tender of my services to another community unless certain that the position desired is to be vacated.

That I should not accept a salary greater than commercial organization experience shows my organization is justified in paying.

That I should accept no remuneration for my services as a commercial organization executive apart from the regular salary for the position, except with the full approval of the Board of Directors.

That I should refrain from attempting to increase my salary by playing one organization against another.

That to make a change of position after only a few months of service or while in the midst of important incompleting activities is wrong in principle and detrimental to the profession.

That the ethics of my profession are best served by giving credit for accomplishments to the organization, rather than to the secretary.

That I should have the courage to admit my mistakes and thereon build for future success.

That I should so conduct myself and the affairs of my organization that others in the profession may find it wise and profitable to follow my example.

That I should be willing at all times, when requested, to assist my fellow secretaries in the solution of their problems and in securing a better understanding of the principles of the profession.

That my acceptance of a position as secretary should be founded upon implicit faith in my community, in my organization, in my profession and in myself.

That above all I should be loyal to my community and to my organization.

That I should exemplify the principles of unselfish community idealism and urge the responsibility and privilege of community service.

THE OPPORTUNITY

There is a constantly growing demand for well-trained men for chamber of commerce secretaryships. Moreover, standards of quality are constantly and rapidly rising.

The problems which the secretary must help to solve call for adequate training, executive ability, the impulse for public service, and a philosophy of society which sees the community problem as fundamentally one rather than diverse.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE BLACK DEATH AND THE AFTERMATH OF THE GREAT WAR

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Ever since the Great War terminated and the world lapsed into the condition—physical, moral, economic, social—in which it now finds itself, historians and students of social pathology have been searching if possibly they might discover a precedent in the past for the present order (or rather disorder) of things. The years immediately following the close of the Napoleonic Wars have been the favorite epoch for examination. But the conditions of the period after Waterloo have been found to bear little resemblance to conditions today. The differences in degree between things as they were then and things as they now are is so great that analogies fail. The old maxims, "We understand the present by the past," and "History is philosophy teaching by example," are broken shibboleths. There seems to have been nothing in the past comparable or applicable to the present.

And yet, though it is true that history never repeats itself, there is one epoch of the past the study of which casts remarkable light upon things as they are today; whose conditions afford phenomenal parallels in many particulars to present conditions; which furnishes not merely analogies but real identities with existing economic, social, and moral circumstances. That period is the years immediately succeeding the Great Plague or the Black Death of 1348-49 in Europe. The turmoil of the world today serves to visualize for us what the state of Europe was in the middle of the fourteenth century far more distinctly than ever was perceived before. It is surprising to see how similar are the complaints then and now: economic chaos, social unrest, high prices, profiteering, depravation of morals, lack of production, industrial indolence, frenetic gaiety, wild expenditure, luxury, debauchery, social and religious hysteria, greed, avarice, maladministration, decay of manners.

Let us consider the first and most immediate effect—the loss of man-power owing to the great mortality. While it is true that the population of Europe is much greater now than in the fourteenth century, and the mortality far higher then than in the past five years, nevertheless, as everyone knows, the working efficiency of Europe has been seriously reduced owing to the death of large numbers of men in battle or of disease, to which must be added some millions of the civilian population from starvation, privation, and disease. And many of those who survive are shaken in body or in mind. The nerves of these people are so shattered that it will be a long time before they can go back to work; many of them never will. The same was true of the people of Europe in 1349, when the Black Death had passed. The psycho-physical shock to them had been so great that restoration of their former vitality and initiative was impossible, or very slow.

The economic effect of the Black Death also was not unsimilar to the effect of the Great War, though the immediate results of the plague were very different. The moment the war began prices soared. This was not so in 1349. The immediate effect of the Black Death was to lower prices and to glut the market with commodities. The reason is not far to seek. Every civilized society possesses a certain accumulated surplus of goods or produce, enough to last it for some months at least, even if production cease. Now the mortality due to the Black Death was very high, at least 35 per cent of the population. The consequence was that when the plague had spent its force the surviving population found itself in possession of these accumulated stores, produce, goods, in addition to movable and real property which had once belonged to those now dead.

Men woke up to find themselves rich who had formerly been poor, inasmuch as they were the only surviving heirs. Land, houses, furniture, goods, farm products, cattle, horses, sheep, were without owners, and most of it was immediately appropriated by the survivors. Everything movable or which could be driven away on four feet was seized; even landed property was occupied since there was no one to protest and the very courts of law were stopped. "There were small prices for everything," records

Henry Knighton, the medieval chronicler. "A man could have a horse, which before was worth 40s. for 6s. 8d.; a fat ox for 4s.; a cow for 12d.; a heifer for 2d.; a big pig for 5d.; a fat wether for 4d.; a sheep for 3d.; a lamb for 2d.; a stone of wool for 9d. Sheep and cattle went wandering over fields and through crops, and there was no one to go and drive or gather them."

The direct result of all this suddenly acquired wealth was a wild orgy of expenditure and debauchery on the part of many. Furs, silks, tapestries, rich furniture, expensive food, jewels, plate, fell within the purchasing power of the poor. Men spent lavishly, luxuriously, insanely. Poor workmen and poorer cotters, living in wretched hovels, who formerly, like Margery Daw, had slept on straw, now lolled on beds of down and ate from plate that once had decorated the sideboards of nobles. Often, too, they removed from their ancient quarters into the vacant houses. The landlord class was hit hard by the plague. "Magnates and lesser lords of the realm who had tenants made abatements of rent in order to keep their tenantry; some half the rent, some more, some less, some for two years, some for three, some for one year, according as they could agree with them."

But this condition of luxury soon passed. Those who survived found themselves personally richer than before; but Europe was immeasurably poorer, for production absolutely ceased for months, even a whole year, and when it was renewed the productive capacity of Europe was found to be much impaired, while the waste had been terrific. When all the accumulated surplus had been consumed or wasted, prices soared and the cost of living, both of commodities and of service, rose enormously. Farm laborers, guild workmen, domestic servants, clerks, even priests, struck for higher wages. "In the following autumn no one could get a reaper for less than 8d. with his food; a mower for less than 12d. with his food. Wherefore many crops perished in the fields for want of some one to garner them. But in the pestilence year there was such abundance of all kinds of corn that no one troubled about it. . . . A man could scarcely get a chaplain under ten pounds or ten marks to minister to a church. There was scarcely any one now who was willing to accept a vicarage for twenty pounds." Even rents

soon went up. Abandoned buildings lapsed into ruin, occupied buildings naturally deteriorated under wear and tear, and the wages of carpenters and other artisans were often so high as to prohibit repairs.

The high prices of staple commodities and the exorbitant demands of the wage-earning class soon reached a pinnacle under the stimulus of profiteering. Accordingly the governments had resort to maximum laws both for commodities and wages. France passed a Statute of Laborers in 1350, England a similar law in 1351.

The social effects of the Black Death were manifold. In the first place, then as now, there was enormous displacement of population. The plague had the effect of an invasion; it either killed or drove out the population. Thousands fled to other places. Infected districts were left deserted. In after-years one finds evidence of this in interesting ways. New place-names, new faces, even unfamiliar speech in various regions, attest it. One finds evidence of Italian colonies in south German and south French cities; French and Germans in north Italy; Flemings in Normandy; Normans in Picardy, etc. Under the stress of fear men were mad to get out of an infected region, and fled, often into another quite as dangerous. We find other evidence of this movement of population in the outcropping of technical industries and crafts, once peculiar to a certain country, in quite another place owing to the flight of workmen from the former to the latter locality.

The texture of society, too, was profoundly modified by the Black Death. In addition to a large class of *nouveaux riches*, the plague opened the door of opportunity to many to get into new lines of employment, or to establish themselves in new kinds of business. Clerks became merchants, former workmen became employers and contractors, farm laborers became gentlemen farmers. The old nobility of Europe, which derived its lineage from the Norman Conquest and the Crusades, largely passed away, leaving their titles and their lands to the kings who gave them out to new favorites, so that a new *noblesse* arose in Europe, a parvenu nobility without the accomplishment, the pride, or the manners of the old *noblesse*. The titles survived, but the blood of the peerage was new, not old; parvenu, not aristocratic. With the passing of

the aristocracy passed also the chivalry and courtesy that had distinguished it. The decay of manners in the last half of the fourteenth century is an astonishing fact. The old-fashioned gentility was gone; manners were uncouth, rough, brutal. Familiar speech became rude, lewd, even obscene. Every student of the literature of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries has observed this. This explains the paradox that books on courtesy were so much in demand in these centuries. The new high society was ignorant of good manners and needed to know. Even fashions reflected the decadent conditions of the age. Refinement and decorum in dress, which marked the distinguished lady and gentleman in the thirteenth century, disappeared. The *nouveaux riches* had a passion for display, for garish colors, for excessive dress, for the wearing of many jewels. Dressmakers and milliners reaped a harvest from this class. The costumes were fabrications to wonder at, but not to admire.

Another characteristic of the late fourteenth century which strikes a familiar note is the protest against political corruption and administrative inefficiency. The cry for reform was widespread and not to be wondered at. The Black Death hit the governments of Europe hard. For two hundred years these governments had been slowly and painfully developing their administrative machinery and training up a skilled class of officials in their employ. Now of a sudden thousands of this technically trained class were cut down, so much so that the governments were crippled beyond what we may imagine; police protection, courts, law-making, the hundred and one everyday activities of an ordered society were arrested. The machinery of the governments nearly stopped. In this emergency two things happened: the offices had to be filled, the government kept running at all cost, so that thousands of ignorant, incompetent, dishonest men were hastily thrust into public offices; moreover, the thousands of vacant offices tempted the job-hunter, the placeman, the professional office-seeker, and this class swarmed into the vacancies with the selfish motive of feathering their own nests and plundering the public. The result was appalling waste, great maladministration, speculation, etc., with the natural protest of society against these abuses.

The church was no better off than the state in this particular. Every student of medieval history knows the outcry that arose in Europe in the last half of the fourteenth century against the abuses and corruption in the church. But the church is not to be blamed too severely for this condition. It, too, had to keep functioning, and to do so impressed into service all sorts and conditions of men; in the universal terror it could not be over-careful in those whom it selected. And again, church offices were lucrative and influential appointments, and many intruded themselves into church livings for the sake of the material nature of the preferment.

Complaints against political and administrative corruption, the prevalence and increase of crime, lightness of mind, and looseness of morals, high prices, profiteering, industrial and farm strikes, extravagance, indolence, or refusal to go to work are common and widespread today. So they were in the fourteenth century. The Black Death wrought a universal upheaval and transformation of society to which nothing else in history is comparable except the influence of the Great War.

Even in the field of psychology this analogy holds true. Not only those who actually fought in the late war, but the whole population is suffering from "shell shock," from frayed nerves. It is this condition which explains the semi-hysterical state of mind of millions in Europe, which accounts for their fevered or morbid emotionalism. The old barriers are down, the old inhibitions removed. The superficial yet fevered gaiety, the proneness to debauchery, the wild wave of extravagance, the flamboyant luxury, the gluttony in restaurant and café—all these phenomena are readily explicable by the student used to making psycho-social analyses. And as always at such seasons, the phenomena of the Freudian complex are vividly presented. A book could be written solely upon the strange, intense, morbid sex manifestations abroad in the world at present.

It was so after the Black Death. The so-called Flagellant movement was a mixture of religious morbidity and sex stimuli, so widespread in its influence that it reduced thousands to a state of frenzy. Not since the Crusades had Europe witnessed so tremendous a manifestation of mob psychology. In the lapse of all the

accustomed inhibitions of church, of state, of society, the thought and conduct of men went off on eccentric tangents. The failure of old authorities gave room for new and self-constituted authorities to establish themselves. Charlatans, mind-readers, sorcerers, witch-doctors, drug-vendors, sprang up like mushrooms, along with perfervid crossroads preachers and soap-box orators denouncing society and the wrongs around them, and offering each his panacea or remedy. A golden opportunity was afforded to the amateur preacher, the amateur reformer, the pseudo-scientist, the grafter.

The literature of the late Middle Ages is rich in the possession of this kind of psycho-social phenomena, which has not yet been studied. Few even know of it. It may surprise the reader to learn that probably the well-known legend about the Pied Piper of Hamelin is attached to the time of the Black Death. Grotesque and amusing as Browning's famous ballad is, there is yet a tragic pathos underneath the tale, which he failed to divine. Browning, as all his readers, regarded the story as a mere legend. But undeniably there is a basis of real history below the surface.

In the first place it is a well-known historical fact that the Black Death was accompanied by a great plague of rats in Europe. Now the rat has been a symbol of pestilence since remote antiquity. One need go no farther than the Old Testament for evidence of this, and the symbolism is attested by ancient art. What probably happened at Hamelin was this: the town was infested by rats; the Pied Piper made his appearance (whether a charlatan or a lunatic cannot be said) and offered to charm the rats away. The rats probably stayed, but the Piper's strange costume and stranger power which he declared that he possessed, united with the intense, even hysterical emotionalism of the people, working upon the natural curiosity of children at sight of such a wondrous spectacle as the Piper in their streets, lured the children after him and they were scattered, never to return. The poor children were swept away on a wave of crowd psychology, of emotional excitement, to the point of hysteria. They suffered the fate of those who went on the Children's Crusade, many of whom we know fell into the hands of professional kidnapers and slavers.

A book might be written upon these peculiar and eccentric effects of the Black Death, as many will write books in the near future upon the social psychology of Europe since the war. The parallel which I have made is not a perfect one, of course, but there is sufficient analogy between the aftermath of the Black Death and the aftermath of the Great War to enlist the serious consideration of the student of history.

A NORMAL-SCHOOL COURSE IN SOCIOLOGY INTRODUCTORY TO WORK IN THE SOCIAL STUDIES

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As stated by Mr. Clow in his report on "Sociology in Normal Schools" in the March, 1920, *Journal of Sociology*, the California State Board of Education has within the last few years made certain minimum requirements in sociology as part of the professional work in normal schools. In expressing these requirements, one of the units of work specifically called for is "Civic Sociology." It is doubtful whether the educators responsible for this requirement possessed any clear definition for "Civic Sociology" in their own minds. It is assuredly true that no two of the California normal schools have interpreted the term in the same way. It may be of some value to outline a tentative course which has been utilized in one such school during the past year in an endeavor to realize the intention of the state board.

The aims of the course, as seen at San Francisco, were three-fold: first, the supplying of a background of science and broad general interest as an introduction to the social studies; second, an attempt to stimulate interest in an understanding and interpretation of the place of the individual in the present social organization; third, and, with us, most important, the preparation of the individual student to meet the social problem of the teacher in the discipline of the school in a manner calculated to help her in handling it as a problem in citizenship training. The time allowed for this course was approximately sixty hours during one semester.

A glance at the outline of the material as presented in the succeeding pages shows that the actual classroom time was utterly inadequate to more than touch upon a majority of the topics presented, and that the ultimate value of the work must have depended upon the outside reading done in following up the assignments.

Although no specified amount of reading was required, a fairly automatic check of whether or not the reading was being done was offered by the quality of each day's discussion, which, in every case, was based upon previously assigned references. In actual fact, the reading in a majority of cases exceeded what would have been considered a reasonable requirement and in many instances exceeded the actual references.

Before discussing the method of presentation and different phases of the course in detail, the following general outline of the work is presented:

A COURSE OUTLINE IN CIVIC SOCIOLOGY

I. THE IDEA OF SPACE, AND THE STELLAR RELATIONSHIPS

A. The Immense Magnitude of Space

- a) Understanding of the terms "star," "planet," "nebula," etc., with their relationships
- b) Extent of space; distances
- c) Appreciation of the fact that the universe responds to "law"—some deliberate attempt to develop a sense of inspiration and awe at the works of creation, based upon scientific appreciation

B. A Brief Study of the Myths of Creation. Conceptions of primitive peoples, with some reference to their points of unity in explaining natural phenomena

C. The Birth of the World

- a) Some understanding of the conceptions of Laplace, Herschel, and Kant, and the Chamberlain-Moulton hypothesis
- b) The soundness of observational conclusions—inductive reasoning
- c) Some of the astronomical observations upon which the explanations of solar origin rest

II. THE DAWN OF LIFE—THE EVOLUTIONARY IDEA

A. The Geologic Evidence of the Earth's Development. The structure of the earth's surface and its organic content

- a) The development of life-forms from simple to complex, as revealed by geologic investigation
- B. The Comparative Data Substantiating the Evolutionary Theory
 - a) Data and conclusions of Darwin
 - b) Data and conclusions of DeVries, etc.
- C. The Embryonic Evidence of Recapitulation
 - a) Fertilization and ontogeny
 - b) Chromosomes as the bearers of "unit characters," etc.

III. PRIMITIVE MAN

- A. Apparent Age of the Race from Geologic Evidence; the Java, Neanderthal, Cro-Magnon, etc., Men

- B. Apparent Distribution. From Java to England, swinging through Southern India, Mesopotamia, Mediterranean Basin, Central Europe to British Isles
 - a) On a basis of geologic evidence, see previous section
 - b) On a basis of ethnic relationship, see succeeding section
- C. Race Types. A study of the Aryan-Caucasian distribution and the apparent Africo-Asiatic offshoots
 - a) Head shape, facial index, etc., in determining racial similarity
 - b) Influence of geography upon race development. See "C" below, further

IV. SOCIETAL EVOLUTION

- A. The "Ages of Man"
 - a) Paleolithic, Neolithic, Bronze, Iron. Are they chronological or coexistent?
 - b) Hunter, herder, agriculturist, industrialist. Are they chronological or coexistent?
 - c) Individual, family, clan, tribe, city-state, nation. Chronological or coexistent?
- B. Prerequisites to the Development of Civilization
 - a) Climatic
 - b) Geographic
 - c) Activity
- C. Influences of Geographic Environment on Civilization
 - a) Geographic "paths." Their influence on the spread of culture
 - b) Geographic "situation" and its influence; isolation vs. central location; India contrasted to Greece; Alpine race vs. inhabitants of Rhine valley; Britain vs. Russia
 - c) Situation and world-conflict; Babylon and Persia; Persia and Greece; Rome and Carthage; France and Germany
 - d) Discovery of New World and results of consequent population movements
- D. Study of the Tigris-Euphrates States. "The Cradle of Civilization"
 - a) Social development, customs, laws, education, culture, "Code of Hammurabi"
 - b) Economic development, use of slave labor, lack of mechanical help
 - c) Comparison and contrast with modern civilization
 - d) Increasing integration of social units
- E. Cycles of Civilization—Growth of the Known World
 - a) Independent rise of cultural groups: Egypt, Chaldea, Crete, India, Mexico, China, etc.
 - b) Evidence of prior civilizations to these: archaeological data
 - c) Rise and fall of Babylon, of Greece, of Rome. Replacement by "barbarian tribes." The steppes as origins of racial migrations
 - d) Disappearance of industrial secrets, etc.; forgotten monuments

- e) For the first time a civilization has annihilated time and space and explored the entire globe; possibilities of the future; Malthusian theories
- F. Influence of Instincts and Emotions on Societal Evolution
 - a) Social psychology—McDougall
 - b) Studies in the unconscious—Freud
 - c) Satisfaction and inhibitions of instincts in social development
 - d) Influence of the mores working through instincts to conserve the existing order and inhibit progress
 - e) In-group and out-group
 - f) What determines right and wrong (study of classroom case problems)
- G. Religion and Social Development
 - a) Comparative social virtues as presented by Confucius, Buddha, Christ, and Mahomet
 - b) Religious martyrdom and violation of the mores
 - c) Rise of science and philosophy, occupying part of the intellectual sphere once reserved to religion
- V. CYCLES OF HISTORY—A BRIEF STUDY OF RECURRING SOCIAL PHENOMENA. (No attempt to be exhaustive, simply to illustrate again through a few typical historical instances, the cycle form of the development of civilization)
 - A. Appearance of written law. (Codes of Hammurabi, Draco, etc., in Babylon, Greece, Rome, feudal Europe, etc.)
 - B. Attempt to equalize voting privileges; the evolution of the "geographical tribe" in Greece, Rome, down to our modern precinct and district
 - C. Land problem; the reiterated attempt to break up the landed estates; Greece, Rome, feudal Europe, modern Mexico, and Russia; the reclamation work of the United States and the colonization schemes of the California Land Settlement Board in adaptation of the Australian system
- VI. TOPIC REPORTS ON MODERN SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL PROBLEMS

The approximate time allotment was about as follows: one-sixth of the total to Sections I, II, and III; one-third to Section IV; one-sixth to Section V; one-third to Section VI.

No general textbook was possible because of the great range of topics. Chapin's *Introduction to the Study of Social Evolution* came the nearest to paralleling the first part of the course, and was therefore used by practically everyone for the work of the first four sections. Lull, *Evolution of the Earth*, was found to be a little

more difficult reading, but was of general use. The *Book of Knowledge* and *Our Wonder World* offered material of equal diversity and were much used. Other than these, a wide list of suggested references was offered, some better than others, and some more difficult than others. This list follows:

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SECTION IV

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Wm. Healy, *Mental Conflicts and Misconduct*
———, *The Child's Unconscious Mind*
———, *The Individual Delinquent*
C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*
Great Religions of the World (Harper), *Collected Papers*
Allan Menzies, *History of Religion*
Lord Dunsany, *A Dreamer's Tale—The Sword and the Idol*

For Section V references were made to any one of a number of high-school history texts, as well as other historical material. The following monthly and weekly periodicals, in addition to specific publications, were used in connection with the current reports: *Review of Reviews*, *World's Work*, *Current Opinion*, *Current History*, *Outlook*, *Literary Digest*, *New Republic*, *Nation*, *Harvey's Weekly*, *Leslie's Weekly*, *Survey*, *Manchester Guardian Weekly Edition*.

Throughout the course it was attempted to keep the discussion on a Socratic basis wherever possible, the instructor attempting to arouse the questioning attitude and avoid direct statement. In the first part of the work this was rather difficult because the students lacked the informational background to sustain discussion. The method proved successful in stimulating reading, and as the reading increased the discussions naturally improved.

One of the chief handicaps from the informational standpoint was due to the small amount of current newspaper and periodical reading done by the average normal student. The topics assigned for individual report were given out about eight weeks before due, and in many instances stimulated this type of reading, with results which became increasingly evident in the course of the later discussions.

Throughout the discussions it was constantly kept before the students that the type of material introduced was of three kinds: facts, experimentally established and accepted; generally accepted theories based upon many proved facts; opinions. All material discussed was classified accordingly, and of course every attempt was made to consider various theories and many opinions. The instructor carefully avoided any tendency to emphasize "pet" theories, and it is probable that at the close of the course each

theory had its adherents, and a variety of opinions were held by different members of the class.

The course was given in both the fall and spring semesters. One group of students took the work while assigned to classroom teaching, and the other group while doing nothing but preparatory work. The first group was in every way more alive to the possibilities of the course, and during the discussion of instincts and emotions, which were illustrated by classroom cases and examples, saw and profited much more by the applications to their current experience.

Although an experiment, attempting in almost kaleidoscopic fashion to survey many fields, a judgment formed sometime after the product had passed on to other experiences is that the work was successful in realizing the aims laid out. It is not to be thought that any pretense of thorough or complete study of any one of the topics enumerated was made. Following this course, each student prepared in greater detail the material included in the courses of history, geography, general science, and life-science—it is hoped and believed with a better realization of the natural correlation existing.

Of course the question remains, Is this civic sociology? I submit that this answer is as good as the next, and in aim and realization justifies the assertion that it is.

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

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Now that the world-war for democracy is terminated and autocracy forever banished, at least from Europe, the most amazing fact which emerges for our reflection is that this achievement had to be brought about at a cost of life and property beyond that of any other achievement in the history of mankind. Indeed, it is inexpressibly amazing that the object aimed at and gained could not have been reached through the exercise of human reason in applying to the situation those fundamental principles which have been observed to be characteristic of the whole progress of civilization. If there is one fact of social evolution standing out more clearly than another it is that the trend of all institutions in the Western World has been away from autocracy and paternalism and toward freedom and democracy. This trend has been conspicuous in industry, in the family, in religion, and in government. The world-war had to be fought out simply because some of the nations of the earth were blind to this universal trend. It will always stand out as one of the most remarkable discordances of history that a people so profoundly learned as the Germans should have remained totally blind to the most obvious facts of human history, and should have perpetuated in their social organization those paternal aspects of industry, the family, religion, and government which have been against the whole trend of civilization. How much better it would have been for the world if Emperor William and his military aristocracy had perceived the trend of civilization and had sought to guide it toward its destination. But such seems to be the aberration of a privileged class everywhere that, owl-like, the more light they have the darker their vision, and they always incumber the path of progress and have to be ejected by violence.

Let us hope that the last great battle has been fought for political freedom; that the world is now safe for all democratic nations, and that the few remaining monarchies will soon undergo a peaceful evolution into self-governing states.

In the meantime, before the smoke of battle of the world-war has quite cleared away, we see the horizon in every direction ablaze with another revolution of far greater extent and importance than the one we are rejoicing to have brought to an end. This new revolution, now flaring up in every country, is merely a logical consequence of the one just ended. It is a revolution in the direction of democracy in industry; and it will go on, like the political revolution of the past, in spite of all opposition, until it is everywhere an accomplished fact.

The peace of the world now hinges upon the attitude which the capitalists and all enlightened citizens will manifest toward this new revolution. Will they have the vision to perceive the inevitable trend of industrial evolution, and seek to guide it toward its destination, or will they, like the German aristocracy in the political revolution, remain blind and set themselves as incumbrances in the path of progress? Their attitude toward this movement will determine whether it shall move on peacefully or become a flame, as in Russia. When this revolution has run its triumphant course, will the historian look back with amazement at the same blindness and imbecility of the capitalists that characterized the Germans in their attitude toward the political revolution?

In the industrial world we see labor and capital divided into hostile camps, wasting their strength and resources in warfare and inflicting manifold sufferings upon the non-combatant population. Will these contending forces ever sign an armistice and form a league to enforce future peace, or will the war go on until the social structure collapses and crushes both of them?

I believe that it is entirely feasible to bring about a permanent peace between labor and capital through the application of democratic principles to industry; and, in the interest of that peace, I will venture to indicate the fundamental wrong in the present relationship of labor and capital and the kind of reconstruction needed to adjust industry to a democratic basis.

At the outset of this problem we should recall that the régime of labor and capital has certain inherent disadvantages, generally recognized by economists and sociologists, which render it incompatible with industrial efficiency. The French economist Charles Gide, for instance, says:

Leaving the high ground of justice, and using the criterion of social utility, the contract of wages is seen to have a vice which absolutely condemns it. As soon as the laborer surrenders his interest in the product of his labor, he loses all stimulus to production; nay, it is obviously to his advantage to do as little work as possible in return for the price the master pays for his labor. He can only be made to act otherwise by the sentiment of duty or the sentiment of fear; fear not of the whip, as the slave feels, but of dismissal, and of the loss of his livelihood. The first of these motives can only influence minds of a higher stamp, and, moreover, grows weaker as the antagonism between masters and workmen becomes more pronounced. The second motive—and human nature may boast of the fact—has never wrung any good result from man.

Further, the interests of masters and workmen inevitably clash, and the wage system does not become more bearable for its fatal offspring—the strike. No one denies that the contract of wages is advantageous in certain cases; but what is contrary to nature is that this form of contract should become the general law of present society, so that, of their own free will or not, the laboring masses are dispossessed of all rights over the produce of their labor, and are deprived of all interest in the work of production. Such a state of things can scarcely be regarded as final.

The modern laborer, in contrast to the slave, has a theoretical liberty, but in reality he has often only the choice of deciding under what master he will spend the greater part of his life, with no more interest in the outcome of his labor than a slave has, with no opportunity for individual initiative or self-realization, and no certainty in the tenure of his employment. Carlyle says:

The liberty especially which has to purchase itself by social isolation, and each man standing separate from the other, having no business with him but a cash account: this is such liberty as the earth seldom saw—as the earth will not long put up with, recommend it as you may. This liberty turns out, before it has long continued in action, with all men throwing up their caps around it, to be, for the Working Millions, a liberty to die for want of food; for the Idle Thousands and Units, also, a still more fatal liberty to live in want of work: to have no earnest duty to do in this God's World any more. What becomes of a man in such predicament? Earth's laws are silent,

and Heaven's speak in a voice which is not heard. No work, and the ineradicable need of work, give rise to new very wondrous life-philosophies, life-practices. Brethren, we know but imperfectly yet, after ages of constitutional government, what Liberty and Slavery are.

Even so arch an enemy of everything socialistic as Herbert Spencer could see nothing durable in the régime of labor and capital. In his judgment it was only a transitional stage between the coercive system of the past and some freer form of association of the future.

The laborer in modern times does not have a proper incentive to self-realization. Because he lacks this incentive he finds his work uninteresting, monotonous, and often very irksome, and he seeks to limit it to as few hours as possible. On the other hand, professional men, such as artists, scientists, lawyers, and doctors, often find their work so interesting that they cannot do as much of it as they would willingly do within the limited years of their lifetime. If we analyze the two classes of workers we shall find that the difference in their attitude toward work is due not so much to the difference in the character of the work as in the conditions under which it is performed. The painter, sculptor, scientist, and professional men generally, work under conditions that bring into play certain fundamental instincts which always awaken interest and a feeling of exhilaration. For instance, the instinct of pugnacity which comes into play whenever man is inspired to overcome anything; the instinct of curiosity which comes into play whenever man is inspired to investigate or pry into anything; the instinct of self-assertion which comes into play whenever man is inspired to excel another or win any triumph over nature; and the constructive instinct which comes into play whenever man is inspired to invent, organize, or combine anything for a definite object. The secret of keeping a child amused, and out of mischief, consists in supplying it with playthings that keep these instincts busy.

The reason that work is generally repellent to the average wageworker is that it affords no opportunity for the employment of these life-sustaining instincts. A man who is merely paid for his time, and who has no share in the control of the business in

which he works, is necessarily deprived of those stimulations which are essential to a normal and satisfied human being. Unless the laborer feels responsibility for the fate of the industry in which he works, he cannot, like the capitalist or professional man, enjoy the exhilaration of putting his whole soul and body into a life-career with the hope of reaping the fruits of his labor. Under present conditions only the capitalist class and the professional class have any individual initiative.

The more labor is specialized the more the laborer is degraded by being reduced to play a purely mechanical part in production. "It is a sad confession for a man to make," says Lemontey, "that during his whole life he has constructed nothing more than the eighteenth part of a pin."

Also, the more specialized the work the more helpless is the worker when turned off or when industrial fluctuations force him to seek a new master. Carlyle says:

A man willing to work and unable to find work, is perhaps the saddest sight that Fortune exhibits under this Sun. Burns expresses feelingly what thoughts it gave him: A poor man seeking to work, seeking to toil that he might be fed and sheltered, that he might be put on a level with the four-footed workers of the Planet which is his. There is not a horse willing to work but can get food in requital, a thing this two-footed worker has to seek for, to solicit occasionally in vain.

Some of our progressive capitalists, realizing the shortcomings of the wage system, seek to encourage initiative among their workmen by offering prizes for any inventions or innovations that they may originate and reveal to the management. For example, a certain workman suggested to his employer a device whereby the employer added one thousand dollars annually to his profits, and the employer was magnanimous enough to hand over to the author a check for thirty dollars.¹ Again some of our capitalists are now offering to sell stock to their employees, and are doing a great amount of welfare work for them with a view to securing a more permanent tenure of service. At a recent meeting of employment managers in Philadelphia deep-laid plans were formulated for making the laborer's job more permanent. The fact was brought out that the hiring and firing of employees, due to

¹ Galloway's *Organization and Management*, p. 381.

the shifting of labor, cost the manufacturers of the country \$172,000,000 annually; and it was proposed to reduce this labor turnover by inaugurating a highly paid employing executive to winnow the grain from the chaff of applicants by making the conditions of the worker more sanitary, less wearisome, and the home surroundings more attractive. The fact was brought out that one company allowed its employees a rest period of three to five minutes in every hour; that another company allowed a rest period in the forenoon at which it relieved the fatigue of its employees by selling them five hundred bottles of milk at three cents each, three crackers and a straw going with each bottle. Finally, some of our capitalists have done wonders in developing scientific efficiency methods whereby laborers may greatly increase their hourly product and daily wage.

Strange to say, however, the laborers have not appreciated these efforts of the capitalists in their behalf. They have not warmed up to the science of intensifying their energies, and, indeed, if their efficiency could be multiplied tenfold and their wages in like proportion, they would be just as dissatisfied as ever. Who ever heard of increased wages satisfying the working classes? Have not wages doubled in the past century, and, in some industries, since the beginning of the world-war?

The fact is that everything which has been done for the wage class has been in a direction exactly opposite to that which leads out of our industrial warfare. The wage class are entirely lukewarm on all schemes of profit-sharing, scientific labor efficiency, prizes for valuable innovations, and philanthropic oversight of their health and community environment. The working people feel an indifference or antagonism to these things because they are all paternalistic and reduce the worker more and more to the condition of clay in the hands of the potter. They offer him no adequate expression of his personality, of his instinct of self-assertion, no incentive to invest his whole vital force in the industry in which he works, no share in the responsibility of the enterprise in which he spends his life, and no share in the fellowship which is so inspiring a characteristic of all co-operation among men who have the power of initiative.

The problem of industrial reconstruction is, therefore, simply this: to restore to the laborer the liberty of self-direction. As every man should have a vote in the political group to which he belongs, so every laborer should have a voice in the conduct of the industry in which he works. As autocracy and paternalism have been banished from the political world, so should they be banished from the industrial world. All incorporated industries should constitute a real or approximate partnership of labor and capital.

It is very gratifying to note that a large group of British capitalists have a vision of the inevitable trend toward freedom and initiative for the wage class, and have formulated a program which provides henceforward for a share in the control and responsibility of every industry by those who compose its working force. The details of this program may be found in the *Monthly Labor Review*, United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, October, 1918. Such a program insures the elimination of strikes and lockouts, and interests every employee in the efficiency of the industry in which he works. It restores to him the power of self-direction, and gives him that sense of responsibility and fellowship in collective undertakings which all free peoples should have and without which no people can be efficient or contented. This program calls for nothing revolutionary nor entirely new. It is susceptible of being worked out in graduated stages, and is already a success in a number of industries in this country and in England.

It remains to be seen whether our modern capitalists will have the vision of the coming democracy in industry, or whether they will foregather to strengthen the old paternalism and devise schemes for making the laborer more impotent and submissive, and less full of life and aspiration. Shall we have self-direction, democracy, and fellowship in the industrial world, or shall we have bolshevism? One or the other is coming.

THE COMPARATIVE RÔLE OF THE GROUP CONCEPT IN WARD'S *DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY* AND CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

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Small approaches the study of sociology from the methodological side. His writings cover a period of more than a quarter of a century, and in themselves offer an opportunity to show the changes in part which have taken place in sociological thought in that period. His thinking is rare in that it shows a growing tendency and an ability to assimilate the modifying trends and movements in the general field. Since we are not attempting to trace the whole of his system of sociology, we shall not attempt to show those changes which may appear, but shall rely on the later points of view in so far as they bear upon the subject in hand. We may, however, point out an impression which a reading of the various publications has left, and that is, a growing emphasis upon the group concept as a tool of thought and explanation. Not that his thinking was ever individualistic, in the proper sense of the term, but that the group concept has become more sharply defined and has gradually assumed a more central and commanding position in his thinking. As will be pointed out later, Small's use of the organic concept in his earlier writings shows that the facts of group solidarity and social continuity, interdependence and unity, were in his thought from the beginning. But the explicit use of the group concept, as such, and its implications for sociology in particular, are increasingly apparent as one pursues a study of the writing in a chronological order. We shall have some hesitancy, therefore, in placing too much reliance on exact statements in *General Sociology* in so far as this particular problem concerns us. In other words, the effort will be to present Small's present views in regard to the group concept, rather than to trace a historical development of them.¹

¹ Reliance will be placed to some extent upon unpublished lectures as recalled from lecture notes and conversations.

We may approach the study of Small's use of the group concept by first indicating his conception of the nature of sociology and its place among the various social sciences. According to Small, sociology is one of the variant techniques that have been developed in the "drive toward objectivity" in the field of social science. It is a natural outgrowth of the effort to see and understand the social life as it actually is, rather than from any abstract metaphysical or a priori standpoint. He has defined or described the place of sociology in various recent publications. These may be cited as the mature expression of his thinking on the problem. "Sociology is that variety of study of the common subject-matter of social science which trains attention primarily upon the forms and processes of groups."¹ A little more amplified statement of the same thought is contained in the following definition:

The sociological technique is that variant among the social science techniques which proceeds from the perception that, after allowing for their purely physical relations, all human phenomena are functions not only of persons, but of persons whose personality on the one hand expresses itself in part through the formation of groups, and on the other hand, is in part produced through the influence of groups. In brief, sociology is that technique which approaches the knowledge of human experience as a whole through investigation of group-aspects of the phenomena.²

The sociological technique is that variant among the social science techniques which proceeds from the perception that all human phenomena are functions of groups.³

These citations are sufficient to show that in Small's view, the group is the fundamental concept in constructing a sociology. The analysis of group relations is the distinct contribution of sociology. This seems to be the only reason for its claim to rank as one among several techniques which seek to arrive at knowledge of the social process. It is the one thing which justifies sociology and puts it on a par with other social sciences or techniques.⁴ In other words, it is the group approach to the common field of the various social techniques, the social process, which constitutes the reason for

¹ "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI, 825.

² *Encyclopaedia Americana*, article on "Sociology," 1919.

³ Lecture notes.

⁴ *Ibid.*

sociology as a method of investigation and thought. In so far as any social science can be said to have a field, the group is the methodological preserve of the sociologist. The aspects of experience which come within the range of the sociological way of thinking are "all incidents of this universal group destiny." The sociologist, as such, is concerned only with relations of men in groups and the results of such relationships.¹ His center of attention is the group. The importance of the group has not been adequately kept in view in the social sciences in general, but both in academic circles and in popular opinion there is an increasing recognition of the group.²

This emphasis upon the group concept, as the key to the claims of the sociologist for standing among the social sciences, is one of the important contributions to fundamental sociological conceptions. It will be noted, of course, that Small's point of view involves a departure from the extravagant notions of Ward, Giddings, and Small himself, with most of the other sociologists of two decades ago, when the claim of sociology as the master among the social sciences was more prevalent than it is today. Small does not leave his repudiation of the "master science" claim to be inferred only; he expressly confesses that the older conception among sociologists is no longer adequate:

Before we fully find ourselves in the ranks of social science, we shall have to make very clear, first to ourselves and then to others, that we have a clue to a particular quest, and we shall, meanwhile, have called in our juvenile pretension to be the masters of everything while we are giving proof that we can discover something. We used to compare the relation of general sociology to the whole range of human activities with the relation of general biology to all the phenomena of organic life. Most of the sociologists at one time made assertions to that effect without a suspicion that they were comical. In fact, neither term of the comparison was conceived in accordance with reality. Biologists today do not recognize a science of general biology, except in the sense of co-operation of many divisions of labor in a field designated generally as biology. No more is there such a possibility as general sociology which is not a division of labor upon a reality common to all the social sciences.³

¹ Lecture notes.

² *Ibid.*

³ "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI, 849.

We have here expressed the point of view which is elaborated at great length in Small's *Meaning of Social Science*. We shall not pursue farther the conception of the division of labor among the social sciences and its implications for social science in general. It is brought in here for the purpose of showing that, in Small's opinion, the older conception of the place of sociology is no longer tenable. In place of that conception he places his methodological plan of the co-ordinated techniques at work upon a common object, the social process. Among these various methodological variants the sociological takes its place by virtue of its particular methodological tool, the group concept. This concept, then, in such an arrangement, is of the most fundamental and vital importance in the whole of that part of the division of labor called sociology. With this introductory survey in mind, we may proceed to some more particular parts of his treatment, showing the use made of the group concept.

Mention has been made of the term "social process." A study of Small's use of this concept confirms what was said in the beginning, that the group approach is not a recent or sudden turn in his thinking. His increasing emphasis and clarity of expression of the group conception are but the normal growth of a thought which was prevalent in his thinking from the beginning. The very conception of a social process which has played so large a part in his thought and which, as explained by him and elaborated by his followers, forms a contribution to sociology, is an implication of a group conception of social reality. What he has done in later years is to make more clear the implications and logical results of his earlier central conception. In this respect he has typified, as well as influenced, the general trend in sociological thought. By the process conception he means the opposite of Spencer's static conception of groups and group relations. The process conception emphasizes a ceaseless interaction in which there is constant change of the group from moment to moment, leaving it different from time to time. A process is a "collection of occurrences each of which has a meaning for every other, the whole of which constitutes some sort of becoming."¹ The social-process view emphasizes

¹ Lecture notes.

the ongoing, changing, moving character of groups. It is a dynamic view of group relations. It emphasizes the essentially group nature of life as an ongoing stream. It is this suggested and implied conception of the solidarity of group life that is so important in all of the more modern developments of social science.

Small's use of the social-process category, connoting as it does the solidarity of the ongoing human stream as one of the fundamental approaches to the understanding of social life, suggests Comte's method which he called the *vue d'ensemble* as contrasted with the atomizing and dissecting method. The essence of Comte's method, like Small's, consists in the habit of looking at things not in their isolation but in their "together" both in space and time. Merz has characterized this method of thought as one of the most significant achievements of the last half of the nineteenth century. He has given to it the name synoptic method or view, in contrast with the process of analysis and synthesis, "the former taking in at a glance the totality of a complex subject, the latter dissecting the same into its parts and then attempting to bring them together again to a united whole."¹ The tendency to look at the problem of social life as a whole, as a plexus of group relations, is so central in Small's thought that it may be well worth while to cite Merz again as he applies the synoptic view to the problem of society:

Formerly all the sciences which have to do with this subject started from the study of the individual organism or the individual mind, frequently disregarding altogether the environment or collective life of man, or reaching this only by slow and uncertain steps. Latterly, however, not only has the collective life of man attracted more attention than the individual it has become rather the fashion to place society in some form or other in the foreground, to start with some definition of the social "Together," of the collective life of human beings, and to approach in this way not only the study of humanity or mankind at large, but also, through it, to get a better understanding of the nature and life of the individual mind itself.²

Small's thinking, from the beginning, displays this tendency, but it has become more explicit and detailed with his maturer thought. In substantiation of the statement that the group view has been

¹ Merz, *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, IV, 431.

² *Ibid.*, p. 436.

central from the beginning of his writings, one might point to the use of the organic concept which flourished in the earlier development of thought in sociology in this country. Small has repudiated the organic theory in its extravagant forms, but he insists that it never, in the minds of those who made use of it, was more than a tool of interpretation with considerable limitation. It did have this much that was sound, the conception of the interrelatedness and unity of the human stream. The kernel of truth in it was the thought which is illustrated in Merz's statement and which is more adequately expressed in the social-process concept. The starting-point for the view which led to the biological analogy was the sociological axiom: "All men are functions of each other." Stripped of the fantastic verbiage and details of some of its sponsors, or imputed to it by its critics, the biological analogy or organic concept expressed the essential idea that "everything somehow hangs together with everything else."¹ It is this thought, which is essentially a group conception, or group approach to the social problem, which one finds running through all of Small's writings. Its significance for our purpose is quite apparent.

As a corollary of the point that has just been discussed, one may note the conception which Small has of the nature and place of social psychology in the recent development of sociological thought. Space does not permit, nor does our purpose warrant us in attempting even, to summarize his social psychology. What is important here is to point out that Small recognizes in social psychology an attempt to give an adequate basis, in the analysis of group psychology, for the final explanation of the social process. He looks for the solution in both a functional and behavioristic social psychology.² By the general term "social psychology" he refers to the fact that, since the beginning of the present century, sociologists in this country have become

increasingly attentive to the states of mind which characterize people in groups, and to the connections between these states of mind and all the activities which the respective groups perform. To express it in terms which seem most convenient to some of us, we are more and more seeing our distinctive vocation

¹ Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 74-80.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 637-49.

in trying to find out what interests are actually effective in the members of selected groups, and in what ways they shape the group fortunes.¹

With the details of his suggestions for the solution of this important work we need not concern ourselves here. What is necessary is to point out that Small recognizes the essential group problem which lies at the heart of the social process. To seek out and discover the essential process which constitutes the center of the group life is for him the task of social psychology. It is, in short, an application of the group concept to the study of life.

It will be worth while to consider some further concepts which afford an opportunity for further investigation of the use made of the group concept. First of all, it will be necessary to refer to the concept group itself, in so far as it is recognized as one of the leading sociological categories. Concerning this concept, Small says:

The fact of social groups is so obvious, and it is so significant, that the concept has been in constant use in the foregoing discussion. The term "group" serves as a convenient sociological designation for any number of people, larger or smaller, between whom such relations are discovered that they must be thought of together. The "group" is the most general and colorless term used in sociology for combinations of persons. . . . Thus a "group" for sociology is a number of persons whose relations to each other are sufficiently impressive to demand attention. The term is merely a commonplace tool. It contains no mystery. It is only a handle with which to grasp the innumerable varieties of arrangements into which people are drawn by their variations of interest. The universal condition of association may be expressed in the same commonplace way; people always live in groups, and the same persons are likely to be members of many groups.²

With this introductory definition of the term group, as he understands it, we may pass on in the discussion to the general problem of the relation of the individual to the group or of the relation between the two concepts, the group and the individual. It is here, of course, that the crucial point of view appears in all our investigations.

¹ "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI, 817.

² *General Sociology*, p. 495.

We may begin the discussion of the problem with Small's statement of the rival theories:

Social philosophy, as hinted in the beginning of this chapter, has always vibrated between theories of individuals, regarded as independent, self-sufficient existences, and theories of society, regarded as an entity which has its existence either altogether independent of individuals, or at least by and through the submerging of individuals. Accordingly, the question has been debated from time immemorial: "Does society exist for the individual or the individual for society?" or more specifically: "Does the State exist for the individual or the individual for the State?"¹

The fallacy in this, Small points out, is the assumption of a disjunctive, exclusive relation between the two. Whether the sociologists or psychologists have had most to do with pointing out this fallacy,

the formulation of life in terms of activity has brought psychologists and sociologists to the point of view that individuals and societies are not means to each other, but phases of each other. *A society is a combining of the activities of persons. A person is a center of conscious impulses which realize themselves in full only in realizing a society.*²

With reference to the discussion of Aristotle's dictum that man is a social animal, Small observes that there is a very important sense in which the dictum is one of the primary sociological data.

Man cannot be man without acting and reacting with man. The presence of others is necessary in order that I may be myself. . . . A person . . . cannot come into physical existence except through the co-operation of parent persons; he cannot become a self-sustaining animal unless protected for several years by other persons; and he cannot find out and exercise his capabilities unless stimulated to countless forms of action by contact with other persons.³

Human life, in his view, is "always and necessarily social life; i.e., life in groups, the members of which influence each other."⁴ To speak of individuals first coming into existence and subsequently forming groups is probably a distortion of the facts; "it is probably nearer the truth to suppose that originally individuals were differentiations of groups, than to suppose that groups were synthesis

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 473-74.

² *Ibid.*, p. 476.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

of individuals."¹ "Actual persons always live and move and have their being in groups."²

Following Baldwin, Small calls attention to the fact that self-consciousness is a group product rather than an individual datum. He says:

Consciousness in itself, or at least self-consciousness, is not an individual but a social phenomenon. We do not arrive at self-consciousness except by coming into circuit with other persons, with whom we achieve awareness of ourselves. For sociological purposes this degree of refinement is unnecessary. We need to know simply that persons do not enlarge and equip and enrich and exercise their personality except by maintaining relations with other persons. Even Robinson Crusoe retained a one-sided connection with society. If, when he walked out of the surf to the shore, he had left behind him the mental habits, the language, the ideas which he had amassed in contact with other persons, not enough available means of correlating his actions would have remained to provide him with his first meal.³

Carrying this thought still farther to some of its implications, he suggests that the category "individual" is inaccurate as an expression of reality.⁴ It is not a tool of precision in the sense indicated above: that there is no separate individual as implied in the older sense of the term. The term is used uncritically in popular speech and usually carries the meaning of a separate, discrete, unrelated entity.⁵ Such a view is tending to disappear in social science.⁶ If sociology and psychology were to accept the position usually implied by the term individual in its baldest sense they would disappear.⁷ These sciences stress the group as the reality and the individual, in the older sense, appears as a fiction.⁸ This does not mean, of course, that sociology does not recognize the force of personality in social relations.⁹ A personalized factor in the social whole is a reality. Persons are real though socially created; they are more important and powerful than in the older view which

¹ *General Sociology*, p. 218.

² *Ibid.*, p. 495.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 476. It should be noted, however, that Small does not follow Baldwin in relying on imitation as the sole process of self-development. Chapter xxxix presents a very effective criticism of the imitation theory.

⁴ If *General Sociology* were to be re-written, Small would substitute "human personality" for "individual" as the title of chapter xxxii.

⁵ Lecture notes.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

made them separate entities.¹ One of the distinct contributions of modern sociology is to aid in clearing the term "individual" of the confusion with which it has been surrounded. It is because of these confusions that Small suggests the value of a substitute category for the term individual. Among the possible substitutes he suggests the term *socius*.² The advantages and significance of this term he sets forth in the following language: "The socius is that literal factor within the human whole which we now find in the place occupied by that discredited hypothesis the individual. It is the sociological conception of the term individual, freed from former misconceptions."³

Before leaving the discussion of this part of the review, it should be pointed out that Small recognizes a division of labor between the sociologist and the psychologist. That is, he accepts the individual as ready-made. The making of the individual is the field of study of the psychologist. It is the function of the psychologist and not of the sociologist to take up this more individual problem. The sociologist is primarily concerned with groups:

In any given inquiry the psychologist, as such, takes association as the known and fixed factor, in order to pursue investigation of his undetermined subject-matter—the mechanism of the individual actor. The sociologist, as such, on the contrary, takes the individual for granted, and pursues investigation of his undetermined subject-matter, viz., associations.⁴

In reply to a criticism of his view of the separation of psychology and sociology in this manner, Small acknowledges that no hard-and-fast line can be drawn but feels that, for purposes of division of labor, the primary work of accounting for the individual may be left to the psychologist, who is better fitted for the work than the sociologist.⁵ The significance of the problem here involved will appear in the next chapter. In passing, it may be observed that to take the individual for granted, as already constituted, as the starting-point for sociological study is an abstraction which has serious consequences both for social theory and social control.

¹ *Ibid.*

² Following the suggestion of Baldwin and Giddings.

³ Lecture notes.

⁴ *General Sociology*, p. 447.

⁵ *Ibid.*

In other words, it would seem that there can be no valid sociology unless based on a valid social psychology, and thus far the psychologists have not as a whole presented that valid basis. One of the implications of the group concept is, as Small himself points out, the impossibility of making a valid separation of the individual from the group or vice versa.

In connection with the criticism referred to, it may be noted that Small's discussion of interests as the ultimate sociological terms of calculation presents a possible opening for attack in its failure to use fully the group concept, which forms such a large part of his thinking. We cannot hope to go into the discussion of interests in any detail. Following Ratzenhofer's suggestion, Small makes interests the basis of his *General Sociology*. Around the concept "interests" he builds up his social psychology as a basis for his sociological argument. The relation of the interests to groups is clearly set forth. The concepts "group" and "interests" form the center of his system. With the psychology of interests, and the use of the concept in social analysis, we are not concerned. What is important to point out at this place is, that the assumption of the priority of interests leaves an impression that the place of the group in the formation of interests has not been adequately stressed. In other words, the group concept has not served as well as it might. The argument implies, of course, that the group must be brought in to explain the interests, but the total impression is one of undue emphasis on the interests, rather than on the group's place in the formation of the interests. The point may be illustrated by citing the criticism made against economic theory in its treatment of the problem of value. As Cooley and Anderson and others have pointed out, the fundamental error in the theory of value has been in the assumption of certain wants as the starting-points for discussion and then building up a theory of the market and its values upon the basis of these assumed prior wants.¹ To do so leaves out the very important fact that the market creates the wants as much as it is created by them.² So in the case of interests,

¹ Cooley, *Social Process*; Anderson, *Social Value*.

² The thought is expressed in the inverted statement of an old saying, "Invention is the mother of necessity."

we cannot start with these initial assumptions and neglect the fact that the group itself creates the interests as well as it is created by them. The process is a reciprocal one and the group approach to it is as essential at least as the interest approach. Interests are group products as well as group creators. In analyzing the social process the group concept is as fundamental as interests.

Two very important illustrations of the use of the group concept remain to be pointed out, namely, the ethical problem and the application of the group concept to property relations. With reference to the first of these problems we may note, first of all, that Small places the ethical problem as the final one in a complete sociological study. For the solution of the ethical problem sociology is fundamental. There can be no valid ethical principles or ethical criteria except those furnished by a valid sociology. "Every ethical judgment with an actual content has at least tacitly presupposed a sociology. Every individual or social estimate of good and bad, of right and wrong, current today assumes a sociology. No code of morals can be adopted in the future without implying a sociology as part of its premises."¹ In place of an individualistic treatment of the problem, sociology must furnish a process conception as the basis for a valid ethical structure. This implies that both the codes and the criteria are social. They are results of social situations. "That is good, for me or for the world around me, which promotes the on-going of the social process. That is bad, for me or for the world around me, which retards the on-going of the social process."² This is the nearest we can get to an absolute system of ethics. It involves a shifting code and shifting criteria-contents, but it becomes more and more stable and refined as human experience evolves. The absolute system of ethics must give way to a functional conception; the static systems must give way to a process conception:

At all events the net result of psychological and sociological analysis for ethical purposes up to date is a certain quantum of detail in specification of this insight that the main situation is incessant movement, having no quality of rest, but consisting of a constant process, not in a straight line, but, taking

¹ *General Sociology*, p. 633.

² *Ibid.*, p. 676.

large periods of time into the field of view, consistently toward something more of the process, which to our ken is interminable.²

On the whole, then, we may summarize Small's position by defining it as an effort to substitute a pragmatic social theory of ethics for the discarded metaphysical, individualistic systems of Kant and his followers. It is a logical application of the conception of life which has the group as its way of approach.

² *General Sociology*, p. 689.

[To be continued]

EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL WORK

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V. THE CASE METHOD OF INSTRUCTION

The case method of instruction as it has been developed especially in schools of law and social work stands out as an important contribution to methods of professional education. The case method considered in its broadest sense is of course by no means limited to these two fields. Its underlying principles have long been the dominant factor in all scientific instruction. It is, in fact, simply the method of science which begins with the concrete fact instead of the general principle. In the field of the natural sciences, no other method would now be given serious consideration. Without the laboratory and the microscope and an opportunity for patient study of specimens and cases, the work of the scientist could not be successfully done. In the social sciences also, this inductive method of instruction has come to be regarded as a matter of course. There must first be the careful study of actual facts and conditions before generalization can begin. In this sense the case method is nothing more or less than the method of induction and as such takes its place in the wider movement of educational reform which in recent years has been so rapidly overthrowing traditional methods of instruction.

But in the more specific meaning of this term the case method applies more particularly to the type of instruction most common in schools of law and social work where the point of departure and the chief content of the course consist in the study and analysis of separate cases. Its origin as far as law schools are concerned goes back to the Harvard Law School in 1871, when Langdell threw aside the traditional textbooks and endeavored to teach the principles of law through a study of selected cases. This method, which at the time seemed so revolutionary, was based on the conviction that law is a science with its own data and body of experience which must be

studied as we do the material of any other science as it develops in concrete situations. In Langdell's opinion the student could be given a more systematic view of the principles of law and a clearer comprehension of their historical development by a study of cases, carefully selected and arranged, than by the customary deductive study of the principles themselves. The central feature of this method of instruction in law is the analysis of separate cases by the students for the purpose of disentangling the facts and bringing out the point of law involved. This task, whether performed independently by the students or carried out under the guidance of the teacher in classroom discussion, results not merely in giving a practical knowledge of law but trains the mind in methods of legal thinking.

The success of the case method of teaching law can be judged by the fact that it has become the general mode of instruction in the more prominent law schools in this country. It is indeed largely due to this method of instruction that the study of law in American universities has been placed upon a scientific basis comparable to that of other important fields of professional education.

In the schools of social work the case method is less widely known but is of equal importance. Its use in this field has been largely in connection with the teaching of the technique of case work. The apprentice in a case-work agency receives his first initiation to his duties through a study and analysis of case records taken from the files of the organization employing him. This study under the direction of a competent district secretary or supervisor and accompanied by actual work in the field under supervision has long been the central feature of the apprenticeship system of training in this type of social work.

The case method of instruction in schools of social work follows essentially the same lines. Carefully selected case histories rather than textbooks are relied upon for teaching material. The instructor of case work usually selects and edits or secures from some outside source a few records suitable for teaching purposes and builds up his course around a class discussion of the facts contained in these records and the points of technique illustrated by them. These records are not usually placed in the hands of the students,

at least in the beginning of the course of study. A common method is for the instructor to read them, paragraph by paragraph, in the classroom for the purpose of enabling the students to reconstruct in imagination the actual situation faced by the worker who handled the case and then decide between the alternative courses of action that present themselves at critical points of the record. By thus living through, as it were, the experience of the case worker and step by step working out the proper procedure to be followed, the student not only becomes familiar with the technique of case work, but obtains a real knowledge of the nature of social problems and of the social forces in the community that may be utilized in working out their solution.

The advantages of this method over that of a general discussion of social problems are obvious. The student who has thought through the experiences of a worker in his efforts over a period of months or years to re-establish a dependent family has an intimate insight into the problems of dependency that could not be obtained by any amount of general reading. When this class discussion of a case record under the guidance of a competent instructor is supplemented by a sufficient amount of field work to give the student actual experience in dealing with the problems under discussion in the classroom, it is difficult to conceive of a method of instruction better adapted to the needs of students preparing for professional work in this field.

One of the problems in the successful use of this method of instruction is that of securing the proper kind of teaching material. Case records, as has already been pointed out by Porter R. Lee,¹ have been prepared by organizations for their own use and not with the needs of students in mind. Their chief concern is with the actual steps that were taken and the results secured, whereas the student is interested primarily in how a particular course of action was decided upon and why it was chosen in preference to other alternatives. This calls for an analysis of the processes involved in handling the case which cannot easily be done because of the lack of sufficient data of the right kind in the record itself. Instructors using the

¹ "Preparation of Teaching Material," New Orleans Conference of Social Work, 1920.

case method sometimes overcome this difficulty by depending upon case records with which they have personal knowledge. Another plan is to secure the needed data through a personal conference with the person who handled the case and wrote the record.

As long, however, as lack of teaching material compels each instructor to be responsible for finding and editing the case records for his own use, the case method of instruction in social work must be regarded as far behind the achievements of the case method in law which for many years has had available a large number of carefully selected and well-edited cases. If the case method of teaching social work is to occupy its proper place as a method of professional education, it is of the utmost importance that teaching material of the right kind be made easily accessible.

Until very recently little attention had been paid to the preparation of teaching records for general use. One of the first and most significant attempts to meet this need was made by Miss Mary E. Richmond of the Charity Organization Department of the Russell Sage Foundation. The records prepared under her direction were edited with great care and have proved invaluable to schools of social work and to supervisors of case work in charity organization societies. It is unfortunate that the records issued under these auspices have been few in number and that the restrictions placed upon their circulation have made them available to only a limited circle.

Another effort to supply this teaching material is being made by the American Red Cross. In order to provide case records suitable for use in its training courses, it has undertaken the preparation of a series of records designed to illustrate the most typical problems met with in dealing with disadvantaged individuals and families. Records are being secured from small towns and rural communities as well as from large cities and as far as possible from all sections of the country so that they may be fairly representative of general social conditions. A new feature of these records is the inclusion of all notes and suggestions for the teacher in a separate teacher's manual. In this manual the various steps taken in handling the case are analyzed and every effort is made to supply the data that would be of use to the teacher in classroom work.

The great need of teaching material of this kind would seem to justify the preparation of case books in social work that would be comparable to those that have been prepared for the use of law schools. There should be included in these case books not only the customary type of record designed chiefly for use in teaching the technique of case work; there should also be case histories intended to illustrate types of problems and results of treatment. Teachers of social work could very profitably use case records patterned somewhat after medical case histories, that give briefly the facts of diagnosis and treatment; or legal case records, that are used to illustrate principles of law rather than methods of legal procedure. Social case records of this kind may very well take the form of a summary of the history of the case. The essential thing is to have the facts stated in sufficient detail to give the student a clear understanding of the problem in its relation to the particular situation in which it occurs. Sufficient attention has not yet been given to the teaching value of such case summaries. Instructors usually rely upon detailed chronological records, one of which may be made the subject of class discussion for a considerable period of time. One of the dangers in a prolonged study of a few cases is that students may come to look upon them as pointing out the definite way in which particular problems should be handled. This danger could be largely overcome if a study of a detailed record dealing for example with the problem of desertion could be followed by a brief discussion of a number of case summaries illustrating the varied forms this problem assumed under different situations, and the kind of treatment given. It would be hard to find a better way in which to give the student a comprehensive grasp of the complex and ever-changing factors involved in social work.

Another type of case record for which there is a real need is that which would embody the experiences of those actively engaged in the various aspects of community organization. It is becoming increasingly evident that social workers must understand the technique of dealing with communities as well as with individuals and families. The adjustment of the social forces of a community so that the largest possible contribution will be made to the welfare

of all its members is a task which requires the services of a skilled leader. If training for this kind of community work is to be carried on effectively it ought to be possible to profit by the experience of community workers just as the experiences of case workers have been made use of in training for family work. Community case records (if we may use that term) should be as valuable in a course in community organization as are family case records in a course in methods of family case work. But here, also, the community record to be of real value for instruction in technique must be more than a chronological statement of work undertaken and results secured; it must analyze the steps that were taken at significant stages of the community work and indicate why any particular course has been chosen in preference to another. The underlying and not always easily recognized factors that determined the line of action must be given due attention. The usual type of survey report contains the information necessary to give a picture of the conditions that were studied but it throws only incidental light on the processes involved in making the survey. The student of social conditions is satisfied with the report if facts are secured; the student learning how to make a survey must have a supplemental statement dealing with the machinery that was used in getting the facts and preparing them for presentation. In a similar manner the student of the technique of community organization is interested not merely in the fact that a certain agency was established in a community; he wants to know why this agency in preference to any other was decided upon and the different steps by which its organization was accomplished.

The great difficulty at the present time is that few community records of this kind have been prepared and as a consequence it is not possible to compare methods and determine whether the technique in this field can be standardized as it has been in other lines of social work. Until more progress has been made in securing this type of community record, teaching material for courses in the technique of community organization must be regarded as entirely inadequate.

The case method of instruction in social work is pedagogically sound, and when a proper amount of teaching material is made

available it will doubtless come into still wider use. There is now a tendency in some schools of social work to demand a great deal of class discussion of different types of case records before permitting the students to engage in any field work except that of the simplest type. While this method of instruction can never take the place of field work, it may be possible when a sufficient amount of teaching material is available to have the study and discussion of written records supplement in a much larger way than is now customary the actual work of the students in the field.

VI. THE PLACE OF FIELD WORK IN THE COURSE OF STUDY

Education for social work, unlike engineering and medical education, has never passed through a didactic stage of instruction with chief emphasis upon theoretical studies. On the contrary, as might be expected in training schools that developed out of the apprentice system, field-work training has always been given a prominent place in the curriculum.

Because of the close relationship between the first schools of social work and the social agencies, the latter as a matter of course assumed responsibility for the field work of the students. While this plan involved the delegation of an important part of the instruction to persons not directly under control of the school it was felt that this was the most practical way of providing this training. Experience soon demonstrated, however, that field work carried on in this way could with great difficulty be made an integral part of the course. Too often it tended to become a kind of extra-mural requirement dominated more by the conditions existing in the agency than by the ideals of the school. The pressure of the work in the agency, coupled with the fact that those actually in charge of the practice work of the students were not always skilled or interested in teaching, frequently caused the students' practice to be limited to meaningless errand-running or to other detached tasks of very little educational value.

The existence of this difficulty has long been recognized and many efforts have been made to find a satisfactory solution. In some cases, the social agencies that have been co-operating with schools of social work set aside teaching districts in which they

make an effort to have workers specially qualified to supervise the field work of the students. The schools of social work on their part frequently give the field-work supervisors a nominal position on their faculty and by periodical conferences with these supervisors endeavor to bring about the proper correlation of the practical work with classroom instruction. In many instances the relationship between the schools of social work and the social agencies has been so close and cordial that the problem has been much simplified. The results attained by the schools of social work indicate that this traditional method of providing field-work training has in a considerable degree been successful. Whatever its failures, they have not been due to any lack of appreciation of educational ideals on the part of the executive heads of the social agencies. The chief difficulty has been to find members of their staff that have teaching ability and to arrange their work in such a way that they would have sufficient time to give careful supervision to the students.

This problem of the proper measure of control over field-work facilities is by no means peculiar to schools of social work. It is a fundamental problem in the whole field of professional education and has been met by the professional schools in different ways. In the field of medical education it is generally agreed that clinical experience cannot be provided in the most satisfactory way by a hospital or dispensary that is entirely detached from the medical school. If the hospital has the right to limit the wards or the types of cases to which the students may have access, or to determine the hours when clinical instruction may be given, or to set up any other restrictions that would interfere with a sound teaching policy, the medical school cannot build up a well-balanced curriculum that will meet the needs of the students. Experience has demonstrated that the school should have educational control of its clinical facilities, a control that involves not only the decision about teaching arrangements in the hospital, but the power to appoint the hospital staff.

Engineering schools, on the other hand, are finding it impracticable to depend upon their own schools for the practice work of their students. With their limited equipment it is impossible to

duplicate the varied processes carried on in industry and familiarize the students with actual working conditions. To instal and keep up-to-date the vast and complicated machinery of the engineering world and develop shops that would approximate the conditions as they exist in the varied lines of industry would mean a tremendous expense. The solution of their field-work problem that seems to be most successful is the so-called co-operative plan which sends the students into industrial plants on a paid basis for their practical work. This shopwork which alternates with classroom instruction is carefully graded and planned so as to fit into the curriculum, but it is real work that is not only of value to the students but to their employers as well. In order to make sure that the shopwork assigned to the students is being done in a way that would have educational value, shop co-ordinators are sent by the school to the shop where they inspect the work of the students and confer with those in charge of their work. The industrial world thus becomes the students' laboratory while the school assumes the function of interpreting this practical experience in terms of the theories and principles that underlie successful engineering practice.

Schools of law have never seriously grappled with the problem of field-work training. Their course of study is intended to acquaint students with the principles of law rather than with the technique of legal practice. Some attention is given to the latter in the moot courts common in some law schools, and law students are sometimes encouraged to get practice work with legal-aid societies or in law offices, but in general the acquirement of skill in the practice of law is regarded as something that should follow instead of form a part of the law course.

In the training of teachers, opportunities for students to teach under supervision have come to be regarded as a necessity. In some cases this is carried on by special arrangements with the public schools where the students have the advantage of familiarizing themselves with the routine of the schoolroom under actual working conditions. Another plan usually preferred by professional schools of education is to have these practice schools under the direct control of those responsible for the training of the teachers. It is very evident that this gives greater freedom in

working out experimental methods and makes it possible to have the proper control over those who supervise the practice work.

The experience, therefore, of professional schools in providing practical training facilities for their students has by no means followed the same lines. The administrative problems vary with the type of field work to such an extent that it may never be possible to work out uniform methods of procedure that would be applicable to all professional schools.

The important thing as far as schools of social work are concerned, is to keep clearly in mind the educational requirements of field-work training and then recognize that methods of fulfilling these requirements must be determined by local conditions and circumstances. The minimum requirements of field work stand out clearly in the definition formulated by the Committee on Field Work of the Association of Urban Universities at the annual meeting of this Association in New York in 1917. According to this committee, field work "includes the activities of students in the performance of tasks of everyday life under actual conditions which may be accepted and directly related to concurrent class work." The two most fundamental things that determine the educational value of field work are the participation in tasks under actual working conditions and the proper correlation of these tasks so that they fit into a systematic course of training. It is conceivable that these two requirements may be met by different methods of field-work administration. There is no inherent reason why a social agency that has been requested to furnish field-work training for students should not do this in a satisfactory manner. The acceptance of such responsibility is by no means incompatible with a sound administration of their work. As a matter of fact the giving of such training must be regarded as one of the regular duties of a well-equipped organization. If their personnel is sufficient and willing to co-operate with the school, students working under their direction ought to receive training of high quality.

On the other hand it should be possible for the schools of social work to build up training facilities under their own management and direction. A school properly equipped with field-work supervisors might very well choose suitably located communities where

some phase of social work was needed and develop in those communities activities in which the students could participate. The university schools of social work that are located in places where social agencies of high grade do not exist may find that the establishment of these training centers is the best method of providing certain kinds of field work for their students. Under the direction of a field-work supervisor a small group of students could make the first beginning of a training center in an unorganized community by making a study of its social needs and resources preparatory to a determination of the program of work that is to be undertaken. The different projects determined upon would then furnish training opportunities for succeeding classes working under the field supervisor who would accept responsibility for the work that was done. In order to avoid the gaps in the work caused by school vacations and to give the field supervisor necessary assistance in training the students, graduate fellowships could be provided which would carry with them the obligation to serve as assistants in the training center. It is probable that as this community work develops and the interest of the people is aroused the time will come when the community will desire to carry on its activities independent of the university. When this occurs, the university will have lost control of its training center, but will have available a social agency which will still offer opportunities to students for practice work.

Such university training centers would only in exceptional instances provide all the field-work training of students. In order to provide a well-rounded training the schools of social work ought to make it possible for students to familiarize themselves with the work of the best-equipped social agencies both public and private. The various social agencies would still be needed by the school, but they could be used as supplementary to the university training center. Much of the preliminary and fundamental training could be given by the school directly under its own auspices, while the different agencies would still be called upon to provide students with experience in specific types of work.

At the present time the development of these training centers under the direction of schools of social work is still in the experimental stage. The experience of the Red Cross in its

home-service institutes during and especially since the war is a good example of one of the attempts that has been made to give the school control over its field-work training. In several of the institutes held in the largest cities the home-service section provided the institute supervisors with a separate office and permitted them to choose from among the active cases those that seemed most desirable, from a teaching point of view, for the students to handle. For these cases the institute supervisors were given the same responsibility that would be given a district secretary and, since they had power to choose suitable cases and to limit the number they would attempt to handle, it was possible to give careful instruction in technique and to insist upon thoroughgoing work in a way that could hardly have been done by the Home Service Section itself with its heavy pressure of work and frequently inadequate staff. In those sections of the country where high social-work standards had not yet been attained a modification of this same method made it possible to give the students good field-work training. During the period of the Institute, the Institute supervisors would be placed practically in charge of one or more Home Service offices in small cities or towns, thus giving them an opportunity personally to give the students good instruction in case work and office routine regardless of what may have been the standards of those offices prior to the holding of the training course.

While this plan for Home Service training involved obvious administrative problems and owed a considerable measure of its success to the co-operative spirit growing out of the war situation it at least indicates how the school's control of its training facilities helps to overcome the handicap of lack of access to well-equipped social agencies. If schools of social work are located near communities where social problems exist in sufficient variety, and maintain a staff of competent field-work supervisors, there is no reason why they should not be able to develop the training facilities they need. This assumption by the school of social work of greater responsibility for the students' field-work training is in accord with sound teaching policy and marks out a method of procedure which seems likely to be more generally followed in the future.

Another important problem of field-work training is how to bring about its proper correlation with the classroom instruction. At what time in the course should field work begin? Can field work be carried on satisfactorily by students whose time is partly occupied by classroom lectures and study? Is it possible to plan the practice work with the social agencies so that it will run parallel with the courses of instruction given at the school?

The general attitude of the schools of social work to this fundamental problem has been that field work must be carried on concurrently with classroom instruction. The first important challenge to this point of view was made by the Smith College Training School for Social Work which was established in 1918. In a recent bulletin of this School its position in regard to the place of field work in the curriculum is set forth and defended as follows:

The Smith College Training School for Social Work is a graduate professional school offering work that falls into three divisions: a summer session of eight weeks of theoretical instruction, combined with clinical observation; a training period of nine months' practical instruction carried on in co-operation with hospitals and settlements; and a concluding summer session of eight weeks of advanced study. . . .

The method of continuous practice is believed by the sponsors of the school to afford the best practical training. To become completely assimilated into the organization, the student must give full time to the work. To obtain the richest possible experience, the student should be on duty regularly and without interruption. In our opinion, practice work with social cases and social conditions can not be carried on satisfactorily with intensive instruction, since it is not possible to regulate human problems, so that experience will run parallel with theoretical instruction. There is great value for drill and discipline as well as depth of experience in the uninterrupted practice and in the continuity of theoretical study which the present plan provides.

While this abrupt departure from traditional methods was doubtless influenced somewhat by the fact that the location of the school in a small town made the usual type of field work not readily accessible, the experiment is of sufficient significance to deserve careful attention. Whatever one may think of the solution arrived at, it represents an effort to escape the difficulties faced by those who insist that field-work and classroom instruction must always go hand in hand. Because of the complex nature of

the social problems dealt with, it is by no means easy to assign the students definite tasks that will illustrate step by step the subjects discussed in the different courses. And unless correlation of the field work and classroom work is achieved to this extent there is a tendency to regard them as two separate activities, each invaluable but only in a limited measure fitting into a unified program. As a matter of fact, since field work brings the students face to face with social problems of absorbing interest that demand an immediate solution and that direct attention to methods applicable to a particular situation, students are more likely to underestimate the value of wider study of the whole problem than to regard this field work as an interpretation of the problems that have already been discussed in the classroom.

Furthermore, the ten or fifteen hours a week that it is possible to give to field work when carried on concurrently with class work are hardly sufficient to enable the student to do much constructive work. The agency in which the student is working is compelled to assign tasks that can be completed in the limited time available. Very important types of field work may need to be omitted entirely because they require consecutive effort which the student cannot give. When the student's time is divided between field work and classroom lectures and assigned readings, it becomes a difficult problem for him to feel himself a part of the social agency to which he is assigned and to have a sense of responsibility for the work undertaken.

The existence of these difficulties in the way of concurrent field and class work has been recognized by the schools of social work, but thus far the Smith College Training School is the only one that has attempted such a radical solution. Several schools of social work have gone to the length of marking out definite blocks of time covering one or more weeks which are devoted to uninterrupted field work. Such an arrangement is of real value in learning technique, and provision ought always to be made for such practice periods during the course of study. The Smith College plan, however, goes much farther than this and is open to the serious criticism that it places classroom instruction and field work in separate compartments which have only in a remote

way any vital relation to each other. Field work of certain kinds may be incompatible with class instruction and intensive study if carried on concurrently, and field work designed for certain purposes may very well be segregated in a way that will give an opportunity for continuous practice, but this does not justify the failure to accompany the class instruction with appropriate kinds of field work that would give the students first-hand knowledge of social problems and of the methods most commonly used in dealing with them.

It will probably take a great deal more careful study and experimentation before a satisfactory decision is reached in regard to these fundamental field-work problems. Doubtless considerable confusion has been caused by the tendency to regard field work as primarily practice work with a social agency for the purpose of learning technique, instead of thinking of it in its broader meaning as including, in addition to the practice work, participation in social research and investigation and working on problems designed to illustrate the principles discussed in the classroom.

Technical courses of instruction ought always to be accompanied by their appropriate field work, regarded as an inseparable part of the course and supervised by those who are familiar with the content of the class instruction. Field work of this kind carried on concurrently with class instruction need not have as its chief purpose the acquirement of skill through work experience. It may even be questioned whether students ought to be expected to gain their technique in this piecemeal fashion. This part of their training may possibly be carried out more satisfactorily by uninterrupted practice work under conditions that would familiarize them with office routine and compel them to accept responsibility for the work assigned them. The field work that should accompany class instruction should be planned with direct reference to the content of the course. Its purpose is similar to that of the field work in a course in botany or geology or any other scientific study. To be of educational value it must fit step by step into the subject-matter of the course and for this reason cannot readily be relegated to a social agency. It has been the failure to work out this close correlation

between the class instruction and the field work that has brought about the unfortunate and illogical distinction between theoretical courses and practical work.

Courses of study worthy of a place in a professional school ought to be theoretical only in the sense that all work whether done in class or in the field seeks to test out theories and formulate principles and devise methods for the purpose of attaining increasingly better results. Field work is one part of the process by which these results are achieved. Its contribution, however, cannot be best made by simply delegating to it the burden of providing the practical side of the training of social workers. As long as we hold to this idea of field work, we have made little progress beyond the apprenticeship stage of training. Education for social work should be carried on by means of courses that include field work designed to make their subject-matter vital and concrete and of such a nature that this field work is not inconsistent with intensive and thorough study.

In this connection it is well to remind ourselves that the graduates of a school for social work cannot be expected to have acquired the technical skill that comes only through long practice. Much of the confusion in regard to the place of field work in the curriculum has been caused by the tendency to give technique an emphasis inconsistent with adequate attention to other aspects of professional training. A study of the curriculum of schools of social work leaves the impression that in spite of the advance made within recent years, they still follow out closely the methods of apprentice training. The field work that is given a central place in the curriculum from the beginning to the end of the course of study is primarily practice work with social agencies for the purpose of gaining familiarity with their technique and methods of work.

In arriving at a critical estimate of this method of training, help can be gained by reference to the procedure in medical education which has so much in common with education for social work. The medical school arranges its courses of study in four main divisions and gives them in the following order: (1) physiology, (2) pathology, (3) therapeutics, (4) hospital experience. In the first part of the course emphasis is placed upon a knowledge of the structure

and functions of the human body, followed by a study of its diseases and abnormalities. In order to do this adequately, the appropriate sciences are called into requisition and the laboratory is extensively used. It is only in the latter part of the course that the student is expected to devote much time to clinical experience. By means of this clinical study and practice the student gains familiarity with the methods followed in the diagnosis and treatment of disease and with the procedure of the operating room, but this is not regarded as sufficient equipment for successful practice. His graduation from the medical school is supposed to be followed by a year of hospital experience where, under the most favorable auspices, he can devote his whole time to the practice of his profession.

Education in social work should also proceed in this orderly and logical way. Beginning with a study of the structure and functions of society, with emphasis upon social research, the students should be led gradually into the field of social pathology, where they will study the methods of dealing with problems arising out of social maladjustments and abnormal conditions. Here the clinical field work may well begin, and no more should be expected of it than is expected of the clinics attended by the medical student. Familiarity should be gained with methods of social diagnosis and treatment and there should be opportunity for a limited amount of practice with the routine work of different kinds of social agencies. But the acquirement of skill that comes through considerable work experience must be left to the social-work internship that should follow the course of study offered by a school of social work. Only in exceptional cases should the graduate of a school of social work be considered ready for a position of independent responsibility. It should become as common as it now is in the medical profession for the social-work graduate to undergo an apprenticeship of varying length in his chosen field where under favorable conditions he can acquire professional skill. When this comes to be regarded as the accepted procedure to follow, it will be possible to give field work its proper place in the course of study and to plan a more thoroughgoing training course than can now be done.

[To be continued]

COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

The purpose of this organization is to secure effective co-operation and mutual helpfulness in their distinctive work among all its members. To this end the annual meetings of the Society should not be confined to expressing the ideas of a few but should bring to common knowledge the most significant ideas that are developing anywhere among its membership.

An invitation and a request is therefore extended to all members of the Society to notify the Secretary of their opinions as to the general theme and plan of the next annual meeting and especially to inform the Secretary of any topics upon which they have results from their own work already matured or maturing, which they wish to present at the annual meeting.

The general subject of the next annual meeting of the Society will be selected with regard for any common trend of interest revealed by the replies to this request, and the program will be arranged as far as possible to utilize the results of the work spontaneously undertaken by the members.

If such an opportunity is desired at least one half-day during the annual meeting will be set aside for sectional meetings devoted to topics which are of special interest to separate divisions of our membership. The members of the Society are invited to propose topics to which they wish to have a sectional meeting devoted. If the response to these requests is as general as is hoped, it will of course be impossible to act upon all the suggestions received, but they all will be given the most hospitable consideration, and they will afford to the officers of the Society the most valued guidance.

In order to serve the purpose effectively, replies should be received within a month after this communication is published.

EDWARD CARY HAYES

NEWS AND NOTES

Notes of interest to the readers of the *Journal* should be in the hands of the editor of "News and Notes" not later than the tenth of the month preceding publication.

SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF EUGENICS

The *Journal* has received the preliminary announcement of the Second International Congress of Eugenics to be held in New York City September 22-28, 1921. The First International Congress was held in London, August, 1912, under the auspices of the Eugenics Education Society and the presidency of Major Leonard Darwin. According to present plans, the Congress will be organized into four sections. The first will deal with the results of research in the domain of pure eugenics in animals and plants, and in studies in human heredity. The second section will consider factors which influence the human family, and their control. The third section will concern itself with the topic of human racial differences in relation to immigration, racial admixture, and national and cultural groups. The fourth section will discuss eugenics in relation to the state, to society, and to education.

The honorary president of the Congress is Alexander Graham Bell. The president is Henry Fairchild Osborn. All papers for presentation at the Congress should be submitted to the Secretary-General, who will see that they are received and considered by the proper section of the program committee. All communications should be addressed to Dr. C. C. Little, Secretary-General, American Museum of Natural History, 77th Street and Central Park, West, New York City.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF LONDON

The *Sociological Review* reports that during January there was an Exhibition of Civic and Regional Surveys at Leplay House. The exhibit included surveys of Westminster, Oxford, Chelsea, Saffron Walden, Ludlow, and Newbury.

Among the several groups of the Society for the study of special problems, the most active at present are the group in social psychology, the group formed for the study of "La science sociale," and the group engaged in studying rural problems.

INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

The International Institute of Sociology announces the election as associates of Professor John P. Lichtenberger, of the University of Pennsylvania, first vice-president of the American Sociological Society, and Professor Scott E. W. Bedford, of the University of Chicago, former secretary of the American Sociological Society.

REVUE DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE

The *Archives Sociologiques* published by the Institut Solvay of Brussels, which was suspended for six years because of the war, has made its reappearance under the title *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*. The *Revue* will appear in six numbers during the year, each issue containing about 140 pages. The editors are G. Barnich and G. Hostelet. Over one-third the space of the *Revue* is devoted to bibliographies, book reviews, and abstracts. The first number, issued last July, contained an article, "La raison et le progrès moral," by Professor Edward Cary Hayes, of the University of Illinois. Communications should be addressed to Institut Solvay, Parc Léopold, Brussels.

CHICAGO COMMISSION ON RACE RELATIONS

The Chicago Commission on Race Relations was appointed by Governor Lowden of Illinois to inquire into the causes leading up to and culminating in the riot of July, 1919, which resulted in the death of twenty-three negroes and fifteen white persons. This Commission has been engaged since February, 1920, in a thorough and comprehensive inquiry into race relations in general with special inquiry into: housing, industry, crime and police administration, racial clashes, race contacts, and public opinion. Throughout this study the emphasis has been placed upon the social and psychological aspects of the relations of the white and negro groups. The material is now in process of compilation. The executive secretary of the Commission is Mr. Graham Romeyn Taylor; the associate secretary is Mr. Charles S. Johnson, formerly of the Chicago Urban League.

AN EMPLOYMENT SERVICE STUDY

A study of public employment in the United States has been undertaken by the Russell Sage Foundation. The general purpose is to gather the experience of this country in planning, organizing, and administering public employment work. The work undertaken groups

itself into three main parts. First, are the questions which have to do with the general organization and administration of the service. They include, among others, questions as to federal, federal-state, or some other unit of administration; the organization and function of the service from the federal center to the local ends; the status of the service in the federal, state, or local government organization; and the distribution of offices.

Second, are the questions relating to the administration of the local offices, and the technique of the local service. They include office layout; the placement process; practice in receiving, registering, interviewing, and referring applicants; forms and blanks in use; and so on.

And third, there are questions as to the place and function of the service in our industrial life, local and national. What are the obstacles which the public employment service must meet and overcome if it is to have a healthy and reasonably rapid development? etc.

The investigations have been made by Mary LaDame, Leslie E. Woodcock, J. B. Buell, Fred A. King, and Helen B. Russell, nearly all of whom have been employed at one time or another in public or private employment work. Their experience has been gathered in several different sections of the country. The study is under the general direction of Shelby M. Harrison.

STUDY OF WOMEN DELINQUENTS

The Bureau of Social Hygiene announces the publication of a book entitled "A Study of Women Delinquents in New York State." The authors of the book are Dr. Mabel R. Fernald, assistant professor of psychology, University of Minnesota, formerly director, Laboratory of Social Hygiene; Dr. Mary H. S. Hayes, formerly psychologist, and Almena Dawley, formerly sociologist of the Bureau of Social Hygiene and now of the Pennsylvania School of Social Work. The book includes a statistical chapter by Beardsley Ruml.

Six groups of women were studied: (1) Women committed to the State Reformatory at Bedford Hills. This group include felons, misdemeanants, and women convicted of such offenses as soliciting on the public streets, frequenting disorderly houses, loitering, etc. (2) A group of felons committed to the State Prison at Auburn. (3) Misdemeanants and felons committed to the New York Penitentiary. (4) A group of minor offenders committed to the New York City Workhouse. (5) A group committed to the Magdalen Home, now Inward House. (6) A group of women convicted in the night court and placed on probation.

STUDENTS' DISSERTATIONS IN SOCIOLOGY

The next issue of the *Journal* will contain a list of doctoral dissertations and Masters' theses now in preparation in American universities and colleges. Letters have been sent to departments which last year reported graduate work in sociology. If any department with candidates for higher degrees in sociology has been omitted, information will be appreciated upon the following points: names of candidates, present degrees with institutions conferring them, title of thesis with probable year of completion.

ROCKFORD COLLEGE

Professor Seba Eldridge, head of the department of the social sciences, announces the inception of a new social-science series under his editorship, and bearing the imprint of Thomas Y. Crowell Company. Arrangements have already been made for books on the following topics: economics considered as a social science, by Professor Lionel Edie; history of socialism, by Dr. Harry W. Laidler; international government, by Dr. Jessie Wallace Hughan; labor problems, by Professor Gordon S. Watkins; crime and punishment, by Clarence Darrow. It is expected that all these contributions to the series, with the exception of Professor Watkins' treatise on labor problems, will appear during the present year. The series is to be broad in scope, and will include books on government and economics as well as on sociology proper.

WITTENBERG COLLEGE

Professor Paul H. Heisey, of the University of Dubuque, Dubuque, Iowa, has accepted a call to the chair of religious education and Sunday-school work at Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio. He goes to the new position in September, 1921.

REVIEWS

Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Umriss einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte. Von OSWALD SPENGLER. Band I: *Gestalt und Wirklichkeit*. Pp. xv+615. München: Beck, 1921. (American price, \$6.00.) Band II. *Welthistorische Perspektiven*. (Not yet received.)

The title-page of the copy before us carries the statement that it is one of the "51st to 53d thousand." This is an index of the amount of notice which the book has attracted in Germany. It has even started discussion of the question, "What will be its effect on religion?" Enough copies have already reached this country to give it extended publicity. Responsibility to our constituency demands then that space enough be given to the volume to assure our professional readers that they may safely dismiss all suspicion of obligation to analyze it for themselves. As it is negligible from the standpoint of technical social science, it also contains nothing over which there is the slightest occasion for a religious or theological flutter.

In brief, the book is the latest attempt to cast the horoscope of the world's history. On page 65 the author naïvely gives away the situation which the first line of his Preface had led the writer to suspect. He frankly states that in 1911 he felt a call to "take a broad view of certain political phenomena." He implies, though he does not directly state, that at this time not only was "the world-war as the already inevitable external form of the historical crisis immediately impending," but that he had detected this immediately. Thereupon he felt called upon to discover the reasons for it

"in the spirit of the previous—not years but—centuries." He goes on to say that in pursuit of his originally limited task he came to the realization "that for actual understanding of the epoch the circumference of the bases must be more widely drawn; that it is wholly impossible to confine an investigation of this sort to a single period and to its group of political events, to hold it within the frame of pragmatic considerations, and even to inhibit purely metaphysical, highly transcendental speculations—all of which is necessary in order to arrive at results that will have the attestation of profound necessity. It became apparent that a political problem cannot be understood from within politics itself; that essential currents which work in the depths come into intelligibility only in the realm of art, and indeed only in the form of far

removed scientific and purely philosophical ideas. . . . At last it was perfectly clear that no fragment of history can be completely illuminated until the secret of world history in general, or more precisely that of the higher stratum of humanity as an organic unity or orderly structure, is completely clarified."

Ergo, the author's mission to reveal that which has remained hidden from the wise and prudent from the foundation of the world!

No more delicious specimen of the "echt deutsch" in thinking could be desired. It dawns upon an earnest and talented man that the everyday is a manifestation of the All. Thereupon he feels himself delegated of destiny to extemporize a philosophy of the All. He has been trained as a mathematician. He has not been trained as a social scientist. He has only the faintest conception of the struggles of social philosophers, time out of mind, to produce credible interpretations of the All. He does not know a thousandth part of the searchings that have resulted in nothing but demonstration of the futility of the proposed techniques of research. He has not assimilated what has become instinctive with conventionally trained students of social science, about the false starts which have been made, particularly within the latest two hundred years, in attempting to fathom the mysteries of human experience. An auto-intoxicated Quixote, he fares forth into a labyrinth which, over and over again, has been partially plotted by many sorts of pioneers. He shows comparatively little sense of the economy of assembling the lessons of their experience. Accordingly every step of his course falls within the footprints of some predecessor, and the tendency of each direction which he takes reveals itself in advance to everyone who is at all familiar with the history of social philosophizing.

Returning to page 5 we find the author revealing the secret of his presumed prognosticating power as follows: "The means of understanding living forms is analogy." Sociologists have had saddening experiences with analogy. They will think twice before putting their trust in it again. The sort of analogy which the author has in mind may be inferred from a sentence a little later (p. 8):

Who is aware that a profound connection of form exists between differential calculation and the dynastic state principle of the period of Louis XIV; between the antique civic form of the *polis* and the Euclidian geometry; between the space-perspective of occidental painting and the conquest of space by roads, telephones, and long-distance weapons; between counterpoint instrumental music and the economic credit system?

That is, the author offers an aesthetic key to interpretation of history. In short, as against prevailing psychological approaches to the problem,

to be typified, let us say, by the method of Professor Hobhouse, he advocates a plan of approach more like that of Professor Patrick Geddes.

As the exhibit unrolls it turns out that the author's "analogy" is not only a symbolism which is invisible to the uninitiated, but that the symbols pass into a cipher code which by comparison makes the alleged Baconian scheme look obvious and simple.

The fundamental assumption of the book is that civilization is what goes on in the most esoteric cells of the brains of the intellectually and artistically elect (p. 8). (Cf. pp. 523-24.) This hypothesis has never been less plausible than since the German war. No civilization can be known by its intelligentsia without discount for its inarticulates. Moreover, it is highly improbable that the ratio of the intellectual to the non-intellectual factors is identical in any two civilizations. Indeed, a better selling proposition, as the phrase goes, would be that the intelligentsia and the individually negligible factors have meaning for the civilization of a period in a ratio similar to that which the wakes of all the ships that sail the seven seas, on the one hand, and the ocean depths, on the other, have to its commerce. Not consistently, but as a rule, Spengler abstracts this "highbrow" factor from the total of human experience, and essays a philosophy of that alone. He thereby throws up the attempt to interpret history, by confining himself to a single strand in history. If he really intends to seek out an interpretation of history, in the sense of the totality of men's past experience, the supposition that the explanation is to be found in this single thread in the tapestry is too naïve for consideration by responsible social scientists.

Spengler's assault upon the conventionalities of historians is spicy reading. By comparison it makes Nordau's heresies look orthodox. The criticism goes over ground, however, which sociologists have traversed for a generation in debate with the historians. It is vigorous argument as to the inconclusiveness of the conceptions which have furnished the background for most historical writing, but it does not help the author's case as proposer of a substitute. Spengler's method of divination reaches the dictum (p. 20) that European civilization (*Kultur*) is "a precisely definable phenomenon between the years 1000 and 2000 A.D." Moreover (p. 36), "The period 1800-2000 in occidental *Kultur* is identical with Hellenism. Particularly is the end of the war identical with the transition from the Hellenistic to the Roman period." The prospectus of the destiny which Spengler declares is in brief this: On or about the year 2000, the world is to resolve itself into a few provinces, each subject to a metropolis, where a Super-Cecil-Rhodes is to

reign. This may or may not turn out to have been a good guess. Meanwhile, in spite of its attendant parade of learning, it remains a guess, nothing more. As a sheer betting proposition, which is all the guess amounts to, the odds would favor any decently restrained formula of denatured sovietism. Then the author proceeds (p. 55):

Hitherto everyone has been free to hope for whatever sort of future one wished. Where there are no facts the feelings govern. In the future it will be everyone's duty to learn of the impending what can and will occur, with the unalterable necessity of a destiny, and quite independent of our personal ideals or those of the age. If we use the questionable word freedom, at all events it is not within our liberty to realize this or that, but merely that which is necessary.

Waiving the trifle that there is nothing whatever in the book which is established as a foundation for this dogmatism, we may be able to imagine ourselves reduced to the belief that the future of the world is fixed in detail by inexorable fate. We cannot, however, imagine ourselves accepting the claim of any visionary who offers himself that he is authorized to reveal the terms of that fate.

At the end of his Introduction the author reduces his apocalypse to conspectus form in three ingenious tables. They dutifully correspond with his own term "morphology." They are verbal-visual symbols of the "soul" of various civilizations as he reacts to them. There is no pretense of making out an evolutionary nexus. Analogy, naked and unashamed, is all the sanction claimed.

With this showing of the author's plan, everyone competent to evaluate method will know whether it is worth while to follow him in detail. No matter what opinions a writer may set forth if his procedure is intrinsically incompetent to validate any opinion whatsoever.

In brief, the book is exactly what one might expect from an exceptionally gifted writer who is as to vocation a mathematician, as to proclivity a mystic, as to ambition a cosmic philosopher. It is spangled thick with pearls of impression, but, with certain notable exceptions, they are wondrously wrought from messy paste. Varying the figure, almost any paragraph chosen at random might act as a mental cocktail, but therewith the whole story is told, so far as the methodological verdict is at issue. Intellectual nutrition is conspicuously absent. The escapade has substantially the same relation to social science which Jules Verne's writings have to physical science. It kaleidoscopes a large amount of knowledge into a historical extravaganza.

One can hardly believe that the author had ever heard of Barth's *Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, or of Robert Flint's *Philosophy*

of *History*, first edition. Either work might have suggested enough sober second thoughts to deter a reasonably cautious amateur from adding to the long list of futile attempts to accomplish the impossible.

ALBION W. SMALL

The Grand Strategy of Evolution. The Social Philosophy of a Biologist. By WILLIAM PATTEN, Professor of Biology in Dartmouth College. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1920. Pp. xviii+412. \$5.00.

The universal end, or purpose in life, and in nature, is to construct, to create, or grow. The ways and means of accomplishing that end are mutual service, or co-operative action, and rightness.

Two reciprocal processes are always manifest in this co-operative nature-action: construction and destruction; organization and disorganization. We may also call these universal processes of give and take, good and evil, anabolism and catabolism, egoism and altruism. But as this nature-metabolism, as a whole, is cumulative and progressive, there is but one all-pervading attribute of nature, namely rightness, which becomes manifest to us as constructive, or creative action, or growth.

I shall speak, not as a scientist in the conventions of science. . . . I have thrown the small verbal cash and other impedimenta of my native province into the melting pot, using wherever possible the irreducible sovereign terms current in all mental exchange. And if you who read will also, for the moment, lay aside your own trappings, coming foot-free with me over some neglected trails, it may be that we shall see more clearly from our new point of view—and perhaps more convincingly because of its scientific setting—that elemental truth which governs alike all the institutions of man and of nature. *The right to exist and the obligation to serve are one and inseparable; for to exist is to give, and to give is to receive.*

The foregoing sentences are the substance of the Preface of a book which it is an inspiration to read and a duty to recommend. It is the sort of book which carries not the burr or the shell or the boxes or burlaps in which nature or man has packed the makings of knowledge and wisdom; but reality in shape to be converted into immediate understanding. It is a book of the kind which epitomizes an intellectual and moral epoch. It brings forth things new and old in a manner which dramatizes the contrast between the thought-world of its era and that of the era when men reflected the actual world in the latest previous tentative picture. It is the kind of book which is a liberal education in itself. It should take the blur out of eyes that can see in the world of

experience at most nothing better than chaos camouflaged by convention; contradiction contradicted by classification; a darkness and light, good and bad at perpetual war, censored by dogma into a conceptual peace. It is a book fit to emancipate people who have been taught that nature is bad, grace is good, and God a shock-absorber between the two. It is a book to shame the type of pseudo-scientist who has learned no more about the ways of nature than that it is a dog-eat-dog economy, with Bernhardt, Tirpitz, and Hindenburg as its prophets. It is a book for every preacher who is still preaching that evolutionist and Christian are mutually exclusive terms. It is a book for every teacher who hopes there is a continuity and consistency of cosmic processes, including the social realm, but is not quite able to make them out. It is a book for every student of school, or post-school, age who wants to know the best that is known about the ground plan on which mundane affairs proceed.

In the first 280 pages the author epitomizes the ways in which the evolutionary method works in nature. It is the most lucid presentation of the subject to the lay mind that we have seen. The remaining 150 pages indicate how the evolutionary method develops after "man's mental imagery (as) a prime creative factor" begins to be the differentiating element.

The guiding idea in this part of the agreement is formulated as follows (p. 277):

All constructive problems in social life may be resolved into secondary problems of ways and means of extending the principles of co-operative action to larger and larger groups, or conditions, for longer and longer periods. To that end, correspondingly larger experience, more comprehensive vision, and greater tenacity or purpose are essential. But the constructive method will always remain the same.

It would not be surprising if the charge should be brought against the social philosophy of the book that it is merely a revival of the discredited "biological sociology" of a generation ago. On the contrary, even Karl Menger, who subjected that crude technique to the most damaging criticism, would probably admit that the method of this exposition is guiltless of the errors he exposed. The obsolete "biological sociology" started with a fanciful morphological conception of "society" as a body analogous with a physiological organism. The method of this book makes no *a priori* assumptions. It simply recognizes growth functions as they follow one another out of the physical into the social realm, and it shows how understanding of physical functions may help

to understanding of social functions. It does not arbitrarily superimpose anything biological upon the social. It shows how vision trained by acquaintance with methods of growth on the physical levels may the better detect growth methods on the social levels.

It may be said, too, that the book overworks the structural aspects both of nature and of human relations. The word "architecture" has a prominence out of proportion to the functional aspects of the growth reality which it is supposed to be expounding. In the reviewer's judgment the fault is real, but it is more in appearance than in actual effect. The author's whole emphasis is so obviously upon growth that the statical connotations of the term "architecture" do not obscure the functional process which it is used to clarify.

On the whole, no book in the entire post-Darwinian literature equals this volume as a guide to the congruity between the constructive processes of nature and the moral economics of "the psychic factors," as Lester F. Ward taught us to call them. In spirit it may well remind us of Drummond's *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*. The later writer, however, is more sure-footed than the earlier author, both on the physical and the spiritual plane, and his book deserves larger and more permanent influence. It would be difficult to overstate the service which Professor Patten has performed in teaching the lesson that the problem of life, personal and public, is not to be solved by "fighting the cosmic process," but by "accepting nature's constructive rightness as the ethical standard, and by adopting her constructive methods as the moral code."

ALBION W. SMALL

Principles of Sociology with Educational Applications. By FREDERICK R. CLOW. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920. Pp. xiv+436. \$1.00.

The phenomenal increase in the popularity of sociology as a study is shown by the demand for its application in institutional fields. This is especially true in education as evidenced by the desire of publishers to get a textbook in educational sociology. The Century Company used that title for W. E. Chancellor's book, when, by no stretch of the imagination, could it be rightfully so named. It devotes only one very sketchy chapter out of thirty-seven to the school and in general pays much less attention to education than does the average textbook on general sociology.

It is to the everlasting credit of Dr. Clow that in his text he has used its proper title, *Principles of Sociology with Educational Applications*, even though his publishers did print on its back *Principles of Educational Sociology*. It is a simply worded, well-organized, and thoroughly suggestive textbook in general sociology written especially for teachers. Most of the illustrative material is such as would appeal to them and would be particularly applicable to their problems. It is divided into three parts, "Factors of Society," "Social Organization," and "Social Progress." Part II is the longest and most effective of the three divisions. At the close of each chapter is a series of topics and problems and an ample list of specific readings for classroom use.

One feature of Dr. Clow's book is unique. Long quotations are embodied in the text, either at the end or in the midst of each topic. It thus becomes a sort of combined text and book of readings. This arrangement has both merits and defects. Its value lies in the fact that students must perforce become acquainted with a variety of authors and realize something of the nature and wealth of sociological literature. Also, it buttresses the author's statements with accepted authorities and brings into immediate juxtaposition the social principle and its practical application. Its weakness lies in breaking the continuity of thought and scattering the student's psychic energy. Likewise the effort to combine textual discussion with topical readings requires unnecessary brevity for each. Dr. Clow's treatment of each topic would be more convincing if he had used the whole space for his own discussion and embodied the readings, equally enlarged, in another book, or, perhaps better, had doubled the size of the book. Is it not time for sociologists to demand more time for an elementary course and to use more elaborate textbooks, or if a manual or brief text is used to guarantee that enough laboratory work is done to avoid the imputation, too frequently justified, that it is a "snap" course?

Dr. Clow has given us a thoughtful and much-needed textbook in general sociology for teachers, and it is certain to be widely used, particularly in normal schools.

WALTER R. SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

A *Digest of Educational Sociology*. By DAVID SNEDDEN. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1920. Pp. ix+264. (Paper.)

The materials in this volume were evidently assembled as a syllabus and guide for the author's students in his courses in educational sociology.

In the first hundred pages there is a digest of the fundamentals of sociological theory—or, more accurately, a statement of problems dealt with in this theory; and along with this are presented our major educational problems from the sociological point of view. While the latter half of the volume continues these problems by breaking them up into greater detail in connection with school subjects and grade levels, in much larger measure it becomes an outline of topics, problems, actual and hypothetical cases, etc., for the guidance of students taking the course.

It is probable that there is no other volume yet published which states, suggests, and contains reference to so wide and well-chosen an array of fundamental educational problems. Herein lies its great value. Rarely, however, are the problems discussed, explained, or made clear to the novice in the field. For the discussion he must go to the collateral readings. The latter, however, in the present condition of the literature, rather inadequately treat most of the educational problems. In large measure the student must draw on his professional experiences and observations. The syllabus is therefore best for mature students who have had practical educational experience.

It is not a book to be *read*; it is a reference book for guidance of research and study. It is primarily a book on education rather than sociology—except as education is itself one of the major fields of sociology.

FRANKLIN BOBBITT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis. By PROFESSOR SIGMUND FREUD, LL.D. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1920. Pp. vii+406. \$4.50.

Sociologists will welcome this book, for it gives briefly, clearly, and with authority the Freudian system of psychology. The layman has waited for a complete, up-to-date, lucid treatment of this difficult subject; and here it is by the master himself. Its presentation is strategically divided in three parts: the psychology of errors, the dream, and the general theory of the neurosis. The book contains much material of value to the sociologists without regard to the reader's attitude toward the Freudian hypothesis. Examples of this are the author's discussion of the sublimating value of art and the sociological significance of fear in childhood.

Although, as Stanley Hall suggests, one may find himself in opposition to Freud's exaggerated emphasis upon the instinct of sex, nevertheless the general reader will regard the book as a whole as less extreme

in this respect than are the works of many of Freud's disciples. The presentation is free from that attitude of "force-it-down-the-public's-throat-to-see-it-squirm," the presence of which in some Freudian literature has repelled the unbeliever and distorted Freud's teaching. The ego instinct is given recognition, although the value of Adler's contribution is not justly appreciated. The book aims to be constructive rather than controversial; and taking into account the subject-matter, it largely succeeds. The Preface, much too brief, gives the reader a favorable but discriminating entrée.

ERNEST R. GROVES

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Social Scandinavia in the Viking Age. By MARY WILHELMINE WILLIAMS. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920. Pp. x+451. \$5.00.

Virile Scandinavia, during the most spectacular, romantic, and dominant period of its career, is brought intimately before the reader in this book. Other students of peoples might well follow Dr. Williams' example in her presentation of a people during the formative period of its development.

The book has the virtue of presenting a well-rounded picture of the life of the people studied. It is as complete as the university student or instructor would require who did not need to go to the original sources.

In every page the book bears evidence of thorough and painstaking study. The sources from which Dr. Williams has gathered her data seem to be as complete as one could reasonably expect, and I would say she has not neglected any source open to her use. A long bibliography follows the text of the book. In order to test the value of the book as a source I several times sought information in chapters I had not then read. In each case what I sought was found and in its proper place.

The following subject headings show the scope of the book: the land and the people; the ties of kinship and nationality; classes of society; infancy, childhood, and youth; dress and ornament; marriage and divorce; position of women; homesteads and houses; house-furnishings and food; agriculture and the routine of farm life; hunting, fowling, and fishing; transportation; trade and commerce; markets and towns; the career of the Viking; government; system of justice; social gatherings; language and literature; learning in general; religion; superstition; and death and burial.

The study is thoroughly and consistently objective. In fact, I fear it is too much so to hold a reader who has not either a definite need of the data or a kinship interest in the people presented. In one way, however, Dr. Williams puts herself into every few pages by suggesting higher phases of culture than her sources seem to allow. The pages of the book are sprinkled with the words "probably," "doubtless," and "perhaps." I failed to analyze the reason for these words, unless it was an unconscious zeal for, "probably" a pride in, the Scandinavian people themselves. I criticize the too frequent use of these *guess* words, because they will waylay the judgment of even the careful reader; he cannot always be sure whether certain statements of the book present real conditions as revealed by the sources, or reasonably justified conclusions of the author, or desirable conditions with which she quite unconsciously wishes to impress her readers.

This study will be of great value to students of peoples in America. The individualistic old-line American will see certain of his own traits and characteristics in the individualistic old Teuton of Scandinavia.

The quotations from the sagas placed at the opening of each chapter are not the least interesting part of the book.

ALBERT ERNEST JENKS

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Klasserna och Samhället. By PONTUS FAHLBECK. Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & Soners Forlag, 1920. Pp. viii+413. Kr. 18.

The author of this book has been a teacher of political science and statistics at Lund University in Sweden. He is known as the editor of *Statsvetenskaplig Tidsskrift* and as the author of several books on sociological subjects. In 1892 Fahlbeck published a book on *Stand och Klasser*, and judging from the list of his published writings his chief interest during the last thirty years has been along the line which furnishes the subject-matter of "*Classes and Society*." The work of this seventy-year-old author therefore presumably represents the results of ample investigation and mature thought and should be of some value to other students of society.

The present volume is the first of a series of three which the author intends to publish on the subject of "*Classes and Society*." In this volume the author attempts to trace the origin of classes in primitive society and the development of class systems up through the historical age of antiquity. As the author says in his Introduction, the presentation is less historical than *typological*, and the main topic is the etiology

and morphology of classes. He accepts the results of historical and ethnological research and is concerned chiefly with the sociological interpretation of these data.

Various theories of the origin of classes which have been put forth are weighed and found wanting. The writer agrees with Durkheim that the social division of labor should be regarded as the most important "driving force" of culture and of social differentiation:

But it is so, not merely as a technical specialization and monopolization, and still less as a purposeful division of economic production. Rather it is such as the result of an unequal evaluation of objects and the consequent grouping of the persons who occupy themselves with these objects. . . . This evaluation receives one of its strongest expressions in the class system. For it is this . . . which is the *raison d'être* of the social division of labor and the hierarchy of higher and lower classes based thereon.

This psychological factor of evaluation is emphasized throughout the whole treatment of "Classes and Society." The function of early religions in originating and fixing social values and in maintaining class distinctions is traced with some care. Subjection through war or unequal distribution of wealth would have failed to maintain class distinctions were it not for the creation of higher sanctions such as those of religion.

While in its individual aspect classes appear merely as unequal stations in life, in its broader social aspect "class systems are simply human organizations of cultural enterprise." Despite many apparent differences the class system of every society in the same cultural stage is held to be essentially the same. On the other hand it is not held that culture progresses indefinitely with the rising degree of class differentiation. The apex of the rising trend of class distinctions has been reached in the feudal and caste systems, while modern culture societies have tended toward a gradual weakening of sharp class distinctions.

The full treatment of classes in modern society is deferred to a later volume. But although this volume aims to treat specifically only the class systems of primitive and ancient societies it is written with a constant reference to modern conditions and current movements which makes it a book of present interest. One senses through its pages the reality of the problem of classes in Europe and elsewhere in the world of today.

What the relative value of this contribution to sociological literature may be I shall leave to more competent critics to decide.

OSCAR B. YTREHUS

Woman and the New Race. By MARGARET SANGER. New York: Brentano, 1920. Pp. 234. \$2.00.

It is hard to see how Havelock Ellis could have written such a fulsome preface for an inferior and poorly titled presentation of the subject of birth-control. As Beecher said, speaking after the tirade of a man-hating war-horse of a suffragette, "Nevertheless, we believe in Women's Rights." Fearless dogmatism rather than scientific judgment has produced the notoriety through which Mrs. Sanger has unfortunately become known as American protagonist of this movement. It is this conspicuous position which alone seems to justify a full review of this bit of unscientific propaganda.

The general argument is sound and obvious: overpopulation causes many evils. Woman is both victim and cause, and is largely ignorant of results and remedies. Birth-control, when freed from stupid laws, will doubtless help, as is shown by conditions in Holland and in Australia. Sound medical research is wisely urged and predicted. Many of the facts which the author marshals in support also seem reliable. They are rendered weak, however, by frequent emotional or special pleading and by questionable and extreme statements. The reviewers find themselves asking what unconscious background must motivate such opinions.

Among her statements or implications are the following:

1. That only the married woman who has been constantly loved by the most understanding and considerate of husbands has escaped [certain] horrors.
2. That feeble-minded children result from alcoholic or insane parents, or from too frequent child-bearing. (Cause and effect are perhaps reversed here.)
3. That infanticide has, in the past, improved the position of women.
4. That a woman is physically fittest for marriage at twenty-five. (Bertillon to the contrary.)
5. That a preliminary period of childless marriage improves family life.
6. That women conceive more easily after an abortion, and that a "cold" woman conceives more easily than does a passionate one.
7. That the average mother of a baby every year or two has been forced into unwilling motherhood, so far as the later arrivals are concerned.
8. That progressive variations in evolution are due to the female rather than the male.

9. That there is a beneficial exchange of magnetism between the sexes in Shaker marriage.

10. That nursing a child after twelve months tends to produce brain disease in the child and deafness and blindness in the mother.

11. That midwives, as well as physicians, should be permitted to impart contraceptive information.

12. That Christianity has set back the progress of women by a thousand years.

For many of these statements she offers no authority other than her own. Even where plausible evidence is offered, her cause is not helped by attacking Christianity and the male sex. Whether or not Mrs. Sanger wants their co-operation, the support of men and of the churches is very essential to the new morality of parenthood.

She ignores those arguments—like those from immigration or industry—which have also been used with some plausibility by the advocates of larger families. Hoffman (the “prudential” statistician) would turn in his gravity to find anything he wrote used to support birth-control!

Her general fallacy is the common one of confusing an indispensable cause with an exclusive cause. She follows the chain of causation in each problem only until she finds her pet link.

But, most fundamental, her entire point of view (insufficiently offset by two or three scattered pages) seems essentially selfish. She emphasizes the emancipation of women rather than the welfare of the family or of the child, which she calls a more selfish interest. The “feminine spirit” for which she pleads, is but a projection of her own protest against economic, political, and other domination. To the reviewers, it would appear that what she is striving for in this respect is the basic rights of human nature rather than of specifically feminine nature.

A more constructive and positive approach to this problem is being worked out from the standard of organic welfare, including both sexes, family and society, worthy childhood, and voluntary parenthood. Men, also, have been degraded, kept ignorant. Why not develop fathers as fathers, quite as much as develop mothers, whether as mothers, as women, or as humans?

It is hard to blame Mrs. Sanger for the shortcomings of this book: we might feel as she, were we to read as many letters like those she publishes. Doubtless, however, she does not hear nor see so much of the happily married. To understand and pardon does not, however,

warrant approval: the cause is so fundamental and worthy that it must be defended even from its friends. One may admire the courage and value the sacrifice of a pioneer and yet refuse to recognize her as a wise leader. Sensationalism may already have seriously handicapped the movement by associating it in the public mind with the *outré* and morbid. Possibly a reading of Aristophanes' marriage-strike might restore a sense of humor to the subject.

S. W. AND T. D. ELIOT

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

What the Workers Want—A Study of British Labor. By ARTHUR GLEASON. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe. Pp. 518. \$4.00.

A panorama of the contending and thinking forces affecting or being affected by the labor movement in Great Britain is presented by the writer in all its human aspects. There is a sincerity and lack of artistry in this book that gives the reader a much clearer portrayal of the situation than would be possible had the author set out to give a systematic analysis of conditions instead of presenting facts and opinions as they are at work in the labor movement.

One is particularly impressed by the personalities that lead the labor movement as portrayed by Mr. Gleason, and to supplement his own descriptions the author makes the leaders speak for themselves. That the special chapters written by the various labor leaders fail to correspond to the descriptions given of them is only reasonable, but in presenting one's moving ideas and ideals the interpreter does well to step aside and let the subject make his own plea.

The reports of the various labor conferences appended to the book are of immense value, as they give the trend of the labor thought and movement in the clearest possible outline and without them the book would be incomplete or even misleading.

Mr. Gleason has a keen eye for essentials and a sense of perspective that makes this seemingly bulky volume teem with human interest, without losing sight of the fact that nothing is final and that all is still in a formative and progressive stage. There are no positive predictions, although we are not left in the dark as to the direction in which things are moving. There is no effort to give the impression that the masses of English labor are more intelligent or farseeing than American labor; but that leadership is evidently more keenly alive to the possibilities of

economic reconstruction and the mass of workers is more willing to listen to those whose social ideals are grounded in the more complex philosophy of the state than is generally conceded to the ordinary labor leader in this country is made clear.

Mr. Gleason's style is vitalized by a deep interest in his subject and his direct contact with the movement and the leaders with whom he deals. A short chapter on old England is of particular interest because of its quaint charm and its masterful description of peaceful England in contrast with the contending forces of labor and capital.

No one interested in the labor movement can afford to forego the advantage of examining this work. The English labor program that came into being during the war and which attracted so much attention in the United States was indicative of the influence that the labor movement abroad must have upon conditions in this country. Whatever the future of the movement in England, it is bound to have its effect upon American labor.

CAROL ARONOVICI

BELVEDERE, CAL.

Readings in Rural Sociology. By JOHN PHELAN. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920. Pp. xiv+632. \$4.00.

In a volume of more than six hundred pages the author has brought together under twenty chapter headings almost 150 brief articles, addresses, and excerpts or abridgments from writings which bear upon this subject. The first four chapters furnish an excellent historical perspective for an understanding of present-day rural problems. Then follow chapters devoted to the various aspects of the rural life of today. The place of farming in our national life, the economic, the mental and moral, the health and the recreational aspects of country life, transportation, police protection, the home, the school, miscellaneous educational agencies, the church, the village, the rural survey, rural organization, rural leadership, and rural sociology suggest the plan of organization under which this vast amount of material has been brought together.

Those who use this volume will wish that the author had arranged the chapters in a different order, or, better still, that he had grouped them under larger divisional headings. The first four chapters are largely historical; chapters v, vi, x, and xviii treat of the various economic aspects of rural life; chapters vii, xi, and xv have to do with health, recreation, and education; while the remaining chapters deal with the important social issues. Some five or six well-chosen divisional

titles would no doubt have had some influence on the particular selections to be included in the book. As one runs through the titles, however, he finds little that even the busy student would wish to exclude.

A second criticism which one is tempted to suggest, even though the volume purports to be only a book of readings, is the absence of introductory and interpretative discussion by the author. Nothing in rural education and rural sociology is more needed just now, after a full decade of popular enthusiasm, and educational, social, economic, and religious propaganda in behalf of rural life, with the flood of investigation, research, and legislation, and the greater flood of every type of literature that has accompanied the movement, than a clear interpretation of just what it has all been about. In this connection the author's principal contribution is his chapter and subchapter headings, together with well-chosen chapter bibliographies. After reading, selecting, and classifying such a mass of material as the author must have handled, the reader will regret the absence of this feature which would have added a total of only twenty or thirty pages at most.

The book is a pioneer attempt, however, to bring some order out of the chaos of material in this field, and even with the absence of the features above suggested leaves one with the impression that the rural problem is a very real problem in American life, and that as a field for careful and scientific study it is not entirely adrift. One is pleased to find the names of Thomas Nixon Carver, Frederick J. Turner, Booker T. Washington, Eugene Davenport, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Horace Plunkett, James Bryce, and Theodore Roosevelt associated with the names of the few men who have made it their principal life business to mine out this field of rural sociology.

The book has made available, in good form, a valuable body of literature, which, previous to this, no one person could hope to find, and by so doing will add impetus to the movement for a better rural America. Almost everybody has read some portion of the book as it appeared in magazines or books, but few have realized the amount of substantial study that has been devoted to the subject. To this end the book will be very informing, to say nothing of the important need it will fill in the university and normal-school classrooms and in the hundreds of circulating county libraries and school libraries throughout the country.

J. B. SEARS

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

The Woman Who Waits. By FRANCES DONOVAN. Boston: Badger, 1920. Pp. 228. \$2.50.

The Woman Who Waits is an interesting account of Mrs. Donovan's nine months' experience as a waitress in the restaurants of Chicago. It is a book which at the same time that it provides an evening's entertainment offers a great deal of information of undoubted value to the student of social conditions. The very readable style in which it is written adds to the vividness of the picture which Mrs. Donovan aims to draw and in no way detracts from the scientific worth of the work.

The most striking feature of *The Woman Who Waits* is the intimate knowledge of all the details of the waitress' life which it conveys to the reader. The process of getting a job and being fired, the necessity of "jolly along" the guests for the much-desired tip, the making of dates with patrons, the advantages of belonging to the Waitress' Alliance or the Waitress' Union—these and other phases of the waitress' existence are described from a sympathetic point of view which lends more than a semblance of reality to the printed page. It is this very humanistic point of view which enables Mrs. Donovan to enter so completely into the joys and sorrows of her companions and to describe them so vividly and accurately.

It must not be inferred, however, that Mrs. Donovan's keenness for details and sympathy for human problems blinds her to the more general aspects of her investigation. While she understands the waitress' love of pretty clothes, her vulgar conversation, and the freedom of her sex relationships, she also evaluates these from the social viewpoint. She concludes that the waitress is typical of the great mass of women wage-earners who, in spite of their lack of educational advantages, etc., are becoming an increasingly important factor in shaping the affairs of society. Their economic independence has brought them an equality with men which has given them the same freedom even in the sphere of sex relationships. In addition, it has brought them new responsibilities which with the aid of their organizations they are training themselves to meet.

PHYLLIS BLANCHARD

NEW YORK CITY

Wealth From Waste: Elimination of Waste a World Problem. By HENRY J. SPOONER. London: George Routledge and Sons, 1918. Pp. xvi+316. \$2.50.

The engineering profession has long been impatient with the excessive wastes of contemporary social conditions. Since the Great War,

especially, appeals for saner economy and efficiency have been meeting with a better understanding and response on the part of the public—in spite of certain tendencies to the contrary during the past year.

Mr. Spooner, as director and professor of mechanical and civil engineering in the Polytechnic School of Engineering in London, wrote the above book toward the end of the war, as a statement of existing, extensive, social wastes, and of certain known and tried methods of correcting them. He divides the work into two general parts: the book proper, and a glossary giving further data and individual instances of successful and profitable economies. In the first chapter he says: "We are beginning to realize that wicked waste is occurring everywhere, far and wide; waste of money, waste of food, waste of materials, labor, fuel, energy and time, waste of human strength and thought, waste of health and waste of life itself." These are the main points he considers. His spirit is practical, straightforward; his style is interesting. He says (p. 5), "The doctrine of waste-prevention should be handled in a broad spirit, for there are justifiable wastes and dangerous economies"—the implied standard of proper economy being the need of society. On this point, however, Mr. Spooner does not explain his contradictory term "justifiable wastes," nor does he attempt to define exactly what, theoretically, must be meant by waste, contenting himself with the consideration of concrete conditions which would be commonly recognized as wasteful. But while he does not enter upon any extended philosophy of waste, he gives us a searching, intelligent, and authoritative statement of admittedly wasteful conditions, chiefly in Great Britain, and particularly in the basic interests of sustenance and production. He does not examine thoroughly the higher professional fields of education, religion, government, art, etc., touching upon them rather incidentally.

Lord Leverhulme, the "enlightened employer," writes the foreword.

Some of the author's conclusions are interesting. He says (p. 90) the English people were spending as a nation for their living in normal times before the war an equivalent of about \$10,000,000,000 a year; they were wasting outright (or culpably failing to secure) about \$3,000,000,000, in which, as waste, he reckons one-half of the nation's annual drink bill, or \$400,000,000. (The whole of it is now, perhaps, over \$1,000,000,000, but he says "there are welcome signs that the drink evil is on the wane.") Mr. Spooner says (p. 11) that adulterations of food and other goods exist to a serious extent and are apparently increasing. In chapter viii he enumerates specific methods of

adulteration. The uses of coal and land are extensively and interestingly treated with figures to show need of conservation. In connection with the question of fatigue and general industrial efficiency he advocates a continued shortening of the work-day (p. 71):

We may well hope that, with a general adoption of shorter hours, with improved methods of working, and with restricted output, the time will not be far distant when still further reductions in the working-hours will be possible, until the six-hour day is reached—with all its beneficial advantages—that has been so powerfully advocated by Lord Leverhulme as an ideal.

The book is important, scholarly, hopeful, and well worth serious consideration by all citizens of America as well as of Britain.

C. J. BUSHNELL

TOLEDO UNIVERSITY

The Limits of Socialism. By O. FRED BOUCKE. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920. Pp. 256. \$1.50.

The interesting thing about this book is to see a professor of economics advocate a knowledge of biology, psychology, philosophy, and sociology as necessary to really understand an economic theory and the social process.

The broadening vision of the late Carleton H. Parker and Robert F. Hoxie is getting adherents and the unity of the social sciences is steadily being recognized more widely.

The author's grasp of psychology is rather inadequate as he fails to mention or use social psychology and labors over his presentation unnecessarily. The book nearest like the present one is Roy W. Sellars' *The Next Step in Democracy* written some four years ago by a professor of philosophy. Sellars' book is more thoroughly unified, his use of the auxiliary sciences is less paraded, and the whole presentation is smoother.

However, it is very refreshing to have an economist acknowledge that a logical refutation of Marxian economic theories by no means disposes of the socialist movement.

VICTOR E. HELLEBERG

LAWRENCE, KAN.

America and the New Era. By E. M. FRIEDMAN, Editor. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1920. Pp. xxx+500. \$6.00.

This comprehensive volume—too comprehensive, if the reader is critical—presents a symposium on social reconstruction that is a companion to *American Problems of Reconstruction, Labor and Reconstruction*,

and *International Commerce and Reconstruction*, by the same editor. These are economic and financial in emphasis; the new compilation is sociological in tone.

In recognition of the truth that the war influence extended beyond the economic superstructure of modern society and made necessary a revaluation of the fundamental values of our national life, the symposium was arranged to crystallize thought on broader issues. The problems of political and social adjustment, and of the conservation of human resources, are discussed "for the purpose of intelligently controlling social forces."

The faults of this "reconstruction" adventure in the sociological field are perhaps inevitable—lengthiness, wide diversity of material, extreme unevenness, and contradiction in viewpoint. The effort at synthesis is at times bewildering. For instance, it is difficult to see how the papers in Part II quite fit into the heading "Social Progress versus Cycles of Change." Between Professor Ellwood's evolutionary discussion of war and Horace M. Kallen's penetrating and dynamic analysis of "The International Mind," and Professor Hollander's forceful little economic essay on "War and Want," are sandwiched static and rather conventional articles on "The International Mind" and "Individualism."

Again, in Part IV, on "The New Nationalism," the reader—after following with interest Dr. Fitzpatrick's statement of the need for effective "Public Administration" and Professor West's realistic discussion of "The Constitution and Political Parties" (ending with the daring plea for a cabinet chosen from and functioning in Congress)—drifts helplessly into the fogs of "The American Spirit" and "The Spiritual Tradition in American Life," to be saved, it is true, though almost too late, by the intellectual clarity of Edward S. Ames's "Religion in the New Age." A few of the writers, to say the least, go far toward violating Herbert Hoover's splendid dictum of the Foreword: "Terms must not be confused with realities, or labels with conditions. We must face concrete facts, rather than attempt to apply doctrinaire generalizations."

Part III, on "Economic Aspects of Social Problems," is most tangible and constructive, containing, as it does, Professor Ely's "An American Land Policy" and Professor Hibbard's "The Drift Toward the City," which give reassuring scientific treatment of the agricultural situation and serve to counteract the effects of much groundless alarmism. Here also are Frederick C. Howe's informed discussion on "The Immigrant and American" and Mary Van Kleek's competent survey of "Women in Industry."

Part V, "The Conservation of Human Resources," which comprises about two-fifths of this large volume, should undoubtedly have received separate publication, in justice to the valuable material that it contains. Certainly the editor did not plan merely a reference volume, but rather a readable and popular book. And there are limits to the powers of attention and concentration, even of the trained mind! In the section are able monographs, written by distinguished specialists, on "Heredity," "Child Welfare," "Vocational Education," "Health," "Food," "Industrial Hygiene," "Delinquency and Crime," "Venereal Disease," "Recreation and Play," and "Mental Hygiene." All are timely, penned in the light of the war and in terms of reconstruction policy.

The editor's two introductory chapters are quite adequate, if manifold and in places labored. Mr. Friedman is to be admired for his tireless work of selection and integration in so vast a field. Herbert Hoover's Foreword, as brilliant a little gem as the whole volume contains, reveals this great American as a true liberal and an exceedingly well-balanced social scientist.

FRANCIS TYSON

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

A Philosophy of Play. By LUTHER HALSEY GULICK. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920. Pp. 291. \$1.60.

This book was posthumously published from a manuscript that was practically completed before the death of Dr. Gulick. Miss Anna L. von der Osten who had assisted him in the preparation of the manuscript had charge of the editing.

In a brief foreword, Joseph Lee refers to it as the "last message of the master," to those interested in the recreation movement, and as a "legacy of an American pioneer in the vitally important field of education." Mr. Lee probably does not overestimate the place that Dr. Gulick occupied in the field of public recreation. He was in fact a pioneer in a field that even yet has extremely few scientific students. And his actual accomplishments as a practical leader and teacher of play gave him a place of authority among recreation workers.

The book is the first whole volume of play theory published in America, and the most important published anywhere since the volumes of Groos on *The Play of Animals* and *The Play of Man*. It comes as a welcome boon to a field extremely lacking in theoretical foundation. The recreation movement of the past quarter-century has been chiefly an elaboration of a few popular ideas on the need for more play space and for the need for supervision of play. There has been no consistent

body of principles, and in fact no real understanding of the physical and mental processes involved in play.

This small volume of Dr. Gulick's does not attempt to supply this entire want. The writer was not equipped for technical psychological or pedagogical or sociological analysis. He is guilty, as Mr. Lee points out in the Foreword, of misinterpreting the foundation of Fröbel's educational methods. His remark (p. xiii) that "the origin and development of gangs and team games among boys similarly present facts that do not seem to harmonize with the views of contemporary sociologists," also leads one to wonder what modern sociological writings he had read or not read. He does express a preference for the theories of Gumplovitz. In the chapter on the "Play of Animals" (p. 111) he says that "it is also evident that tradition and example are necessary parts of animal play." The ascribing of tradition to animal society is based upon a misconception of animal psychology, and the evidence he cites for the notion that animals are taught how to play and hunt and fight is far from convincing.

In spite of these limitations on his technical equipment, he has given us the most complete treatment we yet have of the psychic foundations of play and the principles which should guide its organization and direction. What he lacked in technical equipment for theoretical discussion he more than made up in the breadth of his observation of actual play activities and in the sanity of judgment and keenness of insight that he brought to this observation. The book is the fruit of twenty years of careful observation.

The fundamental point of view maintained throughout is the instinctive theory of Groos, but he does not carry as far as did Groos the notion that play in children or animals is the practice of instincts for the purpose of perfecting their later expression. He emphasizes rather the survival value, for life in the earlier history of the race, of the instincts that are active in play, and the fundamental necessity for our giving these instincts opportunity for an expression that is adapted to modern conditions. He did not seem to be aware that his point, that tradition molds the form of play while instinct drives it, is a fundamental of modern sociological thought. He records some excellent examples of this complementary relation of instinct and tradition.

The final chapters, on the practical aspects of provision for play and control and utilization of the instinctive tendencies for social welfare, contain no new theory but are excellently put and sanely proportioned.

CECIL C. NORTH

The Social Evolution of Religion. By GEORGE WILLIS COOKE.

Boston: The Stratford Co., 1920. Pp. xxiv+416. \$3.50.

This book is devoted mainly to the proposition that all of the different religions are products of social evolution, but that *religion* is a permanent and essential part of the life of humanity. Similarly one may say that all languages are products of social evolution, but communication is an essential element of human life, or that all political institutions are products of social evolution but that government, as the methodical organization of life, is indispensable. The secondary proposition of the book is that every religion which developed in prescientific times has a mythology, that these various mythologies show striking resemblances, and that to this statement Christianity is no exception.

The statement that every religion developed in prescientific ages is provided with a mythology, says the author, applies not only to the folklore of the Hebrew Old Testament but also to the incarnation, virgin birth, and resurrection of Christ. To attribute supernatural birth to the most exalted personages, he says, was as common as is now the attribution of genius. In the ancient world the idea "was one of daily occurrence as an interpretation of every form of genius and authority." And "the conception of incarnation is nearly, if not quite, as widespread as that of virgin birth." "The idea of incarnation was introduced into Christianity because it was essentially known to all the religions to be found in the civilized world when Christianity came into existence" (p. 265). G. Stanley Hall is quoted as presenting evidence to indicate "that there would have been no Christian doctrine of the resurrection had not this doctrine had a large place in earlier religions." And the author refers, for example, to the resurrection in Egyptian mythology and quotes the Egyptian saying, "As surely as Osiris lives I shall live."

"The doctrine of atonement or expiation is also found in all religions which have passed beyond the most primitive stages of development." "Even such a people as the Iroquois believed in a cosmic being who gave his own life that the world might come into existence, and that his life might nourish the life of man." "The Christian idea of it is somewhat more advanced than those which preceded it and it is itself undergoing a rapid process of change." "The god or gods demanding such reconciliation are reflections of human kings, who make similar demands." And the resulting standard of salvation is "metaphysical and not practical." What characterizes it is "disregard for human

welfare and an absence of the humanitarian spirit." Such "holiness is selfishness in disguise."

Throughout the book emphasis is placed upon the character of religion as a social evolution in distinction from the more familiar emphasis upon the creative work of individual religious leaders. This is illustrated by the chapter headings: (i) "The Social Transmission of Human Experience"; (ii) "The Creative Genius of Social Man"; (iii) "Communal and Tribal Religion"; (iv) "Feudal Religion"; (v) "National Religion"; (vi) "International Religion"; (vii) "Universal Religion"; (viii) "Religion as Cosmic and Human Motive."

Folk religions in their older forms, says the author, were always conservative, reactionary, and faced toward the past. In its newer manifestations religion is becoming forward-looking and progressive. "Religion is becoming emancipated from its superstitions, its credulities and its orthodoxies." Religion in the recent past has become individualistic and lost its capacity to direct and stimulate the communal or the national life. Indeed, from the communal life, the life of marts and of legislatures, the broader ethical conceptions and the primary principles of justice appear largely to have been banished, except as a hypocritical pretense, and there is the broadest possible contrast between the justice of the New Testament and the teaching of the creeds and theologians. The author further believes that we are in a period of transition in which the word religion will not stand primarily for a body of beliefs which have become largely untenable in our age, but rather for the universal principles of religiousness and aspirations for the continuing life of man.

In his last chapter the author supplements and interprets his own conception by quoting the views of numerous modern *illuminati* including, among others, Edward Caird, William James, Henry Bosanquet, H. G. Wells, Francis Younghusband, Émile Durkheim, and Eugenio Rignano.

More and more it is borne in upon the minds of instructed men that the absorption of religion in the salvation of the individual soul in another world than this is a catastrophe. The task of rescuing religion from neglect by men who have been touched by the scientific spirit and restoring it to a commanding place as the guide and inspiration of life is a double one: first, that of rescuing it from superstition or supernaturalism and incredibility; and second, the task of rescuing it from individualism and making it messianic. The religion that will furnish an adjustment of all life's powers, and inspiration, guidance,

and joy, that will deliver men from boredom and degeneracy and summon a devotion like that of Christ, will be inspired by aspiration to realize the unfulfilled possibilities of good in the continuing life of mankind. Other men will give their lives as Christ gave his only because they "so love the world." Only in thus giving life will they find it. To discard hypocrisy, to live for genuineness, not so much in good works as in good *work*, to discard the selfishness of individualism, and of party, class, and nation, to look upon one's deeds and character as part of the fulfilment of a common task, this alone can raise us to our true nobility as the Sons of Man. Universal and permanent religion must have its mainspring in a purpose, not in a creed nor a ritual: the social purpose to which humanity has never set itself, and which must wait for realization until it does become the common religion of right-minded men.

E. C. HAYES

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

The Making of Humanity. By ROBERT BRIFFAULT. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1919. Pp. 371. \$4.00.

This is a remarkable book—the most passionate exposition of the intellectualist concept of progress that we have in English. While the author dismisses too cavalierly earlier attempts to formulate the idea of progress and while he admits that progress is still a controversial idea, yet he asserts with almost mathematical definiteness that progress is undeniable, inevitable in fact, even if we do not know the goal. Moreover he declares *the* cause of human progress from the very beginning to be "rational thought."

His argument proceeds somewhat as follows: Rational thought is man's means of adaptation; even though not always or often purposive, frequently only shown in the method of trial and error, yet in the long run rationality prevails and truth triumphs. Reason is necessarily progressive because inexorably logical. Human society is essentially psychological and improvements pass through the social heredity as ideas, not through germinal changes. Progress along rational lines is a battle against the hindrances set up by non-rational custom-thought and power-thought. These fetters are broken sometimes by wise heads or by "dim horse sense of the mob," but usually they are broken in only two ways: by material discovery and by cross-fertilization of culture. Progress is therefore exceptional and is never possible in an isolated people or a social class; but since it is always present it is therefore the

rule! Oriental history illustrates how religious power-thought hindered the rise and flowering of an intellectual impulse. In a brilliant but somewhat superficial chapter the author shows how Greece broke this vicious spell. Later he analyzes the contribution of Rome and describes how Rome succumbed to oriental religion and her own fallacies; how Byzantium only added to the barbarian wreckage and how civilization was rekindled by the Saracens. One of the most brilliant sections in the book is the analysis of power-thought; another is an eloquent apologetic for Moslem civilization. Scarcely less so is the acid criticism of the so-called Renaissance, which is shown to be a distinct setback.

The author distinguishes four broad stages in human evolution. First, the period of tribal or custom-thought. Second, the period of great oriental civilization wholly dominated by theocratic power-thought. Third, the Greek liberation from custom- and power-thought. Fourth, the age in which we live. Only rational thought, he argues, could have made development and progress possible out of the welter of conflicting power and barbarities of the last five hundred years of European history; just as only rational thought could break the crust of oriental theocracy. The key to this development may be summarized as a compound of Arab culture, Protestantism, critical philosophy, and physical science as summed up in the French Revolution.

The author meets squarely the two inevitable criticisms of the intellectualist theory. First, he argues that decadence or corruption such as obtained in Rome and in the Renaissance is not the result of intellectual culture but is the effect of power or is itself not genuine. Second, he contends that intellectual development means moral development. Progress is ethical, for it concerns humanity; and moral considerations are paramount with the idea of humanity since the moral law is the law of nature. Moral nature does progress and its progress is directly associated with diffusion of rational thought and is the direct outcome of it. The essence of moral progress is a refinement of the idea of justice; therefore, while democracy is the clumsiest and most inefficient form of government, it is the most moral because the most just. Since morality, the *mores*, rests upon opinions and not abstract ethics, it is essential for moral progress that opinion be cleared by rational thought. Hence the author's emphasis upon social ethics rather than personal righteousness as a moral dynamic. The main body of the book closes with the new categorical imperative in these words: "A new ethical sense, the true and natural ethical spirit whose vaguely conscious operation has created mankind, is inevitably developing. To

be with the forces of human growth, to be truly a living part, and not a mere dead excretion, of the creative impulse of the race, that is the obligation which if we have indeed apprehended our real relation, is inevitably laid upon us." This categorical imperative has not yet been attained, for specific human evolution has only just begun. We can control and direct this evolution by organizing the "reproductive mechanism"; this is not education as it is now generally practiced, but the imparting of rational thought by whatsoever means and methods, by building up the mental equipment of humanity. And it is understood that this rational thought is primarily critical and not constructive.

While accepting in general the magnificent gesture of the book, it is perfectly possible to question some of its details. The reviewer is in doubt, for example, as to what is *absolute* social right and justice of which the author makes so much. There seems to be nothing absolute about it except its general direction. Again, we cannot but feel that it is an exaggeration to assert that the great modern vice is the toleration of all opinions as equally good and valid. Our recent war experience and the social commotions of a century hardly bear out this criticism. Exaggerated also is the author's dogmatic insistence that there has been no evolution in sexual morality. This would seem to be a denial of his own thesis.

The author makes little parade of scholarship, he offers the reader no bibliography, very few footnotes, and no index. Written largely in the trenches of Gallipoli and France it is nevertheless not slapdash, but the summation of long previous research. His style is lyric, verging toward purple in spots. His chapter titles are vivid; for example, "The Discovery of Man," "Morals as Comfort," "Morals on the March," "The Hopefulness of Pessimism." He gives no hint as to his own personality, yet he shows unmistakably the influence of Comte, in his intellectualism, but is strong where Comte was weakest, namely in historical interpretation. This book is to be welcomed as another straw indicating how the problem of progress is commanding the attention of the world of scholarship and statesmanship, particularly since the world-war. It is moreover a convincing proof that scholarship need not be dull, for as a matter of fact it has all the verve and imaginative thrill of high romance.

ARTHUR J. TODD

CHICAGO

The Principles of Sociology. By EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS. New York: The Century Co., 1920. Pp. xviii+708. \$4.00.

The following observations are supplementary to a review of this work published by Dr. Small in the July number of the *Journal*. Professor Ross's book, so vivid and epigrammatic in style, so mature in its conclusions, so brilliant, so interesting, so original, must appeal to sociologists everywhere, as well those who study social structures as those who study social forces and processes. In this seven-hundred-page treatise, however, the author scarcely touches on anthropological topics, except in the chapters on the "Race Factor" and the "Influence of the Geographic Environment." If there is little anthropology in the volume, there is equally little history, i.e., historical summation setting forth the actual line of development followed by some custom, belief, or institution. Professor Ross, to be sure, has entire right to be more interested in present things than in past things; his work would not be so uniquely valuable if it were not so strictly "up-to-date." But no one must expect to find in it any such detailed exposition of the genesis and historical development of society as is contained in Spencer's three volumes or in Professor Gidding's *Principles*.

There are many opportunities for expansion along anthropological lines, in case Professor Ross decides to add to the bulk of his book in future editions. The two chapters above noted are very brief and sketchy; yet it would be hard to mention any others equally important for the right understanding of human society. Especially does this seem true of racial subjects, which are likely to assume an ever larger place among contemporary questions. Very much more might be said, also, on the geographic background of social life, particularly to show how occupations and customs are affected by environmental conditions. A wide field of inquiry upon which Professor Ross does not enter is that of culture—criteria, classification, transmission, and development. Anthropologists just now seem to be more interested in this subject than in anything else, to judge from the stream of discussion in technical journals and from recent books by Professor Elliott Smith, Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, Dr. R. H. Lowie, and others. Some topics which might profitably be expanded include: the discussion of the roots of the religious interest (pp. 54-55); social grouping (pp. 77-78); suicide (pp. 104-15), to present the evidence from primitive society; the rôle of the festival (pp. 398-400), about which sociologists have had far too little to say; and the origin of the state (pp. 617-19).

It may also be worth while to note here certain points which appear open to anthropological criticism. Professor Ross (pp. 59 ff.) uses the word "race" far too loosely, applying it now to the primary divisions of mankind, now to peoples, such as Frenchmen, Germans, etc., and now to the divisions of peoples, such as North Italians and South Italians. Again, does he not speak too assuredly (p. 60) concerning "veritable differences in race mind"? Compare pages 132 f., where national characteristics of Hindus, Greeks, Armenians, and other peoples are accounted for by purely social considerations. He accepts without question (pp. 77, 122) the time-honored theory of the universal priority of maternal kinship over paternal kinship in the evolution of the family; many anthropologists in good repute now definitely reject such a theory. The discussion (pp. 77-78) of the earliest social groupings might have profited by some consideration of the Lang-Atkinson hypothesis (now adopted by Mr. H. G. Wells), which resolves truly "primitive" society into isolated groups of females dominated in each case by an old male, much as herds of cattle are ruled. In the chapter on the "Genesis of Society" (pp. 86 ff.) the author has not sufficiently emphasized the distinction between the origin of various historic *societies*, concerning which fairly definite information is available, and the more general and more theoretical question of the origin of human *society*. The whole subject of human gregariousness and association needs to be thoroughly treated in the light of our present knowledge of anthropology.

When Professor Ross has given us so much, it is somewhat ungracious to dwell on the lapses and lacunae almost inevitable in such a work of synthesis. The reviewer has read it with great interest and enjoyment, and he cordially acquiesces in Dr. Small's judgment that in this book sociology "has at last arrived." He would also express his approval of Professor Ross's thoroughly pragmatic and even utilitarian point of view, which was that of the founder of economics and socialized ethics—Adam Smith. It seems to the author of *Principles of Sociology*, as it seemed to the author of the *Wealth of Nations*, that social science should more and more influence the legislator, the reformer, the humanitarian, and the common man himself.

HUTTON WEBSTER

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

Health and Social Progress. By RUDOLPH M. BINDER. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1920. Pp. xi+295. \$3.00.

We have grown familiar with attempts to explain history in terms of some one factor such as "race," "religion," and "climate." It

has remained for the present author, who is professor of sociology at New York University, to emphasize health as the cornerstone of social welfare. This he has done, and done well, in this "A Non-Medical Book, Dedicated to the Medical Profession."

Regardless of the reader's acceptance of the author's thesis he will be glad to have so many interesting and important facts put in convenient form.

The volume opens with a general discussion of the relation of health to civilization in which the conclusion is reached that inasmuch as "progress is possible only with a surplus of vitality over the immediately necessary activities of life," we may state as a law of general development: "Individuals and societies develop in proportion to their growth in self-reliance; and this depends upon their ability to attain health with the resultant confidence in their ability to control nature and their own destiny."

Then follows "Specific Cases of Health in Relation to Society," in which ancient Greece, Rome, and the Tropics are considered. Under the caption "Health and World-Progress" the author marshals his facts to show the necessity of attaining and maintaining health if civilization is to progress. In the last chapter, "Results and Prospects," the author describes the health program of The United Fruit Company and the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission.

While all students have glimpsed the importance of health Dr. Binder has done a real service in stressing it and the volume will repay careful reading.

CARL KELSEY

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

The College and the New America. By JAY WILLIAM HUDSON, PH.D. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1920. Pp. xi+202. \$2.00.

This book is a trumpet call to college and university teachers to recognize more fully their social obligations; and, as President Burton of Michigan has said, it should be read by every professor in America. The logical implication of the book would seem to be that all who enter the profession of college and university teaching should be trained in the social sciences, though the writer is careful to point out that specialists in these very sciences are not always fully alive to their social responsibilities. The specialists in the social sciences, he points out, cannot continue to hand over their responsibilities to a special group of men

other than themselves—a special group of “applied” social scientists. “If the body of knowledge embraced in the social sciences is to be rendered most of value to the world of concrete life, the experts themselves are best equipped to transform it into that value.” The only reason why they do not do so is owing to that peculiar tradition which has grown up among college and university teachers which we call the “academic mind.” That is the real source of the divorce between thought and practice, between the academic world and the actual social order, which we so often find. The remedy, of course, lies in the fuller recognition by academic men of their responsibility to the social order in which they live.

The book is decidedly worth while, and it is to be hoped that it will be followed by many other studies of the relation of our system of higher education to our social life. It is to be regretted that Professor Hudson does not take up in detail certain vital points in this relation. It would have added to the value of the book, for example, if there had been a chapter discussing the responsibility of colleges and universities in training social and political leaders. Unfortunately, too, Professor Hudson seems to hold to a very narrow conception of what “education for citizenship” would mean and its place in our whole scheme of education. He speaks of it as a “limited ideal,” though its leading exponents would hold it to be synonymous with that education for social efficiency, for general social and political intelligence, which the book seems to urge as the main function of the American college. In spite of such minor defects the book will be welcomed by all who are interested in the promotion of the social sciences in our colleges and in the socialization of our higher education, and especially because it is written, not by a professional social scientist, but by a philosopher.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

The Principles of Education. By JESSE H. COURSAULT, PH.D. New York: Silver, Burdett & Company, 1920. Pp xii+468. \$3.00.

Dean Coursault has succeeded in producing a text in the philosophy of education which not only breaks with the conventional treatment of the subject, but which will be of interest to sociologists as well as educators. The book undertakes to synthesize the psychological and sociological approaches to the principles of education. It discusses, accordingly, first “the individual process,” then “the social process,” and finally

"the educational process." Under the section on the social process there is a chapter devoted to the analysis of the social process, another to the function of social studies, and still another to social development. The point of view maintained is, moreover, that of control over the individual and social life-processes. Students of sociology will be especially interested in this attempt to rewrite the philosophy of education from the standpoint of social development.

The book is well organized and the main principles are so simply and clearly developed that it should find a large use in colleges and normal schools as a text. If it does, it will certainly aid in the development of a socialized education.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Schooling of the Immigrant. By FRANK V. THOMPSON. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1920. Pp. 408. \$2.00.

Now that immigration has risen to its pre-war rate of a million a year, quite obviously serious and nation-wide measures need to be taken for the social assimilation of the immigrant. The problem has long been recognized, and particularly since 1914, but nowhere has it been solved. Even the best attempts at solution are not yet very promising.

This volume, prepared under the auspices of the Carnegie Corporation, presents in systematic form the more suggestive attempts at solution which have been made throughout the country. There is attempt to discover the positive suggestions of value in these experiments, which may be incorporated in some ultimate successful composite plan; and also the shortcomings and failures of various attempts by way of making clear the nature of difficulties to be overcome. Public and private institutions of all kinds are carefully and critically analyzed by way of discovering their strengths and weaknesses in preparing for citizenship. There is also systematic treatment of specific matters such as methods of teaching English, the training of teachers, legislative enactments, the need of individualizing the training, the problems involved in training for citizenship, etc.

Americanization workers will find in this volume innumerable facts and suggestions of value to them in planning and directing practical educational activities. It is specially effective in making clear the nature of the problems.

FRANKLIN BOBBITT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Nonpartisan League. By HERBERT E. GASTON. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. Pp. viii+325. \$1.75.

The Story of the Nonpartisan League. By CHARLES EDWARD RUSSELL. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920. Pp. 332. \$2.00

The Despoilers. By J. EDMUND BUTTREE. Boston: The Christopher Publishing House, 1920. Pp. 314. \$2.00.

The Nonpartisan League. By WILLIAM LANGER, Attorney-General of North Dakota. Mandan, N.D.: Morton County Farmers' Press, 1920. Pp. 240. (Paper.)

Mr. Gaston was formerly an editorial writer for the Nonpartisan League, but he endeavors to give a fair and accurate account of its history and development, though frankly favoring it. His book is much the best of the four reviewed. The author recognizes some of the League's weaknesses, but gives a clear picture of its point of view.

Over half of Mr. Russell's book is a history of the abuses of the grain trade and the farmers' grievances against the Minneapolis dealers. He outlines the League's program and eulogizes its accomplishments, but the account is somewhat fragmentary and decidedly partisan.

The Despoilers is chiefly a collection of anti-league pamphlets, containing a deal of preachment on the values of individualism, interspersed with anathemas against the League. There is an obvious effort to impress the reader with the author's knowledge of Scripture, Shakespeare, and classical authors, more loquacious than convincing. The book is a good example of the sort of literature to which the League has given rise, but adds nothing to one's understanding of the situation.

Mr. Langer's book is unique, coming from the attorney-general of the state and "published under penalty of the anti-liar law of North Dakota providing for one year in the penitentiary." He challenges the League to disprove his indictments of its incapacity and to bring him into court under this law. Though vitriolic in style, Mr. Langer's pamphlet presents facts against the League which are not satisfactorily answered by either Mr. Gaston or Mr. Russell, and which the League must clearly refute if it is to make its case with even a friendly public.

One cannot but be impressed that here is a movement which furnishes unusual material for the sociologist and social psychologist, but that as yet we have no serious study of it. Mr. Gaston clearly recognizes the weakness of Mr. Townley's domination of the organization, but claims that has been necessary to win the fight. Irrespective of the

theoretical aspects of a more democratic form of organization, one cannot but wonder what might be the outcome of the movement if its leader should be stricken. Whether such a movement for democracy can succeed permanently will largely depend upon ability to develop leadership which is loyal and efficient but independent.

DWIGHT SANDERSON

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Democratic Industry: A Practical Study in Social History. By JOSEPH HUSSLEIN, S.J., PH.D. New York: P. J. Kennedy & Sons, 1920. Pp. 362. \$1.50.

The viewpoint: "The Catholic writers, whose doctrines dated back to the Middle Ages . . . were clearly the originators of modern democracy. Its entire structure, in so far as it is true and sound, rests upon the work of the Catholic schoolmen. . . ."—P. 277.

The aim of the new Catholic guild system: "The full possibilities of increased production will not be realized so long as the majority of the workers remain mere wage earners. The majority must somehow become owners, or at least in part, of the means of production. They can be enabled to reach this stage gradually through co-operative productive societies and copartnership arrangements. In the former the workers own and manage the industries themselves; in the latter they own a substantial part of the corporate stock and exercise a reasonable share in the management. However slow the attainment of these ends they will have to be reached before we can have a thoroughly efficient system of production, or an industrial social order that will be secure from the danger of revolution."—P. 292, quoted from *Reconstruction Pamphlets*, No. 1, p. 22.

VICTOR E. HELLEBERG

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

Italian Women in Industry. By LOUISE C. ODENCRANTZ. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1919. Pp. v+345. \$1.50.

This is an intensive study of living and working conditions of 1,095 young Italian women, representing 61 industries, in that section of New York City which lies below Fourteenth Street. While the investigation deals with pre-war conditions, it contains information valuable to those who are now trying to dovetail our immigrant groups into an American citizenry. Wages are higher today, and expenditures greater, but it is doubtful if conditions are otherwise much changed.

Miss Odencrantz has given us a sympathetic and scholarly study. Such studies must always present a somewhat blurred picture of the life they undertake to portray. We have the interview, the visit to home and work place, the questionnaire, a few budgets, and a book, while the women go on working with feathers, candy, crackers, corsets, petticoats, cigars, boxes, stationery, cereals, olives, and what not, with an overpowering weariness and unutterably barren lives. But the book is not futile if it leads to even a limited understanding of the problems of some foreign individuals enmeshed in our industrial system.

ANNIE MARION MACLEAN

CHICAGO, ILL.

The Social Case History: Its Construction and Content. By ADA ELIOT SHEFFIELD, Director, Boston Bureau on Illegitimacy. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1920. Pp. 227. \$1.00.

The author proposes that the social-case history include only those facts which make effective treatment possible. Successful use of this test, she believes, involves the development of larger and clearer concepts. Many devices are suggested for accomplishing these aims.

This book is the result of much practical experience and will appeal to those who are interested in higher standards of record-keeping, though administrators will probably think that confusion will result from any attempt to make everyday use of larger concepts not previously clearly defined. Further, treatment as a measure of the record-value of a social fact is a useful yardstick (1) when workers are uniformly trained to use and provided with adequate standardized administrative devices; (2) when the appearance of new methods of treatment need not be anticipated during the life of the record; and (3) when social-service policies have been generally agreed upon. Until these conditions obtain, if treatment-value be the test of the relative significance of social facts to the recorder, records must be re-written with changes in the personnel, policy, or procedure of the agency and with every advance in the social sciences.

ERLE FISKE YOUNG

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Housing and the Housing Problem. By CAROL ARONOVICI. Chicago: McClurg & Co., 1920 Pp. 163. \$0.75.

This is a brief statement of the principles involved in a housing program. An attempt is made to point out the fundamental social

and economic conditions connected with the housing problem. The housing situation will not be materially relieved by philanthropic building projects, such as the well-known Port Sunlight and Octavia Hill enterprises. The problem must be approached by a careful study of the economic factors involved, such as costs of land, labor, and materials. Up to date our attention has been largely centered upon the question of sanitation, and to this end we have framed a great deal of housing legislation, much of which is purely arbitrary and complicates the economic side of the question. The author shows that housing is essentially a community problem. The forces at work in our laissez faire system of community life make it increasingly difficult for the individual family to build or own its own home, also make it a hazardous undertaking for private capital to build homes for rent. The community must look upon the housing of its citizens as an essential part of its corporate existence and safeguard the residential areas by a scientific system of community-planning.

Laymen in the field of housing reform will find this a brief but comprehensive statement of the housing problem from the pen of a well-known authority in the field. Unfortunately the author is not always clear in his statements. Sentences are frequently long and involved; sometimes they are meaningless, as for example the following: "Going a little further into the statistics of land we find that one-third of the population of the country. Going a little further into the statistics of the total area of these cities is only 0.123 of the total area of the United States" (pp. 79-80).

The book contains no index, but a selected bibliography is appended.

R. D. MCKENZIE

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Organization of Public Health Nursing. By ANNIE M. BRAINARD.
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1919. Pp. 144. \$1.35.

This is a handbook designed especially for the use of the public-health nurse. It discusses the fundamental principles of the organization of public-health nursing as gleaned from experience in many different types of communities. Among the points emphasized are: (1) the need of efficient organization to support the work of the public-health nurse; (2) ways and means of financing the work in small communities; (3) methods of selecting supervisory committees and boards of directors in order to obtain the most efficient type of local representation and team

work; (4) the sort of technical training required by the public-health nurse. In this respect it might be noted that no mention is made of the need of training in social case work and community organization. It is generally conceded now that the public-health nurse should also be a trained social worker inasmuch as her work brings her into contact with situations requiring for their solution considerable knowledge of community forces and agencies. It is not enough that her professional skill should merely enable her "to interpret the physician's orders correctly."

The book will be found useful by all who are interested in this particular line of social service.

R. D. MCKENZIE

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Industrial Housing. With discussion of accompanying activities, such as Town Planning, Street Systems, Development of Utility Services, and Related Engineering and Construction Features. By MORRIS KNOWLES. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1920. Pp. xv+314. \$5.00.

From the point of view of technical treatment of the housing problem as affecting industrial housing this is one of the first works in America to recognize the "interdependence of many agencies and the need of the co-ordination of several professions in the development of a successful town plan and in the up-building of a contented industrial community."

Approaching industrial housing from this broad point of view Mr. Knowles does not neglect a single aspect of the problem of construction, community development, public service, and administration that may affect the economic, sanitary, and aesthetic aspects of the home. While some questions may be raised regarding the adequacy of the standards propounded by the author and the acceptance without discussion of practices of city planning and housing which are still without thorough scientific foundation, the book is so full of suggestive thought and so devoid of dogmatism that it would make a most excellent classroom text in schools for the training of engineers, architects, social workers, and public-health officials.

The chapters dealing with the engineering aspects of housing and town-planning are especially valuable because of the information regarding the experience of various communities and the guides for procedure in dealing with such problems as lighting, water supply, sewerage, waste disposal, etc.

The author has kept clear of any controverted aspect of the subject and thereby has accomplished a task in systematization that has not been attempted by any other writer in this country.

CAROL ARONOVICI

BELVEDERE, CAL.

Bolshevism at Work. By WILLIAM T. GOODE. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. Pp. 143.

An interesting inside view of the processes of life, labor, and education in Bolshevik Russia.

The Political Philosophy of Robert M. La Follette. Compiled by ELLEN TORELLE. Madison, Wis.: The Robert M. La Follette Co., 1920. Pp. 426.

Short extracts from the public addresses and writings of La Follette. They throw an interesting side light on the Progressive movement in American politics from 1900 to 1920.

Essays on Vocation. Edited by BASIL MATTHEWS. London: Oxford University Press, 1919. Pp. 128.

A stimulating and helpful series of essays by English scholars, intended to point the way to various vocations in post-war Britain.

The Community Health Problem. By ATHEL C. BURNHAM. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920. Pp. 149.

A scientific survey of the public-health movement in the United States. Contains valuable vital statistics.

Labor's Crisis. An Employer's View of Labor Problems. By SIGMUND MENDELSON. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920. Pp. xii+171. \$1.50.

Interesting as revealing the attitudes of a type of employer emerging in the present labor struggle in the United States.

Labor in Politics, or Class versus Country. By CHARLES NORMAN FAY. Privately printed. Cambridge, Mass.: The University Press, 1920. Pp. xii+284.

Reveals the attitudes of a representative of capitalism. Also contains valuable statistics of the labor movement in America.

A Living Wage. Its Ethical and Economic Aspects. By JOHN A. RYAN. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920. Pp. ix+182. \$2.00.

Revised and abridged edition of Ryan's larger book of the same title. Interesting as revealing the most recent official attitudes of the Catholic church upon the problems of capital and labor.

The Opium Monopoly. By ELLEN N. LA MOTTE. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920. Pp. xvii+84. \$1.00.

A brief statement of the main facts of the opium traffic as fostered and developed under British colonial policy. Contains tables of statistics concerning the traffic compiled from the most recent official records of the colonies concerned.

The Industrial Republic. By PAUL W. LITCHFIELD. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1920. Pp. 95. \$1.00.

A brief description of the co-operative plan recently introduced by the Goodyear Rubber Company into the operation of their plant at Akron, Ohio.

Modern Germany. Its Rise, Growth, Downfall, and Future. By J. ELLIS BARKER. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1919. Pp. ix+496. \$6.00.

A new and enlarged edition of the author's *Modern Germany* with much new material based on post-war conditions and situations.

Italy and the World War. By THOMAS NELSON PAGE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920. Pp. xii+422. \$5.00.

A historical review of the diplomatic relations of modern Italy. Valuable as revealing the diplomatic attitudes of many European nations.

The New World Order. By FREDERICK CHARLES HICKS. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1920. Pp. viii+496.

A critical discussion of the problems of world-organization, co-operation, and order following the world-war. Pertinent analyses of the Versailles treaties and the League of Nations. Appendices contain valuable excerpts from the various recent post-war treaties.

Sex and Sex Worship; A Scientific Treatise on Sex, Its Nature and Function, and Its Influence on Art, Science, Architecture, and Religion—with Special Reference to Sex Worship and Symbolism. By O. A. WALL, M.D., PH.G., PH.M. St. Louis: C. V. Mosby Co., 1919. Pp. xv+607. \$7.50.

This book is written by an old gentleman who read a great many books on religion and sex. Unfortunately he lost his notes. The book represents what he remembers of his reading. It is a large book, handsomely bound and well printed, but, in spite of its title, it is not scientific.

ROBERT E. PARK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Pool, Billiards and Bowling Alleys as a Phase of Commercialized Amusements in Toledo, Ohio. By REV. JOHN J. PHELAN, M.A. Toledo: Little Book Press, 1919. Pp. 292. \$2.00.

This is an essay on commercialized amusements based on a survey of the pool rooms in Toledo. It contains, in addition to the facts gathered in Toledo, a copy of the schedule used in the survey, a questionnaire for high schools, a digest of Ohio laws as to minors, and of the Ohio laws concerning recreation, the pool-room ordinances of sixty-two cities, a reproduction of the social and industrial creeds of the churches, and a portrait of the author. It is a useful book but its tone is hortatory.

ROBERT E. PARK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Letters to a Young Man on Love and Health. By WALTER M. GALLICHAN. New York: F. A. Stokes Co., 1920. Pp. 119. \$1.00.

An excellent handbook in sex education for young men. The twelve letters are refreshingly frank, direct, and complete, as might be expected from the author of *The Psychology of Marriage*.

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

A Theory of History.—Historical theories of history are nearly as numerous as historians. Paradoxically, their historicity lies almost wholly in the fact that they are facts of record. So far as intellectual content goes they are philosophy rather than history and the outstanding ones have been evolved by philosophers, not brought forth by historians. History primarily is factual detail and altogether concrete. Secondly, it ventures timorously upon generalizations. It depicts "situations," "general aspects," and "trends." In so doing it becomes in modest measure philosophy or sociology. From Plato to Comte and from Comte to the Adams brothers one encounters five distinct type groups of theories of history. The first group comprises the predestinal philosophies of the metaphysicians, the logicians, and others. In the second group fall the philosophies of social self-determination. A third group of interpretations goes back to the geographical or "environmental" influence. The writings of Montesquieu remain the classical example, but the researches of Ellen C. Semple and Ellsworth Huntington are of a more substantial value. Theories of the fourth group explain history in the terms of heritage. Heritage is the total product of human activity hitherto which we now enjoy. It includes our acquired habits, our arts, our knowledge, and our property. The working hypotheses which make up the fifth group of philosophies of history account for the stream of human experience as the solar system or a thunderstorm is accounted for, as a case of equilibration. Herbert Spencer and Brooks Adams resolve it into a degradation of physical energy. Individual biologists and bio-anthropologists see history as heredity and natural selection. Taking physics and biology both for granted, the author defends the thesis that human history is a psychological or behavioristic equilibration. The premise from which the argument proceeds is that men are not born equal. Behavioristic reaction to stimulation, whether it is instinctive or rational reaction, is more adaptive and vigorous on the part of some aggregations of men than it is on the part of other aggregations. The practical activities of more vigorous groups and classes overflow into those of more sluggish groups and classes. History is adventure and the urge to adventure is the cause of history.—Franklin H. Giddings, *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1920. O. B. Y.

Sociology: Its Nature and Scope, Aims and Methods.—(1) Sociology is the science of society in which the interactions of human beings are expressed through physical bodies and have relation to physical surroundings. Sociology is one of the mental and moral sciences, as the Germans say *Geisteswissenschaften*, sciences of the mind. Human society is essentially living, subject to growth and decay, and its scientific consideration will pay particular attention to the genetic features. Though sociology is based on a survey of social facts, it is almost equally concerned with ideals. (2) The chief subject-matter of sociology is social organism as wholes functioning wholes. It will be well to distinguish in sociology an empirical, a philosophical, and a practical part. The empirical study may concern itself first with a survey of present social facts based on analytic methods. With the consideration of historical social life the genetic character predominates. The material and conclusions need the comparative study of social systems and ideals as they exist at the present time or have existed in the course of history. The comparative study depends for its material on the analytic and the genetic studies of social facts. This leads to the critical consideration of the facts assembled in comparative study of social systems. From the outset of such criticism a constructive conception is almost inevitably implied, even though only tentatively accepted. (3) The aim of sociology is to make clear the nature of social ideals and forces and the conditions in which these are related.

Sociology aims at the scientific co-ordination of social facts. (4) The methods appropriate in sociology are analytic, genetic, comparative, critical, and synthetic. They are psychological and historical, empirical and philosophical.—Alban G. Widgery, *The Indian Journal of Sociology*, January, 1920. C. N.

The Character of Primitive Human Progress.—The most remarkable thing among natural processes is the unfolding of the intellect and moral nature of man. Since his emergence from the animal state he has possessed powers comparable to those which he now manifests. In the earliest stages the individual man or the small group had to approach the problems of life and environment without any effective tradition to guide or sympathetic collaboration with others to inspire. This called for a measure of independence unlike anything manifested by individuals today except in the labors of men of dominating genius. The first fundamental step forward in the control of nature, whether taken by the individual or the collective mind, was the most novel mental event occurring after the appearance of life in the process of evolution. Man's environment, both that which he has found in the external world and that which he himself has created, has served to release the powers inherent in his nature. The external world has no power in itself by which it can project a force from itself into the mind of man and create there a new character. There is no reason to suppose that the release of man's energies was sudden, like that of a coiled spring; it is far more probable that the process was a gradual one. And now it is more probable that the race is still in its infancy than that it has come to old age. In our present state the greatest inspiration to an intellectual life, and hence to an increase of power, comes from the interactions of mind with mind. To the development of language, the prime means of the communication of mind with mind, has been given the honor of initiating the marvelous release of the powers of man. Language was a product of the collective rather than of the individual mind. In view of this first magnificent creation of the primitive mind, we cannot refuse to recognize that early man possessed powers which do not suffer in comparison with those manifested today.—R. D. Carmichael, *Scientific Monthly*, January, 1921. K. E. B.

The Problem of the American Negro.—The degree of variability of physical and mental qualities in each race is very great. In every population we find persons who are stupid and intelligent, weak and strong, moral and immoral. But when we turn to racial types that are fundamentally distinct the biological question seems simpler. Such traits of the negro as the pigmentation of the skin, the form of the hair, the nose, etc., are so characteristic that they are not duplicated among the whites. Yet we cannot follow out the racial differences in the same detail in regard to internal organs. It has been pointed out that the liver, the spleen, and the brain of the negro are on the average smaller than those of the white. Whether or not there is a difference in the number of cells and connective fibers in the brains of the two races is an open question. The problem of heredity is also connected with the negro problem. The army tests have indicated the negro to be inferior to the white and that northern negroes were very much superior to southern negroes. But when we keep in mind the abject fear of southern negroes under the white officer and the limitations of early childhood and of general upbringing of the negroes in the South, we will decline to accept these mental tests as a convincing proof of the hereditary inferiority of the negro race. On the contrary, the highly developed native arts, weaving, carving, pottery, metal casting, etc., done by the black races in Africa, give a proof of the negro's mental ability. The same biological inferiority also is ascribed to the mulattoes who are almost all descended from white fathers and negro mothers. Besides biological and psychological justifications for the inferiority of the negro race there is the social basis of the race prejudice which is founded on the tendency to emerge the individual in the class to which he belongs, and to ascribe to him all the characteristics of his class. The consciousness that the negro belongs to a class by himself is kept alive by the contrast presented by his physical appearance with that of the whites. Intermixture of blood will decrease the contrast between the extreme racial forms and this will lead to a lessening of the consciousness of race distinction. The negro problem will not disappear in America until the negro blood has been so much diluted that it will no longer

be recognized, just as anti-Semitism will not disappear until the last vestige of the Jew as a Jew has disappeared.—Franz Boas, *The Yale Review*, January, 1921. C. N.

The Aaland Question.—Geographically, ethnographically, and culturally the Aalanders belong to the Swedish nationality in Finland. The Swedish Finlanders of the mainland are as determined as the Aalanders to preserve their nationality for all future. It is among them that the Swedish national movement in Finland originated. They maintain that the preservation of the Swedish nationality in Finland is a right which belongs to them and is also a duty to the country which they share with the Finns, because their language forms the cultural bridge with Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries with their old civilization. They believe that just as the French-speaking inhabitants of Switzerland can preserve their nationality without becoming subjects of France, so the Swedish-speaking Finlanders can preserve theirs without becoming subjects of Sweden. Finland's constitution of 1919 recognizes both Finnish and Swedish as the national languages and it recognizes in theory that the cultural interests of the Swedish-speaking population shall be supported by the state in accordance with the same principles as those applied to the Finnish-speaking population. These stipulations presuppose as their supplement special legislation regulating detail. The various Swedish-speaking districts desire autonomy within the state and the establishment of a higher administrative unit comprising the whole Swedish-speaking Finland. Through their delegates they have expressed the hope that the Council of the League of Nations will postpone its recommendations with regard to the Aaland Islands until the diet of the republic has regulated the position of that nationality as a whole.—Edward Westermarck, *Contemporary Review*, December, 1920. O. B. Y.

Social Reform in Missouri 1820-1920.—This treatise is a survey of social reform and social legislation, showing the work of the numerous agencies which have contributed to the social program. The subjects treated are crime and punishment, poverty and disease, the insane and feeble-minded, child welfare, boards of supervision, and welfare. These subjects are treated scientifically with especial emphasis on child welfare and education of the negro since the Civil War.—George B. Mangold (Pamphlet). Columbia, Mo.: Missouri State Historical Society. R. D. G.

The Indianization of Christianity.—In India it has been traditional to confine the chief cultural advantages to those belonging to the higher castes. The majority of the converts to the Christian faith have been from the depressed and backward classes, for Hinduism has very little to offer the non-caste man. When the claims of Christianity are presented he has to choose between the traditional religion which proposes to perpetuate his disadvantages and the new faith which promises amelioration of his wrongs and a democracy of spiritual privilege. These lower classes were not in a position to make much of a contribution to the task of rendering an Indian interpretation of their new faith. Now that the third and fourth generations are appearing in some localities this situation is rapidly changing. Many of these have received the advantages of college training. Christians from caste communities bring with them to their adopted faith the heritage of an ancient civilization. The imagery with which the thought-processes of the Indian people proceed is so different from that of Westerners that we do not realize its significance without years of observation and study and even then not fully. (1) The Indian mind responds more readily to parables than to syllogisms. Even the philosophic arguments abound in similes and metaphors. (2) The Indian mind responds more readily to the idealistic than the empirical method of thought. (3) The Indian religious consciousness is inclined to be mystical and contemplative. Its ideal is a life of ineffable communion or union with God. An example of this mystical element is that expressed in the concepts of *yoga mārga* or way of asceticism. The Christian Sadhu movement is an attempt to link the Christian life to the *yoga* ideal. The Christianizing of India will involve an Indianization of Christianity as surely as the Christianizing of the Graeco-Roman world involved the Hellenizing of Christianity.—Angus Stewart Woodburne, *Journal of Religion*, January, 1921. O. B. Y.

What Are the Japanese Doing toward Americanization?—The Japanese are helping to Americanize themselves in four ways: (1) through the means of Japanese Christian churches, seventy-five of which now have more or less definite programs for social work, including such things as teaching of English, instruction in home economics and sanitation, and other social activities that are definitely contributory to the spiritual and physical assimilation of the Japanese; (2) through the Japanese press, consisting of fifteen dailies and twenty-five periodicals, that are meeting the needs of those who, because of lack of education and advanced age, are unable to read the English papers, by having the bulk of news contents deal with some subject related to the Americanization of the Japanese; (3) through the Japanese-language schools, which are purely supplementary in nature, giving instruction only in the Japanese language which is at present still the dominant language of the home; (4) through Japanese associations in America, organized voluntarily among the Japanese residents in various localities solely for the purpose of promoting the welfare of their members and the friendship both among themselves and with Americans, and not, as many Americans are inclined to regard, agencies supported by the government in Tokyo. One of the recent and important additions to the administrative officers of the associations is the Americanization Committee whose prime duty is to send lecturers on Americanization to various Japanese centers, to distribute suitable literature on Americanization, and to assist and give advice in adopting respectable American customs and spirit.—Junzo Sasamori, *Japan Review*, December, 1920. K. E. B.

Great Cities and Social Settlements.—The Chicago Federation of Settlements, composed of twenty-five groups covering a wide range of work done by settlements of Chicago, has for its object fellowship and co-operation. It endeavors as a unit to further public and private measures intended to accomplish its ends. A statement just issued from the office of the secretary of the National Federation of Settlements sets forth clearly and concisely the motives and methods of settlement work. (1) The democratization of culture among settlement motives continues to be of first importance. The method of promoting culture through the interchange of experience is of proved validity. (2) Residence has demonstrated itself more than a motive and a method: it is a spiritual experience. (3) Residence provides an important means of knowing the conditions of the people's life, and of assisting them to develop new forms of group expression. (4) Residence is among the best forms of preparation for participation in civic affairs. (5) Definite and thorough instruction in the principles, ideas, and methods of settlement work should be assured all residents and associate workers, that they may be capable of seeing the universal in the particular. (6) Settlement organization should be kept flexible enough to permit ready response to opportunities for securing individuals and groups not included in the established routine. (7) The formation of an international federation of settlements, with provisions to keep members in touch with one another through correspondence, exchange of workers, and conferences, is a logical next step in settlement organization.—R. E. Hieronymous, *School and Home Education*, November, 1920. K. E. B.

Survey of Cripples in New York City.—This survey reveals the status of the cripples of that city through a study of 3,600 cases. Graphical representations show how the cases have been analyzed and classified for treatment by the social agencies. A lack of necessary funds and social workers in various lines has greatly impeded the work. With better organization and co-operation greater results are being accomplished. The great problem is vocational training which will function in earning a livelihood for these unfortunates.—Henry C. Wright, Director of Survey (Pamphlet). New York: Committee on After-Care of Infantile Paralysis Cases.

R. D. G.

Industrial Morale.—Industrial morale refers to the degree of co-operation extended by the employees of an enterprise to the management in the course of their work. Fatigue, ill health, nervous strain, the belief that workmen will work themselves out of their jobs, dissatisfaction of the workers with the management, and the belief among the workers that the burdens and benefits in society are too unevenly distributed, create low industrial morale. Industrial unrest is also due to the "getting"

rather than "giving" philosophy. Business men frankly admit that they are in business not primarily to render service, but to make money. The workmen's low morale equally results from fear and resentment inspired among the workers by certain managerial policies. The feeling of unimportance fostered among workmen by their submergence in the vastness of industrial establishments and the policy pursued by many managements in building up in the men the feeling that they are of little importance, prevent the workmen from appreciating the importance of their work. In addition, failure of managements to recognize merit and good service and the lack of material rewards for merit naturally lead workmen to feel that the management does not appreciate good service. The transitory and precarious nature of employment and the impersonal relation that exists between the workmen and industry tend also to create a gulf between the men and the owners of capital. Labor cannot be expected to give its best effort to industry until industry, instead of being the servant of capital and the master of labor, is the joint servant of them both, devoted equally to the advancement of the interests of each.—Sumner H. Slichter, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November, 1920. C. N.

Social Control of Industrial Strife.—The objective of society should be to eliminate premature, unnecessary, and unjust strikes and lockouts without closing the door to the usefulness of the strike in appropriate cases as a last resort. The following classes of strikes should be considered as illegitimate: (1) strikes against democracy in order to control or influence political action, as such acts are revolutionary and lay the ax at the very root of self-government; (2) strikes which unduly injure the public, such as a general railroad strike which can paralyze industry, commerce, and many of the functions of government in times of peace and war, and make millions of innocent people suffer from such antisocial action; (3) strikes against liberty seeking to curtail the rights of an employee to work regardless of union membership; (4) strikes against neutrals or sympathetic strikes which directly injure those against whom the strikers have no grievance; (5) strikes before presenting grievances, for to call strikes in advance of negotiations may be the wanton and malicious infliction of injury; (6) strikes in violation of reasonable agreements; (7) strikes in violation of an arbitration award; and (8) strikes where arbitration is available by a disinterested tribunal. Public opinion would certainly be united on the proposition that strikes in violation of the eight fundamental principles we have pointed out are in violation of sound public policy and should be generally discouraged.—Walter G. Merritt, *The Unpartisan Review*, January and March, 1921. C. N.

L'Enseignement du Bolchevisme dans le Monde.—The influence of bolshevism outside Russia is exercised not only on adults, for in London the Socialists have organized socialist Sunday schools where the children are taught that the regeneration of humanity requires a "bath of blood." The Young Socialist League boasts nine branches in London. The International School Movement (British section) is showing the young "how to bring about the inauguration of the Social Industrial Republic by the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." Social reforms are regarded as playthings like the congresses of the trade unions. The ideal is revolution in the Russian manner. According to the *Journal of Commerce* of New York of July 1, there are in the United States seventy-one colleges and universities where the teaching of bolshevism has penetrated. In France many teachers are impregnated with bolshevism. Article 23 of the constitution of the League of Nations has been inserted in the peace treaty, *ad maiorem Marxi gloriam*. Fully a third of the treaty is a consecration of socialistic dogmas, denying economic truths, and calling for the organization of an international policy of labor which will give the laborers privileges permitting them to despoil their fellow-citizens with the help of foreigners. One should not look in Russia for the dictatorship of the proletariat: it has been instituted in the treaty of peace.—N. Mondet, *Journal des Economistes*, December, 1920. V. M. A.

Le Mouvement Economique et Social.—It seems that a wave of pessimism is sweeping over Germany today. Many laborers think that the leaders of socialism are much more occupied with their own interests than with the general interests of the country. The government is further embarrassed because there is a widespread

temptation to render it responsible for the great financial difficulties of the present. The Germans will not understand that the situation is the consequence of the stubbornness with which they prolonged a struggle which could not end to their advantage. The financial situation fortunately paralyzes the bellicose desires of the German people. Relying on the book of Keynes, which has had a great popularity in Germany, they insist upon the economic interdependence of peoples, that in the weakened condition of Europe all must save reciprocally as much as possible. France is accused of wishing to strangle Germany. It is with the neutral countries that Germany hopes to re-establish commercial relations. The Germans also have to create a whole constitutional organization, and to the difficulties involved in internal reorganization are added those of exterior politics.—Georges Blondel, *La Réforme Sociale*, September-October, 1920. V. M. A.

Population and Progress.—The most persistent cause of war is the overgrowth of population. That consideration alone is sufficient reason for urging that it is the duty of all nations deliberately to control their inherent capacity for increase. A stronger consideration is this: that in any large population a low birth-rate is a necessary condition of racial progress. This proposition holds for plant and animal life as well as for human beings. High birth-rates may be desirable for small populations with limitless opportunities for expansion but are impossible for large populations already short of elbow-room, except on the condition that a high infantile mortality shall keep pace with the high birth-rate. Weeds and insects have no lack of offspring but the survival rate is one-hundredth or one-thousandth of the birth-rate. A similar consideration applies to many of the races of mankind and notably to the Chinese. In China "infanticide, rebellions, and disease, swift slaying famine, or slow starvation," keep the population within the limits of subsistence. The western countries of Europe with their relatively low birth-rates have much lower rates of infantile mortality than India, China, or Russia. It is urban overcrowding which creates the gravest of England's problems today. For various practical reasons the problem cannot be solved either by transference of industries to the country or by immigration within the empire. The numbers are too vast to be dealt with by these methods. Unless these numbers are reduced by deliberate birth control there can be no widespread racial improvement and no appreciable betterment of the general conditions of life.—Harold Cox, *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1920. O. B. Y.

Labor Evolution and Social Revolution.—From the hour of the Armistice, class sentiment and national disunion have reasserted their sinister sway with redoubled force. Labor believes that it can exercise the dominating power in the state. Other classes feel that their actual existence is threatened by the claims set up by labor. To accomplish their purpose the manual workers have built up the trade-union movement in which the temperamental and intellectual characteristics of their leaders are reflected. Trade unionism thrives (1) under the leadership of a conservative, Victorian type of leader who always takes a specific line at conferences and congresses when he knows that it is a safe line for his own interests; (2) the Marxian type of leader who stands for industrial unionism and who points with a triumphant finger to the giant amalgamations of the miners, railway servants, and the transport workers as instruments for the realization of his dreams of Soviet rule; (3) the leader of the All-Red Doctrinaire Communists. This group has openly repudiated its former adhesion to the democratic faith, for this party stands for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The aftermaths of the war on British temperament, the profiteering of profit-mongers, and constant prolongation of the peace negotiations—all these have prepared the social fuel for a vast conflagration. So long as trade unionism was used as a weapon of defense against profiteering, or as machinery for improving the working conditions, it was a legitimate instrument of industrial progress. But when the same implement is used against the state to coerce the government in regard to political questions, it becomes not only illegal but treasonable.—Victor Fisher, *The Nineteenth Century and After*, October, 1920. C. N.

Is Industrial Peace Possible?—The world-war has resulted in an intensification of that class hatred which was first analyzed by Marx. Labor is beating no longer

against the introduction of machinery, but against the institution of profit. As the worker is a wage-slave he is constantly spurred by the fear of unemployment and he therefore will not continue to produce for private profit. The present industrial system has only one possible development, namely, the gradual formation of gigantic trusts on the one hand, and the trade unions with universal membership upon the other. The whole situation presents the conflict of a sullen revolt and of desperate, nervous resistance. The present system stands condemned and it can be abolished by the substitution of a system which will allow present wage-earners to share in the prosperity of their industry to a far greater extent, and which will eliminate the objectionable features of fixed wages, possible unemployment, profiteering, and the sleeping partnership of labor in industrial control. This objective would result in improvement in status and improvement in income. The right understanding of the industrial situation and economic education are necessary for the workers and employers to achieve these ends. The system of co-partnership is the only practicable working out of the gospel of the identity of the interests of all those engaged in industry.—Colin R. Coote, *The Nineteenth Century and After*, September, 1920. C. N.

Der Familiengerichtshof.—Dr. Fehlinger discusses W. H. Liebman's paper on "Domestic Relations Courts," read before the conference of Jewish Social Workers in Atlantic City, 1919. These courts should have complete jurisdiction in the following cases: (1) desertion and non-support; (2) parental responsibility; (3) juvenile delinquency as well as all cases of contribution toward it; (4) adoption and guardianship; (5) divorce and alimony. The courts should have full advantage of all medical, social, psychological, and other expert advice; should maintain their own psychological stations and should conduct all familial problems in private. Society and not the individual should be the unit of welfare interest. And the whole atmosphere of the court should be as little official and as tactfully intimate as possible, using its judicial authority, even its probation powers, only as a last resort.—Dr. H. Fehlinger, *Zeitschrift für Sexualwissenschaft*, September, 1920. R. S.

Co-operative Community Building.—The things in which farmers have a common interest and which every farmer and community ought to foster are: (1) good farming which lies at the root of good living and of good community building. Every farmer has a right to expect that his neighbor shall not rob posterity by a soil-depleting system; (2) good schools are a matter of common interest. Community effort is necessary to educate public opinion to the needs of rural schools; (3) the betterment of roads, for they are important for the transit of commodities, persons, and the exchange of ideas. Communication is the first requisite of any form of social organization; (4) good churches are necessary, for good country life depends on well-supported and ably ministered churches; (5) good recreational facilities for young people and grown-ups alike. The open country has little organized recreation; (6) the production of good farm products and of disposing of them honestly adds to personal, social, and business values alike; (7) the protection of rural government and rural legislation from the incumbrances which so easily attach themselves to governmental activities; (8) the dissemination of hygienic and sanitary knowledge. The purpose of rural organization is so to relate and adjust the forces, organized and unorganized, that the best economic and social standards of that unit shall be maintained.—Albert R. Mann, *The Southern Workman*, August, 1920. C. N.

Infant Welfare Affected by Class Distinctions and National Traits.—The economic and social status of the mother has a great deal to do with infant welfare. The rich mother is unwilling to nurse her baby, because it interferes with her social duties. She can, however, get possible substitutes in place of breast milk. The poor mother who is anxious to nurse her baby presents the biggest problem. For financial reasons she must go out of the home to add to the family livelihood. According to the degree of co-operation they give the physician and nurse the mothers may be classified into three classes: (1) the American (white) mother who does not present special problems in connection with infant-welfare work, except those peculiar to social conditions; (2) the colored mother who presents the problems of extreme

youthfulness, many of whom are only sixteen or seventeen years of age and the problem of illegitimacy of children. Besides, from 95 to 98 per cent of colored infants suffer from rickets in one form or another. Furthermore, the matter of tradition and superstition may to a certain extent interfere with good hygiene; (3) the mother of foreign birth who does not see the necessity of going to see a doctor or nurse with a well baby. Many foreign mothers have to assist in the earning of a livelihood and they cannot devote their entire time to their children. Besides the large number of children among the foreign-born makes their economic problem more acute.—A. Levinson, *Modern Medicine*, October, 1920. C. N.

The School as an Agency in Preventing Social Liabilities.—For the purposes of our discussion we shall divide our problem into five distinctive fields: (1) the problem of the feeble-minded of whom some states handle only one-tenth of the known defectives at large. To provide for this group of social defectives the state program should include a criterion for identification of the feeble-minded, efficient state registration, some standard of education, segregation and colonization, and public education as regards financial and moral support to limit the drain upon state resources; (2) the delinquent who presents a complex of environmental conditions, heredity, mental make-up, and general disposition which makes for anti-social conduct. Physiological investigation and research should be used to determine personal manifestations which are delinquent; (3) the dependent—our public schools have failed to develop those aptitudes and potentialities which might have made for efficient living; (4) the psychopathic surveys reveal that five out of every one hundred children present some symptoms of mental maladjustment and yet mental-hygiene measures find no place in our routine handling of children. Preventive mental-hygiene program should include methods through which defectives can be adequately studied and encouragement of free activity should replace repressive tendencies; (5) the gifted child should receive special attention so that there would be no wastage of human and economic resources.—S. C. Kohs, *School and Society*, October, 1920. C. N.

Rassenbiologie.—Our worship of mechanical and industrial civilization and the rampant individualism of our age with its complex corollary of immoralities has a physiologically definitely deteriorating effect upon modern man. To this deterioration the "policy of the empty cradle" heavily contributes. The author also deplores the bad eugenic effects of race mixture. He considers the "pure Nordic races" of a much higher variety than the Balkan race mixture and, especially, than the "blood chaos" of Middle and South America. Hybridization, industrialization, and also the "proletarianization of the rural stock" are, in his eyes, the causes of race degeneration. As a remedy he suggests biological research institutes whose eugenic findings should be given the wide publicity of an educative campaign.—H. Lundberg, *Die Umschau*, B. S. 9. Heft, 1920.

Reaching the Immigrant through Books.—The extent of the problem of Americanization can be seen from the following statistics: from July 1, 1900, to June 1, 1918, more than 14,000,000 immigrants came into this country. Approximately 75 per cent of the workers employed in American industries are either foreign-born or the children of foreign-born parents. In refining of sugar 85 per cent of wage-earners are foreign-born; in manufacture of clothing, 72 per cent; in manufacture of agricultural implements, 6 per cent; in iron and steel industries, 58 per cent. We are agreed that this vast population of alien origin should be imbued as thoroughly as possible with the best traditions and ideals of America. How shall these men know what America means to us and what it may mean to themselves and to their children, unless there is placed before them the story of the first European immigrants and their struggles with untamed savages and wild beasts and with nature's elementary forces? This knowledge that is so fundamental can be best acquired through the medium of books. The interpretation of American institutions and ideals to the immigrant must involve a somewhat extensive publication of books interpreting those institutions and ideals in foreign languages. Just as I would not suppress the foreign-language newspapers, as so many people who seem to me to be misguided

in their patriotism want to do, so I would not discourage the extensive publication in foreign languages of books which will help to make America understood and beloved by those who are able only to read those languages. A popular history of America has recently come off the press, printed in Italian and English text on alternate pages. This idea should be applied extensively to the publication of books intended for immigrants, at once interpreting America and facilitating their acquisition of America's language. At least the experiment should be made upon a large enough scale to determine its value beyond question. Finally, such books should be printed on cheap paper with paper covers so as to make the price of such books within the financial reach of the poor immigrant.—John Spargo, *American Journal of Education*, September 2, 1920.

K. E. B.

Child-Welfare Standards.—A new standard has been proposed by the Children's Bureau, which goes into some detail. An outline covers the following topics: (1) Minimum standards for children entering employment: (a) *minimum age*—sixteen years in all occupations; eighteen years in mines and quarries; twenty-one years for girls as telephone or telegraph messengers; twenty-one years for special-delivery service of United States Post-office; prohibition of minors in dangerous, unhealthy, or hazardous occupations; (b) *minimum education*—compulsory education for all seven to sixteen years for nine months per year. Between sixteen and eighteen those legally and regularly employed, compulsory attendance at continuation schools at least eight hours per week; (c) *physical minimum*—annual examination of all working children under eighteen years of age; prohibition from work unless found to be of normal development for a child of his age and physically fit for the work at which he is to be employed; (d) *hours*—minors not more than eight hours a day or forty-four hours a week. Time at continuation school to count as part of working day. Prohibition of night work for minors between 6 P.M. and 7 A.M.; (e) *wage*—minimum necessary for "cost of proper living," as determined by a minimum-wage commission or other similar official board; (f) *placement and employment supervision*—adequate provision for advising children when they leave school of the employment opportunities open to them; supervision during first few years of employment; (g) *employment certificate*. (2) Minimum standards for public protection of health of mothers and children: (a) *maternity*; (b) *infants and pre-school children*; (c) *school children*; (d) *adolescent children*. (3) Minimum standards relating to children in need of special care: (a) *adequate income*; (b) *assistance to mothers*; (c) *state supervision*; (d) *removal of children from their homes*; (e) *home care*; (f) *principles governing child-placing*; (g) *children in institutions*; (h) *care of children born out of wedlock*; (i) *care of physically defective children*; (j) *mental hygiene and care of mentally defective children*; (k) *juvenile courts*; (l) *rural social work*; (m) *scientific information*. (4) General minimum standards: (a) *economic and social standards*; (b) *recreation*; (c) *child-welfare legislation*.—Julia C. Lathrop, Chief of Children's Bureau, *The Child*, August, 1920.

K. E. B.

Medical and Allied Professions as a State Service.—At present preventive medicine is state controlled. Why should not curative medicine also be state controlled? The doctor would then be to the whole public what the club doctor is now to a section of it. He would be a state official, salaried and pensioned as such. We should be able to summon a state-paid physician for a broken leg, pneumonia, or insanity just the same as one can do in Canada in case of measles or diphtheria. Hospitals would then become state institutions just as prisons, penitentiaries, and asylums are now. The Indian medical service affords an example of a state-managed medical service. Promotions, disability pensions, retiring pensions, etc., would be arranged for as in the civil service. A state medical service would carry out measures to prevent disease, but the measures would emanate from legislative bodies. It should advise Congress, county, city councils, and other public bodies. It should suggest legislation. It should not only treat all the sick but educate the community in the ways of healthy living. The best advice and treatment would then be placed within the reach of every person in the community. Because of the expense involved in modern diagnoses, such as X-ray, chemical tests, sera diagnoses, etc., only the

well-to-do can afford such medical service. The best medical service should not continue to be a special privilege of the rich or the gift of charity that pauperizes. The health of the nation should be looked after in a manner similar to that in which any other national concern is managed—war, law, trade, agriculture, or fisheries. If fighting and law are considered such honorable state services, why may the equally noble profession of medicine not be so considered?

The state service would conserve the health of all our social groups—the army, navy, civil servants, inmates of prisons, asylums, boys and girls in reformatories, defective children, the blind, deaf, dumb, immigrants, and, equally important, those who constitute the “public” in general. Such state service would make present amateur efforts of supervised health of school children superfluous. A part of such state service would also be investigation of all problems of public sanitation, such as adulteration of food; the storing, cleansing, and distribution of water; inspection of ventilation; quarantine; prophylactic inoculation; etc. It would organize, direct, and reward research. All qualified men would become registered in the national service, the quacks and irregular practitioners would soon be exposed and got rid of. Osteopaths would become licensed *masseurs* and nothing else. “Homeopaths” and “faith-healers” would cease to be because they would not possess the state license to practice. The pay of all would not be equal; there would be different grades the same as in the post-office department. This is neo-socialism, socialism *in excelsis* which has absolutely nothing to do with the socialism of the red tie and the leveling-down to hopeless vulgarity. Therefore, for this neo-socialism a name is needed; I would suggest “co-operationism.” Individualism, often heroic beyond all description, was sufficient for the earlier, ruder, simpler, and smaller communities; but co-operation, the organized working for the common good, is the goal we aim at in this newer and truer socialism.—Fraser Harris, M.D., *Scientific Monthly*, September, 1920. K. E. B.

Americanization.—We have eighteen million children in our public schools today who are in need of Americanization. We must supply them with red-blooded, healthy, educated, cultured teachers—American in spirit and training. But we must not crowd forty or fifty pupils into one badly ventilated and poorly lighted room. One step further in this process of Americanization is to teach the words and then translate them into the thought and action of the pupils—“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” To secure the right to “life” means giving to everyone a square deal. Do you believe there is a profiteer in America today who did not cheat in the spelling lessons long ago, or cheat in games, or bully the smaller boys? Liberty! Liberty in America means that we set people free to live and grow and develop into the best for which they are intended, and free to be helpful. Let us remind our boys and girls that liberty does not mean freedom to do as they please. It does mean freedom to build up and to help. We believe most earnestly in freedom of the press and freedom of speech. We often hear soap-box orators inciting their hearers to the verge of treason. But how much less harmful are such men spouting like geysers on the street than plotting in cellars! Happiness! This does not mean money for all the “movies” to which we want to go. It does not mean wealth or power or comforts. It means ability to grow. Happiness for each child means that he shall have a right to develop his ability and win the respect of the community. It means that the children give to the son of the Italian street vendor the same rights in class and on the playground as to the son of the doctor, lawyer, or wealthy manufacturer.—Jessie L. Burroll, Chief of School Service, National Geographic Society, *American Education*, October, 1920. K. E. B.

American-Japanese Problem.—The essential cause of the anti-Japanese feeling that has arisen in some parts of America is not any racial difference or any alien ways of social life—it is the incompatibility of labor ways and standards. The trouble is, above all else, economic; and it has arisen out of the so-called human “struggle for existence.” After large numbers of Asiatics came to the Pacific Coast, the slogan cry became, “We are ruined by Chinese cheap labor.” This was an economic, not

a mere racial, outburst. It was the protest of American work-people against a struggle with rivals who underbid them for wages. And they declared, "The Chinese must go." Later, when Japanese emigration to America began, no one was more welcome to the country than the Japanese as tourist, official, student, or merchant. There was no protest of any kind until the Japanese low-class workman came, and gave reason to have turned against him the same complaint about his success by means of cheap labor. If the situations were reversed, I am sure that the Japanese would act similarly to the United States. The Japanese would oppose the incoming into Japan of hosts of Chinese, or Siamese, or Malays, or Hindoos, who would take a masterful hold in their factories, in their trades, or in their paddy-fields, and work these national resources for all they could produce even at the same wages that the Japanese themselves are getting. If Japanese labor should once become well organized at home and brought into a real working co-operation with the organized labor of the world, so that common standards of wages and living were gained, the great barriers to an interchange of residence would greatly lessen. If the Japanese workman should receive in Japan the same wages that he would receive in America, he would probably not wish to emigrate to America. And if the American workman should not find a destructive rival in his Japanese neighbor, he would soon see that his other reasons for opposition would grow much less in importance.—Dr. Clay MacCauley, *Japan Review*, October, 1920.

K. E. B.

Geburtsrückgang und Gesetzgebung nach dem Kriege.—The author pleads for a "qualitative attention to the race rather than a quantitative one." He discusses more the juridical phases and implications of birth-control than the ethical. It is bad legal psychology to prohibit unenforceable behavior. Besides, the "unborn fruit of the female body is *pars viscerum*," and hence woman has a right to protect her body from conception and its consequences. He also points out that the international democratic movements, especially the various forms of the socialist movement, join the men of science in the defense of neo-Malthusianism. (The American Labor Movement, on the whole, is against neo-Malthusianism.)—Dr. Hirsch-Ulm, *Archaeologie* . *Krim.*, 1920, 1. Heft, S. 74.

B. S.

Vocational Education as a Preventive of Juvenile Delinquency.—Pauperism and lack of education whereby one may earn an adequate living are the direct causes of a very large percentage of crime and juvenile delinquency. Nearly 70 per cent of the children in this country do not get beyond the sixth grade in our public schools. Ninety per cent of all children in the United States between the ages of fourteen and sixteen are out of school, and 50 per cent of those have only a fifth-grade education or less. Most of these children remain out of school because of wrong teaching methods. Between 70 and 80 per cent of the child labor is due to a distaste on the part of the child for teacher and school. Most delinquents come from boys who leave school at or before fourteen years of age. Proper technical and industrial training would tend to remove many of the causes of pauperism and delinquency. The child should be trained to work at some useful art. Vocational education directs surplus energy in useful channels, inhibits habits of licentiousness, or the cravings for excitement and stimulants, establishes a higher plane of living, and creates new and legitimate wants, the satisfaction of which will arouse ambition and promote habits of industry. Social workers and criminologists were the first to start the campaign for vocational training.—Arthur Frank Payne, *School and Society*, November, 1919.

C. N.

Recreation Facts.—The Playground and Recreation Association of America has attempted to determine how far the war affected the recreation movement in America. Information secured indicates that 41 cities discontinued work in 1918, and 172 cities out of 277 reported that the effect of the war on their work had been unfavorable. A decrease in playground attendance was due to the following causes: many of the older children worked in factories; lack of competent leaders; the cutting down of appropriations; and the use of playground property by war-work agencies. One hundred and five cities reported that the war had not affected them. Five hundred and seventy-two cities had some form of playground and recreation-center work; eighteen

communities reported that plans had been affected. In 403 of the 572 cities work was under paid leadership. Three hundred and ninety-six cities employed 8,137 workers, 3,126 men, 4,909 women. (In 102 instances sex was not given.) One hundred and twenty-nine cities employed 1,628 workers the year round. A total expenditure of \$4,891,601 was reported by 380 cities. In 236 cities the work was supported by municipal funds, in 69 by municipal and private, in 84 by private, funds; 143 cities reported 818 playgrounds open and lighted evenings; 101 cities conducted evening recreation work in schools; 86 cities reported 332 buildings for recreational purposes.—Abbie Condit, *Playground*, October, 1919. C. N.

Six Months' Americanization in Delaware.—The program for Americanization in Delaware was first put into operation in September, 1918. It is to be a long-time program. A survey of the conditions, opportunities, and traditions of the foreigners is to be made. Night schools, which were realized to be both absolutely necessary and immediately possible, were started. Some of them were held in public schools and others in halls lent by the various race groups. The teachers were given some preliminary training. A simple book was used as a text and the "direct method" was employed in the classroom. About a thousand foreigners attended the schools while they were open last winter and spring, but it is expected that twice as many will be present this season. A prime requisite for successful Americanization was felt to be the interest of the community, as a community, in it. This requisite was successfully created. Only such committees were appointed as could be assigned definite work to do. The teachers did "follow-up" work to keep the pupils regular in their attendance. Some recreation was introduced, but in some cases it proved to be premature, for the foreigners wanted to learn and not to play. The Board of Education has now taken over the night schools, and the Service Citizens' Committee will this season devote itself to Americanization largely through social functions and recreation.—*Bulletin of the Service Citizens of Delaware*, September, 1919.

S. C. R.

France's First City-Planning Law.—Under the French planning law passed last March cities and communes of more than 5,000 inhabitants, within three years of the promulgation of the law, must have plans formulated concerning (1) the direction, width, and location of highways, extent and plan of squares, public spaces, reserve lands, building sites, etc.; (2) a program for the hygienic, archaeological, and aesthetic servitudes, the height of buildings, provisions for drinking-water, sewers, waste, etc. Any settlement destroyed by a catastrophe, such as fire or earthquake, may not be restored until the plans have been approved by the commission. A departmental planning commission is composed of local bodies in charge of hygiene, natural sites, etc., and of four mayors appointed by the state. This commission advises on (1) municipal schemes, (2) derogations from the general planning principles, (3) incidental aesthetic or hygienic servitudes and other matters. A superior planning commission of thirty members created by the Ministry of the Interior establishes planning rules and regulations and gives advice on schemes referred to it. A plan must be submitted (1) to examination by the municipal council; (2) to a preliminary hearing; (3) to the examination of the departmental planning commission. The municipal council then gives its decision on the plan, after which the state council or other authority gives its final approval.—Frank Backus Williams, *National Municipal Review*, October, 1919. C. N.

An Administrative Ideal in Public Welfare.—The specific functions of a state department of public welfare should be differentiated into the following bureaus: (1) a bureau of health, having the duties and powers of a state board of health, and, in addition, the administration of institutions for the treatment of physical disease and disability; (2) a bureau of mental hygiene, having the duties and powers of a state board of insanity and such additional duties as a state program of mental hygiene may require; (3) a bureau of social work, having the duties and powers of a state board of charity and such additional duties as the ideals of social work may require; (4) a bureau of rehabilitation, having the duties of a state board of correction and its allied agencies. These bureaus should be co-ordinated with each other within the

department of public welfare and with other departments of the state. Each should be autonomous in its own field under the supervision of three expert directors appointed by the governor of the state. The twelve directors from these several bureaus should constitute a commission of public welfare, having advisory and supervisory relations with the several bureaus. In addition this commission should conduct the following agencies: (1) an agency of research and publicity; (2) an agency of co-operative community service; (3) an agency of co-operative purchasing. The advantages claimed for this scheme are: (1) it co-ordinates activities but does not destroy personal initiative; (2) it is democratic in principle and practice; (3) it promotes the efficiency of the individual and of the local agency, whose efficiency and standards are the measure and limitation of combined achievement.—Owen Copp, *American Journal of Insanity*, July, 1919. F. A. C.

Establishment of International Standards of Public Health.—Great Britain and America both desire an international standard of public health and welfare work. By the co-operation of these two countries a standard can be established throughout the world. In fixing a standard there must be a careful analysis of each region; second, the establishment of a unit of public-health nurse service and the territory she can conveniently handle; third, the correlation of these on the basis of adaptation to the region to be handled. To push these standards over the world will necessitate constant changes based upon knowledge of the language and of the origin and former condition of the people to be cared for. In the international scholarships in public health nursing there is already a beginning.—W. C. White, *Lancet*, October, 1919. D. H. K.

Essential Units in the Care of Tuberculosis.—In a complete scheme for the care of the tuberculous there should be: (1) an improved method of notification to provide fuller information regarding the type of the disease and the circumstances of the patient; (2) an efficient and co-ordinated system of dispensary and domiciliary treatment; (3) the provision of adequate hospital accommodation for acute and advanced cases of tuberculosis with compulsory powers of removal; (4) the provision of up-to-date sanitarium accommodation with facilities for the industrial training of patients; (5) the provision of large hospitals for the conservative treatment of non-pulmonary tuberculosis, each hospital to serve a large district and population; (6) the provision of sanitarium accommodation for children and of facilities for open-air instruction in connection with hospital, sanitarium, and schools; (7) the incorporation in the scheme of an after-care unit with an emigration and employment bureau; (8) carrying out a comprehensive scheme of scientific investigation and preventive effort with a view to the control and final abolition of tuberculosis.—H. H. Thomson, *Journal of State Medicine*, October, 1919. D. H. K.

The Co-operative Movement in the United States.—The co-operative movement, or the Rochdale movement, as it is often called, is one of great social significance. It tends to substitute for the present system of private profit-taking a condition of society under which every need of life, social and economic, will be supplied by the united effort of all. While this aim is revolutionary, the method is economic and not political. The immediate object of the movement is the reduction of the cost of living by eliminating the profits of the middleman. Certain of the principles of the Rochdale co-operators, which one authority says must be maintained or invite failure, are followed by their American successors. They usually provide for unrestricted membership, shares of low denomination, one man one vote regardless of stock ownership, cash sales of pure foods at prevailing market prices, payment of not more than a legal rate of interest on share capital, and the return of the "profits" as a dividend to members in proportion to their patronage. Started in England in 1844 by twenty-eight weavers, the Rochdale system spread to America in the form of all sorts of co-operative ventures some of which were purely co-operative, others political, and some religious. Through bad management and failure to adhere to the Rochdale principles nearly all of them failed. The most notable examples of successful co-operation are the California Fruit Growers' Exchange and the various live-stock

shippers' organizations. Although there are but meager data relative to the extent of the co-operative movement in the United States, it is estimated that there are about three thousand consumers' societies, having a combined business of approximately \$200,000,000 a year. Most of the societies conform to the open membership policy, have shares of low denomination, and without exception in the societies studied, the principle of "one member one vote" is strictly adhered to. Sales are made at prevailing market rates in order not to incur the hostility of other regular merchants. Dividends returned to members have ranged from 3 to 13 per cent. Besides the monetary benefit, co-operation has provided other advantages such as a practical education in business methods, training for citizenship, utilization of the latent abilities of the workmen, and the habituation of all men to altruistic modes of thought and conduct.—Florence E. Parker, *Monthly Labor Review*, March, 1920. C. V. R.

Reactions of Welfare Work on Religious Work.—The war brought thousands of ministers into contact with the real needs and actual problems of men. The return of this large body of welfare workers to their former tasks should be accompanied by a revival of human interests in the sphere of organized religion. There has been a shifting attitude in these religious workers due to their close contact with human needs. With them the emphasis passes from doctrine to service and the technique of religion must be the technique of everyday conduct rather than for specific times and seasons. The church of today ought to realize her mission as a great agency of social redemption and that means that the successful minister or church worker must be a practical sociologist.

The participation of so many religious workers in welfare activities has resulted in a growing consciousness that the time has come for the church to assume a more positive attitude toward current problems and movements. Efforts for recreational and entertainment activities of the community, endeavors in regard to public health, the redemption of public affairs, the fight against ignorance and economic maladjustment; all these should have a profoundly religious motive. Both the existence and the servicefulness of the church depends on her ability to adjust herself and to interpret the gospel to the changing atmosphere. The church should anticipate the world's need with a liturgy, a hymnology, and a gospel that will answer to the awakened social consciousness.—Angus S. Woodburne, *Biblical World*, May, 1920. R. G. H.

A Program of Americanization.—To have any program of Americanization we must agree on the characteristic qualities which constitute the American type. This type can be distinguished politically and socially. Politically, the American principle is that everybody shares in the democracy; socially, the American principle is that people must work together to accomplish an object, but that each member of the group retains the right of original opinion and original contribution. The program of Americanization must include forgetful and indifferent Americans as well as aliens. To Americanize the alien certain conditions are necessary to insure the best results. These teachers must be properly trained, adequately paid, and should have a clear vision of the goal to be reached. The organization of the school must be flexible as to time and location. It requires likewise the co-operation of newspapers, churches, boards of trade, as well as the direct and special agencies of education. Aside from the conscious education of the foreigner in and out of the school there is the other program for the citizen group. Every real program of Americanization must take in the whole community as a partner with the school. The plan prepared here looks to the organization of committees which will undertake to look after the industrial opportunities in the community, instruction in factories for aliens and citizens, legislation, school finance, use of public facilities for public good, public community activities, and publicity. The essential thing in Americanization is the creation of a better community life.—Albert Shiels, *American Education*, June, 1920. R. G. H.

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JUSTICE AND POVERTY

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I

The discussions of the proper distribution of wealth that are now so common usually assume two propositions that are in fact highly questionable. A just distribution of wealth is assumed to be a completely satisfactory end of social endeavor, and society stands condemned, we are told, if the distribution of wealth is not definitely just. It is likewise presumed that justice is all that can or should be expected of social institutions. These assumptions reveal serious misunderstanding of the deeper meanings of the principle of justice. They are a direct result of the tendency to deem just those arrangements or consequences which appeal to the sentiment of the individual. Justice becomes synonymous with "right"—a right that is intuitively perceived and hence agreeable to moral sentiment. Precisely because of this identification of justice with what is felt to be right, the sentimentalist comes to regard justice as the *summum bonum*, and, with reference to social arrangements, all that can be desired.

Underlying this sentimental ideal there is a disposition to think of justice as something external; something contrived or invented by thinkers and reformers, bodied forth in social life

by clever institutional arrangements which accomplish that preponderance of good that is held to be characteristic of the "just" society. The organized system of repression and retribution seems to the naïve mind an exact and explicit indication that justice is indeed something external, brought into social life by men. Deep down in the thought of many people there still lurks the notion that misdeeds are not punished unless the offender is caught. There has doubtless been some progress since the days of Sparta, for few would actually confess to the belief that sin is sin only if it is detected. The naïve belief, however, persists despite all the teachings of literature, and despite a profound but obscure consciousness of the deeper meanings of justice which is revealed in its lowest forms by melodrama and in its highest forms by Shakespearian tragedy. The literary ideal of justice, frequently called poetic justice, is significant because it expresses the thoughts of the greatest thinkers and reflects convictions that are common to all.

Poetic justice is, as nearly as may be, the opposite of the sentimental ideal of justice. Poetic justice is a principle of necessity: it is an expression of rational rather than emotional needs. According to this notion, the consequences of an act are a necessary and inevitable result of the act itself. This is a principle of reason, because it is an assertion of the continuity of life and consciousness without which all living would be a mere jumble of incident devoid of moral content or rational meaning. The tragic literature of all ages is dominated by this conviction. "Whatsoever ye sow, that shall ye also reap." In early literature the process of retribution involves not a little mystery; the individual is compassed about by spirits whose activities seem to be external. In modern literature the chain of circumstance is more closely woven into the incident of daily life. Evil deeds bring their own retribution through the remorse of guilty conscience or through a final catastrophe created by the succession of misdeeds committed in a vain attempt to avoid detection and punishment.

It is of peculiar significance to note that the suffering of the innocent victims is no indication that there is no justice in the world. The nature and existence of justice is to be discovered

only in the relation of acts and their consequences. It must be evident that no individual can be guaranteed such independence and isolation as to insure him against any possible misconduct on the part of others. In its extreme form, the principle of justice requires an inconceivable degree of isolation and a hopeless enslavement to the past. Absolute freedom from all external interference would mean that nothing could break into the stream of individual action, whether for good or evil. The individual would indeed be master of his destiny, but the errors and sins of the past would be as a millstone around his neck. The influences and demands of social life destroy the self-sufficiency of the individual that is implied in the conception of justice.

The stream of circumstance in which we live is not really continuous to the extent implied. All the possible consequences of our acts seldom have the opportunity to reveal their full content before other acts have broken the chain of circumstance and thwarted necessity of its grim fulfilment. The rational disposition to conceive of life as wholly continuous slurs over many things that are persistently thrust upon our attention if we observe the movement of real events with any care. It is this failure to carry every act to its logical conclusion that engenders the mysteries of life, giving it an element of unexpectedness without entirely destroying that rhythmic structure that makes it intelligible even though the chain of circumstances is interrupted in a variety of ways. A world that was merely just would be wholly unreal. Life is neither as logical nor as pitiless as the principles of pure justice would require.

Both of the fundamental convictions of the sentimentalist are false. The existence of evil and of injustice in the world is no proof that there is no such thing as justice in our existing social order. However much suffering we may endure personally or behold as spectators, we, like Job, must maintain unshaken the faith that our lives are not mere capricious successions of meaningless events. To lose faith in the existence of some rational meaning in life is unconditional surrender. No doubt at times it seems as if absolute rationality—continuity—could alone make life worth living, but it is a delusion to suppose that a solution of

difficulties can be found in that complete mastery of destiny implied in the principle of justice. It would not be enough if the world were to become merely just. We could not even then intone a grateful "Nunc dimittis." Even if every one were to become the absolute master of his destiny for good or for ill, and all were to become so moral as never to interfere with the fulfillment of the ends and desires of others, even in that millennium of the individualist there would be something lacking. The imperfections and incompletenesses of the individual would make that millennial state a torture chamber fit to be compared with the hells of Dante's vision. Unless we were to become gods, we could not cheerfully accept the complete mastery of our destinies.

II

The limitations of the conception of justice are of peculiar significance with reference to the distribution of wealth. It is of the essence of justice that acts be judged with reference to the point of view of the doer. The protest against judgments based on conventions is merely an expression of this conviction. The content of the act and the intention of the doer always mean more to us than any conventional classifications of right and wrong. Acts are not right or wrong because they conform or fail to conform to social conventions; their meaning is to be discovered only in their full content in the consciousness of the doer. This fundamental importance of the individual point of view makes it easy to apply the principle of justice to the moral aspects of actions. Each individual does in a measure constitute a moral universe; he is, indeed, a microcosm set over against all that is external to his consciousness. The exclusion of external influences from certain judgments is therefore intelligible and intensely real. Even though there be some mysterious affinity between mind and mind, so that our feeling of individual isolation should really be deemed an illusion that will ultimately be overcome, we must none the less admit that our philosophies and our ethical systems rest upon this postulate of the isolated individual whose means of communication with the outside world

are imperfect and whose relations to it are subordinated to ends that are selfish, in a lower or in a higher sense.

The production and distribution of wealth is fundamentally a social process. The individual cannot be treated as an isolated unit. In isolation the individual could accomplish little. Furthermore, the significance of economic activities is determined primarily by their appeal to the needs and desires of others. The fact that Whistler painted the famous *Nocturne* in a few hours with little apparent effort was no indication that the high price set upon it was unfair or unjust. The significance of the result was not revealed or measured by the painfulness of the effort to the artist. Pleasure is paid for as well as pain, and sometimes more bountifully. There is a great temptation to seek for some direct connection between the quantum of effort and the amount of the reward. This would, indeed, be a legitimate application of the principle that there must be a direct connection between each act and its consequences. The analogy between moral acts and productive efforts does not hold. Productive efforts are not the acts of isolated individuals, nor can they be appraised exclusively from the point of view of the doer, like moral acts. The sacrifices and efforts of the producer are the least significant factor in the valuation of the product. The palpably great efforts of unskilful singers or actors furnish notable illustrations. The beautifully finished performance is not only achieved with less evident effort, but frequently with quantitatively less effort than is put forth by unskilful performers. In a boat race, for instance, it is entirely conceivable that the losing crew should have exerted more foot pounds of energy than the winners. Efficiency in many things means that energy is being exerted with economy, with a minimum waste in internal resistances. Results are not directly proportional to sacrifices, if we judge the results from the social point of view. With the individual it is different. The hopelessly mediocre painting, the inept and futile model of some proposed invention may contain a wealth of meaning to their creators that no masterpiece could convey to them. Worthless things may well furnish their creators with significant spiritual experiences.

Whenever the individual appraisal of results is set over against the social appraisal, there will inevitably be discrepancies which may seem to indicate injustice in the distribution of wealth. But criticisms of distribution based on allegations of such defects involve a misunderstanding of the conception of justice and a failure to appreciate the difficulties of applying to social problems a conception that is so essentially individualistic.

In no society can there be the close correspondence between productive effort and reward that exists in the moral realm between acts and their consequences. The productive process is essentially a joint process, involving the unconscious, and, at times, the unwilling co-operation of vast numbers of individuals. The efforts of a particular individual cannot be clearly distinguished. No special part or share of the product can be attributed specifically to him. Granted that he should receive "that which is his," there is no means of ascertaining precisely what is his. The principle of justice would require that he should receive such portion of the joint product as can be attributed to his efforts. Not his sacrifice, but his contribution to the final accomplishment is the proper measure of his reward. As a principle, this would be an adequate rendering of the more general statement that justice consists in the necessary connection between acts and their consequences. Remuneration in proportion to the product would indeed express a necessary connection between productive effort and its reward. Some such principle, too, seems to be implicit in the system of production and distribution under "free competition." There is a connection between efforts and products, but it is of such a nature that we can never adequately express this individual productivity in the wage or salary. We may say that a competitive society is just in principle, but we must needs admit that this principle is not as clearly manifested as it is in the field of ethics.

Sooner or later the ethical content of an act will be revealed to the individual. Even the most unimaginative criminal has the meaning of his deeds borne in upon him at last. Retribution may come in the more direct form of a final catastrophe, as to Macbeth; or there may be more of the drama of conscience in it all, as with

Hamlet's mother and uncle. The content of the deed is ultimately revealed to the doer. Social devices, police, detectives, and courts may facilitate this process, but even without any mechanism the evil content of misdeeds would become known. Similarly the content of just deeds becomes known to the individual. In some small measure, criminal purposes may be forestalled and circumvented, but innocence can be protected only in a measure. The mechanism of suppression can do little more than express objectively the truths that emerge ultimately in the inner life of the individuals concerned. In the realm of ethics, therefore, we may speak of justice as certain.

In the material world, distributive justice cannot be certain. All appraisals are subject to some errors, larger or smaller as the case may be. The valuation of the social product is not certain. The valuation of the efforts of particular laborers and classes of laborers is even more uncertain. Most of the product is distributed before its final values can be known. The process of production is directed with reference to expectations, and many workers are paid in terms of these expectations. The contribution of the individual to the joint product is thus unknowable; within some considerable margin of error, the individual's contribution may be ascertained by processes of imputation and computation, but not with any certainty. Furthermore, all these acts of appraisal must be repeated over and over again. They must be made in each case for stated periods of time and with reference to conditions that will change. There is no chance for the correction of errors, no eternity in which one may wait patiently for the revelation of truth. Action in the ethical realm is more closely related to the eternal verities. The continuous elements of reality are fundamental. In the material world we are closer to the flux of life. The submergence of the individual in the complex stream of circumstance keeps the discontinuity of life ever present. The notion of justice, a principle of continuity, thus means less in the material world. It is less clearly revealed to us, and such principle as we do discover is less certainly manifest. We may say with some assurance that no society will ever achieve any large measure of justice in the distribution of wealth.

We may say this without pessimism and without despair; for justice in and of itself cannot make life worth living, nor can the absence of a perfect and certain justice in distribution destroy any of the deeper meanings of life.

III

Recent studies of the distribution of wealth have revealed conditions that seem to admit no favorable interpretation. In the United Kingdom, 11 per cent of the population controls about one-half the total income; in the United States, 18 per cent of the population controls 45 per cent of the income. Many aspects of these statistical summaries are open to question; the most carefully prepared figures are at best only a crude approximation to the truth, but with these allowances the figures must be accepted as an account of the larger facts with reference to the distribution of wealth. The conclusions to be drawn from these figures, however, are by no means self-evident. There is no warrant for treating these percentages as *prima facie* evidence of injustice in the distribution of wealth. The full presentation of the statistical problem would be out of place here, and it is not desirable to create the impression that it is possible to prove any specific conclusion. It should therefore be sufficient to suggest that these facts may indicate conditions that are not sinister.

It is not difficult to secure the tacit assent of reader or audience when it is suggested that just apportionment of wealth should result in substantial equality, so that given portions of the population should receive equivalent proportions of the total income. Now few would presume that absolute equality of distribution would be possible; it would be admitted by most people that some moderate differences of income are reasonable as an expression of the differences in capacity. It is seldom that people realize how these moderate differences would affect the gross percentages.

"A concrete example," says Professor Young, "may give point to this consideration. Suppose that incomes in an imaginary society were distributed symmetrically around the modal or most common income, in the form of a normal frequency distribution.

This might represent either one of two things: (1) a normal distribution of ability and a perfect proportioning of income to ability; (2) a random or chance distribution of incomes, under the influence of complex but unbiassed forces. This second condition would be consistent with the existence of real equality of opportunity, broadly understood, coupled with the presence of a myriad of small circumstances that might deflect one towards a lower or a higher portion of the income range. Now suppose that the average family income is \$1,500 and that half of the families get incomes that are within \$200 of this average. Under such conditions the richer half of the families would get 58 per cent of the aggregate income and the poorer half would get 42 per cent. Increase the dispersion of distribution somewhat, so that half of the incomes are between \$1,000 and \$2,000. Then 70 per cent of the aggregate income would go to the richer half of the population, and 30 per cent to the poorer half. Increase the limits between which half of the incomes fall to \$800 and \$2,200, and the portion of the aggregate income assigned to the richer half of the population becomes 78 per cent, leaving 22 per cent to the poorer half.

"I do not think that Dr. King's recent estimates err in the direction of underestimating the present inequality in the distribution of incomes in the United States. He assigns about 27 per cent of the aggregate income to the poorer half of the families and 73 per cent of the richer half. But this is a slightly smaller degree of concentration than would be given by a normal frequency distribution with half the incomes falling between \$900 and \$2,100. This suggests that no single or general statement of the degree of concentration can give, by itself, an adequate notion of the extent to which the existing distribution of wealth has to be deemed unsatisfactory. . . . The amount of concentration, the amount of departure from a condition of uniform incomes, does not matter so much as does the particular form of the income distribution underlying the concentration."

Particular kinds of concentration may be unfortunate, and there are grounds for believing that some aspects of the present distribution of incomes are abnormal and undesirable. It would seem that there is an undue porportion of very large incomes and

an abnormally small number of incomes intermediate in size between the very large incomes and the average income. These large incomes are not individual incomes in the strict sense of the word, though industrial conditions have placed them in the hands of individuals. Such wealth is really social in its origin, the cumulative result of the changes in industrial technique that have been the work of two or three generations of men, inventors and captains of industry. There has been some caprice, perhaps, in the massing of the profits in the hands of particular individuals, and yet the mere size of the income has made it impossible to devote such fortunes to purely individual ends. The larger portion of such fortunes has, in fact, been devoted to social uses. If desirable, the disposition of such incomes could be significantly altered without destroying the competitive character of social organization.

The severest criticism of the concentration of wealth, however, has been based upon a slightly different use of these statistics of income. Division of the total income of the United Kingdom by the total number of families seems to indicate that an equal distribution per family would enable all to live in substantial comfort. Each family might have \$1,100. Similar possibilities exist in the United States. These figures and sundry statistics of production have lead some economists to declare that poverty can be abolished. William Smart, the English economist, says that these figures present a "dazzling possibility;" he is not sure that the results could actually be accomplished, because it might be impossible to induce people to consent to the reduction of all incomes to an equality. Professor Hollander cherishes a stronger conviction. "Like preventable disease," he writes, "economic want persists as a social ill only because men do not sufficiently desire that it shall cease. There is still much mumbling of common-places, and it has seemed worth while to emphasize anew this definite corollary of modern political economy, that the essential causes of poverty are determinable and its considerable presence unnecessary."

These expectations are based upon an illusion. The development of the present industrial system forces all to strive for pur-

chasing power. Scarcely any worker today feels conscious of any struggle with nature. We all seek money incomes, assuming that if there is money in hand, all material goods can surely be procured. A couple of centuries ago, when industry was proportionately less important and the primacy of agriculture definitely recognized, there was a greater disposition to think in terms of commodities. Prosperity or distress depended upon the character of the harvests, and it was not merely a matter of having a greater or a smaller money income, but an actual difference in the abundance of food. The problem of getting through until the next harvest, which has become with us a war problem, was with them a persistent feature of life. In those days none could forget that the struggle to provide for material wants was in reality a struggle with nature, rendered hazardous and uncertain by the caprice of seasons. When dearth came it was accepted with resignation, and, in the less fertile districts which never afforded bountiful subsistence, the persistent pressure of hardship was likewise borne with resignation. In the midst of such circumstances it was not difficult to explain poverty; the humblest understood.

Now that this struggle with nature has become less direct, so that the economic problem seems to be merely a struggle for purchasing power, poverty is not so easy to understand. There seems to be an abundance of goods if only there is money to buy them. Employment at a sufficient wage seems to be the only difficulty; to the workman, the obstacle that stands between him and adequate maintenance is not a capricious and uncertain Nature but the niggardly employer. The direct obstacles always assume concrete human or social form. The existence of poverty seems to be positive proof that there is some vital defect in the mechanism of this industrial society that offers all things in its markets and withholds the wage that would enable the workman to buy.

The apparent abundance in the markets is misunderstood. The caprices and niggardliness of Nature are not overcome and done away with by making the struggle less direct. Purchasing power is not food and drink, raiment and shelter; nor does the

apparent offer of all things for a price guarantee such abundance that all may be fed and clothed.

Return for a moment to the dazzling prospect held forth by the equal division of purchasing power among all the families of the United Kingdom. By the simplest process of arithmetic it is demonstrated that there is sufficient purchasing power for all. This purchasing power will be sufficient, however, subject to two conditions. The general level of prices must remain unchanged and there must be enough goods to supply the demands of willing purchasers. It is scarcely conceivable that either of these conditions would be fulfilled.

If by some act of magic the division of incomes were carried out overnight, there would be a most serious lack of adjustment between supplies and demands. There would be too many motor cars, too many fine silks, too much champagne. The supplies of meat, cereals, cottons, and medium grade woollens would be inadequate. Many house servants would be discharged. Prices would inevitably change. Many radicals would rejoice in this readjustment of production to the legitimate needs of the population. The curtailment of luxurious consumption and the deflection into other channels of the labor set free would be regarded as an estimable result of the change in the distribution of wealth. The lack of goods would be only temporary, according to the radical.

We cannot be certain that the lack of goods would be temporary. The redistribution of incomes, if permanent, must imply that such incomes are received in return for labor. After the first redivision, it must be assumed that these incomes are earned. Now the income of the majority of the families of the artisan classes would be increased by about one-third by such a division. If the new incomes were paid to them as wages, wages would have to be significantly increased. Such an increase in wages would inevitably mean an increase in all prices, and with the increase in prices would disappear all hope that the equal incomes per family would afford adequate maintenance. The prospect suggested by the statistics of income is thus pure illusion, because it is based on the assumption that the purchasing power assigned to each family would always command as much in the markets as it does today.

IV

The disposition to treat the problem of poverty as a problem of justice in distribution is unfortunate. It is not true that the material comfort of the wealthy and the middle classes is enjoyed at the expense of the poor; nor is it true that the misery of the poor is merited, a just judgment upon deficiency and inefficiency. It is naïve to suppose that difficulties and evils are all due to human wickedness, and that all of them can be overcome by mere honesty and competency in high places. Nothing is explained or accomplished by this disposition to apply opprobrious terms to either rich or poor, and it would seem that effective study of poverty and its alleviation would be most significantly furthered by abandoning this unfruitful discussion of justice.

Questions of right are likely to be determined in the light of personal convictions, so with characteristic certainty that happiness and virtue must needs go hand in hand, the mid-Victorian adopted the simple program of preaching middle-class virtues to the poor. Smaller families, higher standards of comfort, and good middle-class prudence were deemed a sufficient solution. The earlier writings of Miss Jane Addams furnish a significant commentary. Her work in the slums was begun under the influence of this mid-Victorian idealism. The settlement was to afford the means of teaching these ideals. But the aspiring teacher soon discovered that she was really the pupil, learning the terrible lesson of the slum: that large families represent the wisdom and prudence of the slum as truly as small families represent the collective wisdom of the middle class. It has been the achievement of this generation to attain sufficient knowledge of the slum to understand its life, at least in a measure. Many thoughtful workers have been reaching out toward this same truth that large families are an inevitable outcome of slum conditions.

The life of the slum is dominated by the grim necessity of rearing large families as a provision for old age, despite the severity of the economic pressure caused by these numbers. Life in the slum runs in a vicious circle. It is a wheel of life from which the individual can scarcely ever entirely escape. The situation is vividly described by Seebohm Rowntree with reference to York,

England. The newborn child is nearly if not quite adequately nourished. At the age of three or four, the child must begin to share the privations of the family. When the adolescent boy or girl begins to contribute something to the family income at twelve or earlier, more adequate provision for its wants is possible, must indeed be made in hopes of maintaining the earning power of the family. Between eighteen and twenty-two the average youth is fairly prosperous, his wages are about as high as they are likely to become and his responsibilities are limited to the provision for his personal wants. Rarely would he feel any obligation to his parents. This condition of well-being cannot long continue. If he is prudent, he marries. The wages which were wholly adequate for his needs become relatively inadequate for the needs of the family, particularly when it becomes necessary for his wife to give up her work. The rearing of the children subjects the family to a period of pressure. Some members must needs be undernourished and ill provided with clothing. Much of the burden falls upon the mother. Any serious illness or accident to any member of the family may, at this period, result in definite pauperism. There is no margin for unusual expenditures. Now it will be apparent that the only provision for the declining years of the parents is a number of unmarried children capable of making some contribution toward the support of their parents. Unless the family is fairly large there will be no unmarried children when the parents reach the age of forty-five. It will also be evident that the burden of supporting an elderly parent cannot be borne by one unmarried child.

Provision for the years of impaired earning power is thus the dominant feature of the life of the poor. It would seem that the primary solicitude of reformers should be provision for old age. This is indeed a prominent feature in modern social legislation, but the study of the details of modern insurance statutes affords abundant evidence of the intrinsic difficulty of the problem. The earning power of the manual worker is likely to decline after forty-five, and at fifty the average individual would be partially, if not wholly, dependent. Significant attack upon the problem of poverty would thus require provision of old-age pensions begin-

ning at the age of fifty or fifty-five at the latest. The age limits in the various insurance laws are much higher: sixty-five in Australasia, seventy in Germany and Great Britain. In Germany considerable numbers of workmen become entirely dependent before they reach the age of seventy, and though they will have a right to a pension ultimately, they have neither the means to live nor the means to contribute the necessary payments to the insurance fund. In such cases the Poor Law authorities provide for the immediate needs of the individual and also make the payments to the insurance fund. If the man lives to the age of seventy he becomes a recipient of an old-age pension and ceases to receive an allowance as a pauper. The Germans entertained high hopes of their insurance legislation, but it has neither diminished the relative amount of dependency in the community nor the relative expenditure for poor relief. These measures were designed to supplant at least a certain amount of poor relief, and, if the scheme were adapted to the accomplishment of its evident intentions, it would doubtless diminish expenditure for the relief of the aged poor. The failure to achieve this result is probably due to the excessively high age limits. These pension laws will probably fail to produce the desired results until the age limits are significantly reduced.

The financial problems that would be created by such a change in the age limits of the pension laws, apart from any increase in the small stipends now furnished, would have strained the budgets of the leading countries even before the war. The insurance laws are an enormous burden as they stand, and each year that the age limit was reduced would increase the financial obligations by immense sums. These comments must not be interpreted as a criticism of the existing laws. The statutes as they stand are productive of much good, and they may lead to larger results, but it is essential to realize clearly why such acts fail to accomplish all that has been anticipated. The logic of these laws is sound, but it is not wholly a question of logic. It is also a question of finance, and it may be permitted to doubt the possibility of ever carrying such a reform to its logical conclusion. Much good may be done, however, even if all the anticipations of the

most optimistic reformers are not realized. Poverty is not a permanent condition even today, if we may trust the analysis of Mr. Rowntree. Primary poverty is felt during the earlier years of married life, and many families rise out of this position of extreme pressure. Well conceived remedial legislation can doubtless diminish the length of this period of pressure, mitigate some of the hardships, and make it easier for the individual and the family to rise out of this condition. If ideals of individual responsibility are to be retained, there must be some possibility of failure, but the result of economic failure need not extend beyond a probationary interval, and this interval can be used for vocational training. Even if poverty cannot be abolished, it need not be a condition of abject misery unrelieved by prospects of ultimate achievement of a decent standard of living.

THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE LOCO-FOCO DEMOCRACY

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In a recent number of this *Journal* (May, 1918) there appeared a significant article from the pen of Professor William E. Dodd on "The Social Philosophy of the Old South," in which is described the development of an aristocratic conception of society which by the middle thirties had come to dominate the philosophy of southern leaders. It is a matter of no little moment in the history of democracy that, at about the time the aristocrats of the South were repudiating the ideas of Jefferson as "glittering fallacies," a determined group of common men in the city of New York were re-emphasizing and reformulating those ideas and promulgating anew the precepts of a philosophy founded on the theory of human equality.

The movement began to assume definite form in the fall of 1835 as a mutiny within the Tammany organization against the domination of a conservative element. It soon grew into a separate party which called itself the Equal Rights Party, but which is better known in history under the fantastic sobriquet of "Loco-Foco," a term first applied in derision by its enemies. The party was active in a few local campaigns and held two state conventions in one of which it formulated an interesting model for a revision of the state constitution. It also fostered noteworthy mass meetings in New York City. Its achievements as a party organization, however, were not impressive, since its nominees at no time secured more than 5000 votes. Yet it did effect an important revolution in Tammany which allowed reunion in the fall of 1837, its career closing thus after scarcely two years of separate political activity.

Though in duration and in number of adherents this Equal Rights Party was almost negligible, its significance is enhanced by consideration of some of the forces back of it. Its existence was

made possible by that tremendous innovation in the world's practice of politics—American manhood suffrage. Massing of population, moreover, to a degree hitherto unknown in the New World and the ushering in of a new stage of industrial development were producing in the city so strategically situated at the mouth of the Hudson new economic and social tendencies. Hither had come from England noteworthy agitators and thinkers, fervid from the industrial unrest there. A strong labor movement for some years had been experimenting in forms of organization and formulating principles. A group of young intellectuals within the Democratic-Republican party, which included William Cullen Bryant, John Bigelow, Samuel J. Tilden, and, most conspicuously, William Leggett (the prophet of the Loco-Foco movement), was keenly responsive to a philosophy of equal rights; and with these might then have been classed a brilliant independent editor, Horace Greeley. The New York *Evening Post*, of which Bryant was editor and Leggett associate editor, was the organ of this group and was distinctly sympathetic with the new movement. Furthermore, there were still surviving men like the Loco-Foco leader, Jaques, who reached back in feeling and experience to the hallowed days of the American Revolution. Finally, all fixed-income classes in general—laborers, professional men, holders of small estates—were under the economic pressure of a rapid rise in cost of living, a condition due chiefly to grave inflation of the currency.

This inflation and the prevalent widening of the credit system were defended vigorously by the speculative members of society, the entrepreneurs of the time, promoters of the new capitalism, whose philosophy of the new era would not have been difficult to affiliate with that of the aggressive young planters of the lower South. That the social principles of the two classes at least were not thought discordant appears from an appeal which was made by a group of New York merchants during the panic of 1837, as follows:

Avow your belief that in a great majority of cases the possession of property is the proof of merit, because in a country of free laws and equal rights, property, as a general rule, cannot be acquired without industry, skill and economy. . . . With a firm faith that the many will follow the wise and the good, call upon the men of sound morals, of intelligence, and industry, throughout the

nation, to forget all the distracting topics which have agitated it, and unite in defense of the institutions, without which commercial society cannot exist. . . . Appeal to our brethren of the South for their generous co-operation, and promise them that those who believe that the possession of property is an evidence of merit will be the last to interfere with the rights of property of any kind.

The main sponsors of this manifesto were of Whig persuasion; but a large and influential division of the Democratic-Republican party was inclining to the same philosophy and was keeping in close touch with such southern leaders as Rives of Virginia and Legaré of South Carolina. Indeed, there were throughout the North, as Professor Dodd observes (citing as instances Chancellor Kent and Daniel Webster), numerous "conservatives" whose social philosophy agreed to a considerable degree with that which was obtaining in the South.

Between the conception of society held both by northern capitalists and southern planters and that advocated by themselves, the Loco-Focos thought there existed a fundamental, historic antagonism. Their perception of this antagonism was set forth in an address by Jaques, as follows:

There are two opinions abroad in the world on the subject of social relations and the government of men. The supporters of both profess to have the same objects in view—the peace, the order, and the happiness of the human race. But as they are founded on different views of our nature and the laws of the Creator, both cannot be true. It is therefore of the first importance that the question should be speedily settled in the minds of this community.

The theory of the one party is, that man, by reason of his ignorance, and of his corrupt nature, is not capable of self-government; it is therefore necessary that he should be restrained by force. They assert that the Creator in his providence has produced a different order of intelligence among men, and intended that the most intelligent should be the governors and rulers, as well as the owners, and live by the labor of the other portion of the human family. Most of the governments of the Old World have been founded on the above theory; its effects are well known, and need not be here enumerated.

The other theory referred to, is that man is a rational and moral being, "that all men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights." That by nature he is also a social being, and that on entering society he does not give up any of his natural rights, but to secure those rights in their fullest enjoyment "governments are instituted among men." . . .

The governments of these United States were founded on the latter theory, and it is now to be proved by after-experience whether it is capable of being carried out in practice.

That there was a very real danger of American democracy being diverted from its true course, the Loco-Focos believed; and so they fought bitterly (and at times irrationally) the money-power and the conservatism of their time and engaged zealously in the formulation and propagation of a social philosophy which they counted of incalculable worth to humanity.

The chief significance of Loco-Focoism, consequently, is not derived from its manifestation as a political party in New York, but from the spread of its tenets. Its conception of democracy, its social and political formulations, its spirit of aggressive radicalism became ascendant between 1837 and 1844 in the national Democratic party; and, furthermore, after the seizure of the leadership of the national party by the southern expansionists in 1844, the process of permeating the Democracy of the North with Loco-Foco doctrines continued well up to the outbreak of the Civil War. By this assertion, however, it is not meant that the teachings of the Loco-Focos were the only source of radical democracy during this period; for, prior to and contemporaneously with the Loco-Foco agitation, a large section of the Democratic Party (of which Senator Benton of Missouri was a representative leader) was developing similar views. The original Loco-Focos, in fact, may quite properly be regarded as constituting merely a militant vanguard of the general body of the progressive Democracy. Nevertheless, it is not too much to say that the congeries of principles which came to be known under their name—especially that of unqualified belief in the philosophy of human equality—became ingrained in large portions of the northern populace and thus contributed an important element to the idealistic democratic movement which finally by armed force confounded the southern votaries of aristocracy. Another contribution to the advance of world democracy, perhaps of equal permanent worth, was due to the fact that Loco-Foco radicalism furnished important and lasting ingredients to the great process of remodeling state constitutions which went on in the United States in the two decades prior to the Civil War. During

this period the constitutions of practically all of the older states were recast, and those of ten new ones were framed.

We have here space for no more than the barest outline of the historical steps by which the doctrines of the earlier Loco-Focos were diffused through the Democracy of the North.¹ So early as the national campaign of 1836, Professor Woodburn tells us, their Declaration of Principles was widely used by the general Democracy as a party platform. Then, through a succession of events in 1837 President Van Buren was compelled to choose between the conservative and radical elements in his political following, and decisively chose the latter. He and his associates, thereupon, established at Washington a high-class magazine, the *Democratic Review* (the first issue appearing in October, 1837), which became an effective vehicle for the dissemination of the larger Loco-Focoism. In line with its teachings was the Democratic platform of 1840 which, as Professor Dodd has noted, was the last ante-bellum pronouncement of the national Democracy to endorse the Declaration of Independence. Meanwhile, a majority of the political group in New York known as the Regency, adhering to the leadership of the President, was forming the celebrated Barnburner faction (essentially a radical movement), and this in turn became an important nucleus eventually of the Free Soil party. Throughout the period following 1837, indeed, northern Democrats in general—and more specifically the numerous contingent of radicals—were widely known under the appellation of Loco-Focos.

The conceptions of society, thus widely disseminated under the name of Loco-Focoism, were not new. The original Loco-Focos themselves, indeed, did not claim to be initiating a new philosophy, but held that their mission was "to bring back the Democratic party to the principles upon which it was originally founded, . . . those heaven-born principles which had been so long trodden under foot of Monopoly." The doctrines of the earlier much-maligned partisans, the *Democratic Review* averred, were essentially those of Jefferson, Taylor, and Madison. But, in reviving and re-emphasizing the ancient maxims of democracy, these humble men

¹ A history of the movement, with references and bibliographical data, is in the *American Historical Review* for April, 1919, under the title, "Diverging Tendencies in New York Democracy in the Period of the Loco-Focos."

insisted that they were basing their contentions upon eternal principles, and they regarded themselves as "political apostles of the future"; and, indeed, the fact that the party arose in the midst of a new industrialism, that many of the reforms which it advocated were distinctly modern, and that its envisagement of life was characteristically more that of the mass-action of cities than that of the individualism of the frontier gives to its philosophy of society added pregnancy. Its philosophy, in truth, was that of a nascent proletarianism.

The dominating and ever present idea in the creed of all Loco-Focos, whether of the earlier zealots in New York or of the later proponents upon the western prairies, was that of equal rights. On this idea depended their whole social and political philosophy; from it proceeded in some measure all of their demands for reform. While they repudiated the teachings of communism, they asked "that the blessings of government, like the dews of heaven, should descend equally on the high and the low, the rich and the poor." They conceived the state, therefore, not as an aggregation of social strata, the lower bound down by the upper; but as an organization of voluntary units, no one more entitled to preference than another—provided each functioned usefully. Upon the latter proviso, however, they were disposed to insist and to resent, therefore, the presence in the body politic of those who in any manner (but especially through the manifold devices of "paper capitalism") subsisted or preyed upon their fellowmen. Aristocracy they considered as economically parasitic, and they certainly regarded those only as good citizens who were somehow "producers," a contention for which they were bitterly reproached as stirrers up of class hatred. But, in the judgment of the Loco-Focos, the strength, the purity, the excellence of government depended in the last analysis upon equality of opportunity, limited only by natural endowment; equal participation of citizens in the affairs and benefits of government; and impartial application of laws which themselves should be conformable to the eternal principles of justice. Loco-Focoism, in fine, held with almost fanatical fervor the ultimate postulate of democracy—the largest chance for the self-realization of every individual consistent with like chances for all other individuals.

The Loco-Focos, accordingly, were strongly opposed to what they conceived to be the exactions and pretensions of the aristocracy. This opposition was caustically set forth in one of their Reports as follows:

The world has always abounded with men, who, rather than toil to produce the wealth necessary to their subsistence, have contrived to strip others of the fruits of their labor, either by violence and bloodshed, or by swaggering pretensions to exclusive privileges.

It is, however, chiefly by the latter mode of robbery, that the working classes of modern times are kept in debasement and poverty. Aristocrats have discovered that charters are safer weapons than swords; and that cant, falsehood, and hypocrisy serve all the purposes of a highwayman's pistol, while they leave their victims alive and fit for future exactions.

Naturally, therefore, the Loco-Focos abhorred all manner of monopoly and of special privilege and strongly questioned vested rights. The latter generally were to be traced, they thought, to the brutal coercion of the common people in feudal times and to belated laws which preserved the inequalities of those times. Charters in perpetuity, in particular, were most earnestly denounced as a form of injustice which, in violation of democratic principles and the rights of the people, were designed to nourish a privileged class. There was to be nowhere, in the Loco-Foco scheme of things, opportunity for vesting privileges in the few, and thereby divesting the many of their rights for generations to come. The Loco-Focos felt that they were fighting in this matter a danger which placed in acute jeopardy their ideals for the progress of civilization.

The doctrines and activities of the Loco-Focos were not only opposed by those whose interests were assailed, but naturally, were viewed with horror by many of the good and staid people of the time. The Loco-Foco philosophy, it was averred, set class against class and not only threatened the stability of society, but tended to overthrow all society. These agitators were called disorganizers, visionaries, agrarians, labor unionists, infidels, or worse. If the governor of New York, William L. Marcy, for instance, would apply such a term as knave to William Leggett, one of the most sincere and brilliant apostles of democracy that America has ever known, it is not to be wondered at that other men of the period

likened the spread of Loco-Focoism to the devastation which had been wrought by the great fire in New York or to the awfulness of the epidemic of cholera.

It is true that the Loco-Foco ideas were in some respects extreme and needed the correctives of moderation. Constructive reform would have been hindered by the theory that laws have only the function of keeping men from injuring each other, and by insistence that in no respect has a legislative body the right to bind its successors. The proposal, likewise, that debts should be merely debts of honor and not legally enforceable, while it contributed to the adoption of exemption laws, nevertheless was unrealizable. Hatred of speculation and of "paper capitalism" extended to a demand for banning all paper money, a contention which would have hindered legitimate functions of credit; and the formidable and persistent attempts absolutely to do away with banks necessarily were moderated everywhere by the good sense of the people.

The Loco-Foco program of reform, on the other hand, embraced sound features. The determined opposition to banks and to special acts of incorporation met real evils of corruption and tended to restrain undue aggrandizement of the "money power." Imprisonment for debt was opposed, and lien laws and the right of laborers to organize unions were upheld. Land laws in the interest of the people were advocated, and "a more extended, equal, and convenient system of public school instruction" was urged. Popular election of judges was long agitated, and a system of reformed primaries was actually put into operation by the party in New York City as early as 1836.

The penology which appears in the Model Constitution of the New York Loco-Focos is especially suggestive. "There shall be no capital punishment," one clause declared, "but in all convictions for murder or unjustifiable homicide, the sentence shall be banishment or imprisonment at hard labor for life; the net profits of said labor to be given to the dependents and relations of the person murdered, or to the poor, as the jury shall direct." The principle of restitution to the injured was to be applied also in the use of proceeds from the labor of persons convicted of felonies, and this principle was very wide-reaching since embezzlement and breaches

of trust were to "be indictable as frauds and all frauds shall be punishable as felonies"—the Loco-Focos thinking, seemingly, that the principles of equality extended even to sentences for criminality. Moreover, "all articles manufactured in the prisons of this state, over and above the purposes of restitution, shall be appropriated to the use of the poor in such manner as the legislature shall direct," and the rising competition of prison labor with workingmen was met by the proviso that, "the time or labor convicts shall not be bargained to contractors, or to any person whatsoever."

Since the social philosophy of the early Loco-Focos thus embraced a penology tender of the interests of workingmen and reflected in general a broad humanitarianism, it is the more strange that it took no cognizance of negro slavery. Perhaps its advocates felt themselves, as one of their Reports states, victims of the "slavery of poverty," and were more concerned about avoiding the servile condition to which the southern philosophy would have consigned them than in agitating the wrongs of fairly comfortable negroes. Perhaps also the Loco-Foco attitude merely reflected the preoccupation of the average citizen in his own affairs. As Loco-Focoism spread over the country, moreover, the growing opposition of its adherents to the claims of the southern oligarchy seems not to have been directed so much against the institution of slavery per se as animated by a developing consciousness of the final irreconcilability of the two conflicting theories of society and of the systems of labor based thereon; a consciousness ripening eventually into a determination that the republic with all that it meant for democracy was not to be dominated or ruined by the slave power.

There was always present in Loco-Focoism, however, the impulsion of a humanitarian ideal which ultimately comprehends all races, classes, and conditions of men. "For," as this ideal was strikingly expressed by the *Democratic Review* in 1837:

Democracy is the cause of Humanity. It has faith in human nature. It believes in its essential equality and fundamental goodness. It respects, with a solemn reverence to which the proudest artificial institutions and distinctions of society have no claim, the human soul. It is the cause of philanthropy. Its object is to emancipate the mind of the mass of men from the degrading and disheartening fetters of social distinctions and advantages;

to bid it walk abroad through the free creation "in its own majesty"; to war against all fraud, oppression and violence; by striking at their root to reform all the infinitely varied human misery which has grown out of the old and false ideas by which the world has been so long misgoverned; to dismiss the hireling soldier; to spike the cannon and bury the bayonet; to burn the gibbet and open the debtor's dungeon; to substitute harmony and mutual respect for the jealousies and discord now subsisting between the different classes of society as the consequence of their artificial classification. . . . It is essentially involved in Christianity, of which it has been well said that its pervading spirit of democratic equality is its highest fact.

The countless ages of the future, the *Review* affirmed, are "committed with the cause of American Democracy."

The idealism of the Loco-Focos, and particularly of the earlier partisans, was consciously drawn from two great historic sources. The one was the teachings of Christianity. Perhaps their frequent allusions to the example and words of the Carpenter of Nazareth may have been induced in part by anxiety to meet the charge of being infidels and atheists; but there is no doubt that the use of these by some of the leaders was due to genuine piety. The historian of the party, Byrdsall, calls his co-laborers the "Methodists of democracy" and constantly seeks to set forth the movement as in consonance with "Christian democracy."

In the second place, not only the idealism of the Loco-Focos, but, in fact, their philosophy as a whole, was thoroughly impregnated with the doctrines of the compact theory of society, that group of ideas which has been so omnipresent and so powerful in the logic of revolutions. Practically all of their various reports, addresses, and declarations include references to this theory as fundamental. The immutability of the laws of nature and the irrevocability of natural rights were affirmed over and over again. How directly Loco-Foco beliefs were derived from this source is shown in the first article of the "Proposed Constitution" which read as follows:

ARTICLE I. NATURAL RIGHTS

1. We, the people of the State of New York, in order to mutually secure to each other the peaceful enjoyment of our natural rights, and the equal participation of the advantages of society, do hereby establish the following Constitution, as our social compact and system of government.

2. All men are created equally free, and are equally entitled to the exercise of their natural rights. On entering into society, man gives up none of those rights; he only adopts certain modes of securing the peaceful enjoyment of them.

Man's natural rights of person are, his right to exist, and to enjoy his existence; and the right to exercise those physical and mental faculties with which nature has endowed him. Man's natural rights in relation to things are, his right to the things produced by the exercise of his personal endowments, and his right to participate in those bounties which nature has equally given to all. Right, as related to action, is that principle of equality which teaches man to do to others as he would that others should do to him. Those acts are naturally, politically, and morally right, which may be done by all without injury to any.

To readers of the article referred to in our opening paragraph, it will be apparent from this brief survey that the Loco-Foco philosophy which in the two decades preceding the Civil War had wide influence in the North was the antithesis of that which contemporaneously came to command adherence in the South.

THE COMPARATIVE RÔLE OF THE GROUP CONCEPT IN WARD'S *DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY* AND CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY¹

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IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GROUP CONCEPT

The object of this chapter is to sum up the contrasts that have emerged from the two preceding chapters, and to attempt to suggest the significance of the group concept and its implications for social sciences and for social control. In general, it may be said that contemporary sociology shows a striking difference from Ward in its use of the group concept. The shift that appears is not always so much a matter of terminology as a change in point of view. Even in the matter of terminology, however, a review of the writers mentioned shows an increasing use of the group concept, as such, as one of the fundamental tools of analysis of the problems with which they deal. The difference in point of view, even where the concept as such is not expressly stressed, is still more noticeable. The summaries in the preceding chapters show this shift very clearly in their development of the analysis of such problems as the origin of society, of language, of religion, of the origin and nature of the mind, the relation of the individual to the group or to society or the state, and the nature and meaning of the group or social process. In the treatment of all these problems the conscious effort of contemporary sociology is to approach them from the group standpoint. The contrast might be referred to as that between pioneer social science, without a social psychology, and a later social science with a more or less adequate social psychology. The sociology of the present time is a sociology whose viewpoint and method have been considerably modified by a psychology in which the group plays a fundamental and in some respects a primary part. We may make the difference in

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point of view more concrete by calling attention to the widespread influence of Baldwin's thinking as expressed in his *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, and his subsequent development of the same fundamental thought of the oneness of the individual and the group. The frequent references to his stimulating influence are one of the evidences of the effort on the part of contemporary sociology to profit by the newly created technique, social psychology. The contrast, of course, is not an absolute one but one of degree. Ward, particularly in his *Applied Sociology*, was attempting to found a social psychology which foreshadowed the coming of a more adequate sociological point of view; but it still was only a foreshadowing, and it was not at all apparent in his first great work, with which we are particularly concerned. As was pointed out in chapter ii, Ward approached his problems almost exclusively from the standpoint of the individual, while the group was only incidental. Contemporary sociology reverses the process, starting with the group as the fundamental unit and developing its individuals as a part of the social or group process. It should be pointed out, however, that while the latter stresses the group in its analysis, it does not consciously eliminate or subordinate the individual as did Plato and his more modern followers in Germany. One of the general characteristics of the writers whose works have been reviewed is, that they recognize the worth and value of the individual. Earlier writers approached their problems from the premise of the individual versus the group. Contemporary sociology attempts to set out by removing the disjunctive particle between the individual and the group and to hold consistently to the view that the individual and the group are different aspects of the same total group situation.

It should also be pointed out that contemporary sociology, in its emphasis on the group, does not revert to the metaphysical theory of Hegel with his imperial state. The group, in the thought of the writers we have dealt with, is a very real thing. It is a matter of actual give and take of everyday life. There is no attempt to find in it a mystical social mind which exists apart from the actual persons and institutions and objects that make up the tangible situation. It is not an attempt to impose upon a social situation

the categories of an older introspective psychology. What the contemporary writers seem to refer to and have in mind when they deal with the group is a total social situation in which the action of one form stimulates and responds to the action of another form; it is interaction among persons. Contemporary sociology tends to be pragmatic rather than metaphysical.

The difference, which we have tried to point out, between the two periods, can be no better expressed than to quote from Baldwin:

All our thought has led us to see that one of the historical conceptions of man is, in its social aspects, mistaken. Man is not a person who stands up in his isolated majesty, meanness, passion, or humility, and sees, hits, worships, fights, or overcomes, another man, who does the opposite things to him, each preserving his isolated majesty, meanness, passion, humility, all the while, so that he can be considered a "unit" for the compounding processes of social speculation. On the contrary, *a man is a social outcome rather than a social unit*. He is always, in his greatest part, also some one else. Social acts of his—that is, acts which may not prove antisocial—are his *because they are society's first*; otherwise he could not have learned them or have had any tendency to do them. Everything that he learns is copied, reproduced, assimilated, from his fellows; and what all of them, including him—all the social fellows—do and think, they do and think because they have each been through the same course of copying, reproducing, assimilating, that he has. When he acts quite privately, it is always with a boomerang in his hand; and every use he makes of his weapon leaves its indelible impression both upon the other and upon him.¹

It is this conception which has become the conscious point of view of contemporary sociology. It expresses the contrast between the view of Ward with its individualistic bent, and contemporary thought with its emphasis on the group. The importance of this change in point of view is suggested in the continuation of the quotation from Baldwin.

It is on such truths as these, which recent writers² have been bringing to light, that the philosophy of society must be gradually built up. Only the neglect of such facts can account for the present state of social discussion. Once let it be our philosophical conviction, drawn from the more general results of psychology and anthropology, that man is not two, an *ego* and an *alter*, each of which is active and chronic protest against a third great thing, society; once dispel this hideous unfact, and with it the remedies found by the egoists—back all the way from modern individualists to Hobbes,—and I submit the main barrier to the successful understanding of society is removed.³

¹ *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 96-97.

² Stephen, Alexander, Höffding, Tarde. ³ *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 97.

Ward produced his sociology before this transition had taken place. The contrast between him and contemporary sociology, in general, is expressed in the words just quoted from Baldwin.

Starting with the group as a point of departure, contemporary sociology not only dissolves the older individualistic attitude but adopts the fundamental notion that the mind of the individual is a social product. Stated in other terms, the self is a social self, a creation, rather than a datum, which is but another way of stating that the individual and the group are different aspects of a group or social situation. The importance of this change in the field of practical efforts toward social control will appear later. Back of the self, as a biologically inherited group of tendencies lie the instincts, the raw materials out of which the group builds a social personality. Such in very brief terms is the prevailing trend of thought in contemporary sociology.

The characterization of contemporary sociology, which has just been sketched in general terms, must be qualified to some extent. It is a description of tendencies and trends as well as realized ends. The transition that has been suggested is one that is not complete in its details nor clearly recognized in its implications. More work remains to be done before the newer view becomes uniformly clear. As was pointed out in the various separate reviews of some of the writers, there is still some confusion of tongues. Not all of the writers of sociology have held consistently to the views which they consciously adopt. This results from two different facts, first, the inadequate grasp of the position to which they consciously adhere, and secondly, the difficulty of adapting words of an older psychology to a new point of view. The second is one of the most difficult barriers to understanding among sociological writers. Such concepts as "individual," "group," "society," "mind," "psychic," "instinct," "social," "thought," are freighted with meanings that tend to obscure views rather than clarify them. As Small has pointed out, one of the pressing needs of contemporary sociology is the clarification and definition of the categories which it uses. The lack of this, and the inherent difficulty of the use of abstract terms create some of the apparent and perhaps real inadequacies of some of the uses of the group concept which we have mentioned.

Aside from matters of terminological confusion, however, there do exist noticeable lacunae in efforts of various contemporary sociologists to apply the group concept to the particular problems with which we find them dealing. We found, for example, frequent reversions to older individualistic preconceptions which occasionally appeared as real or apparent contradictions of the consciously proclaimed point of view. Such conceptions appear most frequently in the shape of apparent conceptions of the individual as a thing given rather than created, in the conception of the mind as an essence rather than as a function, as a thing in itself rather than as a type of behavior that appears in peculiar conflict situations. The separation of the mental from the physical, of the inner from the outer, of the individual from the group, which appear again and again in the literature, are evidences that the shift to the new point of view has not yet been complete. In most cases, these lapses are due to reversion to older complexes in periods of unconscious activity. In some cases they are consciously asserted but with a qualification which attempts to relieve them from the taint of earlier psychology and metaphysics with their essences and existences. These lapses, however, are not of primary importance for our purpose. They bear witness, rather, as occasional variations which serve to bring out in more relief the underlying thought which seems to run through all the writings, namely, that the group is fundamental and that sociology finds its justification in attempting the study of the social process from this point of view. The point of view is not always expressed in the same terms; it may be in terms of association, of interaction, of mental unity, of social mind, of group behavior, of social process, or of group process. These categories, as well as the methods of procedure may vary, but the constant feature is the thought involved in what we have called the group concept. Small has suggested the same thought in a little different connection. Speaking of the distinctive technique of the sociologist, he says:

The technique accordingly involves, second, a body of procedure. This varies in accordance with the particular character of the problem undertaken, from the most abstract dealing with questions of epistemology and methodology to the most concrete questions of juvenile courts or milk supply. The generic

factor in common, from one end of this scale to the other, is reference of the problem to its group attachments, instead of treating it as something isolated from the human process as a whole.¹

It is this common attempt to approach problems from the group standpoint that stands out as one of the characteristic features of contemporary sociology, in spite of its frequent reversions to older terms and conceptions. It is this view which contrasts with the opposite emphasis shown in Ward.

Before leaving this part of the discussion, it should be noted that the most striking and universal lack in contemporary sociology's effort to establish itself on this general group conception is the absence of an adequate procedure to explain the essential features of a social process. No one of the sociologists has yet elaborated a concrete process by which the essence of the group behavior can be interpreted. Not only is there a lack of such a process found in the works of contemporary sociology, but in some cases the consciousness of the need is not adequately recognized. In a measure, this part of the work may properly fall to the field of the psychologists, and social psychologists, but the gap remains essentially unfilled for sociology. Baldwin's imitation mechanism has not been accepted, generally, among the sociologists as an adequate or complete account of the social process by which the self and all its implications of language, habits, and thought are to be accounted for.² Until provided with an acceptable hypothesis, furnished by psychologists, or by sociologists themselves, the analysis of group behavior must remain inadequate and must deal largely with results based upon assumptions rather than upon explanations of a process.³

¹ *Encyclopaedia Americana*, article on "Sociology," 1919.

² Most sociologists, while accepting the thesis of Baldwin as to the fundamental unity of the individual and the group, reject his undue emphasis on imitation as the process whereby his results were obtained. None of the criticisms, however, seems to be adequate or to offer a satisfactory supplemental process. Outside of the sociologists, the only adequate criticism of the imitation theory and satisfactory elucidation of the process of interaction is that furnished by Professor Mead of the University of Chicago.

³ Around this point revolves the current revival of the mechanistic conception of behavior which is finding increased vogue among certain writers. The reaction from the futilities of metaphysics and from the introspective psychologies is variously

The change in thought which has taken place since the time of Ward's first book has been characterized as a transition from an atomizing process to a synoptic method of thought. Concerning this transition Merz says:

I may, later on, have an opportunity of dwelling more fully upon this change of thought in the course of the nineteenth century; at present it will suffice to point out that no subject of philosophical or scientific interest has been more profoundly affected by it than the study of man in his individual and collective existence. Formerly all the sciences which have to do with this subject started from the study of the individual organism or the individual mind, frequently disregarding altogether the environment or collective life of man, or reaching this only by slow and uncertain steps. Latterly, however, not only has the collective life of man attracted more attention than the individual, it has become rather the fashion to place society, in some form or other, in the foreground, to start with some definition of the social "Together" of the collective life of human beings, and to approach in this way not only the study of humanity or mankind at large, but also, through it, to get a better understanding of the nature and the life of the individual mind itself. It is not long since we have been told that the individual mind must be considered as exhibiting two sides which may be appropriately termed the subjective and the social self; nor is it unlikely that from this point of view, much of the earlier and later psychology may be profitably rewritten.¹ All this simply means that sociology has become not only the study of the collective interests of society and mankind, but also in its bearing upon other philosophical and scientific problems, an important and leading doctrine.²

To point out briefly some of the ways in which sociology has thus become an "important and leading doctrine" for some of the social sciences is the object of the rest of the chapter. No attempt will be made, of course, to construct a social science, or to furnish a scheme for such construction. Only the broadest general signifi-

termed, in its more extreme forms, as physiological psychology, objectivism, mechanism, behaviorism. This reaction tends to relegate consciousness to a secondary and unimportant rôle as a negligible by-product. It carries the revolt of functional psychology still farther. The latter retains consciousness as a central factor in activity. The term behavioristic psychology is used to cover both the functional and the mechanistic conceptions, with very confusing results.

¹ A footnote at this point refers to Royce's discussion as the clearest statement of the doctrine of the social self. This suggests that Merz did not grasp the doctrine fully himself, or Royce's limitations would have been apparent to him. This does not detract from the force of the quotation given, since Merz's central thought is sound.

² *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, IV, 436-37.

cance of the group approach for some of the social techniques can be pointed out.

First of all, attention should be directed to the significance of the group conception for the problem of the relation of the social sciences to each other. We have here a problem which has consumed so much discussion with the advent of each new division of labor, with its claims for admission into fields believed to be already fully occupied. "Thus it has come about that scholars for a large part of the last two thousand years have carried on intermittent discussions that have been meanwhile almost utterly sterile about the scope and definition of the sciences."¹ These older struggles are tending to disappear and in their place is arising a conception of the unity of physical sciences and social sciences.² With reference to the latter it seems to follow as an easy corollary from the group conception, that "social science is one" as Small has said.³ The subject-matter of social science is not blocks of material which can be separated and dealt with in isolation, but is rather a group in which all things are in relation and in incessant movement. From this it follows that the various social sciences are but variant techniques which approach this common unity from different angles of interpretation and analysis. The older claims of sociologists that theirs is an independent science, is being rapidly displaced by the realization that there can be no independence of these various techniques in the sense in which that term was used thirty years ago. In place of the separatist conception of social science, there must be set up the conception of co-ordinating techniques at work upon the common group process in an effort to understand and, if possible, control it. It is in this sense that we have a real meaning and purpose for social science.

¹ Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI, 822.

² See, for example, Woodward, "The Unity of Physical Science," *International Congress of Arts and Sciences*, St. Louis (1904), IV, 3; Small, *The Meaning of Social Science*, and "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI, 849.

³ The statements of this paragraph are attempts to reflect the thought of Dr. Small. While the inspiration is his, the responsibility for the form of statement is not.

The argument here suggested is not intended to do more than to point out the significance of the group concept for social science in general. The details of the scheme are beyond the limits of this paper. It should be brought out, however, that the implication of the group concept does not mean the abolition of specialization on the one hand, nor the denial of a scientific method on the other hand.¹ Both are essential for social science.

The group concept has further significance for sociology in particular, since, with the surrender of its older claims to suzerainty, it must take its place along with the other social techniques as a co-ordinating viewpoint. It thus becomes a way of thinking, a point of view from which the common social process is observed and analyzed. The group concept, then, furnishes the basis upon which it establishes its claim. Small expresses this opinion in his definition of sociology where he describes it as that "variant among the social science techniques which proceeds from the perception that all human phenomena are functions of *groups*."² The analysis of group relations, the group concept, is the only apparent distinct contribution of sociology, and is its justification for a claim to rank as one of the techniques. As was pointed out in the review of Small's work, he has here, it seems, made a distinct contribution to sociology in his suggestion of the group con-

¹ Dr. Small's *The Meaning of Social Science* may be given as a detailed description of the method whereby specialization and co-ordination may be achieved. The very conception of a division of labor implies work upon a unified problem. The scientific method, i.e., observation, experimentation, testing, hypothesis, etc., is common to all the sciences. Karl Pearson has an interesting observation on the unity of science: "The reader may perhaps feel that I am laying stress upon *method* at the expense of material content. Now this is the peculiarity of scientific method, that when once it has become a habit of mind, that mind converts *all* facts whatsoever into science. The field of science is unlimited; its material is endless, every group of natural phenomena, every phase of social life, every stage of past or present development is material of science. *The unity of all science consists alone in its method, not in its material.* The man who classifies facts of any kind whatever, who sees their mutual relation and describes their sequences, is applying the scientific method and is a man of science. The facts may belong to the past history of mankind, to the social statistics of our great cities, to the atmosphere of the most distant stars, to the digestive organs of a worm or to the life of a scarcely visible bacillus. It is not the facts themselves which make science, but the method by which they are dealt with."—*The Grammar of Science*, Part I, 12.

² Notes from unpublished lectures.

cept as the central proposition upon which sociology may rest its case. It offers the most encouraging prospect for the dissolution of the older crudities of separatism in social science and for a positive statement of the meaning and place of sociology in American thought.

The significance of the group concept for the other social sciences may be indicated by a brief reference to some of the evidences of the use of concept by occasional expressing of some modern writers in some of those fields. The change may be suggested by pointing to the growing recognition of the social factor in each of the several fields of labor which have evolved in American thought. In economics, history, psychology, pedagogy, theology, ethics, and jurisprudence this special sociological concept is beginning to modify the whole outlook. In some of these branches the change that has resulted from the use of the group concept has been such as to undermine the whole of the structure. In others it has just begun and its end is not yet seen. A sociological approach in other words, to these various divisions of labor is far-reaching in its effects. Without exception they were built up under the influence of individualistic and metaphysical conceptions. They still, for the most part, bear unmistakable evidences of their origin. The coming of a social hypothesis means, as Merz suggested, the rewriting and reconstruction of economic theory, of history, psychology, theology, ethics, and all the rest. We may note, now, some of the beginnings of such reconstructions. They will recall the parallel movement in social practice which was sketched in the first chapter.

Among those sciences which have to do with human behavior, probably none has shown such a thoroughgoing reconstruction as psychology. We have had occasion above to refer to some of the changes that have taken place. Without attempting to go into detail or to repeat other statements, one may epitomize the movement by referring to it as the coming of *social* psychology. As a representative of the latter movement and its significance one may cite Baldwin. A layman could not pretend to predict what the final result will be, but the shift away from the older individualistic basis is unmistakable. Indeed, it seems that among the ranks of

the psychologists there are those who find no place for individual psychology at all. Baldwin summarizes the transition in psychology thus: "For psychologists and logicians the problem now is to find any knowledge that is psychologically private, not to find knowledge that is common and public. . . . The result is that the subjectivistic theories of knowledge, like the individualistic theories of political science, are soon to be laid away in the attics where old intellectual furniture is stored."¹ The behaviorist movement, as has been mentioned, is a part of the transition movement. Dewey, in speaking of the behaviorist movement in psychology, says: "From the point of view of behavior all psychology is either biological or social psychology, and if it still be true that man is not only an animal but a social animal, the two cannot be dis severed when we deal with man."² With the further details of this change we are not concerned; we are only to point out that such a change has taken place, and that current psychology is still in a state of confusion attendant upon a transition period.³ Social psychology is a corollary of the group concept in the field of psychology. Its significance is apparent.

Among the social sciences no division showed a clearer example of the older individualistic conceptions than political economy, particularly in its classical form. The group hypothesis or group conception was as completely ignored or denied in the classical school as it is possible to do. The individual was assumed as a given entity, which was supreme both in economic theory and practice. At most, social entanglements were but necessary ills and superficial interferences which had to be taken account of as a practical fact. Founded and formulated largely before an adequate psychology of any kind existed, before a social psychology

¹ *Darwin and the Humanities*, p. 75.

² "The Need for Social Psychology," *Psychological Review*, XXIV, 266.

³ Reference cannot be made to the large volume of literature bearing on the point. Attention may be called again to: Ellwood, "Objectivism in Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXII, 289; Bernard, "The Objective Viewpoint in Sociology," *ibid.*, XXV, 298; Weiss, "Relation between Structural and Behavior Psychology," *Psychological Review*, XXIV, 301, and "Relation Between Functional and Behavior Psychology," *ibid.*, 353; Watson, "Psychology and Behavior," *Psychological Review*, XX, 150; Angell, "Behavior as a Category of Psychology," *ibid.*, XX, 255.

was more than hinted at, and before an adequate development of a scientific method, it is not surprising that economics grew up without showing the results of these later developments. Its philosophy was individualistic, its method deductive. From those early characteristics it has not yet recovered completely. This is true even in America, where other influences early entered in to modify the harshness of political economy as it developed in England prior to John Stuart Mill¹ who attempted to reform the subject, and place it on more modern bases. From the rigid individualism of the classical school up to the more advanced economists of America is a period of considerable progress. The limits of this paper forbid any pretension to record the changes that have taken place, or, indeed, to do more than call attention to some of the earlier limitations of the classical school. The difference in economic life which prevailed in this country, the influence of German thought since 1870, the infiltration of the influence of the Austrian school, and finally the neo-classical synthesis of Marshall, tended to give economics an evolutionary trend toward a theoretical basis which is more in accordance with the results arrived at in other social sciences. Both social theory, as developed by other social sciences, and social evolution, as shown by the practical development of American industry, trade, and life in general, have made necessary a movement in economic thought toward a diluted social hypothesis. Some passages from Ely may serve to illustrate the difference between the philosophy which characterized the older economy and that of the new: "The attempt of the classical economists to isolate an 'economic man' ruled entirely by an enlightened self-interest and unaffected by political, ethical, and humanitarian impulses, is recognized to have been a mistake."² As contrasted with this description of the classical school modern economics recognizes social relationships as important: "Our science then is interested in man in his relations to others, and not

¹ "The reaction against English economists, it is interesting to note, began earlier in the United States than in England or Germany."—Ely, *Outlines of Economics*, p. 672. "Almost from the beginning the peculiar environmental conditions met with in America have given a characteristic set of tendencies to American economics."—Haney, *History of Economic Thought*, p. 511.

² *Outlines of Economics*, p. 675.

in man by himself. Moreover, as a science which studies the present in order that it may predict and prepare for the future, and discovering that interdependence is the law of progress, it must not hesitate to shape its principles with reference to a solidarity which shall grow more rather than less, stronger rather than weaker."¹

One must recognize then that current economic theory has made considerable advance from the stricter classical school of the first half of the nineteenth century. "Economists are realizing the interrelation of things; more and more the quest for absolute law of causation is modified by a knowledge that things move in circles and mutually determine one another as do supply, demand, and price."² While admitting the force of this statement with all that it implies in theory and practice, one must still come to the conclusion that current economic theory has not yet been penetrated very deeply with the conclusions arrived at by contemporary social psychology, with its emphasis upon the significance of the group in the formation and control of men. Economic theory in America today is still fundamentally individualistic; it still conceives mind as a datum rather than as a social product; it still assumes the wants of the individual as given and relatively fixed; it still assumes the medieval doctrine of the freedom of the will and choice; it still interprets freedom in the negative sense as absence of restraint and interference; it still emphasizes unduly "individual initiative" and individual struggle for existence and tends to ignore the correlative fact of co-operation or group activity. In a word, contemporary economics still employs an antiquated psychology in the solution of all its problems.³ Once a grasp of group concept with its psychological implications is obtained, it will mean the rewriting of all economic theory, in so far as it has not already been done. The transformation for economics will be as that of psychology has been.

There have appeared some current evidences of the movement to reconstruct economic theory in the light of the group concep-

¹ *Outlines of Economics*, p. 6. ² Haney, *History of Economic Thought*, p. 549.

³ Merely as an illustration one might cite Carver's *Principles of Political Economy* (1919) as an exhibit of all these shortcomings.

tion. It is beyond the purpose here to attempt to sketch any of these attempts even in its most general details. They are to be cited merely as illustrations of possible ways in which the group concept may be applied to the resuscitation of economic theory. Possibly the most ambitious effort was the attempt to restate the theory of value, the central process in economic theory, which appeared in Anderson's *Social Value*.¹ Broadly speaking, the book may be characterized as an attempt to apply a functional social psychology to the value problem. In order to get his point of view it will be well to allow him to summarize his argument, in so far as it bears on our purpose. After referring to earlier theories of value among the economists, he continues:

The defect is in the highly abstract nature of the determinants of values which these theories start from; they abstract the individual mind from its connection with the social whole, and then abstract from the individual's mind only those emotions which are directly concerned with the consumption and production of economic goods; this abstraction is necessitated by the individualistic, subjectivistic conception of society, which growing out of the skeptical philosophy of Hume has dominated economic theory ever since: Present day sociology has rejected this conception of society, and has re-established the organic conception of society in psychological, rather than biological terms, which makes it possible to treat society as a whole as the source of values of goods; this does not obviate the necessity for close analysis, nor does it, in itself, solve the problem, but it does give us an adequate point of view; the determinants of value include not only the highly abstract factors which the value theories here criticized have undertaken to handle arithmetically, but also all the other volitional factors in the inter-mental life of men in society—not an arithmetical synthesis of elements, but an organic whole; legal and ethical values are especially to be taken into account in a theory of economic value, particularly those most immediately concerned with distribution.²

¹ The term "social value" is not original with Anderson among the economists. It was first used in this country by Clark in 1881 and has been used by various writers since then. The theory of social value held by those writers has been severely criticized by other economists, and rightly so perhaps, for it was lacking the essential psychological basis for a logical structure. As used by those earlier writers, the concept represented either a summation of individual values or a valuation based on the discarded biological analogy. Anderson's contribution is that he supplies, in a more or less inadequate way, the psychological foundation upon which a theory of social value may rest if it is to have real worth.

² *Social Value*, pp. 197-99. With reference to the relation between ethics and economic theory suggested in the last clause of the quotation, one may note Stuart's conclusion: "Ethics and economic theory, instead of dealing with separate problems

Economic activity in society, is an intricate, complex thing, for the motivation of which no individual's motives can suffice. If motivated at all, its guidance comes from something super-individual, and that something is social value. Ends, aims, purposes, desires, of many men, mutually interacting and mutually determining each other, modifying, stimulating, creating each other, take tangible determinate shape, as economic values, and the technique of the social economic organization responds and carries them out.¹

These quotations are sufficient to illustrate the point of view from which contemporary economic theory may be reconstructed. It amounts to an application of the group concept to a particular part of one of the social sciences. It is not implied that the task has been fully or successfully performed by the writer quoted.² It does, however, represent an attempt to apply the conclusions of social psychology to an admittedly difficult problem in economic theory. It is pioneer work, but is an illuminating illustration of the beginning of reconstruction of economic theory due to an application of the group hypothesis.

In the preceding chapter, attention was called to the effort of Cooley to deal with the subject of pecuniary valuation from the same group or social standpoint.³ His point of view is essentially the same as that of Anderson. He analyzes the problem from the standpoint of the group, including within the problem the social process of the formation of demand rather than assuming it as given. The market is a group phenomenon which creates its own values as much or more than it is created by individual demands. It is an institution which has an existence of its own and bends individual desire to its own likeness. As was pointed out in the review of his writings, the discussion is significant in its attempt to substitute a group conception of the problem for an individual one. His discussion is cited here as another illustration of the attempt that is slowly being made to put a sociological foun-

of conduct, deal with distinguishable but inseparable stages belonging to the complete analysis of most, if not all, problems.—*Creative Intelligence*, p. 349. Stuart's essay, "Phases of the Economic Interest," is also of significance on other points connected with the problems of economic theory.

¹ *Social Value*, pp. 197-99.

² Mead's criticism of the book from the standpoint of social psychology is trenchant. See *Psychological Bulletin*, December, 1912, p. 435.

³ *Social Process*.

dation under the economic structure which has been reared on an individualistic psychology. It gives a concrete expression to the significance of the group concept for economic theory. Such expressions parallel the actual changes taking place in our economic life.

In taking up the significance of the group concept for history one cannot do more than merely suggest in the faintest way some general considerations. The whole problem of the study of history, its methods, and point of view, is so vast and complicated even for the historians, that one outside cannot hope to summarize the field in a few paragraphs. This need not deter one, however, from some general observations which seem to arise naturally from the preceding pages. Certain modern writers will serve as examples of the shifts in point of view and method which indicate the coming of a "new history."¹ Most significant changes have taken place in the course of the nineteenth century. History, like all other bodies of knowledge, has been largely transformed as a result of the progress of science, particularly as crystallized and set forth by Darwin and his followers. This change, which has taken and is taking place, may be conveniently summarized in saying that history, since the middle of the past century, has been seriously affected by the imperative of the scientific spirit and method, which was so characteristic of that period. The older point of view in historical writing and study is characterized thus by one writer:

Indeed we shall not be far astray, if we view history, as it has existed through the ages, and even down to our own day, as a branch of general literature, the object of which has been to present past events in an artistic manner, in order to gratify a natural curiosity in regard to the achievements and fate of conspicuous persons, the rise and decay of monarchies, and the signal commotions and disasters which have repeatedly afflicted humanity.²

Into the writing of this type of history the past century brought the doctrine of continuity. Although this doctrine had been developing before the middle of the past century, it was not until

¹ Among others, Lamprecht, *What Is History?* Robinson, *The New History*; Green, *Short History of the English People*; Becker, "Some Aspects of the Influence of Social Problems and Ideas upon the Study and Writing of History," *American Journal of Sociology*, XVIII, 641.

² Robinson, *The New History*, p. 27.

the coming of the work of Darwin and Lyell that the real foundations of the conception of the continuity of history and indefinite progress and change were established.¹ The principle of continuity is essentially a corollary of the group concept; it is an application of the principle of seeing things "in their together" as Merz has expressed the concept. It is a temporal application of the fundamental notion in the group concept. The essence of the doctrine is expressed in these words of Robinson:

The doctrine of the continuity of history is based upon the observed fact that every human institution, every generally accepted idea, every important invention, is but the summation of long lines of progress, reaching back as far as we have the patience or means to follow them. The jury, the drama, the Gatling gun, the papacy, the letter S, the doctrine of *stare decisis*, each owes its present form to antecedents which can be scientifically traced.²

In other words, the principle of continuity, which has revolutionized the methods of historical writing, is an application of the sociological conception of the group as a fundamental unity, and an application of the mechanism of the group process, or social psychology, to an interpretation of any fact or situation viewed chronologically. The boundary line between the historian and the sociologist is of no concern here.³ The chief end in view at this point is merely to point out that the group approach to the study of what is called history is one of the most significant facts in the type of history that has appeared in the last century, and is of increasing importance in the latter half of that century.

The group concept implies, not only the unity of the social process in its continuous development, but also the fundamental unity of a particular period in that development. The older type of political history, which concerned itself chiefly with strictly political problems, grew up largely as a result of the interest in

¹ Robinson, *The New History*, p. 80. Small has given Savigny, 1779-1861, a leading place in the development of the principle of continuity but points out that Savigny deserted his important principle, in part, in his controversy with Thibaut over the matter of codification in 1814. See "The Present Outlook of Social Science," *American Journal of Sociology*, XVIII, 433.

² Robinson, *The New History*, p. 64.

³ Small has presented an interesting discussion of one of the boundary controversies, that at New Orleans in 1903. See "Fifty Years of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI, 816.

political problems which was stimulated by the political chaos that resulted from the political disturbances attendant upon the French Revolution. Historians were interested in the matters that were occupying attention. The crisis that presented itself in various groups and in the world was deemed a political crisis solely and the attempts of the historians to recount those events took on a peculiarly biased political tone. The error of the type of history which has been called political history is the easy assumption of the priority of the political and dramatic in the life of a given group and the neglect of the commonplace and habitual. In other words, this type of history is a violation of the group conception of the social process. The type of history that the group concept demands of the historian is not an account of the accidental, if indeed such a thing as a historical accident be possible, but a picture of the life as a whole. The conception of the group as the fundamental unity within which all things find their relations, and their meanings must necessarily transform the political type of history into a more adequate analysis, or surround it with such qualifications that it ceases to have much value for any practical purposes. The point of view here suggested has been well put by Cooley:

The organic view of history denies that any factor or factors are more ultimate than others. Indeed it denies that the so-called factors, such as the mind, the various institutions, the physical environment, and so on—have any real existence apart from a total life in which all share in the same way that the members of the body share in the life of the animal organism. . . . We may concentrate attention upon some one of these things, but this concentration should never go so far as to overlook the subordination of each to the whole, or to conceive one as precedent to others.¹

The transition that has taken place from the older type of political history to the more modern type of history, which is more in accordance with the conception of group unity, reflects a growing change in the attitudes of historians. The shift is by no means complete, but it has been fundamental. The most important cause of the change toward a social type of history has been the

¹Quoted by Small as a part of the New Orleans discussion referred to above, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI, 813.

changes that have taken place in the actual life of the nations, a change which one may briefly but perhaps inadequately characterize as the emergence of the social problem. One of the contributing factors in helping along this change was the work of the sociologists who were developing the notion of society, and who had a conception of the unity of the thing they were describing. The newer type of history developed later in America than in England, or Germany, but it has been increasingly influential in all three since the last quarter of the nineteenth century. A social history is an implication of the group concept applied to the analysis of past group phenomena. That such a view increases the problem of the historian enormously is apparent, but the difficulty of the task is no excuse for the failure to accept the responsibility, provided history is to have any practical value at all, outside of mere amusement in dealing with historical effigies. The difficulty of the problem of the study of history, when viewed from the group conception, assumes such proportions that the value of most of the history for the current popular comparisons between the past and the present is almost negligible. A recognition of the bearing of the group concept, with its implied social psychology must discount almost to the vanishing-point any proposals of historical analogies, except when made by the most careful scholar. It has the negative value, in this respect, if no other, of arousing caution in the face of easy historical proofs. "If we find ourselves guessing about the undercurrents of politics in our own ward, the suspicion naturally steals in upon us that we may have believed fairy tales about the Wars of the Roses, or the revolts of the Italian Cities, or the European War of 1914."¹

The underlying defect in historical method of the past has been the inadequate psychology which formed its prepossessions and thus shaped its whole procedure. The assumption of the individual as a datum, particularly in the case of its distinguished personages; the assumption of a mind or soul as somehow prior, as a thing in itself, which may be taken for granted without creating it, these have been the cardinal errors of not only the earlier history but even of

¹ Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI, 835.

that of today. As a part of the group conception of the nature of any given part of human life one must, if one purposes to escape violent abstractions, explain and create one's great characters. To assume the person, Alexander, Caesar, Jesus, or Washington, is to give only half the process which makes up the historical whole. The historian's problem is as much that of the details of the creation of these characters as it is to recount their acts. In other words, it seems there can be no adequate history which has not assimilated the essence of modern social psychology, with its fundamental viewpoint of the unity of the group-individual situation. Historians have, of course, done much to escape the more exaggerated forms of the "great man" theory. They have still to emancipate themselves from the "common man" theory, in which the individual is assumed rather than socially or groupally created. It is in this latter respect that the group concept and its implications will continue the revolution in the method of history.

In attempting to relate the group concept to the field of ethics little more is necessary than to suggest the large volume of thought that has been given to the development of ethical systems within recent years, and the place that the social or group point of view has assumed in those systems.¹ One may say, in fact, that the latter point of view has become the predominant one in ethical studies in this country. The changes that have taken place may be summarized in the statement that the center of gravity in ethical thought has shifted from the theological, first to the metaphysical, and then to the social or group basis. In the rough, Comte's three stages suggest the course of thought upon ethical problems. Prior to the eighteenth century, the sources and sanctions of the ethical systems were found in a religious philosophy which had dominated the thought of Europe for centuries, and which is still the dominant system of ethics among the rank and file of American people. The revolt in France in the eighteenth century and the skeptical movement of thought in Germany and England paved the way for the transition from a theocratic to a democratic point of view. Intermediate between the two stages, the theocratic and the social, appeared the philosophy of Kant,

¹ For example, Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*.

which sought to find a new foundation for an ethical system. Kant, seeking new sanctions, founded his system upon the human reason, and was thus instrumental in distorting German thought up to the present time. Though France and England escaped some of the intermediate distortions that were found in Germany and proceeded more directly to a more scientific system of morals, it remained for the latter half of the past century to bring forth the further transition to the sociological point of view as the most promising way of approach to the problem of morals.

The significance of the group hypothesis for ethics lies in several things. In the first place, it relieves the problem of all supernatural problems. The roots of moral practices, of codes, of sanctions, must be looked for in the life of the group. In the second place, the psychological implications of the place of the group in the development of the individual impose increasing responsibility upon ethical theory to explain its ethical individuals, the "genius" as well as the follower, in terms of group relationships. That is, moral leaders are products rather than data. It cannot assume a pre-existing faculty of reason, but must develop its ethical individual out of a congeries of animal instincts. In the third place, the group concept imposes upon the system of ethics that it find its tests or criteria, as well as its sanctions, in the group life. Beyond the group there is no appeal. In other words, the whole ethical system must be founded on a scientific method, which finds its place in a group situation. The whole significance of the group hypothesis for the field of ethics may be summed up in the statement that moral conduct is always social, it always involves socii.

What has been stated in the preceding paragraph amounts to saying that the group approach to the ethical field is the *sine qua non* in contemporary thought. It is the dominant influence of group life which runs through the history and evolution of morals. Something like this thought, it seems, was in the mind of the writer of the following:

Ethics must consist of empty forms until sociology can indicate the substance to which the forms apply. Every ethical judgement with an actual content has at least tacitly presupposed a sociology. Every individual or

social estimate of good or bad, of right and wrong, current today, assumes a sociology. No code of morals can be adopted in the future without implying a sociology as part of its premises. To those acquainted with both the history of ethics and the scope of sociology these propositions are almost self-evident.¹

One of the fields of study which has been least affected by the group concept is that of jurisprudence. This is peculiarly significant for the sociologist, since the problem of social control and social change involves the legal and political machinery which limits and conditions any change. For some reason, the importance of the group approach to jurisprudence has not been adequately recognized by sociologists, either on its theoretical side or on the practical side. Small is well within the truth when he states that it is "equally astonishing and unfortunate that for nearly a generation legal institutions were left almost wholly outside the range of American sociologists' vision."² This situation suggests the necessity and justification for a brief reference to the implications, for jurisprudence, of the group concept as it has been elaborated in the preceding pages.

The coming of the group conception, with its psychological implications, will mean for jurisprudence what it has meant in all the other social sciences, an almost complete change of view and method in making further pursuits of the particular quests. The need for the revamping of jurisprudence in America has vital significance at this time in its social evolution because the practical affairs of our national economic and social life have already undergone such important changes that a new type of juristic and political thought is necessary to keep up with the demands made by these practical changes. The archaic philosophy of the legal profession, which includes the bench as well, assumes peculiar importance in this country since the latter's political and juristic framework is so completely in the hands of this one profession. The extreme difficulty of securing adaptive machinery for social changes, when contrary to the trend of opinion of the judiciary and lawyers, has been more noticeable here than in some other countries. If one add to this, the fact that the constitutions of

¹ Small, *General Sociology*, p. 663.

² *Encyclopaedia Americana*, article on "Sociology," 1919.

both the United States and the various states are incrustated expressions of the older views which reflected a period of development in our economic and social life that was naïve and crude, on the one hand, and completely dominated by a prescientific and pre-social theory of government and society on the other, then the practical need for a reconstruction of the fundamentals of jurisprudence, becomes apparent. The pressing necessity for modernization of jurisprudence has led one writer to say that "perhaps nowhere in our national life is the growing recognition of the group or community principle so fundamental for us as in our modern theory of law."¹

To return to the theoretical aspect of the problem, which is the principal object of interest here, it will be well to point out that on the whole the legal profession and the courts are still in that period of thinking which may be called the philosophical tendency, which flourished in the time of Blackstone and his followers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The law is still felt to be reason, and the method is that of deducing rules to apply to particular cases. The psychological prepossession is still, as it was then, an individualistic one, frequently a faculty one. The implications of the group viewpoint with its psychological emphasis upon function and the social creation of the self have scarcely penetrated the thought of the legal profession. Its general philosophy is that of the metaphysician and medieval churchman with his absolutes and essences rather than that of the scientist with his tentative hypotheses and scientific method of observation, experimentation, and conclusions based on actual results. One still reads of natural rights, of individual freedom as against governmental aggression, of the doctrine of contract, of individual rights which antedate all government and law. Even where the courts have allowed the facts of life to force limitations of their philosophical prepossessions, they have done so grudgingly, and have sustained their decisions on the basis of special protection to a certain class or individuals rather than on the basis of general group interest. Cases are still decided, in the main, on abstract issues and antiquated economic and political philosophy. In other

¹ Follett, *The New State*, p. 122.

words, the situation which is presented is one in which an incrustated legal philosophy, embodied in a political framework, and backed by a written constitution, and interpreted in the light of a pre-scientific legal tradition, has come into conflict with a changed and changing situation. The fundamental assumption of the legal philosophy was the priority of the individual, while the reality of the latter is the fact of group life. Until there can be a reformation of the former on the basis of analysis of the latter in terms of an adequate social psychology there must result conflict and disrespect for law and for its interpreters.¹ The situation of conflict between the prepossessions of the older school and the incipient "sociological" school is thus expressed by a representative of the latter:

A Bench and Bar trained in individualistic theories and firm in the persuasion that the so-called legal justice is an absolute and a necessary standard, from which there may be no departure without the destruction of the legal order, may retard but cannot prevent progress in the newer standard recognized by the sociologist. In this progress lawyers should be conscious factors, not unconscious followers of popular thought, not conscious obstructors of the course of legal development.²

The significance of the group concept when applied to this particular field, is that it would serve to supplant the older obstructionist legal philosophy with a point of view and method which would be in harmony with the contemporary scientific thought. The importance of this progress in a highly organized group, such as the United States, is very great.

The foregoing paragraphs are not intended to ignore the evidences of a transition to a new point of view, and it may be well to mention some of them. Attention may be called, in the first place, to some of the practical changes that have taken place in legislation and in the decisions involving the constitutionality of such statutes. These changes appear in several different aspects. There is an increasing tendency of law to impose limitations on

¹ See, for example, Pound, "The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence," *Green Bag*, October, 1907, and "Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with Administration of Justice," *American Bar Association Reports*, 1906.

² Pound, "The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence," *Green Bag*, October, 1907; "Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with Administration of Justice," *American Bar Association Reports*, 1906.

the use of property and greater regard for the human element; limitations upon freedom of contract are shown in statutes regulating conditions of labor, in the law of insurance, in decisions establishing quasi-contractual in place of strictly contractual duties of public service corporations; limitations; upon the right of creditors or injured parties to secure satisfaction, i.e., exemption laws; imposition of liability without fault in such laws as workmen's compensation; changes in the law of water rights with a view to enhancing the group interest and right therein.¹ There have been minority views among jurists which have recognized the necessity of a new jurisprudence. Such judges, for example, as Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court, have been found interpreting the newer points of view. In the field of theory, the most noted efforts to establish a sociological jurisprudence and to attempt to replace the older philosophy of the law with a modern viewpoint have been those of Roscoe Pound.² Similar efforts have been made by Wigmore³ and Frankfurter,⁴ not to mention others. The newer school, represented by the latter group of pioneers, had its origin largely in the influence of certain European writers who were endeavoring to develop a new philosophy of the law. One writer has summarized the new movement among theorists in a brief manner which may bear repetition:

In the domain of jurisprudence the past thirty years has been marked by ominous unrest. Instead of working out problems of systematization, construction, and application, leading jurists have been querying and contesting the most fundamental doctrines of the theory of law. Stammer in Germany, Saleilles and Charmont in France have laid stress on the contrast between positive law and *right* law, the latter being conceived as a modernized law of nature sitting in judgment over the injustice and conventionalism of the rules

¹ Pound, "The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines," *Harvard Law Review*, XXVII, 195-234; "The Need of Sociological Jurisprudence," *Green Bag*, October, 1907, p. 1.

² "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," *Harvard Law Review*, XXIV, 591; XXV, 140, 489; "Justice According to Law," *California Law Review*, XIII, 696; XIV, 103; and other articles.

³ *The Evolution of Law Series*.

⁴ "Hours of Labor and Realism," *Harvard Law Review*, XXIX, 353; "The Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes," *ibid.*, XXIX, 683.

imposed by the courts. Duguit maintained that it is idle to speak of the State as the subject of rights and that altogether there is no such thing as rights in distinction from organized social functions and services. American teachers of law [Pound and Wigmore are referred to in a footnote] insisted on the necessity of establishing the closest connection between jurisprudence and sociology. Continental lawyers like Geny and Bülow traced the barrenness of modern judicial practice to the slavish respect for terms and logical deductions and demanded a free interpretation and application of juridical rules by judges attentive to the varied expressions of public opinions and public needs.¹

To attempt to trace out the extent to which the newer spirit has permeated the teaching of law in the law schools of the country would constitute a study in itself. It seems to offer one of the most fertile fields for the application of the group view, which has become the tendency in contemporary sociology. Jurisprudence, in spite of hopeful tendencies, still remains to be rejuvenated with the spirit of the scientific age which has opened up so rapidly since the middle of the past century. To transform the law into a means rather than an end, to make it an experimental hypothesis whose validity is to be determined by its function and its results, to make the courts social experts with adequate machinery for the measurement and testing and observation of the experiments made, to insure decisions on the basis of the results achieved, are some of the problems left for the twentieth century. One of the keys to an adequate performance of these tasks is the group concept, resting on an adequate social psychology.

One further general comment on the significance of the newer point of view in sociology, which we have tried to point out, is the hopeful outlook it gives to the problem of social control. The coming of a point of view which recognizes that the group actually creates its own persons means much to a society which finds itself face to face with increasing demands for readjustment and progress. To assume the individual as given, and as prior to the group, is to assume the futility of much effort toward the remaking of society or the modification of social institutions. With the newer point of view, the problem of social control becomes not merely one of the manipulation of ready made individuals nor the assistance in

¹ Vinogradoff, "Crisis of Modern Jurisprudence," *Yale Law Journal*, XXIX (1920), 312.

helping ready-made minds to unfold, but it becomes the very positive one of creating the conditions under which and by which the type of mind or self that is desired is created. The real problem of social control is creation. Dewey has stated the matter so clearly that it is worth while to repeat his statements. In showing the need for social psychology he points out that the historical method,

in spite of all the proof of past change which it adduces, will remain in effect a bulwark of conservatism. For . . . it reduces the rôle of mind to that of beholding and recording the operations of man after they have happened. The historic method may give emotional inspiration or consolation in arousing the belief that a lot more changes are still to happen, but it does not show man how his mind is to take part in giving these changes one direction rather than another.¹

The chief source of reliance of the conservative attitude toward progress is the conception of mind as a datum rather than a creation:

The ultimate refuge of the standpatter in every field, education, religion, politics, industrial and domestic life, has been the notion of an alleged fixed structure of mind. As long as mind is conceived as an antecedent and ready-made thing, institutions and customs may be regarded as its offspring. By its own nature the ready-made mind works to produce them as they have existed and now exist. There is no use in kicking against necessity. The most powerful apologetics for any arrangement of institution is the conception that it is an inevitable result of fixed conditions of human nature.²

On the other hand, if one recognizes the results of the group approach to the problem of progress with its implications in the shape of the mind as a created thing in group relations, then the heart of the conservative reliance upon the fixity of human nature is taken away:

If mind, in any definite concrete sense of that word, is an offspring of the life of association, intercourse, transmission, and accumulation rather than a ready-made antecedent cause of these things, then the attitude of polite aloofness or condescending justification as to social institutions has its nerve cut, and with this the intellectual resources of sanctified conservatism disappear.³

The significance of this new point of view in relation to human progress has been so well stressed in different writings that it is

¹ "The Need for Social Psychology," *Psychological Review*, XXIV, 274.

² *Ibid.*, p. 273.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 274.

hardly necessary to refer to it further. Todd has made the modifiability of human nature the central basis for his treatment of the problem of human progress. The concept of a social self, that is, the self as a group product, as recently developed makes possible the reconstruction of educational methods and the direction of social development in a way not dreamed of by previous generations. As Todd says, "sociology and social psychology declare in no uncertain terms that the sense of self is a social product and should indicate how self may be controlled, moulded, colored, and adapted for human welfare and progress."¹

Just a word should be said of the relation of the new point of view to the field of education. Education becomes, from this standpoint, the chief method of social control. The group or social approach to the aims and methods of education seems to be one of the prevailing emphases in that field. The increasing number of writers dealing with the problem of social education and the close harmony that has arisen between the sociologist and the educator is indicative of the recognition of the newer approach to the problem. The field is so broad and is attracting such attention among educators that mere reference to it is all that can be made here.²

¹ *Theories of Social Progress*, p. 9. This book is a very able presentation of the relation of the conception of the self as a social product to progress. Robinson's *The New History*, chap. viii, presents a very valuable discussion of the relation of history to conservatism. He develops the same thought given above, that human nature is modifiable, the self is created by the group, and points out with this new conception coming to the front the conservative's chief reliance is being taken from him. See also Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*.

² Dewey's *Democracy and Education* is an epoch-making discussion of the principles involved in this connection. Smith's *Social Education* is an excellent example of the application of the group approach to the educational field. It serves as an illustration of the above view.

EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL WORK¹

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VII. THE SOCIAL-WORK LABORATORY

The practice work with social agencies, which has been the dominating type of field work in training courses for social workers, is sometimes compared with the clinical experience of medical students. If this analogy is permissible (and it certainly is in a general way) the question at once arises as to the advisability of using this type of field work in the early part of the training course. Is it sound educational procedure to launch students out on their training course in social work by giving them field work with a social agency where they will almost at once become involved in problems of social treatment?

On the other hand where can students get an introduction to social problems that surpasses that gained through work with social agencies? There can be no social-work laboratory comparable to the bacteriological or physiological laboratory where social problems and conditions can be segregated, apart from real life, and made the subject of various experiments. In studying the social effects of bad housing or of unwholesome family life we cannot use methods comparable to those employed in studying a tumor removed from a diseased body. Data concerning these social problems can be gathered together and utilized for the purposes of social research, but even this may not be of great value as a preparation for clinical instruction if these problems are dealt with in an abstract way apart from their original setting. The laboratory of the student of social work cannot be built up in the seclusion of academic walls. It must be found where people are actively engaged in trying to find a solution to the problems of human association. Since social agencies represent organized efforts to deal with the problems in which social workers are chiefly interested we are right in looking

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to them for a large part of the field work that enters into the training program.

But this conclusion by no means justifies the too-common failure to realize the necessity for field-work activities that would constitute a logical preparation for more difficult tasks of social organization and treatment. While it is not possible because of the nature of social work to have an experimental social-work laboratory where beginning students could get their first experience without elements of social risk, the situation could at least be partly met by differentiating between field work in which the emphasis is primarily upon social facts and the field work that is chiefly interested in changing social conditions. Broadly speaking, social research and social treatment represent two types of field work that might be for practical purposes assigned respectively to the social-work laboratory and the social-work clinic. In the former, emphasis is upon field work which involves the collection, tabulation, and interpretation of social data. This of course is by no means limited to an analysis of second-hand facts. The material for study should be secured as far as possible by actual work in the field which would give a first-hand acquaintance with social conditions.

The social work clinic, on the other hand, has to do with social adjustments. Clinical experience involves diagnosis and treatment. Its emphasis is upon people and the solution of their social problems rather than upon knowledge of social facts. While as a matter of course it must continually make use of the tools of social research and therefore overlaps somewhat this field, its purpose is sufficiently distinct to make field-work activities of this type stand out as a separate group.

It will no doubt be generally agreed that the social-work laboratory as thus defined has its logical beginning in the field work that accompanies the undergraduate courses in sociology. Its simpler activities, designed for students getting their first introduction to this field, should illustrate normal social relationships and social institutions instead of drawing attention to the more striking facts of social pathology. Even fairly mature students may have difficulty in visualizing social relationships and for this reason laboratory

work may very well begin with the use of such simple devices as diagrams drawn by students illustrating their social contacts, the sources of food supply of a city, and the social forces of a community. Carefully directed visits should be made to the most common social institutions that have to do with the daily normal life of the community. Students' knowledge of these institutions is likely to be very superficial and they can secure in this way training in methods of observation and study of social institutions which students should possess before being brought into contact with agencies dealing with abnormal conditions. Illustrative material should be collected from the available written sources so that students become familiar with methods of finding and utilizing the data in this field. Especially valuable are the tabulation and the graphical presentation of material that form the laboratory work of courses in statistics. As soon as courses in social pathology are taken up there will be need for investigation involving field study of the social problems discussed in the classroom. This to a certain extent can be carried on in connection with social agencies but it need not be limited to the facilities they have to offer. The university ought to maintain independently its own arrangements for different types of field studies adapted to the needs of students in the various courses that are presented. In this way the university is not only making available properly correlated field work for its undergraduate students in sociology, but is laying a secure foundation for the work of the graduate students in the field of social research.

Graduate schools of social work ought to be able to take for granted that the students who apply for admission have been trained in laboratory work of the types that have just been outlined. Unfortunately by no means all of them have been so trained. College graduates who decide to enter schools of social work have not always made social science their major subject or they may have studied in institutions where the equipment in this field was very meager. When we include also those who for one reason or another are admitted to graduate schools of social work without a college degree, it is evident that a considerable proportion of their students have not had even elementary laboratory experience in the field in which they wish to specialize.

It certainly is not in accord with the best educational procedure to plunge students who lack this preliminary training into field work with social agencies where the students' attention is directed at once to problems of social treatment. Miss Edith Abbott in a recent discussion of the field work of the Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy describes in the following manner the difficult tasks that confront students who are assigned field work with family welfare agencies:

I have already pointed out that "case-work" is the backbone of all our field work training. In this work the student is brought face to face with the deep, inevitable, heart-searching and heart-breaking problems of human life—the problem of the deserting husband and the deserted wife, the feeble-minded child, the problem of parents immoral and degenerate beyond any thinking, the problem of homes so degraded in their filth that they can hardly be discussed. Not only must these problems of low living be dealt with, but there remain the even more difficult questions of what to do with the kindly and affectionate but weak-willed and drunken father, the well-meaning but incompetent and subnormal mother; the social worker must face them all, "hunger, drunkenness, brutality, and crime" and all the manifold problems of depravity and distress.¹

Miss Abbott arrives at the very sound conclusion that field work of this type is not suitable for the immature undergraduate who can give only a few hours of his time a week to the social agency directing his work. In view of the complex nature of the social problems described it would seem justifiable to go a step farther and conclude that such field work does not constitute the most logical beginning of the training course of even the professional student. This conclusion of course is directly contrary to the traditional procedure of the schools of social work which have not only made case work the "backbone" of their field-work training, but have regarded it as the first step toward an understanding of social problems. The Pennsylvania School for Social Service has recently decided to give even more than usual emphasis to this field work in the beginning of their training course. According to their plan the course begins with a seven weeks' field-work period with the Society for Organizing Charity in which the full time of the student is divided

¹ Miss Edith Abbott, *Field Work Training with Social Agencies*. In report of Committee on Field Work of the Association of Urban Universities, at New York, 1917.

between field work (including group and individual conferences with the supervisors of field work) and the class in social case work.

To take the place of this early emphasis upon clinical work, the suggestion is here made that following the custom in medical schools, field work of the laboratory type should be utilized as the introductory, practical work of the training course. It is not contended that the usual laboratory work in connection with the undergraduate courses in sociology, is adapted to the needs of students beginning their professional course. The exact nature of the field-work activities that should be included within this social-work laboratory would be determined partly by the location of the school and the branches of social work in which it desired to specialize.

In general the use of social data found in pamphlets, reports, and periodicals would constitute the first part of such laboratory work. Material bearing upon a definite problem can be collected from available written sources, tabulated and illustrated by means of graphs, diagrams, or maps. Family case records and records of community work can be studied and analyzed for the purpose of throwing light on the social problems with which they deal. The social-work laboratory should have its own collection of case records, but these ought to be supplemented if possible by getting access to the files of social agencies where thoroughgoing studies can be made of specific problems.

As a next step the students can carry on similar studies of material secured through their own field work. In making these field studies the emphasis should be upon acquiring a knowledge of the community rather than upon the discovery of means for its improvement. Furthermore, the knowledge sought is not merely facts that easily lend themselves to statistical tabulation. Students should be trained to analyze a community from the standpoint of the habits and customs of the people, their mental attitudes and sentiments and their reactions to their environment. Out of such study should come not merely a fundamental knowledge of community problems; the student should also acquire a mind trained to see and appraise properly the essential facts that determine the nature and quality of community life.

The question may be raised as to the possibility of using a community for such a purpose year after year. The school located in a large city would not be seriously troubled by this problem because of the immense number of neighborhoods within the city and adjacent territory. Even in the smaller communities there ought to be no serious difficulty because the field studies are by no means thoroughgoing surveys designed to expose the weaknesses of community life. The studies need not always involve a house to house canvas or the securing of information from public officials. The important thing is to have a proper approach to the community either through an understanding with the people or through an assignment of work to the students that is recognized as necessary by the public. The Massachusetts State College of Agriculture secured field work for its students by frankly telling the farmers in the vicinity that the students needed practical field-work training and by asking them to consider their communities as a part of the college laboratory. The students in the School of Public Welfare of the University of North Carolina gained access to the communities they wished to study by being appointed school enumerators. If care and tact are used, this part of the social-work laboratory ought to offer increased facilities for field work as experience is gained in making them available.

The amount of time that should be given to field work of this kind must depend to a large extent upon the length of the training course and the intellectual and practical equipment of the students. It would seem hardly possible to give the average student even elementary training in social research in less than three or four months of classroom study and field work. In this period of time he ought to have acquired a point of view and a habit of mind that would enable him to grasp more quickly the technique needed in his clinical work. His experience in social research would of course not cease at this point. It would be inextricably bound up with all his later field work no matter in which branch of social work he decides to specialize. And because of the emphasis upon training in methods of social research at the beginning of his course he is in a better position to gain a clear insight into the social problems with which he must deal in his clinical field work.

VIII. THE SOCIAL-WORK CLINIC

It has already been indicated that the usual types of field work carried on in connection with social agencies may very properly be compared with the clinical experience of medical students. This practice work in dealing with actual problems is of fundamental importance in professional education. It is a commonplace in education that training is secured, not by looking on, but by doing. Education for social work requires adequate clinical facilities where students closely supervised can engage in tasks under conditions that approximate those they will face when they have entered upon their professional career. The emphasis upon academic attainments or upon ability in social research must not be at the expense of the clinical side of the training course. Schools of social work should not turn out graduates whose approach to social problems is primarily academic. Social workers are expected not only to understand conditions, but to practice an art.

Their training must be regarded as entirely inadequate if it has not given them familiarity with the technique of dealing with social problems. A high degree of technical skill, of course, cannot be insisted upon. This can come only through a much longer experience than can be gained within the limits of a training course. But the graduates must have a more thorough equipment in technique than can be acquired by a passive acquaintance with the work of social agencies. Clinical experience, which involves the active participation of students in organized efforts to deal with social problems and bring about their solution is a fundamental part of any training course in social work.

In order to enable students to engage in this practice work, a social-work clinic must be available. While this clinic may, of course, vary greatly in the type of activity that is undertaken, case work has quite generally been looked upon as the most appropriate and fundamental practice work for students of social work. The reasons for this are quite obvious. At the time of the organization of the first schools of social work, the charity organization societies represented one of the most aggressive movements in the social-work field, and had developed a case-work technique that was regarded as fundamental in dealing with individual and family social

problems. Moreover, graduates of schools of social work found their most available opportunities for employment with case-work agencies and naturally felt the need of specialization in this field.

But the emphasis upon clinical experience of this kind cannot be attributed entirely to its accessibility or to the demand for workers skilled in case work. Its prominent place in the curriculum has been assured by the fact that it affords a ready means of teaching concretely the scientific method of approach to social problems. Through the steps that must be taken in the diagnosis of a family situation, and the following out of the plan of treatment decided upon, students are enabled to see the complex nature of social problems and learn how to deal with them in an orderly and systematic way. No other type of social work deals with a greater variety of social problems, so intermingled and complicated that they resist routine classification and compel individual study and treatment. Intensive training with a family welfare agency not only acquaints students with a technique fundamental in social work, but brings them into intimate touch with the social forces, both constructive and destructive, that enter into the fabric of our social life.

To such an extent is this true, that students are likely to find themselves out of their depth if this clinical experience comes too early in their course. As a matter of fact, past experience has shown that immature students in the case-work field frequently fail to adjust themselves to the unfamiliar conditions they must face, and, as a consequence, do work so inferior in quality that it is detrimental, both to their clients and to the agency with which they are working. This brings up the question as to the advisability of making case work the first introduction to clinical experience. It has already been pointed out that clinical instruction should ordinarily be preceded by social research. Is it possible to go a step farther and differentiate between types of clinical work, in a way that would be helpful in arranging them in logical sequence?

Besides the case-work type of clinical experience which has just been discussed, the social-work clinic should include at least two additional types of activities—social work with groups,

and social work with communities. Social work with groups is a type of field work that has been very commonly furnished by social settlements or by agencies in the recreational field. It includes such activities as organizing and conducting boys' and girls' clubs, experience in playground supervision, work with immigrant groups involving the teaching of classes in English and civics, participation in the work of the Young Men's Christian Association, Young Women's Christian Association, Boy Scouts, and similar organizations that specialize in group activities; special work with institutional groups in hospitals, asylums, reformatories, etc.; and certain phases of industrial welfare work.

The third type of clinical work—social work with communities, or community organization—has to do with the social welfare of the community as a whole, instead of with that of particular families or groups within the community. While community work in accordance with customary usage may, and frequently does, include activities for groups, as is seen in the work of social settlements, playground associations, and community centers, the two types of work employ different techniques and in a training course should be considered separately. The looseness with which the term "community" is now used makes it inevitable that community work should have a varied meaning. On the one hand, in the large cities, it may designate the work of settlements and neighborhood associations; or it may be applied to the work of federations of social agencies that are co-ordinating the various activities of separate agencies so that they may serve best the needs of the whole community or city; or again it may take the form of the social unit organization, with its special machinery designed to utilize the ability and resources of the people themselves in meeting their own problems. These city types of community work are usually quite complex and involve difficult problems of organization and administration.

On the other hand, the community work, that within recent years has been rapidly developing in small towns and rural communities, deals with a comparatively small social unit and is more simple in character. In some cases, a single organization, such as the Young Men's Christian Association or the Red Cross, adopts

a wide community program and furnishes the leadership for the work. A more common plan is to form a community council composed of representative people who study the situation from the community point of view and endeavor to organize the various social forces so that they may be utilized to the greatest advantage. In any event, an essential thing in community work is a study of the resources and problems of the community in order to ascertain facts upon which to build a satisfactory program of work. The program itself may be simple, but it must have a long look ahead and include all the vital interests of the community.

Of these three general types of clinical activities that have been mentioned, social work with groups is the most elementary. It demands sufficient skill to justify the requirement of practice work under supervision, but it approximates so closely the non-professional activities in the social-work field with which students are usually familiar, that they find little difficulty in adjusting themselves to the group work assigned them. From this point of view, it would seem that social work with groups constitutes an appropriate activity with which to begin clinical experience. The experience of schools of social work, however, indicates that group work possesses too little educational value to be given much emphasis. The more simple group activities may very properly be carried on as field work in the undergraduate curriculum. With few exceptions, clinical work with groups will have a very small place in a professional training course, except in so far as it fits into activities in connection with training in community organization.

The question then to be decided is whether clinical practice should begin with community work or case work. Certainly all would agree that the more difficult problems of community organization should be postponed until the latter part of the course. Likewise, case work with families involving complicated situations is field work suitable only for more mature students. Whichever precedes in the course, it is important that the beginning be made with comparatively simple situations that do not compel the student to shoulder heavy responsibility. Since case-work with families cannot be carried on without a great deal of knowledge of community resources and underlying social forces, the case-work student

is compelled to study his community in connection with his special work with family problems. As a matter of fact, the usual contention is that, through this family work, the student gains a more intelligent grasp of community problems than in any other way. On the other hand, it may be said that the study and analysis of the resources and problems of a small community (and, upon the basis of the facts secured, the development of a community program) comprise field work that will give a better perspective to students of family welfare, as well as furnish them with knowledge that will facilitate their dealing with family problems. It may still further be argued that community work should precede because it deals chiefly with the normal elements of the community, whereas case work directs attention to the abnormal and pathological.

In any event, the recent development of social work in small communities has made available for clinical instruction a simple unit, which presents to students an unexcelled opportunity to see at work in more simple form the social forces that are hard to disentangle in the complex life of the city. The fact that this community work is not now generally accessible does not justify the little attention that is paid to it in schools of social work. Its usefulness has already been demonstrated, and later experience will undoubtedly point out its proper place in the curriculum.

The activities of the social-work clinic have been divided into three general groups, which, broadly speaking, cover the techniques most fundamental in social work. In the different schools of social work, there will be considerable variation in the activities of their clinics, depending upon the availability of social agencies or the ability of the school to provide its own clinical work. Any school, however, that desires to give a well-rounded training in social work must be able to give the students practical experience in family, group, and community work. A working knowledge of the techniques in these three fields should be required for graduation.

If this is made the minimum requirement of clinical work, the curriculum must be arranged with this in view. Because of the time consumed by field work, it is impracticable to have students

carry two field-work courses during one term. When we take into consideration the additional time needed for the field work in social research, the necessity for at least a two-year course is apparent. Even in that period of time, the ground could not be adequately covered unless much preliminary work had been completed during the regular college course. The best solution seems to be the five-year undergraduate and graduate course which will make feasible the completion of the academic and practical work in a thorough manner.

But even in the best-arranged curriculum, there cannot be sufficient clinical experience to give students a high degree of skill in the special field they choose. Graduates of schools of social work, just as graduates of other professional schools, must plan to gain skill and experience by serving first in subordinate positions. The school should attempt to give only fundamental training. Otherwise the curriculum becomes so heavily weighted with clinical experience that the training course can offer few advantages beyond that of a well-planned apprenticeship.

In a preceding section, attention was called to the possibility of a school's having control over its field-work facilities. As far as the clinical side of the field work is concerned, it will in many cases be found more convenient to utilize the established social agencies. Whatever arrangement may be made for clinical practice, it is essential that the school should have entire direction of the clinical instruction. The traditional method of securing the clinical staff has been to rely largely upon the services of workers employed by social agencies. This has been justified by the fact that students have the advantage of learning their technique from persons in intimate touch with the methods followed in social work.

Directly opposed to this point of view is the statement of Dr. Frankfurter, quoted above in another connection, in which he said: "The time has gone by when the teaching of any profession can be entrusted to persons who, from their exacting outside work of practice or administration, give to teaching their tired leavings." In the introduction to the report on medical education in Europe,

issued by the Carnegie Foundation, Dr. Henry S. Pritchett, President of the Foundation, emphasizes this same point as it applies to the instruction of medical students. Says Dr. Pritchett:

It has come to be generally conceded that not only must the basic sciences of chemistry, physics, and biology be taught by those who are primarily teachers and who give their whole time to teaching and to research, but also that the more definitely medical sciences of anatomy, physiology, pathology, and bacteriology must be represented by specialists. It has not been so generally granted that the clinical teacher must also be primarily a man who devotes his life to teaching and to research. This reform is the next great step to be taken in the improvement of medical education in the United States and Great Britain. In Germany only has it heretofore found recognition, and to this fact, next to the development of an orderly and efficient system of secondary schools, is to be attributed the high level of German medical science and medical teaching. With the more general acceptance of the view that medical education is *education*, not a professional incident, the conception of the clinical teacher must undergo the change here alluded to. The teaching of clinical medicine and surgery will then cease to be a side issue in the life of a busy practitioner; it will propose to itself the same objects and conform to the same standards and ideals as the teaching of any other subject of equal importance.

In the field of education for social work, only a small beginning has been made in providing an adequate permanent staff to have charge of the clinical instruction. Usually the responsibility for the supervision of field work is placed upon one person, who, unaided by assistants, is compelled to turn over a large part of the practical training of the students to members of the staffs of social agencies. If the field work is a fundamental part of the course, as is generally claimed, it would seem that its actual supervision should not be delegated to persons who are only indirectly under the control of the school. In several of the newer university schools of social work located in places where skilled social workers are not employed, it has been found necessary to maintain their own staff of field-work supervisors. While this is a new departure in schools of social work, it is a step in line with the best procedure in other fields of professional education.

IX. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PREPARATION FOR RURAL
SOCIAL WORK

The country-life movement during recent years has been characterized by a growing tendency to lay stress upon the social aspects of life in rural communities. It is no longer believed that rural programs are serving their full purpose when they are dealing with the problem of increased production. There has come about, partly as an aftermath of the war, a more general recognition of the social ills of the countryside which are retarding its steps toward economic progress. The rural leader must know more than how to make the farm more productive; he must know how to make community life more wholesome and attractive.

This new emphasis upon rural social problems has necessarily drawn attention to the need of supplementing the usual equipment of rural workers such as farm bureau and home demonstration agents, rural school teachers and rural public health nurses, so that they will enter their work with a vision of its social possibilities and be familiar with the methods common to social work. Moreover, the recent experience of the Red Cross, the county work of the Young Men's Christian Association, the county welfare work in North Carolina, as well as that of other agencies, both public and private, have demonstrated that there is a real opportunity in rural communities for leaders who are prepared to give their whole time to problems of rural organization and social work.

The movement to provide the training facilities adapted to these needs has already begun to take definite shape. Universities and agricultural colleges are offering courses in applied sociology in which special emphasis is given to methods of meeting rural social problems. The Springfield Young Men's Christian Association Training School has an arrangement with the Massachusetts State College of Agriculture, whereby students in preparation for county work spend one year in the study of rural subjects at the latter institution. The Boston School of Social Work is endeavoring to work out a similar co-operative plan of study for its students who desire to prepare for rural social work. Several colleges and universities located in small towns are co-operating with the Red Cross

in developing training courses specially designed for social workers in small towns and rural communities.

It is but natural that these efforts to carry on training courses outside of large cities should be regarded with considerable misgiving by those accustomed to look to the city for field-work facilities. A legitimate question to ask is whether rural and village life with its small population, its difficulty of access from the training center, the small number of cases that can be available in any particular locality, and its lack of well-equipped social agencies, can be made to furnish a satisfactory training ground for social workers. While the burden of proof must rest upon those who have departed from the traditional methods, it must be remembered that experimental work of this kind requires considerable time before its results can be adequately tested. It is too early now to draw anything more than tentative conclusions from the comparatively few significant efforts that have been made to train for rural social work.

Without doubt the recent efforts to develop rural training centers have grown out of a recognition of the different environments faced by rural and city social workers. These differences in environment of course affect other professional groups, although not as profoundly as they do those whose work is concerned with problems that are so intimately bound up with the social and economic life of the people. The rural physician will not have convenient access to hospitals and specialists and to this extent he will be handicapped in his work, but the technique of the treatment of disease or injury does not need to be modified in accord with social customs or conditions of living. In the teaching profession the value of special training for rural teachers is more apparent and fortunately is now quite generally recognized. The rural school cannot attain its highest efficiency unless its curriculum and methods are determined by the needs of the country rather than by those of the city. Especially significant are the recent efforts to provide training courses adapted to the needs of the rural ministry. In this case the purpose in view is not merely to give the minister a practical knowledge of rural problems and a sympathetic understanding of the habits of life and thought of rural people; it is also to develop

a love for the country and to give such a vision of opportunities for far-reaching rural service that it would not be regarded as a stepping-stone to a city pastorate.

The dearth of professional men and women in small towns and rural communities who look upon their work there as an end in itself and not as a means of advancement to a city, has been one of the great hindrances to rural progress. For this attitude of mind the professional schools in the cities are largely responsible, for, either consciously or unconsciously, the rural students acquire the city point of view and find themselves out of sympathy with the more conservative and slow-moving community from which they came and where they had expected to return to work.

In the city schools of social work this acquirement by the students of city ideals seems inevitable and is especially disastrous from the point of view of the development of rural social agencies. Social workers who have been trained in a city where well-equipped agencies are readily accessible have reason to feel lost when later they accept a position where social work is not highly organized. If they do not soon become discouraged by the conditions confronting them and feel too keenly their isolation from other social workers, they are likely to urge the adoption of methods more applicable to the city than to the small town and thus alienate the support of their constituency.

For these reasons many have concluded that the successful development of rural social work is dependent upon the possibility of establishing rural training courses that will definitely prepare for social work in small communities and give such a vision of the opportunities in this field that people of real ability will regard it worth while to become rural specialists.

Possibly the first serious attempt to train social workers in a small town and rural environment was made at Berea College, Kentucky, in 1919. This course, which was six months in length, was carried on by the College in co-operation with the Red Cross and was intended to prepare home-service workers for the Red Cross chapters in the mountain counties of Kentucky.

For this experimental training course in rural social work Berea College was admirably adapted. Located in a small village on the

edge of the foothills that lead back into the isolated mountain regions, it had within easy reach communities that presented rural problems of a serious and complicated nature. From these mountain communities came the majority of the student body whose dominating desire, fostered by the College, was to carry back to their homes the knowledge that would increase the welfare of their own people. The College, as a matter of fact, was engaged in social work although its activities were not carried on under that name. On its teaching staff were men experienced in group and community work in sparsely settled rural sections.

The establishment of the training course was, therefore, a much more feasible undertaking than it might at first glance seem to be. The College furnished the proper setting for the course, as well as a considerable amount of instruction admirably suited to the needs of the students. With the assistance of the personnel of the Lake Division of the Red Cross, it was possible to plan a well-rounded training course designed particularly for workers in places where social work was not yet well organized.

The classroom work was given under these headings: principles of social work in the home, public-health problems and administration, child-welfare problems of rural communities, social-service resources and how to use them, organization and administration of Red Cross work. The field work to accompany these courses was carried on within the jurisdiction of the Berea Red Cross Chapter. Through an arrangement with the chapter its home-service office became the headquarters of the students. One of their first field-work activities was to equip this office for work. Desks, files, and all the necessary office furniture and supplies were installed and properly arranged. State and local maps showing matters of interest to social workers were prepared. A directory of the Berea community was compiled which gave information about churches, schools, lodges, community clubs, places of business, public officials, and professional people, such as doctors, lawyers, nurses, ministers, and teachers. The two well-equipped hospitals gave the students practical training in rendering some of the simple services needed by mountain families in time of sickness. The home-service work among soldiers' families gave opportunity for

experience in family case-work. The community field work was carried on in eight neighborhoods or communities which are included within the Berea Chapter. To each of these communities two students were assigned for study and service. The methods used varied in the different neighborhoods. In Scaffold Cane and Narrow Gap well-organized community work was in progress and offered opportunities to the students to participate in their activities.

Two other districts were approached through the Sunday schools. The students organized and taught Sunday-school classes and through the contacts made in this way found a ready access to the homes of the people. This enabled them to make a study of local conditions upon the basis of which they worked out plans for community betterment. The experiment of family case work without any attempt at neighborhood organization was made in one district. One of the most successful pieces of work was done in Bobtown where, according to the report of Professor E. L. Dix, the supervisor of field work,

sickness in the home was used as an entering wedge and a basis for beginning service and acquaintance. Contacts and friendly relationships continued after sickness had disappeared. Especially in the homes where there was an evident need for further service, this relationship was continued as a means of developing a constructive plan to bring about the necessary change in the situation. Through this family and friends of the family, students became friends easily with many other families in the neighborhood, working with them always according to comprehensive programs, as soon as they had sufficient time to develop them. When they were thus on a solid footing of confidence and friendship with most of the families of the neighborhood, it was easy to proceed to a community organization and to work out for their own guidance a community plan.

In commenting on the results of this field work experience Professor Dix adds:

No attempt will be made to enumerate individual results obtained but a few instances may be mentioned as examples: Many truant children were placed in school and kept there; people who never went to church became regular attendants; at least two persons unable to walk at all were provided with crutches and taught to use them to their great satisfaction; several adult illiterates were taught to read and write and two of these became students in the foundation school of Berea College; several pairs of eyes were saved by surgical operations; some Sunday Schools and community organizations were

started; some families were taught the use of a budget of household expenses; an officer was appointed by the county court to act as guardian or adviser for a family of children whose mother was not deemed entirely the proper person to look after them; medical examination was introduced into rural schools; soldiers and sailors and their families were assisted in regard to their war-time and post-war-time difficulties. Many other interesting things were done but lack of space forbids mentioning them here.

The experience gained through this course seemed to demonstrate the possibility of giving practical training in social work in rural surroundings. It was found that students could render to small communities services of real value and do this work in such a way that their presence would be welcomed. Contrary to what had been previously the prevailing opinion, a sufficient number of cases was available for practice in case work. The difficulties in handling them, while many were not insuperable. The only essential modifications in technique were those which naturally suggested themselves to workers dealing with family problems where very few organized agencies can be called upon to give assistance and where the neighborhood life is such that impersonal or anonymous service is impossible.

Another significant effort to train rural social workers was made this past summer by the new School of Public Welfare at the University of North Carolina. The territory adjacent to the village of Chapel Hill in which the university is located presented both the opportunities and hindrances of a typically rural and unworked environment and therefore seemed an appropriate setting for rural field-work training. Orange county has a population of about 15,000 all of which is classed by the census as rural. The three small hamlets which can be reached by railroads are very similar to those found in most rural counties in the South.

Paid social work was limited to what could be done by a home-demonstration agent, about to be dismissed; a county farm agent, who spent part of his time on his farm; a county superintendent of public welfare, who performed his duties in this position in addition to his work as county superintendent of schools; and a Red Cross nurse in Chapel Hill who came just before the course started and left while it was in progress. In the adjoining county of Durham, which was also used for field work, there were farm-and-home-

demonstration agents as well as a full-time county welfare superintendent.

The training course was attended by two different sets of students, county welfare superintendents and Red Cross students. The former were already employed and actively at work and could find time for only a six weeks' course. One of their most pressing problems was in connection with the cases on their county pauper lists. The supervisor of field work spent six weeks prior to the opening of the course as nominal assistant to a county superintendent of public welfare in order to obtain an intimate acquaintance with the conditions encountered in handling these problems.

The field work of the public welfare students was carried on in connection with the office of the Durham County Welfare Superintendent. Each student was required to investigate and work out under supervision initial plans for treatment of two or three disadvantaged families. To help the students gain a better appreciation of the problems of institutional care, visits of observation were made to a large orphanage and to the state hospital. Prior to these visits the methods of such institutions were discussed and definite subjects were assigned for special observation and report. In view of the brevity of the course, no attempt was made to give well-rounded field-work experience. It was felt that in this initial course better results could be secured by beginning with case problems already faced by the students and giving them some guidance in working out a solution of these cases. That the course was of value seems evident from the fact that the students are planning to attend a similar training course next summer. By influencing the Orange County board to employ a full-time superintendent of public welfare, the school has already made a beginning in the development of a program which will bring about this coming year an increasing number of community activities in the territory adjacent to Chapel Hill in which the students can participate.

The course taken by the Red Cross students was to cover a period of twelve weeks and was intended to prepare them for work in Red Cross chapters where their first and most urgent problem would be the building up of an organization capable of meeting the social and health needs of the small town and open country. The

emphasis upon their field work was accordingly placed on acquaintance with community situations and the organization of community forces. After consultation with the county school superintendents of both counties, it was decided to make use of the school census as the method of introduction to the communities. Both superintendents wrote letters of introduction and endorsement to the chairmen of the school boards in the districts chosen.

Friday and Saturday of each week were given over to field work. The students, by twos, went to the school districts assigned them and visited as many homes as time permitted, usually walking from house to house, securing the information for the school census by questions, and all kinds of family and community information by observation and friendly conversation. The districts differed in area but each included between one hundred and one hundred and fifty families. A very careful system of weekly reports and conferences with the field-work supervisors was of great help in checking up the work of the students and in enabling them to appreciate the significance of the conditions they found.

As their acquaintance grew the students were asked to visit homes and to attend parties and meetings. It was a natural step for local leaders to ask the students, whom they had discovered were interested in their problems, to help in community enterprises. The recreational training the students had had through play demonstrations early in their course was often the easiest part of their training to use. A community meeting in one neighborhood, two young people's parties in another—one of them an occasion when a society of one church entertained that of the rival church as a step toward church co-operation—furnished opportunities for recreational leadership. A boy in one of the communities said that the young people wanted a glee club. The student promised to help, provided he could get the group together. The glee club that started in this way included nearly thirty boys and girls and continued to meet after the student leader left the community.

Baby clinics in which the students assisted the Red Cross nurse, were held in two communities. A community picnic was revived at one place and a speaker secured from the University. The students encouraged the interest they found in community fairs and

met with fair committees in three communities. Partly, at least, as a result of the students' efforts four fairs were held in Orange County—the number required to obtain the truck demonstration of home conveniences furnished by a state department.

Their experience with the school census gave the students a wide though casual acquaintance in the districts visited and enabled them to know the local leaders and factions, which was of value to them in planning for community activities. They also had revealed to them through their official visits many family problems that needed attention. In some instances, the students investigated family situations and worked out tentative plans of treatment, but in most cases lack of time made this impracticable. In addition to their official reports to the school boards, the students submitted carefully written summaries of the work done and of the conditions found in families and communities. These records will be studied by the next class of students who will be guided by these facts in their attempts to carry on the work that has been begun. That students can do this work in such a way as to win public approval seems indicated by the fact that several of the communities requested the School of Public Welfare to have students again assigned to them for field work. Two of the students also accepted paid positions in Durham County, one as Red Cross executive secretary and the other as county attendance officer.

In this summer training course the field-work emphasis was upon the gathering of information about the communities visited. Little attempt was made to go beyond the preliminary steps that must be taken before community work can be developed. It, therefore, did not make available to the students the wide training needed by social workers. But even in the most favored circumstances this cannot be done in a short summer course. When students are required to become familiar with the technique of community work, as well as that of family case work, it is useless to expect them to cover the whole ground in less than one year. Later experience may prove that a much longer time than this is necessary to give students the training they need for organization and executive work in small communities together with a technical knowledge of the methods of family case work.

One of the serious problems in training courses of this kind is that of transportation. If students must cover a wide territory where street cars are not available, some other means of transportation must be provided. To hire conveyances is too expensive and reliance upon the conveyances of friends or co-operating organizations makes systematic field work impossible. The best solution would seem to be for the school of social work to add to its equipment one or more automobiles which under certain conditions can be used by the students. A practical plan of operation which would be financially burdensome to neither the students nor the school would be to charge a sufficient mileage to cover depreciation and operating expenses. Since the students who later accept positions in county work will find an automobile an indispensable part of their equipment, the operation and care of a car might be made a requirement of the training course. Unless arrangements can be made to give students easy and quick access to rural communities and adjacent small towns, it will usually be found impracticable to offer courses that require field work outside the city in which the school is located.

The rural training courses thus far given have demonstrated that there is plenty of field work to be done in small towns and the open country. It is clear that the rural field furnishes all sorts of problems which have as much educational value as do those found in the city. More experience will be needed to prove whether it is entirely practicable in a rural situation to give satisfactory training in family case work. The point of chief significance that has thus far been established is the practical value in a training course of experience in studying social life under simple conditions and in participating in the development of rural community activities.

STUDENTS' DISSERTATIONS IN SOCIOLOGY

The following list of doctoral dissertations and Masters' theses in preparation in American universities and colleges is the compilation of the returns from letters sent by the editors of the *Journal* to departments of sociology. The dates given indicate the probable year in which the degree will be conferred. The name of the college or university in *italics* refers to the institution where the theses or dissertations are in progress.

LIST OF DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN PROGRESS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES

- Van Meter Ames, Ph.B. Chicago. "Friendship among the Greeks." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Gertrude B. Austin, B.S. Grinnell. "Leadership in the Woman Suffrage Movement in New York City." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Ray E. Baber, A.B. Campbell; A.M. Wisconsin. "Changes in the Size of American Families." 1923. *Wisconsin*.
- Frank Clyde Baker, A.B. Oberlin; B.D. Yale; LL.B. New York Law School; LL.M. New York University Law School. "A Statistical Study of the Local Distribution of Voting on Constitutional Amendments by the Population of New York City." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Owen F. Beal, A.B., A.M. Utah. "Labor Legislation of Utah since Statehood." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Herman H. Beneke, A.B. Miami; A.M. Chicago. "The Concept of Graft." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Martin Hayes Bickham, A.B. Pennsylvania; A.M. Chicago. "The Social Evolution of Democracy." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Emerson O. Bradshaw, Ph.B., A.M. Chicago. "Social Forces Affecting the Life of the Industrial Community." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Beulah B. Briley, B.S. Iowa State College; A.M. Iowa State University. "The Economic Efficiency of the Single Family as a Household Unit." 1922. *Iowa*.
- Ginevra Capocelli, A.B. Naples; A.M. Columbia. "The Influence of the War on Italy." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Ernest John Chave, A.B., B.Th. McMaster; A.M. Chicago. "Life Situations of Children Nine to Eleven." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Alice S. Cheyney, A.B. Vassar. "A Theory of Social Work." 1921. *Pennsylvania*.

- Archibald B. Clark, A.B. Reed. "The Popular Vote as an Index of Solidarity." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Frieda Opal Daniel, A.B. Drake. "A Social Survey of an Industrial Area, Chicago." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Stanley P. Davies, A.B. Bucknell. "Racial Assimilation in a Community in the Anthracite Coal Region." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Jerome Davis, A.M. Columbia. "Russians in the United States." 1921. *Columbia*.
- William Lloyd Davis, Ph.B. Wisconsin. "Social Effects of the Development of the Arts of Selling." 1922. *Wisconsin*.
- Carl Addington Dawson, A.B. Acadia; B.D. Chicago. "The Social Nature of Thinking." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Harmon O. DeGraff, A.B., A.M. Iowa. "Juvenile Delinquency in Iowa." 1922. *Iowa*.
- Frederick German Detweiler, A.B., A.M. Denison; B.D. Rochester. "The Negro Press in the United States." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Z. T. Egardner, A.B. Basel; A.M. Cincinnati. "Problems of Socialization, Democratization, and Americanization in an Urban Community." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Kenneth M. Gould, A.B. University of Pittsburgh. "A Quantitative Scale for Measuring the Social Welfare of Cities." 1923. *Columbia*.
- Ralph P. Halben, A.B. Franklin and Marshall. "Poverty with Relation to Education." 1921. *Pennsylvania*.
- Ernest B. Harper, A.B., A.M. Virginia; B.D. Chicago. "Psychotherapy of Personal Moral Complexes." 1921. *Chicago*.
- George E. Hartmann, A.B. Cincinnati. "Race Consciousness: A Function of Race Prejudice, with Particular Reference to the American Negro." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Horace B. Hawthorn, A.B., A.M. Iowa. "Rural Standards and Social Efficiency." 1921. *Wisconsin*.
- Roy Hinman Holmes, A.B. Hillsdale; A.M. Michigan. "The Farm in Democracy." 1922. *Michigan*.
- Jakub Hořák, Ph.B. Chicago. "A Study of Czecho-Slovak Community Organization in Chicago." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Charles Dee Johnson, A.B., A.M. Mississippi. "The Negro Problem in Relation to Education in the South." 1921. *Iowa*.
- Glenn R. Johnson, A.B. Reed. "The American Newspaper as an Indicator of Social Forces." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Frederick Jones, B.S. Virginia Polytechnic Institute; A.B. Richmond; A.M. Columbia. "Measure of Forms of Political Progress." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Oscar W. Junek, A.M. Prague. "Contribution to the Technique of the Study of Group Psychology." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Fay B. Karpf, B.S. Northwestern. "American Social Psychology." 1922. *Chicago*.

- Samuel C. Kincheloe, A.B. Drake; A.M. Chicago. "The Prophet, the Poet, the Agitator." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Ellis Lore Kirkpatrick, B.S. Iowa; M.S. Kansas. "The Farmer's Standard of Living." 1922. *Cornell*.
- Russell R. Kletzing, A.B. Northwestern. "The Relation of the Church and Labor." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Ernst Theodor Krueger, A.B. Illinois; B.D. Chicago Theological Seminary; A.M. Chicago. "Life-History Case Studies in Temperaments and Social Attitudes of College Students." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Dan H. Kulp, A.B., A.M. Brown. "The Chinese Family." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Oswald R. Lavers, A.B., B.D. Queens; A.M. Chicago. "The Social Significance of Housing." 1922. *Chicago*.
- John Lord, A.B. Transylvania; A.M. Syracuse. "The History of Spanish Sociology." 1921. *Clark*.
- Charles William Margold, A.B., A.M. Columbia. "Celibacy among Notable Americans." 1921. *Michigan*.
- Anne Harold Martin, Ph.B. Chicago. "The Conflict Myth." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Joseph Mayer. "Public Opinion and the Control of the Social Evil." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Bruce Lee Melvin, A.B., A.M. Missouri. "The Social Structure and Function of the American Village in Its Relation to the Open Country." 1921. *Missouri*.
- Roderick D. McKenzie, A.B. Manitoba; A.M. Chicago. "The Social Study of the Neighborhood." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Snyder Harmon Milton, A.B., A.M. Carthage; B.D. Wittenberg. "Lutheran Psychoanalysis." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Ralph W. Nelson, A.B. Phillips; A.M. Kansas; B.D. Yale. "Elements of the Social Theory of Jesus." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Clemens Niemi, A.B. Minnesota; A.M. Chicago. "The Finnish Element in the American Population." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Hazel Grant Ormsbee, A.B. Cornell. "The Juvenile Labor Exchange in the United States and England, with a Statistical Analysis of Records in the Philadelphia Bureau of Compulsory Education." 1922. *Bryn Mawr*.
- Bernard Ostrolenk, B.S. Massachusetts Agricultural College; A.M. Pennsylvania. "Social Aspects of a Decreasing Food Supply." 1922. *Pennsylvania*.
- Maurice Thomas Price, A.B. Chicago. "The Technique of Religious Propaganda." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Edward G. Punké, B.S. Hastings; A.M. Missouri. "Effect of Industrial Depression on Marriage and Birth-Rate." 1922. *Michigan*.
- Clarence E. Rainwater, A.B., A.M. Drake. "The Neighborhood Center." 1921. *Chicago*.
- S. C. Ratcliffe, A.B. Mount Allison; A.M. Alberta. "The Historical Development of Poor Relief Legislation in Illinois." 1921. *Chicago*.

- Ellery Francis Reed, A.B. Lenox; A.M. Clark. "The Treatment of Social Radicalism." 1921. *Wisconsin*.
- Ruth Reed, A.B. Brennan; A.M. Georgia. "The Negro Press in America." 1922. *Columbia*.
- Frank Alexander Ross, Ph.B. Yale; A.M. Columbia. "A Study of the Application of Statistical Methods to Sociological Problems." 1921. *Columbia*.
- George S. H. Rossouw, A.M. Chicago. "Nationalism and Language." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Albert James Saunders, A.M., B.D. Chicago. "Changing Attitudes and the Missionary Task in India." 1921. *Chicago*.
- J. T. Sellin, A.B., A.M. Augustana. "Swedish Sociology." 1922. *Pennsylvania*.
- Herbert Newhard Shenton, A.B. Dickinson; A.M. Columbia; B.D. Drew. "Collective Decision." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Ernest Hugh Shideler, A.B. Ottawa; A.M. Chicago. "Social Heredity." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Russell Gordon Smith, A.B. Richmond; A.M. Columbia. "A Sociological Study of Opinion in the United States." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Donald R. Taft, A.B. Clark. "Portuguese in New England." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Franklin Thomas, A.B. Beloit. "Theories concerning the Influence of Physical Environment upon Society." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Frederic Milton Thrasher, A.B. De Pauw; A.M. Chicago. "The Boy Scout Movement as a Socializing Agency." 1922. *Chicago*.
- W. Russell Tylor, A.B. Swathmore; A.M. Wisconsin. "Organized, Disguised Propaganda." 1922. *Wisconsin*.
- Amey Eaton Watson, A.B. Brown; A.M. Pennsylvania. "Social Treatment of Illegitimate Mothers." 1921. *Bryn Mawr*.
- Comer M. Woodward, A.B. Emory; A.M., B.D. Chicago. "A Case Study of Successful Rural Churches." 1921. *Chicago*.
- D. R. Young, A.B. Lafayette. "Social Importance of Motion Pictures." 1922. *Pennsylvania*.
- Erle Fiske Young, Ph.B., A.M. Chicago. "The Use of Case Method in Training Social Workers." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Oscar Bernard Ytrehes, A.B. North Dakota. "The Norse-Danish Press in the United States." 1922. *Chicago*.

LIST OF MASTERS' DISSERTATIONS IN PROGRESS IN AMERICAN
UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES

- Max Arzt, B.S. College of the City of New York. "Recreational Facilities of a Lower East Side District." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Mary Louise Ash, A.B. Agnes Scott. "Three Generations of a Southern Family." 1921. *Columbia*.

- Edwin F. Bamford, A.B. Southern California. "Social Aspects of the Fishing Industry in Los Angeles Harbor." 1920. *Southern California*.
- Alfred M. Black, A.B. Wake Forest. "Changes in State Control of Marriage." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Thomas Blaisdell, A.B. Pennsylvania State College. "The Present Status of Labor Legislation in India." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Roy Melton Brown, A.B. North Carolina. "The Correlation of Social Agencies in North Carolina." 1921. *North Carolina*.
- Marguerite Buckhous, B.S. Montana. "The Value of the Health Center in Public Health Service." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Ruth E. Chapman, A.B. Trinity. "A Social Type of the Old South." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Tiao-Swen Chu, A.B. Nanking. "A Comparison of Reconstruction Programs." 1921. *Northwestern*.
- Edna Clark, Ph.B. Chicago. "Case Work and the Employer." 1922. *Chicago*.
- Everett R. Clinchy, B.S. Lafayette. "The Outcastes of India." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Robert U. Cooper, B.H. Springfield Y.M.C.A. College. "The History of the Treatment of the Insane in Massachusetts." 1921. *Clark*.
- Edith B. Cousins, A.B. Texas. "Leadership in a Girls' Club." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Alice Culp, A.B. Southern California. "A Case Study of Mexican Children in Los Angeles." 1920. *Southern California*.
- Mary J. Delany, A.B. St. Lawrence. "Religious Education in Public Schools." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Mrs. Inez Douglass, A.B. Southern California. "The Causes of Delinquency among Girls in Los Angeles." 1920. *Southern California*.
- Mary R. Fenderich, A.B. Oberlin. "Social Tendencies in the Methodist Episcopal Church." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Alice Fesler, A.B. Southern California. "A Social Service Program for the Churches." 1921. *Southern California*.
- Faith M. Frazier, A.B. Heidelberg. "The City Block Organization Plan." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Meredith B. Givens, A.B. Drake. "Labor and Protest Parties." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Miriam Goldblatt, A.B. Rochester. "The History of Juvenile Court Procedure in New York State." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Ruth A. Grimes, A.B. Chicago. "Socializing Forces in South Blue Island." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Irma Hahn, A.B. Barnard. "Recent Legislation for the Promotion of Physical Education." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Will Ashley Hawley, B.D. Yale. "Social and Economic Causes of Divorce in the United States." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Norman S. Hayner, A.B. Washington. "Effect of Prohibition in Packingtown." 1921. *Chicago*.

- Melville J. Herskovits, Ph.B. Chicago. "Arrests of Labor Leaders in the United States." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Minnie Himmelstein, A.B. Hunter. "Government Aid for Housing of Wage-Earners in the United States." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Sze Yuan Ho, A.B. Beloit. "Chinese Political Ideas from 1898 to 1920." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Charles Russell Hoffer. "A Study of Paternal Parental Occupation of Iowa State College Graduates, and the Occupations Entered by the Agricultural Graduates upon Graduation, 1910-1920." 1921. *Iowa State College*.
- Alexander W. Holroyd, A.B. Hiram. "Is the Type of 'Great Man' in America Changing?" 1921. *Columbia*.
- Frank L. Hunt, A.B. Mercer; B.D. Newton. "Socializing Experiments among Boys." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Mabel Jackson, A.B. Southern California. "The Teaching of English as a Socializing Process Based on Experiments in the Junior High School." 1920. *Southern California*.
- Harold R. Keen, A.B. Williams. "The Educational Problem in a Suburban Town." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Mary B. Kellogg, A.B. Mills. "A Case Study of Child Placing in Los Angeles." 1921. *Southern California*.
- Helen G. Kixmiller, A.B. DePauw. "The Toynbee Society of DePauw University." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Toryu Kudara, A.B. Waseda. "Social Influences of the 'Namu Amida Butsu' in Japan." 1921. *Columbia*.
- E. C. Lacy, A.B. Milligan; B.Th. Transylvania. "The Orphan Child in Kentucky." 1921. *Kentucky*.
- Paula C. Lambert, A.B. Barnard. "Maternity Insurance in the United States." 1921. *Columbia*.
- F. Lambertson, A.B., B.D. Boston. "The Evolution of Rural Housing, with Special Reference to American Conditions." 1921. *Northwestern*.
- Lalia Lane, A.B. Hunter. "Care of Mental Defectives in New York City." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Choo Y. Lee, A.B. Drake. "Comparison between Social Conditions in Korea and in the United States." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Clinton Leonard, B.H. Springfield Y.M.C.A. College. "Educational Work of Y.M.C.A. of Boston." 1921. *Clark*.
- Yat Kwan Liang, A.B. Chicago. "The Chinese Family System." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Chiang Liu, A.B. Cornell College (Iowa). "The Position of Women in China." 1921. *Iowa*.
- Delbert Martin Mann, A.B. Kansas. "The Economic Implications of Democracy." 1921. *Kansas*.
- Ada C. McCown, A.B. Reed. "Population and the Physical Environment in Oregon." 1921. *Columbia*.

- Edith H. McDowell, A.B. Mount Holyoke. "Lincoln University and Its Alumni." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Ross A. McReynolds, A.B. Missouri. "Survey of Farm Homes and Families in Boone County, Missouri." 1921. *Missouri*.
- Olga M. Meloy, A.B. Dickinson. "A Recreation Survey of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Ernest R. Mowrer, A.B. Kansas. "Causes of Divorce." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Thomas J. Murray. "Rise, Progress, and Program of the British Labor Party." 1921. *Columbia*.
- W. L. Nofcie, A.B. Union. "An Economic Social Survey of the Kentucky Mountain Countries." 1921. *Northwestern*.
- Stanley North, B.S. Rutgers. "Housing and Migration in a New York City District." 1921. *Columbia*.
- H. C. Northcott, A.B. Northwestern; B.D. Garrett. "A Survey of Elsdon Neighborhood, Chicago." 1921. *Northwestern*.
- Leonardo Padilla, A.B. Ohio Wesleyan. "The Functioning of Government in the Philippines since the 'Autonomous Act' of 1916." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Charles H. Parrish, A.B. Howard. "Social Organization among the Negroes of a New Jersey Town." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Benjamin Plotkin, A.B. College of the City of New York. "The Social Ideal of Isaiah." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Annie Beckwith Pruitt, A.B. North Carolina. "Programs for the Correlation of School and Home." 1921. *North Carolina*.
- Minta Madelyne Queen, A.B. Southwestern. "The Changing Attitude of the Negro." 1921. *Kansas*.
- James Alfred Quinn, A.B. Missouri. "Family Desertion in St. Louis." 1921. *Missouri*.
- Leroy A. Ramsdell, B.S. Bowdoin. "Vital Losses Due to Preventable Diseases in Rural Communities." 1921. *Columbia*.
- William Lee Rector, A.B. Oklahoma Baptist University. "The Place of Ideals in Moral Education." 1921. *Missouri*.
- Samuel Courts Redford, A.B. Oklahoma Baptist University. "Survey of Atoka and Tillman Counties, Oklahoma." 1921. *Missouri*.
- Leona D. Rubelman, A.B. Iowa. "Activities of the Church in the Field of Labor." 1921. *Iowa*.
- Wiley Blake Sanders, A.B., A.M. Emory. "An Attempt to describe Modes of Adaptation to Human Environment." 1921. *North Carolina*.
- Florence W. Schaper, B.S. Missouri. "The Place of the Social Sciences in Junior Colleges for Women." 1921. *Missouri*.
- Gustav. T. Schwenning, B.H. Springfield Y.M.C.A. College. "Industrial Work of the Y.M.C.A." 1921. *Clark*.
- Harry B. Sell, A.B. Pittsburgh. "The A. F. of L. and the Labor Party Idea." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Gladys Sellen, A.B. Cincinnati. "Total Return of Workmen from Industry." 1921. *Cincinnati*.

- Paul W. Shankweiler, Ph.B. Muhlenberg. "The Nonpartisan League and the Local Community." 1921. *Columbia*.
- T. C. Shaw, A.B. Central Wesleyan. "The Social Doctrines of Confucius." 1921. *Northwestern*.
- Stockwell Simms, A.B. Acadia. "The Neighborhood Center a Factor in Socialization." 1921. *Boston*.
- Harold E. Sortor, A.B. Cornell College. "Development of Sociological Consciousness." 1921. *Chicago*.
- W. B. Stone, Ph.B. Chicago. "Study in Culture Conflicts." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Walter Bliss Swan, A.B. Indiana. "Feeble-minded Ex-Service Men." 1921. *Indiana*.
- Elizabeth Tandy, Ph.B. Chicago. "The Organization and Administration of Public Health Agencies for the Prevention and Relief of Sickness in the Rural Communities of New York State." 1921. *Columbia*.
- L. R. Templin, A.B. Southwestern; B.D. Garrett. "A Survey of an Open Country Neighborhood: North Prairie, Illinois." 1921. *Northwestern*.
- Charles B. Thompson, A.B. Hamilton. "Curriculum Changes in Theological Seminaries." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Earl Vaugh Timmins, A.B. Kansas. "The Personal Element in Journalism." 1921. *Kansas*.
- C. T. Tseo, A.B. Bates. "The Chinese Family." 1921. *Northwestern*.
- Henson Utchikata, A.B. Washington. "Minimum Wage Legislation and Its Administration in the United States." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Melvin J. Vincent, A.B. Southern California. "An Analysis of the Sociological Writings of George Elliott Howard." 1920. *Southern California*.
- Mary Alloniz Waldron, A.B. Indiana. "Causes of Dependence in Twenty-six Selected Families." 1921. *Indiana*.
- May D. Ward, B.S. Washington. "Variety of Work Done by Women." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Helen B. Watson, A.B. Newcomb. "The Practice of Midwifery in New Orleans." 1921. *Louisiana*.
- Pauline Wherry, A.B., B.S. Texas. "The Small Town: A Study of a Kentucky Community." 1921. *Kentucky*.
- Cass Ward Whitney, B.S. Cornell. "The Play Activities of Rural School Children in New York State." 1922. *Cornell*.
- Malcolm M. Willey, A.B. Clark. "The News Appeal of the Rural Press." 1921. *Columbia*.
- Blodwen Mary Williams, A.B. Iowa. "Social, Historical, and Racial Factors in Welsh Community and Choral Singing." 1921. *Iowa*.
- Hidesakuro Yokoyama, A.B. Utah. "A Study of Japanese Communities in the United States." 1921. *Chicago*.
- Willie Zuber, A.B. Newcomb. "Spare-Time Activities of a Group of Factory Girls." 1921. *Louisiana*.
- Frederick R. Zucker, A.B. Concordia Seminary. "Attitudes of Low Caste People in South India." 1921. *Chicago*.

NEWS AND NOTES

Notes of interest to the readers of the *Journal* should be in the hands of the editor of "News and Notes" not later than the tenth of the month preceding publication.

RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION

The *Journal* has received an advance copy for review of the *Social Workers' Guide to Serial Publications of Representative Social Agencies* by Elsie M. Rushmore. The value of the *Guide* to social workers and to sociologists is indicated by the fact that it lists approximately four thousand institutions and organizations whose publications are on the library shelves. This volume has been issued in order to make the collection more readily available. Its Index, arranged by subjects—the Feeble-minded, the Blind, Prison Reform, and so forth—makes it possible for students to find valuable reports of institutions in a particular field. Acknowledgment is given to the assistance of John B. Andrews, Leonard P. Ayres, Kate Holladay Claghorn, Earle Clarke, Charles K. Gilbert, Arthur H. Ham, Lee F. Hanmer, Shelby M. Harrison, Hastings H. Hart, Philip P. Jacobs, Allen J. Kennedy, Porter R. Lee, R. R. Lutz, Samuel McCune Lindsay, Orlando F. Lewis, Clarence A. Perry, Mary E. Richmond, Franz Schneider, Henry W. Thurston, Philip Van Ingen, Mary Van Kleeck, Agnes Van Valkenburgh, Gaylord S. White. Sociologists interested in research will welcome this aid to investigation.

SCIENCE SERVICE

The establishment of an organization for the purpose of familiarizing the general reading public with the progress of scientific research was announced today at the offices of the National Research Council. The new organization, to be known as "Science Service," has been substantially endowed and is chartered as a non-profit-making corporation. Its control is vested in a board of trustees composed of ten scientists and five journalists. The National Academy of Sciences, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the National Research Council each elects three trustees.

The charter of the new organization is a wide one, authorizing Science Service to employ newspapers, periodicals, books, lectures,

conferences, motion pictures, and any similar educational agencies in the distribution of scientific information. Edwin E. Slosson, for twelve years professor of chemistry at the University of Wyoming, for seventeen years literary editor of the *Independent*, is to be the editor of Science Service. The manager is to be Howard Wheeler, formerly managing editor of *Harper's Weekly* and for five years editor of *Everybody's Magazine*. The policy of the Service, according to the announcement, is to be one of co-operation rather than competition with existing press associations, news agencies, and syndicates. It will aim to supply accurate and interesting articles on all branches of science and technology at the lowest possible cost.

Offices have been opened in the National Research Council Building, 1701 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D.C.

"THE HOSPITAL SOCIAL SERVICE QUARTERLY"

The Hospital Social Service Quarterly, after two years of publication, has become a monthly magazine to be known as *Hospital Social Service*. Medical social service in hospitals has passed the formative stage and is now recognized as a distinct department of the hospital. *The Hospital Social Service Quarterly* was first published in February, 1919. Prior to this time the chief writings on the subject were embodied in the works of Dr. Richard Cabot, and in occasional special articles in hospital and medical journals. The *Proceedings* of the Hospital Social Service Association of New York City preceded the *Quarterly* and consisted chiefly of papers read at the meetings of the association. The first issue of the monthly magazine contains the survey of hospital social work in the United States which was made by the American Hospital Association last year; an account of social work in hospitals of Toronto by Mr. Robert Mills of the Toronto Health Department; an article by O. M. Lewis and two collaborators of the division of venereal disease of the Massachusetts General Hospital; a discussion of methods of parental authority, by Miss J. L. Beard.

The editor of the *Quarterly* is Dr. E. G. Stillman. Among the contributing editors are Dr. Michael M. Davis, Jr., John E. Ransom, Ida M. Cannon, and Dr. Jessica B. Peixotto. The editorial offices are at 19 East Seventy-second Street, New York City.

BROWN UNIVERSITY

D. Appleton & Co. announce the publication of the volume *The State and Government* by James Quayle Dealey, professor of social and

political science. The publishers state that it is an introduction to political science from the sociological point of view.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Professor Walter B. Bodenhafer, of the Washington University, will give two courses on "General Sociology" and the "Development of Sociology in the United States" in the Summer Quarter. Dr. Warren S. Thompson, of the department of rural organization of Cornell University, is to give the course in "Rural Sociology."

In the Graduate School of Social Service Administration Dr. Roderick D. McKenzie, associate professor of sociology in the University of Washington, is announced to give two courses, one in "Social Progress" and the other in "Community Organization." Mr. William T. Cross, formerly survey officer of the Illinois State Department of Public Welfare, will offer a course on "Physically Handicapped Persons."

CLARK UNIVERSITY

Professor Frank Hamilton Hankins, head of the department of sociology, is spending the academic year 1920-21 in Europe on a leave of absence. He holds a fellowship for study in French universities, and is also delivering a series of lectures on American institutions before the *École Libre des Sciences Politiques* under the auspices of the Institute of International Education of New York City. While abroad Professor Hankins will complete a book which he has been preparing on the bearing of differential biology and psychology upon the theory and practice of democracy. The work in sociology in Clark University for the present academic year is under the charge of Professor Harry E. Barnes, of the department of history, and courses are offered by Professor Barnes and by Professor Hermann Hilmer, of the department of economics.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

The University of Missouri will accept for entrance beginning with the coming academic year one-half unit in sociology, provided the student offers at the same time either one-half unit in economics or one-half unit in American government. This will mean the establishment of half-year courses in Sociology in most of the accredited high schools of the state. The course is being standardized by the department of sociology in the university and the state department of education.

Professor C. A. Ellwood will teach sociology this summer at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, for the first half of the summer quarter.

Professor A. F. Kuhlman, assistant professor of sociology in the University of Missouri, will spend the summer studying in the Graduate School of the University of Chicago.

UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Dr. Rudolph M. Binder, head of the department of sociology, has been offering during the year a series of lectures on the general subject "Man's Place and Responsibility in the World" at the Twenty-third Street Y.M.C.A. The different lectures are organized to describe and elucidate the origin and the development of life, man, society, religion, the state, and the internation.

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

The Harlow Publishing Company of Oklahoma City announces the publication of a work by Professor Jerome Dowd, entitled *Democracy in America*. The object of the volume is to show the relation of democracy to the progress of civilization.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Professor Carl Kelsey, who was granted a year's leave of absence, is now engaged in making for the American Academy of Political and Social Science a social and economic survey of Haiti and Santo Domingo.

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Professor Frank W. Blackmar, of the University of Kansas, will give two courses in the coming summer session at the University of Southern California. "Applied Eugenics" and "Problems of Democracy" are the titles of the courses.

Mr. M. J. Vincent, instructor in sociology, is offering a new course this semester entitled "The Cost of Living." Dr. W. C. Smith is giving for the first time, a course entitled "The Family as a Social Institution." Professor C. E. Rainwater is giving a new course on "Social Uses of Leisure Time."

The graduate students of the department of sociology have organized an honor society which is known as Alpha Kappa Delta. The requirements for membership include scholarship, social personality, and

distinctive sociological or social-work achievement. Those eligible to membership are subject to definite limitations in number. The society is organized on a democratic basis of merit with no secret characteristics.

The new division of social work, which was organized in 1920, has enrolled fifty-two students this semester who are candidates for the certificate of social work and the diploma of social work; the former being given only to persons who have an A.B. degree and the latter to persons who have an A.M. degree, and who have met the social-work requirements that have been set by the division.

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

Professor Philip Archibald Parsons, who has been the head of the sociology department at Syracuse University since 1909, has resigned to accept the position of professor of sociology and director of the school of social work at the University of Oregon. He replaced Professor Franklin Thomas, who resigned to accept the superintendency of the famous orphanage at Hastings-on-Hudson. The former superintendent, Dr. R. R. Reeder, left to take charge of child-relief work in Serbia.

PUBLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

The fifteenth volume of the Publications of the American Sociological Society, entitled *Some Newer Problems, National and Social*, will be off the press early in May.

REVIEWS

Vocational Education. By DAVID SNEDDEN. New York: Macmillan, 1920. Pp. ix+587. \$2.75.

This volume should appeal to the intelligent students of educational systems and movements and to the sociologists. It is a thoroughgoing and critical study of vocational education in the light of the actual and pressing demands of modern society and the nature of individuals subject to the educational process. Its method is the analysis of the various factors entering into the different problems of vocational education, criticism of present vocational educational attempts to meet the situation, and the formulation of tentative programs for constructively meeting the issue.

The chapters of the book deal with the meaning and social needs of vocational education, its relation to general education, its principles of method, administration, attempts, and programs in the fields of agriculture, commerce, industry, homemaking, and the professions, training of vocational teachers, special and future problems of vocational education, the economic future of women, and practical arts in general education. There are also appendixes on occupational statistics and terminology of vocational education.

It would appear that the great *motif* of the volume is specialization in life and the need of a combination or correlated training of practice, related technical knowledge, and social insight in order to meet this situation. This is luminously illustrated in all the essential spheres of endeavor—agriculture, commerce, homemaking, etc.

A treatment of the author's view on several important points may serve to give a perspective of his general position in this field. Vocational education, according to the text, includes both by-vocational and direct vocational education; the former consisting of the vocational training people pick up in all manner of ways out in society outside of schools, the latter of the direct effort made in schools to bestow vocations. There is an increasing demand for vocational education, one demand issuing out of the fact that society goes on making new vocations by the process of specialization—something that is inherent in society and promises to be continuous—another demand springing out of the increased need for production and productiveness on the part of

individuals and society generally. Increasing democracy that presses for productiveness on the part of all and rising standards of living that render it imperative that each worker shall make an increased contribution in order to draw a larger income explain the latter demand.

The public cannot long escape the task of educating everyone to or into a vocation. The tendency is strongly in that direction and the principles of democracy make as rigorous demands for this as for equality in voting and before the law; for there can be no equality in fact until the artificial obstructions to giving everyone a chance to do some job efficiently, to realize his life through well-trained and qualified mind and body, are broken down. But the public in the form of the state—some form of the state—will have to found and carry on this kind of education. For vocational education under private auspices is not promising. Either it is not really vocational, as in the case of most so-called commercial schools—"business colleges"—which profess to train for business in general, yet in truth train for only two or a few lines, and for those poorly; or it is really vocational—as in the case of some corporations of a large or monopolistic nature—but not auspicious, since except in one or two monopolistic utilities, as telephone companies, where labor is immobile due to the fact that the girls trained live at home, labor is too mobile to make it profitable for a corporation or enterprise to train employees to their work, and there is too great competition between enterprises.

But there can be little hope of establishing a system of general vocational education. Such a thing as general vocational education is out of the question because of the nature of vocations. It is not possible to discover a common denominator for all the vocations, not even for those in any great line of endeavor, as agriculture—something generally regarded as a simple calling. Practically all callings susceptible to vocational education are specific callings, so that a training for one is not a training for another. Of course the idea of education as discipline, in which case there is supposed to be a carry-over from one kind of discipline to another, is discarded. In agriculture there is nothing or little common to stock-raising, fruit-raising, and so on; consequently education for one of those callings is of little service should another be taken up.

This conception strikes a stunning blow at the prevailing idea that a generalized vocational education is possible, at least in a restricted sense. There is a widespread belief among educators that an agricultural community, for example, can train boys for agriculture and girls

for homemaking by means of the local school. There might be something to this in a one-crop community, according to the view under review, but not a great deal because of lack of equipment, technical knowledge, and correlation of work and training. But in a community of diversified farming, where various kinds of crops and stock are produced, local training would not be a real vocational training because a common factor for training purposes could not be found for all the productive lines. The technical knowledge and social insight embedded in each line is different from the others, and, besides, the practice work would have to be in each individually and not in all generally. On the basis of this conception, the best we could say of the proposals in behalf of generalized vocational education is that programs of education established on that foundation are better than nothing, may be contributive to something in some degree, but can only be regarded as an entering wedge or a way station to the real vocational education which is to grow out of such attempts. I am not certain that Dr. Snedden would exactly consent to this last interpretation. I rather believe he would say that society should stop such tiddledewinks efforts and do the right and real thing now. But it is pretty evident that were educators and society convinced that what they are doing is completely wrong, they and it would be too much discouraged to begin on a new task. In agriculture, at least, it seems to me, we should go on with what has been begun, realizing that it is not the best that might be conceived, but believing that it is on the right road to something better.

In the author's opinion, high schools and public schools generally cannot realize vocational education successfully, not only because the callings are so diverse that small communities are not able to get a plant large and complex enough to train for them, but also because many callings demand an equipment for the practical work—always to be associated with the process of getting the technical knowledge and social insight—that is far beyond the financial ability of such communities. Thus, to educate for locomotive engineering would require several miles of trackage, a hundred locomotives, and other equipment in proportion. From this it follows that vocational education will have to be realized by the establishment of special schools to which the youths to be trained shall go as they now do to normal schools, medical schools, etc. Some of these will be state schools or schools for a state, others district, some local. Towns may co-operate in the establishment of local schools, one kind of training being given in one place, another in another, and so on.

As to the administration of vocational education, nation, state, district, and locality will share inasmuch as each is a contributor to the support of the enterprise. In localities, the tendency is toward unity of management, instead of management under a dual system such as has been established in certain states.

Were space allowed, it would be fruitful to review certain of the chapters of this volume. Those on vocational education for the agricultural callings and for homemaking and on the practical arts are remarkable analyses of the situations. Dr. Snedden is a master at analysis and many of the results of his analysis strike the mind of the reader as in the nature of discoveries. Sociologists who have specialized in some of those directions considerably will be surprised to find here some things new and worth while.

I believe this book by Professor Snedden will prove a milestone in the field of vocational education. He has demonstrated that many of his conclusions are incontestable. He has torn up old foundations relentlessly, but for the most part with the conclusiveness of demonstrative evidence. His proposals are ideal in the sense that it will take society a long while to realize his objectives, but he has created a serviceable steering gear for future operations. The educator who can think and really wants to understand the subject of vocational education in itself and in relation to society and in relation to other education will find here a most stimulating and valuable aid.

JOHN M. GILLETTE

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA

Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence. By SIR PAUL VINOGRADOFF, F.B.A. Oxford: University Press, 1920. Pp. ix+428. \$8.00.

This is the first of several volumes dealing with the subject indicated by the title. This volume serves two purposes for the series: (1) it presents a general introduction to the *Outlines*, and (2) it covers the first general division of the history, "Tribal Law." A second volume will deal with "Jurisprudence of the Greek City."

The Introduction, comprising 160 pages, is perhaps the most important part of the book. It takes up two problems: (1) the relation of law to other sciences, (2) schools and methods of jurisprudence. The relationship of law to logic, psychology, and social science is found to be particularly close. Logic, though open to exaggeration in the hands of lawyers, gives an essential framework for legal reasoning. Since law

has always to deal with persons, it is fundamentally based on a psychology; and since law is always a function of the social complex, social science forms an indispensable background for its study. Jurisprudence in fact is but a part of social science.

Vinogradoff groups the schools of jurisprudence under three heads: rationalists, nationalists, and evolutionists, and concludes with a valuable chapter on modern tendencies in jurisprudence. These modern tendencies are not yet far enough advanced to rank as a new epoch in historical jurisprudence, but there are certain new features which deserve attention and are "likely to advance toward new vistas." Besides the influence of the evolutionary conception and the critical tendency that has recently developed, the contemporary social crisis is bringing a new constructive point of view. The "individualistic order of society is giving way before the impact of an inexorable process of socialization, and the future will depend for a long time on the course and the extent of this process."

The author displays a knowledge and an appreciation of psychology, philosophy, and social science and of the significant changes going on in those fields of thought, as well as a profound knowledge of jurisprudence. The chief value of such a book is that it tends to arouse teachers and interpreters of law to a consciousness that their chief function in society is not that of inculcating finished rules, but that of building up the conception of law as one phase in an endless process of adaptation and equipping students with a scientific point of view and method for criticism of legal rules and institutions.

WALTER B. BODENHAFFER

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Field Work and Social Research. By F. STUART CHAPIN, PH.D.
New York: The Century Company, 1920. Pp. 224. \$1.75.

Under this title Professor Chapin has given us a book on method—method in conducting field work in the social sciences. Believing that much valuable information on this subject was scattered through the publications of government and private agencies, he set about putting a considerable amount of it into permanent reference form.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the place of field work in social research and with the critical examination of documentary sources of information which must precede good field work. Part II takes up the scope and organization of field work, pointing out

that it falls into three main types: (1) case work—the intensive investigation of individuals and families; (2) sampling—the selection for study of a representative portion less than the whole; and (3) complete enumeration, as in a government census. Attention is also given to several different methods followed in planning the field work of particular investigations and the principles involved. Part III deals with special problems connected with field work, more particularly the purpose and preparation of schedules, and the editing, classification, transcribing, tabulation, and interpretation of field-work data.

There are a number of minor inaccuracies; but the book is valuable and will prove useful to those interested in social research, for Professor Chapin has added to our fund of material in a field where contributions are welcome—that is to say, in the matter of methods and procedures. Credit is due him, moreover, for the conception of the importance of a carefully worked-out technique in this kind of field work.

SHELBY M. HARRISON

RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION

Human Geography. By JEAN BRUNHES. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1920. Pp. xvi+648.

Principles of Human Geography. By ELLSWORTH HUNTINGTON and SUMNER W. CUSHING. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1921. Pp. xiv+430. \$2.50.

"Human geography" is another name for what Frederick Ratzel first made popular under the title of anthropogeography. It is an attempt to put our present knowledge of the relations between man and his geographic environment into a systematic form and to outline the methods and problems of further investigation. Between the works of Ratzel and Brunhes there are, however, some striking differences. Brunhes, for example, puts more emphasis upon methods and is more circumspect and less genial in his deductions. Ratzel, in a comparatively new field, wrote extensively and expansively, throwing out generalizations that were suggestive and prophetic, but not always justified by the facts. Brunhes' work is a scrupulous effort to keep the subject within the limits of geography, to point out the connections between human geography, sociology, and ethnology, but to preserve the limits of the different disciplines.

The fundamental facts of human geography for Brunhes are position and communication between positions. These two elements are typified

for him by the house and the road. All permanent human habitations are included under the one and all forms of communication are included under the other. A city is a complex of the house and the road, structures divided and connected by streets.

Human geography thus reduces itself to an investigation of the manner in which the organization of life within the house, within the communities, i.e., village or city, and within the typical geographical areas (islands) is determined by geographical facts, that is to say, soil and water, flora and fauna, coal and other minerals.

From the point of view of the sociologist the most interesting chapters in the book are those entitled "Beyond the Essential Facts," in which the writer discusses the relations between geography, ethnology, sociology, and history, and the last chapter entitled "The Geographic Spirit," in which he indicates the varied directions in which human geography is likely to be extended and the rôle which it is to play in the future in relation to the other social sciences.

The volume by Huntington and Cushing, *Principles of Human Geography*, is something quite different. It is not concerned with principles of interpretation and methods of investigation but with the presentation of positive facts. It is a sketch of physical geography to which is added an interpretation of human relationship so far as they are determined by geographical conditions. *Human Geography* is an attempt to apply geographical methods and the geographical point of view to relatively new fields, a book not merely for the schoolroom but for the student. *Principles of Human Geography*, on the other hand, is a body of fact organized and presented for use in the classroom.

ROBERT E. PARK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Rural Community, Ancient and Modern. By NEWELL LEROY SIMS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920. Pp. xxiii+916. \$4.50.

Professor Sims has produced a selection of excellent readings on the various phases of rural community life. The text is divided into three parts. Part I gives illustrations of primitive, medieval, and early American villages and closes with a discussion of the disintegration of the earlier type of village community organization. Part II discusses types, institutions, and evolution of the modern rural community. Part III is devoted to the problems as illustrated by surveys made in

various parts of the United States, the program of improvement of rural life, and the agencies for improvement and their co-ordination.

The selections describing life in primitive villages are especially valuable. Charts are included showing the division of fields for hand cultivation. The survivals of the primitive village land division in modern life has had a vital influence on determining methods of agriculture in Europe as compared with conditions in America. And Americans may be thankful that they have been able to develop their agriculture free from many of the handicaps of land division still existing across the water.

The closing selections outlining plans for unified community organization through community councils should have a wide influence on future smaller group activities.

Dr. Sim's discussions of what constitutes a community are a real contribution to this much talked-of but as yet poorly defined subject.

The text is an important addition to the literature of rural life in that it makes readily available to the student much of the best literature that has appeared.

PAUL L. VOGT

PHILADELPHIA

Die Entwicklung der Hegelschen Sozialphilosophie. By FRIEDRICH BÜLOW. Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1920. Pp. 158. Paper, M. 5.

The reviewer's first reaction to this monograph is a surprised sense of indifference to its subject-matter. Even a sociologist who, in years which seem longer gone by than they really are, has diligently studied Hegel from beginning to end now wonders how he ever convinced himself that it was worth while. The change is not due to a reversal of attitude toward men and things German, as such, since the war. Our present temper has as little use for any "social philosophy" in the Hegelian sense as it has for a theology based on the assumption that the world was made and contemplated with pride as a finished product in the course of a calendar week. Simply because we are out of sorts with all attempts to subsume human experience under categories, and then to interpret human experience by a logic of these subjective constructions, an American sociologist who today, from the strictly sociological angle, had the slightest interest in what Hegel thought would be a curiosity. Why he thought it might be the unknown quantity in a sociological problem, but we need our energies for more importunate problems than

that. It is to be hoped that few American sociologists are such philistines as to ignore the tremendous importance of Hegel in the evolution of human thought; but by that same token, because we do take knowledge of human thought as an evolution, we realize that, measured by thought qualities, it is a longer distance back from what we now regard as objectivity to Hegel than from Hegel to Socrates.

This little book is hardly more than a prospectus. It consists of an account of the antecedents of Hegel the producer of the *Phänomenologie*. Tradition may have ungenerously associated this book with the battle of Jena, but the social philosophy which in the germ was in the book makes little more appeal to American sociologists than the statecraft of Frederick William III does to modern democrats. Less than two concluding pages are devoted to "the completed Hegelian system." Another volume containing a digest of the system is hinted at. The appendix (p. 154) contains, in addition to well-known sources, only two titles later than 1914. The monograph is worthy of the attention of serious students of Hegel as a philosopher, but it cannot be recommended to sociologists.

ALBION W. SMALL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

United States Housing Corporation Report. Volume I: Organization, Policies, Transactions. Edited by JAMES FORD. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920.

Soon after hostilities in Europe were ended there was a concerted effort on the part of real estate and building interests to bring about a quick liquidation of the affairs of the United States Housing Corporation and to salvage whatever was still in the hands of the Corporation by way of real estate properties. The volume issued under Professor Ford's editorship shows that, whatever fear we may have had of extravagance and inefficiency of government enterprise in the production of war materials, such fear was not justified in the case of the United States Housing Corporation. Without previous experience, without an established machinery for the administration of home-building work, and without sufficient time in which to develop adequate methods for the handling of pressing problems of housing war-workers in regions scattered over widely distributed areas, the Housing Corporation has established a record that justly aroused concern among real estate dealers and builders regarding the possible competition of the government in the building of homes.

Those who are inclined to be skeptical regarding the possibilities for meeting the housing shortage through government appropriations and under government administration would do well to read this volume. It shows not only the reasons for organizing the Corporation and its general policies, but it points out ways and means of administration which if applied to private building enterprise would make possible the achievement of much better results than are at present afforded by the ordinary business building enterprise.

The standards of construction, the human elements involved in the planning of each housing scheme, the town-planning principles applied, and the efforts to solve the engineering problems connected with building of homes seem to have been handled in a manner that is not only creditable to those who were connected with the enterprise, but to the country as a whole. No progressive builder can afford to disregard the vast and valuable experience of the United States Housing Corporation, and that experience is clearly and convincingly stated in the first volume of the Corporation's report.

CAROL ARONOVICI

BELVEDERE, CAL.

Proceedings of the International Conference of Women Physicians.

New York: The Woman's Press, 1920. 6 vols. \$3.00 the set. (Paper.)

In the autumn of 1919, an international conference of women physicians was held in New York City under the auspices of the Y.W.C.A. The volumes here noted contain in full the addresses and remarks of the speakers and delegates who attended.

The conference was not limited to the consideration of medical topics, but covered also industry, economics, education, clothing, psychology, and sociology, experts in these various fields being invited to address the medical delegates.

The volumes dealing with the health of women and children are especially significant as establishing the viewpoint of modern women physicians. The old notion of woman as a natural, chronic invalid should be replaced by ideals of health, hygiene, and energetic participation in the work of the world. For the realization of these ideals, health education, dress reform, maternity insurance, control of venereal diseases, and the single standard of morals are believed to be the chief means. Birth control, as fundamental to the improvement of the condition of women and children, is also freely recognized.

In the discussions of mental life, the speakers identify psychology with the system of thought generally called psychoanalysis. The concepts of Freud and Jung are uncritically accepted as satisfactory explanations of human behavior, and are regarded as established guides for educational procedure. The reader gains an impression that very few of those speaking are acquainted with psychology as understood by the experimental and educational psychologists of our day.

As is inevitable when the complete verbatim proceedings of such a conference are published, much is included that is not worth printing. To offer an exhaustive critique of the contents would be to exceed the intentions of this review. It was evidently not the purpose of the conference to add to knowledge, as original research is not presented. It was the purpose, rather, to discuss points of view. The philosophy emanating from the conference on this basis shows women physicians to be in line with the most progressive aims of women at large.

LETA S. HOLLINGWORTH

TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

League of Nations. A chapter in the history of the movement.

By THEODORE MARBURG, M.A., LL.D. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1917. 139 pp. \$0.60.

The first part of this volume takes up the conclusions of a private study group of eminent scholars in regard to the organization and working of a league of nations. This organization would consist of a Legislative Assembly, made up of representatives from all the nation members. The brains of this would be an executive committee but there would be a Council of Conciliation, which would be invested with the power of injunction, and an International Court of fifteen judges, who would reside permanently at the seat of the court.

In addition to incidents in the history of the organization of the League of Peace (later changed to League to Enforce Peace), the author takes up some of the special problems that would confront a league of nations. Among these are the backward nation, race, and alien governments, sovereignty, and war. Also a few criticisms of a league are considered.

The volume closes with expressions of opinion in favor of a league of nations by leading statesmen in America and Europe. While an interesting and very suggestive little volume, it of course makes no attempt at a complete treatment of the subject.

G. S. Dow

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO

The English Middle Class. By R. H. GRETTON. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1917. Pp. xii+238. \$3.50.

Distinctly suggestive of the "economic interpretation of history" but quite free from any "taint" of radical propaganda is Gretton's history of the English middle class. Beginning with a definition of the middle class in terms of its attitude toward money, he develops the thesis that each stage of its growth has been correlated with an important change in the history of currency. Thus its first definite appearance in the fourteenth century coincides with the release of money from the treasuries of the Knights Templar and the hoards of the Jews. Its displacement of the old military caste was facilitated by fresh supplies of bullion from America. Its eighteenth-century commercialism was accompanied by new conceptions of exchange and new methods of taxation. Its later industrialism was made possible by the growth of the banking system. Finally its modern inclusiveness has coincided with discoveries which have placed coined money within the command of practically the whole community. Particularistic though it be, Gretton's study is well worth correlating with other views of the middle class.

STUART A. QUEEN

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

The Gospel for a Working World. By HARRY FREDERICK WARD. New York Missionary Education Movement of the United States and Canada. 1918. Pp. xv+249+Bibliography+Index. \$0.40.

The purpose of this volume is to state the conditions in the industrial world, and to show how the church can remedy these conditions by adopting an adequate program of presenting the teachings of Jesus to all parties in the industrial process. "It seeks to make the gospel the inspiring force and power of the whole social organism."

The book contains eight chapters with illustrations produced from actual photographs taken from life in industry. The first four chapters, "The Right to Live," "The Day's Work," "The Pay Envelope," "War or Peace," deal very pointedly with the seamy side of the labor world and portray in some instances the seeming bias of the author in favor of the ultraradicals (see pages 101, 102, 116, 132, 138, 149, 154).

In the last four chapters, "Not by Bread Alone," "Master and Man" "Men and Things," "New Frontiers," the writer takes up the constructive task of the church in carrying on its mission to the working

world. But even here the author's sympathies sag at times in favor of the ultraradicals (see pages 151, 154).

Written and published at the time of the greatest struggle the world has experienced in history, with the triumph in arms of righteousness over the most diabolical wickedness imaginable, supported by an efficient labor power in Germany, so long as loot was in sight, and by the ultraradicals in the United States, in Russia, and elsewhere, it seems to lack that moral discrimination that an adequate gospel to the working world at this time so urgently demands.

EDWIN L. EARP

DREW THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

The Passing of the County Jail; Individualization of Misdemeanants through a Unified Correctional System. By STUART ALFRED QUEEN. Menasha, Wis.: The Collegiate Press, (G. Banta Pub.), 1920. xiii+158 pp. \$1.50.

Dr. Queen's studies of the county jails of California are already well and favorably known. As an official jail inspector, and later as secretary of the California State Board of Charities and Corrections, he collected and published in official reports the facts relating to the jails of that state. The present volume is in a measure an outgrowth of these earlier studies, and the author draws very largely upon his California experience and upon California data in the chapters dealing with jail conditions and prisoners. Evidence has been collected, however, from other states to show that the county-jail system in other parts of the country is as bad or worse than that of California.

But the book deals largely with constructive policies, and some of the most successful substitutes for the old county-jail system are described, notably the District of Columbia Workhouse at Occaquam and the Swiss and Belgium farm colonies. The title of the book indicates that the old county-jail system is being done away with, but when Dr. Queen assembles his evidence on this point, the reader wonders whether the title is not perhaps a too optimistic one. It is to be regretted that Dr. Queen did not include a study of the adult probation system in the chapter on "Substitutes for the County Jail System." It is probably true that the "system" will disappear not so much because new and better penal institutions in the shape of farm colonies are substituted but because such institutions will become unnecessary as a result of prohibition, probation, and the substitution of the instalment-

fine system for the old system of "laying out" fines in county jails. There is at any rate reason to believe that the former emphasis on "prison reform" will give way in the future to the finding of substitutes for imprisonment.

Much is said about the individualization of punishment; and in chapter iv the writer claims that the individualization of felons has received more attention than the individualization of misdemeanants, and he believes that the misdemeanor has been neglected in part because of the maintenance of the old and somewhat irrational distinction between the two groups of offenders. Whether these statements are accepted or not, they have led the writer to an interesting and useful feature of the volume—the tabulation of penalties provided by different states for identical offenses. Thus cattle-stealing in Wisconsin is a misdemeanor with a penalty of imprisonment for ten days to one year and a fine of \$5 to \$100; in Illinois the same offense is a felony with a penalty of imprisonment from three to twenty years. "Drawing a weapon" in Louisiana is a misdemeanor with a penalty of imprisonment from ten to sixty days and a fine of from \$10 to \$300; in New York the same offense is a felony with a penalty of seven years' imprisonment and a fine of \$1,000. This lack of uniformity in our state criminal codes is a matter of great interest and importance to criminologists, and Dr. Queen has rendered a service in revising and bringing down to date the study in this field begun by Dr. Wines for the Eleventh Census.

E. ABBOTT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

This Changing World—The Expansion of Personality.—The inanimate world is coming more under the control of human thought by the multiplication of the individuals and by the multiplication of the individual through mechanical inventions. The measure of one's personality is the amount of energy he can master. In overcoming the *limitations*, (1) of time, man has been magnified by the machine, his life extended by a greater knowledge of hygiene, more rational mode of living; (2) of space by means of modern mechanisms of social communication such as the wireless, the telegraph, and mail, he has extended his power and personality to all parts of the world; (3) of altitude, man has used the airplane and the steel-supported skyscrapers; (4) of night and day, man has used the artificial light such as electricity and gas; (5) of cold and heat, man has used devices not only to keep the bodily temperature constant, but also to preserve food products; (6) of climate and season by means of migration, irrigation, reclamation, or modern heating apparatus; (7) of food supply, man has multiplied the production of the soil through intensive cultivation, scientific fertilization, and by modern methods of preparation of food; (8) of natural materials, man has learned to make and combine metals, building materials, precious stones, etc.; (9) of the fine arts by a broader use of the best literature, instrumental and vocal music, of paintings, etc.; (10) of language, race, sect, class, and nation by wider social communication; (11) of personal freedom, i.e., freedom of thought, of speech, and of action, the tendency for the last five hundred years has been to enlarge them; (12) of ignorance through increase of knowledge, mankind is able to abolish those restrictions of human activity that are unnecessary and useless. All of these triumphs have been gained through applied science and especially through the utilization of external energy.—Edwin E. Slosson, *The Independent*, January, 1921. C. N.

Mental Contagion and Popular Crazes.—There are two principles that dominate abnormal popular movements or "pandemic psychoses." The first is the emotional or sentimental factor. When a mere emotion becomes the chief motive of conduct, we have reversal of normal psychology. The mental processes of children offer a good example. They argue and act from their emotions, for they have not developed the reasoning faculties sufficiently to control conduct. The second factor is imitation. We owe most of our attainments to others, and we have come by them by the simple, process of copying them. It is by imitation largely and unconsciously that mental contagion spreads in an abnormal environment, both domestic and world-wide. The automobile mania is one result of a pandemic psychosis. Zionism is another example based on a disordered sentiment. The aspiration of the pacifists is an abnormal sign due to an avoidance of conflict, or it may be regarded as one of the "repressed emotions." Such popular movements as the crusades, prohibition, industrial unrest as expressed in strikes derive their energy from sentiments and imitation. The present age is neurasthenic from war-shock and industrialism, and this state of nerves provides good ground for all kinds of pandemic psychosis.—James Hendrie Lloyd, *Scribner's Magazine*, February, 1921. C. N.

Garvey's Empire of Ethiopia.—Marcus Garvey as head of the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League of the World, believes in a world-movement for the unification of political and economic interests of all negroes everywhere. He believes that as Europe and America are the home of the white man, and Asia of the yellow man, that Africa should be for the negro race. This growing race consciousness was stimulated by the participation of two million negroes in the world-war who now desire liberty and democracy as a race—a thing

for which they claim they were asked to fight in Europe. An international convention composed of three thousand negro delegates met in New York in December to frame a bill of rights for the negro race. They complained of many grievances such as lynching, Jim-Crowism, disfranchisement, industrial exploitation, segregation, and various other kinds of discrimination. The convention elected officials of this new "supergovernment" of negroes, including Garvey as provisional president of Africa and Dr. J. W. Eason as leader of the 15,000,000 negroes in the United States who should obey his orders in all things pertaining to the negro race. The mayor of Monrovia, the Liberian capital, was made "Pope of the Negro Race" and head of the religious organization which is adapted from the model provided by the Catholic church. He would decide, in case of America's entry into another war, whether the negroes should participate. A \$10,000,000 commercial enterprise was also approved to be called the Black Star Line, which has already bought three steamships to be operated by negroes, and plying negro freight and passenger trade for the negroes' own pecuniary benefit, between Africa, the West Indies, America, and later possibly South America.—Truman Hughes Talley, *World's Work*, January, 1921. K. E. B.

Intelligence and Behavior.—The doctrine of intelligence embodied in the volume entitled *Creative Intelligence* has recently been subjected to a keen analysis by Professor Lovejoy. The main contention of his articles are summarized as follows: The pragmatic doctrine of intelligence, with its emphasis upon the quality of "creativeness," is an assertion of the efficacy of consciousness in the control of behavior. Negatively it is a rejection of the idea that thinking is "a vast irrelevancy, having no part in the causation of man's behavior or in the shaping of his fortunes." This assertion of efficacy is coupled with the denial of the interaction between mind and matter. The denial of interaction is not based on a study of the facts but springs from a prejudice against the belief in the existence of psychic "entities" or "states." The attempt to give an account of intelligent behavior without having recourse to such entities rests on an "incomplete analysis." The point of departure is the contention that conscious behavior can be explained in terms of body and environment, without the intervention of a third order of facts as distinct links in the causal chain, namely, mind or psychic state. The central feature of the doctrine is the contention that consciousness is identifiable with a certain unique type of control. It involves a peculiar kind of stimulus which sets on foot activities directed toward getting a better stimulus. Illustrations of this "psychic" element are taken by preference from situations of doubt and uncertainty in which the "unfinished" character of the stimulus is sufficiently prominent to be recognized. In so far as a stimulus is of this sort behavior becomes "forward-looking." It is behavior that is "controlled by the future." A stimulus is sought (by the method of trial and error) which will adjust the conflicting reactions. From this standpoint, the psychic is a distinguishable aspect, but not a separate link, in the chain of causation. Behavior is conscious or intelligent only because the process as a whole presents a specifiable differentiating trait.—B. H. Bode, *Journal of Philosophy*, January 6, 1921. O. B. Y.

The Social Need for Scientific Psychology.—It is difficult to explain to the layman the difference between the real psychologist and the alleged psychologist. A fairly accurate basis of discrimination may be based on the indorsement of the American Psychological Association. The conditions attending the present wide interest in psychology and pseudo-psychology make it imperative to guard the membership in the American Association more carefully in the future than in the past, and to admit to official recognition no one who may use his indorsement to the detriment of science. We find in the list of accredited psychologists those reactionaries who would have no advance beyond the conceptions of John Locke and Wilhelm Wundt, and also those radicals who would altogether abandon psychology as it is historically known and would admit of no biological science beyond physiology. The two great and inexorable conditions laid upon every science are that it shall in the first place be *empirical*, and that in the second place it shall be *logical*. The movements which threaten to disrupt or destroy psychology can be analyzed into omissions of scrupulous regard for one or the other of these great principles. William James and Malbranche have been guilty of constructing systems on a defective empirical basis. The most

recent construction of this *a priori* sort is the psychology which calls itself Behaviorism, which reaches a conclusion apparently quite different from that of reactionary psychology, but by the same method. The effects of the neglect of logical consistency are perhaps most strikingly illustrated in the system or group of systems variously known as "psychoanalysis," "Freudianism," or "the newer psychology." It lacks an empirical basis, but reaches its most astonishing results by the complacent ignoring of the elementary principles of deductive and inductive reasoning. Psychoanalysis threatens the older psychology not so much with demolition as absorption. Scientific psychology is the sure antidote for Freudianism because of its three essential characteristics, its logical method, its empirical basis, and its fundamental working hypothesis that the fact of consciousness is uniformly connected with reaction.—Knight Dunlap, *Scientific Monthly*, December, 1920.

O. B. Y.

The Psychology of the Thrill.—In his most primitive state man's conduct was largely impulsive in its nature. His restrictions in doing whatever he wished were governed solely by his physical power and skill in protecting himself from his enemies and in securing the gratifications of his desires. The constant danger that attended his survival caused him to be in more or less of a continual state of heightened excitement. It was only when overcome by physical exhaustion that he relaxed his vigilance and sought rest. From a study of the human body, scientists have come to the conclusion that man led such a mode of existence for many thousands of years and that he is not altogether adapted to his present customs of living. His impulsiveness of action has been subjected to a certain degree of repression. As a result the individual is often forced to seek relief by relaxing his suppressive processes and indulging in some sort of exciting activity. Certain forms of exercise or sport owe their fascination to the fact that they resemble the activities of primitive life. Defective systemic oxidation is often associated with certain mental symptoms of restlessness, dullness, irritability, and a craving for excitement. Physiologically, the purpose of the thrill is to enhance systemic oxidation. Its psychical effect is a sense of well-being. Thrills are the manifestations of a single vital force, but for the sake of analysis are empirically divided into four elements: positive and negative, pertaining to the sensory aspect of thrills; active and passive, pertaining to the motor aspect. All thrills may be looked upon as being attempts at physiological adjustment.—Irving R. Kaiser, *Pedagogical Seminary*, October, 1920.

O. B. Y.

The Creative Impulse in Industry.—A change has come over men's minds in the twentieth century and labor is no longer satisfied with a little more comfort, a little more wages, a little more "bread and circus." One reason for this change is that modern industry more and more cuts off the possibility for self-expression. In some kinds of work the only form of skill is the attainment of an extremely high degree of speed. The creative instinct in man makes him take pleasure in the work of his own hands and exult to see it take shape and grow, but this instinct is largely starved under such conditions. A recent American writer, Mr. R. Wolf, holds that the creative instinct in the individual cannot be suppressed, but can only be deflected or perverted into useless or destructive channels. According to a recent work on biology there have been certain critical points in the evolution of man when the race was impelled by instinct to choose (using the words instinct and choice to symbolize forces but little understood) between one line of development or another. Thus the hand rather than the wing, hoof, or fin was developed. Passing from the evolution of the human body to the evolution of men in society, it is possible that human society is now faced with a similar alternative of developing capacity and function among its members. The faculty of creativeness is not confined to the few who exercise directive functions but "is common to mankind." Autocratic domination of the wills of workmen by preventing free self-expression (as in some forms of scientific management) evokes destructive forces in industry.—B. L. Hutchins, *Contemporary Review*, February, 1921.

O. B. Y.

Liberty of Teaching in Social Sciences.—It is widely believed that better civic education requires the teaching of the various social sciences in public schools because the "large group" social responsibilities of citizens are becoming constantly more

complicated and momentous in all "federate" societies. But how should teachers of sociology approach contemporary problems, since contentious issues in the realm of the social sciences arise largely over interpretations of *social values* or *worths*? Only seldom are questions of *fact* involved. Successful teaching of social values means that the teacher shall be an advocate, a pleader, perhaps a partisan. To "teach" various social values means inevitably to "advocate" them, to seek, to shape appreciations, ideals, sentiments, attitudes of learners toward them. Thus social-science teachers will in the future exhibit three types, (1) the servile teachers, perhaps a minority, who have little will and are eager to teach whatever is approved by the "powers above"; (2) the wilful teachers who tend to value their own opinions above those of any, or all, of their fellows, are possessed of strong impulse, and promote the antagonism of conservative groups or those having vested interests in a stable social order; (3) the balanced teachers who come between these two extremes and are guided by the evidence rather than by partisan contentions or their own prepossessions. Guiding principles for the two extreme types are of little use, hence these principles will be considered from the standpoint of the "balanced" type. The social-science teacher should follow the collective opinions or valuations of the society which he serves. He should distinguish between those conclusions and hypotheses as to fact and valuation and those tentative findings and speculations. In dealing with unsettled issues which divide men into different camps he should suppress his own partisan impulses and emotional preferences. He must conform to the will of the majority by practicing toleration and other kinds of compromise.—David Snedden, *School and Society*, February, 1921. C. N.

Food Tastes and Food Prejudices of Men and Dogs.—Eskimo dogs brought up around ships and used to eating many sorts of food do not mind eating a new food, but dogs brought up on a diet restricted to two or three articles, will, if they are more than a year old, always refuse at first when an entirely new food is offered to them. The food prejudices is always stronger the older the dog. Of dogs of the same age, the female dog also has much the stronger prejudice against the new food. A similar condition prevails among men. Men who are used to a few staple articles of food are reluctant to try new foods, but men used to a variety in diet take readily to a new food. Similarly it was observed that Eskimo women were far more reluctant to try a new food than the men. Such observations lead to the conclusions that prejudices are due to early habits and that women are more conservative than men, and that conservatism is a fundamental characteristic of the female sex extending down into the lower animals.—Vilhjalmur Stefansson, *Scientific Monthly*, December, 1920.

K. E. B.

The Measurement of Intelligence.—Intelligence tests are not limited to schools and colleges, but they extend widely to commercial and industrial institutions as well. Many different methods are used of which the Binet-Simon Scale is used mainly to identify and grade feeble-minded and backward children. While the value of intelligence tests cannot be accurately measured, they, however, purport to give two facts concerning the intellects of children. One is *mental age* or the measure of the level of intelligence attained. This is the essential fact in the accurate grading of children in school. The other fact is the *intelligence quotient*, or the index of mental alertness or brightness which is the basis for prediction of progress both in school and to some extent out of it. Thus, the intelligence test is of high value in reclassifying children according to their mental age and alertness, in selecting them and assigning them to the work for which they are best fitted, and in providing means of testing what Thorndike calls mechanical and social intelligence as well as abstract intelligence.—V. A. C. Henmon, *School and Society*, February, 1921. C. N.

Expert Testimony in Criminal Procedure Involving the Question of the Mental State of the Defendant.—The method of trial of a criminal case before a jury is in the nature of a combat in which two opposing forces are lined up against each other and the battle goes to the strongest. The judge is a referee whose business it is to prevent fouls and the taking of unfair advantages. Into this arena the expert witness is introduced. He is hired and paid by one of the parties to the issue, his direct

testimony is given in response to the attorney representing that party. The attorney for the opposite side then undertakes to tear to pieces his contribution to the evidence. It is essentially a partisan conflict. Having this psychological situation in mind, it is remarkable that expert witnesses have measured up to the demands as well as they have. A committee upon which the writer has served has formulated statutes designed to eliminate these evils by providing for the services of disinterested expert witnesses and by providing that when the existence of mental disease becomes an issue in the case the accused shall be committed to a hospital for the insane in order that he may be under observation. This projected statute was unanimously adopted by the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology. The function of the expert should be to bring his specialized knowledge to the service of the particular issue being tried and upon the witness stand to explain as far in detail as his examination permits the mental state of the defendant.—William A. White, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, February, 1921. O. B. Y.

The Essential Sociological Equipment of Workers with Delinquents.—Attempt is made here to sketch the minimum of social-science equipment for any judge, probation or parole officer, or executive of an institution who conceives his job seriously in the scientific spirit. (1) He should understand the normal life of society, i.e., social processes, the functions of typical social institutions like the government, the family, the school, and religion, the dominating rôle of social customs and mental relationships, in order to get at the conditions under which normal citizenship may be expected to thrive. (2) He should have an understanding of the institutions and forces which might be developed for social control. (3) He should be able to develop the sense of social responsibility in the antisocial as already has been done through honor systems and self-government plans in prisons, jails, and reformatories. (4) The worker with delinquents should know enough economics to be able to teach thrift, to manage an institution with some business acumen. (5) Every probation or parole officer should be familiar with the leading literature in vocational guidance such as Brewer's *Vocational Guidance*, Kelly's *Hiring the Worker*, etc. (6) He should know the elements of ordinary business economics which include the fundamental factors in production, distribution and exchange, money and banking, the problems of unemployment, etc. Standard textbooks on economics and on labor problems would offer such information. Other sociological information can be obtained from such standard books in sociology that are available.—Arthur J. Todd, *Social Hygiene*, January, 1921. C. N.

Nogen Tanker om Arbeiderspørsmål.—Industrialism as a form of organization of human labor is hardly a century old, yet its rapid development is in itself an indication of its vitality and efficiency. The idea of industrialism has so obsessed the minds of men that the greater number believe this form of productive organization to be the final phase of the evolution of human labor. It has been proposed that all society should be made one great industrial plant which should absorb the functions of capital and business, and that all citizens should become the paid servants of the state. Nothing but dire necessity can ever force people to cherish industrialism or state socialism as ideals. The ideal of industrialism is opposed to human ideals of freedom, especially the ideal of giving men work which they can enjoy because it is interesting. In the period of the Renaissance the work of a large number of independent artisans was closely related to that of the highest arts and sciences. Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Velasquez, Dürer, and many others of the famous masters began their career in the workshop. The period of colonization of Africa, Asia, and America also gave a wide scope to initiative and enterprise. Progress in the technique of production does not always mean the loss of individual enterprise. Twenty years ago 100,000 Norwegian fishermen spent most of the year at sea in open rowboats and suffered untold hardships in return for a meager livelihood. By the aid of public loans and through individual and co-operative enterprise the fishing industry has been modernized and before the war Norway had a fishing fleet of more than 7,000 covered motorboats. The writer notes a marked change in the personality of the men engaged in fishing. The development of independent enterprise is also advancing in agriculture. In Denmark and Belgium there has been a rapid development of the small-farm system. Modern agricultural science and technique has made intensive cultiva-

tion on a small scale profitable. The conclusion is that neither large-scale industry nor individual enterprise is necessarily the highest form of industrial development.—Johan Hjordt, *Sociale Meddelelser*, October, 1920. O. B. Y.

Success Record of Delinquent Boys in Relation to Intelligence.—This study furnishes data concerning the occupational grouping, success record, and intelligence of boys who had left Whittier State School during a period of two years. A positive general relationship between intelligence and success records for the whole group was indicated by a coefficient of correlation of .19. Considering the specific occupational groups, however, there was a wide variation of relationship indicated; i.e., from a positive correlation of .74 in the agricultural group to a negative correlation of $-.51$ in the case of those engaged in transportation. The study suggests that a more detailed classification of success record, an objective method of estimating degree of supervision afforded, a measure of vocational ability, as well as measurements of intelligence and temperament, must be devised before we can evaluate the importance of the various factors which bear on the probable success record. The present study indicates that intelligence is one of the important factors and should be considered in social diagnosis, with due consideration of supplementary factors.—Willis W. Clark. (Pamphlet.) Whittier State School, Whittier, Cal. R. D. G.

The Juvenile Delinquent.—The two important facts of criminology are, first, that the present method of dealing with crime is a failure; second, that the habitual criminal always starts at an early age. The failure of the law to stay the development of habitual offenders is due to attempting to treat crime by a prearranged vindictive plan without any consideration of the cause or the individual. Crime is a form of conduct; the organ of conduct is the mind. How can it be possible to deal properly with a prisoner without studying his mind? Mental defect is pre-eminently the cause of crime. Juvenile delinquents may be divided into two groups, general and special. In the general group we may put those whose bad conduct can be explained on well-recognized lines, e.g., some physical defect or illness, a bad home, the wrong occupation, or lack of training for any occupation at all. In the special group we put those for whom some form of mental analysis is necessary to detect the fundamental causes. For those who have graduated in misconduct, how can a few weeks of imprisonment, even if assisted by training, be sufficient to change the habits and wrong trends of thought that have existed for years. Lightning cures are scarcely ever possible. Reform usually means much hard work, both on the part of the offender and those in charge of him. Often the whole conditions must be changed to prevent persisting bad influence. Such influence may come from the present reputation, old associates, and even from the family attitude. For the prevention of juvenile delinquency social reform is one of the most important steps. The child must have opportunities to play and develop. A public park in every district is essential, but there must be supervision and organization.—W. A. Potts, *School Hygiene*, November, 1920.

K. E. B.

The Criminologist and the Courts.—Personality is the most diverse of the individual phenomena which must be dealt with in mental science. But all items in a personality analysis are not of equal value and it is therefore possible to make some classifications and groupings. The *egocentric* or *paranoid-personality* type includes a great diversity of qualities, the common characteristic being the exaggeratedly egocentric reaction. This classification is not based upon any physical or structural quality but is based entirely upon an analysis of behavior. On account of their resemblance to a group of mental diseases known as paranoia, the name of paranoid personality has been applied to this type. They are not to be considered feeble-minded, insane, or mentally below par in the ordinarily accepted sense of that term. They are frequently endowed with average or even superior intelligence. Their success in plying their criminal trade often depends upon their ability to outwit honest citizens. In the Juvenile Court of Chicago practically all cases which fail on probation belong to this type. The *defective delinquent* is a mentally defective individual who conducts himself in some unusually offensive manner. The *psychopathic criminal* is an individual in which there exists a definite and positive trend toward

some form of antisocial behavior. Under our present system of administering justice he is usually pronounced insane by the court and committed to a hospital for the insane. So long as criminal law determines these cases on the basis of responsibility and on the basis of property damage there will be difficulty in treating them adequately. The following recommendations are made: (1) Criminals and delinquents should not be committed to definite institutions, but to the guardianship of the state, to be under scientific direction of trained criminologists. (2) The treatment applied to the prisoners should be based upon their individual needs and the duration of the treatment depends upon their progress toward normalcy rather than upon their promises or upon their ability to conform to the discipline of any particular institution. Under a properly administered department of state guardianship it would be possible to transfer the wards of the state from one institution or occupation to another according to the need of each individual case. (3) The criminal, the insane, and the dependent should be legally declared minors until such time as they show that they have reached a state of maturity equivalent to adult age and are capable of managing their own affairs.—Herman M. Adler, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, November, 1920. O. B. Y.

Early Anticipation of Prison Reform.—Recent years have brought prison reform into general view by such prison wardens as Thomas Mott Osborne, Tynan, and Homer. The Quakers of Pennsylvania had already undertaken the initial effort between 1776 and 1790. They had as a guide and inspiration the splendid tradition of William Penn who believed in the penological principle that in each county there should be a workhouse, and that hard labor should supersede idleness, while corporal punishments should take the place of capital punishments. In 1793, when yellow fever came to Philadelphia, prisoner volunteers were employed at the Bush Hill Hospital. Some sort of a modified self-government system was developed by the convicts. But it was in the period from 1828 to 1833 that at the Boston Juvenile House of Reformation, a most surprising development of self-government occurred. Wells inaugurated a government by the children and placed responsibility for advancement or punishment upon the children themselves. It was a government by personality. This very prominence of personality as the controlling factor in administration has been the leading feature of the prison history of the nineteenth century in America. Today American prisons seek social and industrial reformation and in prisons training for life is done through action and not through suppression of action.—O. F. Lewis, *The Unpartizan Review*, January and March, 1921. C. N.

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